Chapter 9

Memories of Cinema

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Deleuze's concept of temporality undergoes radical revision with his elaborations of time's expressions in cinema. In *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, Deleuze elucidates aspects of Bergson's thought to present a concept of time that is no longer tethered to the movements of entities. Deleuze – in what is perhaps one of the oddest definitions in the history of western philosophy – characterises cinema as attempting to move beyond the representation of the movements of existents to give viewers a 'direct presentation of time' (1997b: 38). In the present chapter, I elucidate Deleuze's tantalising suggestion that cinema, the art form that has moving images as one of its ontic bases, involves a direct representation of a sort of temporality that is conceptually discrete from the movement of existent entities. I further suggest that filmic expressions of time reveal it to be a singularity that enjoys the attribute of radical indeterminacy. Deleuze further suggests that time – as it is presented in film – obtains as that ongoing continuum of variation.

My argument progresses through four stages: (1) I will critically assess the suggestion of various commentators that the *Cinema* texts offer a fraught addition to Deleuze's philosophy of time; (2) I suggest that Deleuze's innovative reading of Bergson's concept of duration is key to understanding how time is expressed in cinema; (3) I observe – through reference to Alain Robbe-Grillet's theory of artistic descriptions – that a direct image of time enjoys nascent expression in the form of 'pure optical and acoustic situations' (i.e., moments of profound change in any of the diegetic elements of a film story); (4) finally – through reference to Deleuze's nuanced reading of Bergson's ontology of virtual and actual modes of existence – I suggest that time gains direct cinematic expression in the peculiar 'crystal-images' that proliferate in post-Second World War cinema. I observe that time's expression in cinema involves

a diminishment of the relative importance of the relation of temporal succession, a prioritisation of time's involvement with fundamental ontological change, and a specification of the strictly simultaneous emergence of past and present. Further, I suggest that this temporality forms a continuum of variation without end. Taken together, these yield the claim that the direct presentation of time in cinema involves characterising temporality as a singularity that is intrinsic to the cinematic mode of artistic expression. Perhaps the most magical of all art forms, cinema continues to delight us in no small measure due to its capacity to express a little morsel of time as pure, unceasing variation.

Deleuze's Phenomenology of Cinema?

The nuanced nature of Deleuze's identification of cinema as a presentation of time that is somehow removed from the movements of photographically represented objectivities (i.e., all of the characters, elements of setting, material entities, etc.) has produced some critical befuddlement, in the sense that analyses of Deleuze's claims on the nature of cinema and its expression of temporality tend to be divided. Commentators seem oddly flummoxed when it comes to Deleuze's analyses of film. This consternation is evidenced variously as hesitancy in addressing the substantive philosophical claims about the nature of temporality elaborated in *Cinema* 2, mischaracterisation of the relative importance of Deleuze's re-evaluation of time through reference to cinema, and a strange ambivalence evident in competing identifications of what Deleuze is up to with his striking analyses of film.

In an otherwise superlative elaboration of Deleuze's philosophy of time, James Williams suggests that though the *Cinema* texts stand as remarkable contributions to the philosophy of film, one should be wary of approaching the texts as though they develop a substantive contribution to Deleuze's thought on the nature of temporality. Williams identifies three reasons for being wary of both *Cinema 1* and *Cinema 2*: (1) he observes an apparent ambiguity in Deleuze's use of the term 'image' (2011: 160); (2) he suggests that the analyses of all the artists, works of art and the ontological concepts expressed by these tend to be inadequate, in the sense that these are 'descriptive and restricted' (160) in comparison to more lengthy treatments offered in other of Deleuze's works – particularly *The Logic of Sense* and *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, though one also might mention *Coldness and Cruelty*, *Proust and Signs*, as well as *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*; (3) he claims that the mode of exposition and the development of substantive

claims tends to be rather disjointed in comparison to that evidenced in other texts.[1] Here, I should point out that Williams's reasons for his hesitancy to elaborate on – let alone endorse – the conceptualisations of time developed in the *Cinema* texts are sketchy. Deleuze's use of the term 'image', as I argue (through particular reference to the 'crystalline image of time') in the penultimate section of this chapter, is consistent with that of Bergson. In the absence of a clearly stated set of criteria and means of evaluating the merits of one mode of philosophical exegesis relative to another – neither of which Williams gives – one must reject second and third putative reasons for wariness as akin to an ill-defined axiological complaint.

