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Two-Dimensional Awareness Logics

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Abstract

Awareness logic is a type of belief logic in which an agent's beliefs are restricted to those sentences that the agent is aware of. Awareness logic is a successful way to circumvent the problem of omniscience so that actual belief is modelled in a reasonable way. In this paper, we suggest a new method modelling awareness and actual belief by using two-dimensional logics. We show that the two-dimensional logics are flexible tools. Different types of concepts of awareness can be easily modelled by this method.

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Liu, H., Ju, S. Two-Dimensional Awareness Logics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33, 481–495 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:LOGI.0000046141.49831.24

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:LOGI.0000046141.49831.24

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