Identity, individuality, and unity

Lowe, E. J.

doi:10.1017/s0031819103000329

Identity, individuality, and unity

Lowe, E. J.

Authors

E. J. Lowe

Abstract

Locke notoriously included number amongst the primary qualities of bodies and was roundly criticized for doing so by Berkeley. Frege echoed some of Berkeley's criticisms in attacking the idea that ‘Number is a property of external things’, while defending his own view that number is a property of concepts. In the present paper, Locke's view is defended against the objections of Berkeley and Frege, and Frege's alternative view of number is criticized. More precisely, it is argued that numbers are assignable to pluralities of individuals. However, it is also argued that Locke went too far in asserting that ‘Number applies itself to ... everything that either doth exist, or can be imagined’.

Citation

Lowe, E. J. (2003). Identity, individuality, and unity. Philosophy, 78(3), 321-337. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819103000329

Journal Article Type	Article
Publication Date	2003-07
Deposit Date	Jan 8, 2009
Publicly Available Date	Jan 8, 2009
Journal	Philosophy
Print ISSN	0031-8191
Electronic ISSN	1469-817X
Publisher	Cambridge University Press
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	78
Issue	3
Pages	321-337
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819103000329
Keywords	Identity, Individuality, Unity.