Abstract
I examine an argument that appears to take us from Parfit’s [Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1984)] thesis that we have no reason to fulfil desires we no longer care about to the conclusion that the effect of posthumous events on our desires is a matter of indifference (the post-mortem thesis). I suspect that many of Parfit’s readers, including Vorobej [Philosophical Studies 90 (1998) 305], think that he is committed to (something like) this reasoning, and that Parfit must therefore give up the post-mortem thesis. However, as it turns out, the argument is subtly equivocal and does not commit Parfit to the post-mortem thesis. I close with some doubts about Parfit’s case for his indifference thesis.
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References
J.M. Fischer (Eds) (1993) The Metaphysics of Death Stanford Stanford University Press
Luper, S. (2002): ‘Death’, in E.N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford University Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
S. Luper (2004) ArticleTitle‘Posthumous Harm’ American Philosophical Quarterly 41 IssueID1 63–72
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M. Vorobej (1998) ArticleTitle‘Past Desires’ Philosophical Studies 90 305–318 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1004264421281
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Luper, S. Past Desires and the Dead. Philos Stud 126, 331–345 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7815-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7815-0