Journal of the History of Philosophy

BOOK REVIEWS 277 living, pure T " (ibid.). This "affiliation" is regarded by her as that in virtue of which the multiple phases of the stream of consciousness are phases of one stream, as well as what accounts for the "mineness" of the hving body, acts of consciousness, and consciousness itself (cf. pp. 37-38). And this affiliation itself has its locus in the "I," that is, in the "selfness" of the "I." But in what sense is it possible to move from the 'T' which is "itself" ("sclfness") to the "I" as that which "has" experiences, a living body, etc. ("affihation")? The fundamental problem, obviously, concerns the phenomenon of selfness, for this is the basis for all "affiliation ." Beyond this, selfness seems as well the ground for empathy: This otherness [of the other] is apparent in the type of givenness: it is other than 'T' because it is given to me in another way than "I." Therefore, it is "you." But since it experiences itself as I experience myself,~ the "you" is another 'T' (p. 36). Thus, selfness is the ground for all experiences whatever. As such, Stein's contention that it is "the otherwise indescribable, qualityless subject of experience" (ibid.) seems to me to stop short of the most crucial of issues in her study, and one of the fundamental problems of phiiosophy generally. What is the nature of this reflexiveness (the "I" is "itself"), in what ways is it, or can it be, given, and what does it reveal as regards the being of the "I"? At one point Stein does seem to suggest that this "otherwise indescribeable" "I" can be submitted to further analysis, for she is careful to emphasize that the 'T' who performs the methodological "disregarding" and who takes "the world and my own person as phenomenon" (p. 5) is itself precisely that 'T' whose "selfness" has been disclosed as fundamental. That is, 'T' who reflect and 'T' whose selfness is apprehended thereby are one and the same. Accordingly, what is disclosed is not just a "qualityless subject of experience" but rather the phenomenon of reflexivity expressed most clearly and dramatically by the phrase suggested by Herbert Spiegelberg , "I-am-me" (or, in a larger sease, "I-am-me-myself-I")? It is this phenomenon which must be focused upon, but which is merely suggested by Stein's study. The translator and the publishers of this small, but highly fruitful, study deserve great credit. It is to be hoped that other such studies will be brought out. Not only do they reveal a significant period in continental philosophy, but they help to underscore the enormous relevance and fruitfulness of actual phenomenological inquiries. RICHARD M. ZANER Trinity University ~cience, Perception and Reality. By W. F. Setlars. International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method. (Routledge & Kegan Paul and the Humanities Press, 1963: Pp. 366. $8.5O.) These papers lock horns in one way or another with the metaphysics of logical atomism and positivism, and principally with the views that knowledge rests on a basis of propositions which note the occurrence of atomic facts, sense-data, or other "bare" particulars (the myth of the given) and that theoretical entities of science are logical fictions or mere calculational devices (which might be called the positivist myth). Added to the papers devoted to these themes are various pieces on topics in semantics and one rather interesting discussion of language games. The method employed is complex to the point of prolixity, which is too bad, as Sellars has many important things to ~y. But he does not state arguments so much A clearer way of expressing this would be to say that the otherness of the other is experienced by me as experiencing itself in the way(s) I experience myself--it is this which forms the core of empathic experience, although Stein does not put it in quite this way. eSee his "On the 'I-am-me' Experience in Childhood and Adolescence," Review o] Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, Y (1964), 3-21. The phenomenology of the self was the theme explored in depth by Spiegelberg's exciting Workshop in Phenomenology, held at Washington University last June, 1965, for two weeks. At...