Though András Bálint Kovács characterises Deleuze's as 'by far the deepest and most developed theory of modern cinema [that] has been formulated', he also observes that it 'does not fit in with any previous theoretical frameworks' (2007: 40–1). Paul Schrader, on the other hand, starkly identifies Deleuze's elucidation of the nature and function of cinema as 'the phenomenology of perception through time' (2018: 3).[2] Vivian Sobchack echoes Schrader's sentiment with her suggestion that Deleuze's philosophy of film parallels phenomenology in the sense that Deleuze's key claims about the nature of cinematic movement and image seem to correlate with insights in Merleau-Ponty's later work (1992: 31). Julien Guillemet suggests pretty much the exact opposite with his stark claim that 'Deleuze's relation to phenomenology appears as a strict refusal of the traditional phenomenological model' (2010: 94). As is the case with most stringent interpretive claims, this reading is dubious, in the sense that Deleuze's relation with phenomenology in the *Cinema* texts tends to be decidedly more nuanced than partisan readings would care to admit. David Rodowick observes that Deleuze tends to characterise phenomenology as an 'ambiguous ally' to the Deleuzian conceptualisation of cinema (1997: 214). Deleuze's nuanced critique of the suggestion that cinematic expression involves aspects that are akin to substantive claims of various phenomenologists (primarily Husserl, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty) involves two observations: (1) it seems that phenomenologists tend to disregard cinematic art as something worthy of analysis; (2) Husserlian phenomenology tends to prioritise a mode of (natural) perception of spatiotemporally extended entities, which is ill-fitting with the experience of viewing a film. Each of these invites elaboration.

Deleuze's suggestion that phenomenology has an 'embarrassed attitude' with respect to cinema has some merit, in the sense that there seems to be a paucity phenomenological analysis of cinematic art relative to

the analyses of other art forms (Deleuze 1997a: 57). (Here, one cannot help but think of the numerous phenomenological analyses of paintings and literary works by Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer and their followers.) Deleuze's provocative observation that Husserl 'never mentions cinema at all' (56), though technically true, is not quite as scandalous as one might think. Though Husserl doesn't specifically mention the moving images of film (i.e., cinematographic images), this shouldn't come as a terrible shock, if for no other reason than cinematic art was in its infancy when Husserl was writing. The Lumière brothers are credited with presenting the first series of documentary shorts to a paying audience on 28 December 1895 – *L'arrivée d'un train en gare de La Ciotat*, *Déjeuner de Bébé* and *L'arroseur arrosé*. Georges Méliès founded the first film studio and in-house film theatre in 1896. Méliès is also credited with producing and showing the first single-reel narrative film – *Le Voyage dans la Lune* – in 1902.[3] During this period, Husserl was busy starting his philosophical career at the University of Halle before being uprooted to take residence in Göttingen. He published the first edition of the *Logical Investigations* one year before Méliès entertained audiences with the images of magical aliens dancing on the moon. In all likelihood, Husserl was unaware of the evolution of the magic lantern in France when he published his first major phenomenological text. It should also be noted that Husserl does discuss the moving image (albeit briefly) during this time (2005: 66, 584n3, 645, 646). Unfortunately, the situation does not improve much with Sartre, who – though he mentions going to the movies with his mother in *The Words* and briefly elaborates on the nature of slow motion cinema in *The Imaginary* – refrains from offering a systematic analysis of the art form (Sartre 1964: 119; 2004: 130).[4] Deleuze also suggests that cinema suffers from a cursory treatment by Merleau-Ponty (1997a: 57).[5] Perhaps it is worth noting that Roman Ingarden discusses film in a slightly more substantive way than Merleau-Ponty. Unfortunately, Ingarden's brief analyses of film have – until quite recently – been unduly neglected by North American and French phenomenologists (Ingarden 1973, 1989). Deleuze's observation that phenomenologists tend to treat the filmic art form in a manner analogous to how a family might be inclined to treat a bastard cousin is borne out (with some modification) by history.

