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https://hdl.handle.net/2440/34418
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Type: | Journal article |
Title: | Relativity of Value and the Consequentialist Umbrella |
Author: | Louise, J. |
Citation: | The Philosophical Quarterly, 2004; 54(217):518-536 |
Publisher: | Blackwell Publ Ltd |
Issue Date: | 2004 |
ISSN: | 0031-8094 1467-9213 |
Statement of Responsibility: | Jennie Louise |
Abstract: | Does the real difference between non-consequentialist and consequentialist theories lie in their approach to value? Non-consequentialist theories are thought either to allow a different kind of value (namely, agent-relative value) or to advocate a different response to value ('honouring' rather than 'promoting'). One objection to this idea implies that all normative theories are describable as consequentialist. But then the distinction between honouring and promoting collapses into the distinction between relative and neutral value. A proper description of non-consequentialist theories can only be achieved by including a distinction between temporal relativity and neutrality in addition to the distinction between agent-relativity and agent-neutrality. |
Description: | The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com |
DOI: | 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00370.x |
Published version: | http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00370.x |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 6 Philosophy publications |
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