Journal of the History of Philosophy

278 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY as embroider them. Some of the difficulty may be idiosyncratic, but I suspect that in part it is due to the fact that his thoughts are, in a sense, Wittgensteinian while his style is a cumbersome mixture of those positivist and atomist precursors whose views he so capably and thoroughly criticizes. The result is a weakening of the polemic just where the polemic is required to give clarity and strength to his position. The most important paper in the collection is "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (previously published in Volume I of Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy oJ Science), in which Sellars steers his way carefully between the opposite errors of Cartesian dualism and Ryleian behaviorism, seeing the first as a misapprehension of the need for a foundation for empirical knowledge and the second as an overhasty rejection of the error without appreciating the epistemological point of dualism. His conclusion is a kind of common sense combination of correspondence and coherence views: "empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated extension, science, is rational, not because it has a ]oundation but because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once" (p. 170). A. R. Lovc~ Claremont Graduate School Freedom and Reason. By R. M. Hare. (New York: Oxford [Galaxy Books], 1965. Pp. viii + 228. $1.50.) The antinomy referred to in the title and described on the cover plays a minor role in Hare's new book. He is chiefly concerned to show (1) how a moral argument could seem to be rational and yet fail to convince without nonrational means of persuasion, and (2) how it is that moral judgments, though not factual, relate to facts. On (1) Hare argues that reasoning is only moral if judgments reached by it are universalizable. If a person fails to apply principles to himself as well as others, he is cast beyond the pale of moral debate. But this device merely shifts the burden of moral persuasion back a step, in which the object of moral debate is to convince someone that the act done to others is one he should also will for himself. On (2) Hare wants to say that moral judgments must refer to relevant properties of the situation with respect to which judgment is made. The color of a man's skin, for example, is not a morally relevant difference, presumably because there is no factual connection between a man's color and the morally important questions of political, intellectual, or social competence. The formula seems impressive because it is illustrated by cases which utilize faulty factual connections (like race and intelligence) as a way of promoting favored policies. It is not clear what Hare could say to a person who did regard color as a relevant moral difference, as the substance rather than the sign of inferiority. Thus, while Hare's last chapter is an excellent critique of the devious arguments of typical racists, it is not as clear that his method provides an explication of "relevant moral difference" that is free of circularity. Nonetheless, and especially in the later chapters, Hare has moved on to fresh and welcome ground in the normally jejune treatment of the philosophical issues of moral argument. A. R. LOUCH Claremont Graduate School Philosophy o[ Education. By Leo R. Ward. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1963.) Dr. Leo Ward's Philosophy oJ Education is essentially a development of a ThomisticAristotelian educational philosophy, which seems mainly directed toward a popular audience rather than professional philosophers. It is dependent upon the Aristotelian doctrines that there is such a determinate thing as human nature ; that we can learn what this nature is; and that the goal or end of this nature is its own realization. Dr. Ward has the merit of recognizing that these doctrines might be disputed and attempts to provide a "verification" of them. Unfortunately, the facts which Dr. Ward adduces to verify the Aristotelian concept of human nature are capable of quite different interpretations than those given by the author (pp. 116- ...