Deleuze offers a further clue to the fraught relation between phenomenology and cinematic representation with his explicit suggestion that cinema offers an alternative to the model of natural perception offered by Husserlian phenomenology. In a lecture on the topic given during the autumn of 1981, Deleuze starkly notes that 'cinematic perception is not

natural perception. Not at all' (Deleuze 1981). The difference between cinematic perception and natural perception involves the ontic bases of perceived objects. Deleuze suggests that natural perception presents objects in motion – e.g., the object of natural perception might be a bird fluttering its wings, pecking at a worm, prancing along a branch. The object of cinematic perception is explicitly the photographic representation of an entity isolated from motion. Deleuze's analytic point is based on the observation that we typically perceive physical entities in motion and cinematic perception only affords us the perception of entities for which motion is a second-order property. The claim is that the smallest building block of our natural perception – the ontologically primary base of naturally perceived moments – is composed of entities enjoying interrelated motions. Writing a few scant years after the birth of cinema in 1895, Henri Bergson observed that cinematic perception involves (as its ontic base) 'snapshots of a passing reality' (1998: 307). Bergson goes on to suggest that cinematic images are frozen in time, in the sense that they are bereft of any movement (i.e., the cinematic image involves a negation of the motion of the naturally perceived object). Though it is the case that, when watching a film, we perceive entities that have the semblance of motion – e.g., the grotesque image of the razorblade slicing an eyeball in Luis Buñuel's *Un Chien Andalou* (1929), or the horrific image of the blood gushing out of the elevator doors in Stanley Kubrick's *The Shining* (1980) – this is the product of the serial organisation and projection of static photographic images. While natural perception involves entities in motion, cinematic perception involves the mere illusion of entities in motion. In this sense, the perceived motion of cinematic entities is an ontologically secondary event; a cinematographic illusion conjures the projection of still images at very specific temporal rates.[6]

In addition to Deleuze's observations about the ontic base of the cinematographic illusion of movement, one may observe a further difference between natural perception and cinematic perception. Deleuze seems to suggest that cinematic perception differs in kind from natural perception. Here, Deleuze's critique is directed as much against André Bazin as it is against Husserl. One of the fundamental observations of Husserlian phenomenology is that 'all consciousness is consciousness of' (Husserl quoted in Deleuze 1997a: 56). Natural perception suggests that objects (in the real world) are presented to consciousness as composites of various schematised aspects. Intentional consciousness then sets about performing the complex task of fulfilling these aspects through reference to transcendent structures of reality, structures of consciousness, and social conditions evidenced in the lifeworld (most

