Abstract
It has been argued that there is a problem oftemporary intrinsics, the problem of explaininghow it is possible for things to possesssuccessively contrary properties, if a certaintheory about time, ``eternalism'’, is true. Inthis paper, I consider whether there really issuch a problem and survey some standardsolutions to it. I argue for one of them, onewhich has been offered by Mark Johnston andPeter van Inwagen, and which I call the``exemplification-solution''. I consider avariant on that solution offered by E.J. Lowe(and Sally Haslanger), and I argue that thisvariant should be rejected.
Article PDF
We’re sorry, something doesn't seem to be working properly.
Please try refreshing the page. If that doesn't work, please contact support so we can address the problem.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Lombard, L.B. The Lowe Road to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics. Philosophical Studies 112, 163–185 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022555113538
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022555113538