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Against Norström’s Argument for Technological Knowing How Not Being an Instance of Knowing That

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Abstract

In this paper, I evaluate an argument offered by Per Norström in section 8 of his paper Knowing how, knowing that, knowing technology. The argument is for the proposition that some instance of knowing how is not an instance of knowing that; the instance in question being one of technological know-how. This conclusion contradicts Stanley and Williamson’s proposal that all instances of knowing how are instances of knowing that. I provide reason to think that there are problems with Norström’s argument.

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References

  • Norström, P. (2014). Knowing how, knowing that, knowing technology. Philosophy & Technology. doi:10.1007/s13347-014-0178-3

  • Thulesius, O. (2007). The man who made the monitor: a biography of John Ericsson, naval engineer. Jefferson: McFarland & Co.

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Correspondence to Morgan Luck.

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Luck, M. Against Norström’s Argument for Technological Knowing How Not Being an Instance of Knowing That. Philos. Technol. 28, 573–579 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-014-0181-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-014-0181-8

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