

of mind and action, the theory of rationality, and moral philosophy" (166). In presenting itself as a model of a planning conception of intention, where intentions are key elements of partial plans, *Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason* succeeds in shedding new light on a number of traditional problems in the philosophy of mind.

The author also provides the reader with an excellent use of well developed examples, and a fruitful varied use of the same example, Walter Mondale's options prior to his second debate with Ronald Reagan. As a result of the reliance in this book on examples, the central thesis, intentions are key elements in partial plans, is enhanced and given a clarity and consistency of thought.

As the author notes, *Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason* raises more questions than it answers. On the side of answering questions, the text does provide an illuminating sketch of human beings as planning creatures. Nevertheless, the material with which one is presented is indeed a sketch in which intentions are key elements in making plans for the future and for coordinating and carrying out such plans. "Intentions," for Bratman, "are typically elements in such coordinating plans: as such, intentions are distinctive states of mind, not to be reduced to clusters of desires and beliefs" (111).

The phenomena of future-directed intentions and partial plans are located in a model of "limited rational agency, a model that articulates some of the main ways in which future-directed intentions and partial plans help support coordination and extend the influence of practical reasoning over time" (165). The model is plausible, especially when it seeks to clarify "what it is for an action to be performed intentionally or with a certain intention" (165).

On the side of raising questions, *Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason*, offers a three point plan. One, more needs to be said about "habits of reconsideration that are reasonable of an agent to have." In addition, Bratman claims much more can be said about "flat-out beliefs," the "background of prior intentions and plans." And, finally, more study is needed about the usefulness of 'suggestive parallels between the roles of prior plans in practical reasoning and the roles that deontological constraints are supposed to play" (166). One can only hope that whatever considerations are given to these three areas, or other related areas of concern, they are communicated with the cogency of *Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason*.

WILLIAM J. MOHAN

ALEXANDER BROADIE, *Introduction to Medieval Logic*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1987, vi + 150 pp.

Broadie's book is an excellent introduction to, and handbook of, medieval logic, but one must be clear on what it does and does not offer. Broadie is interested exclusively in deductive inferential logic, and he uses his sources, mostly fourteenth century writers such as Burley and Ockham, Paul of Venice and Albert of Saxony, to construct an elegant system covering the same territory as modern first order logic, including multiple quantification and tense logic. He does his job well, but he sticks to that job. So, though he grounds his account of the rules of inference in the consideration of truth conditions for the propositions entering an inference (axiomatics plays no role in medieval inference theory), following his authors closely in doing so, he avoids the more fundamental issues in philosophical semantics, that, for instance, between nominalists and realists. Most of what interests Broadie is associated with nominalists, and so he reports the nominalist position with only a word about the alternative. Thus, there is no mention of "formal" supposition, and simple supposition is taken to occur when the term in its context stand for the species, that is, the concept or intention rather than any individual falling under it. This does not, however, falsify the core of medieval inference theory common to realists and nominalists, and Broadie is careful to alert the reader when he is simplifying an historically confused tradition. Broadie also ignores the superstructure of medieval logic, for instance, the study of the continuum and the puzzles to which it gives rise, and *insolubilia*,

or sentences presenting self-referential paradoxes. This superstructure is immense, for the medieval logicians did not conceive that the system of inference rules should be closed, and were always willing to introduce more rules, or additional qualifications to the old rules, in special contexts. That is the result of doing logic in a natural language, rather than constructing an artificial one. What Broadie *does* report is the basics of inferential logic according to his authors, those rules of inference presupposed in every more advanced discussion of a special topic, and he does a superb job of that, using his sources to construct a formally elegant system that should convince anyone of the value and interest of the medieval approach. His account of supposition's role in logic is especially nice, and his discussion of the role of squares of opposition is fascinating. In order to complete various squares of opposition, medieval authors introduced artificial forms of categoricals not found in ordinary Latin, to provide contraries, subcontraries, subalternates, and contradictories for every type of sentence. Here one sees a distinct parallel to the interest in completeness in modern symbolic logics.

Broadie's introduction fills a need met by nothing else written to date. Up until now, one has had to rely, for a handbook of medieval inferential logic, on Boehner's classic work, *Medieval Logic*, an excellent piece, but 35 years out of date, or on spotty and (for the neophyte) confusing discussions in such sources as the Kneales' *The Development of Logic* (1962), or the relevant chapters in Kretzmann et al., *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* (1982), or else on the medieval authors themselves, say in Kretzmann's translations of William of Sherwood. None of these sources is really adequate to the needs of a logically sophisticated beginner today, but Broadie's book is, and for many it might make medieval logic interesting for the first time as a source of genuine logical insight.

JOHN LONGEWAY

CLAUDIA J. BRODSKY, *The Imposition of Form*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1987, x + 331 pp.

Claudia Brodsky's laborious attempt to place Kant within the post-modern school of narratology will unearth approving readers among the fellow-travelers of this literary movement. Finding the venerable German epistemologist implicitly to countenance putting all knowledge except for nonrepresentational mathematics into the category of narrative fiction adds historical authority to other modes of justification tried by the group. Then discovering precisely the right kind of Kantianism in works of Goethe, Austen, Balzac, Stendahl, Melville, and Proust provides a touch of argumentative verisimilitude.

Interestingly, most of the literary analyses might stand as independent and interesting studies. Brodsky's willingness to tackle the ambiguities of *Pierre, Or the Ambiguities* opens new eyes to the novel. So, too, the direct comparison of Balzac's *Lucien* and Stendahl's *Julien* adds to our appreciation of both characters in light of the contrast. Such are the suggestive merits of literary argumentation via textual explication. Yet, Brodsky uses all the novels investigated to another end: "these novels narrate that narrative will become a form of discursive ignorance whenever employed to exhaustive cognitive ends" (308).

Those readers more used to philosophic argumentation may be keenly disappointed in the work. For the entire mode of presentation, even in the long chapter on Kant, lies grounded in the suggestive linkages of literary analysis. Indeed, Brodsky's method of handling Kantian materials, however meritorious her mastery of his German, is philosophically suspect. For example, she avoids detailed forays into the complex structure of the first *Critique* in favor of leaning heavily upon a few definitions from the *Logik*. She prefers the *Prolegomena* for its overview of the purpose of the first *Critique* to the details of the project in the larger volume. These ploys may suffice to reduce Kant to a chapter for readers seeking a light introduction to a difficult philosopher, but they hardly satisfy the canons of philosophic scholarship.