of which are presented in a schematised fashion), in the ongoing creation of real objects of consciousness.[7] Bazin suggests that perception of cinema seems to involve a similar process with his observation that the cinematic image reveals the 'natural image of a world'; a flow of image which is 'uncompromisingly realistic', in the sense that it perfectly conveys the aspects of 'the natural world' (2005: 14, 27). Bazin's claim here is that the camera functions as a prosthesis to the human eye, which assists in the process of perception (presenting aspects of entities in the empirically sensed world and fomenting their fulfilment by intentional consciousness) that is fundamentally analogous to that originally specified by Husserl. Deleuze explicitly denies this analogy when he observes that 'the cinema can, with impunity, bring us close to things or take us away from them and revolve around them, it suppresses both the anchoring of the subject and the horizon of the world' (1997a: 57). The substantive observation here is that the camera does things which the human eye cannot do, in ways that are liberated from the direction of the perceiver's intentional consciousness. With these analyses, Deleuze appears to be making a complex deduction from premises specified by Walter Benjamin, Dziga Vertov and Robert Bresson. Benjamin makes the astute observation that the camera 'can bring out those aspects of the original that are unattainable to the naked eye yet accessible to the lens, which is adjustable and chooses its angle at will' (2007: 220). Vertov observes that cinema's 'kino-eye lives and moves in time and space; it gathers and records impressions in a manner wholly different from that of the human eye' (1984: 15). Bresson elaborates on the camera's capacities to record 'what no human eye is capable of catching, no pencil, brush, pen of pinning down . . . without knowing what it is, and pins its down with a machine's scrupulous indifference' (1977: 14). Deleuze observes that Husserlian phenomenology grants a privilege to the human eye as the means by which to perceive the world. Without hesitation, Bazin accepts this privilege, only to suggest that the camera augments it. Benjamin, Vertov and Bresson each fundamentally deny that the human eye enjoys this privileged status – the movie camera (with its swoops, long tracking shots, radical close-ups and sweeping panoramas) performs functions to which no human eye could dare aspire. All of these imply that cinematic perception involves an intentionality that is decidedly not human. The profound capacities of the kino-eye are illustrated in the – nearly sublime – opening sequence of *Berlin: Die Sinfonie der Großstadt* (1927): the film begins with the image of the languid ebb of calm waters, only to give way (through an abstract dissolve consisting of multi-section white planes and a descending circle) to the metallic

arms of a railway crossing; then, there is a rapid cut to a speeding train, which dissolves into a shot of the pistons of an engine.[8] Here we have an atypical conjunction of typical geometric forms (the abstract dissolve), as well as images of nature viewed in unnatural ways; things are viewed from angles that are seemingly unattainable by the human eye – e.g., hovering over the unblemished surface of water, which is not disturbed by the ripple caused by the immersion of a physical body. These are illustrative of a mode of perception of that is quite removed from any that we would identify as directed by human intentionality. These observations of poets, filmmakers and philosophers suggest that cinema affords a mode of perception which is radically distinct from that so rigorously specified in Husserlian phenomenology.

When taken together, these two complex claims – that there is scant substantive discussion of film in the works of Husserl, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, and that cinema affords a modality of perception that is distinct from (Husserlian) natural perception – imply that there is a conceptual distance between phenomenological accounts of the cinematic art form and that offered by Deleuze. One might add to these a further observation, which obliquely challenges the notion that Deleuze's account of temporal expression in cinema is akin to aspects of Husserlian phenomenology. In an interview with Raymond Bellour, Deleuze starkly observes that 'there is no dualism at all' involved in his account of the nature of cinema (2020: 226). It has been observed that there is a sort of dualism hard baked into Husserl's phenomenology. This suggestion enjoys ample textual support, in the sense that Husserl explicitly claims that there is a methodological dualism involved in his phenomenology. Husserl stipulates – in *Ideas I* – that the *res cogitans* is separated from the world of physical, material, spatiotemporally extended entities 'by a veritable abyss' (1931: 153). Husserl tries to diminish dualism by prescribing the application of the phenomenological method, but by limiting the scope of his phenomenology to epistemology he avoids really contradicting ontological dualism. In *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, Husserl suggests that the function of intentional consciousness is to intertwine with the external (physical and ideal) world through various acts of clarification achieved by intentionality fulfilling the schematised aspects of entities presented through perception – i.e., by becoming conscious of entities.[9] Were this intertwining achieved (i.e., were the process of fulfilment of schematised aspects ever completely actualised), this would diminish any concerns about an abiding dualism. Unfortunately, the success of Husserl's efforts is a matter of dispute. Françoise Dastur observes that Husserl's phenomenology seems to be

plagued by an intractable dualism.[10] Merleau-Ponty echoes this suggestion with his observation that at 'the end of Husserl's life there is an unthought-of element in his works which is wholly his and yet opens out on something else' (1964: 160). The existence of this unresolved something else which consciousness opens toward fulfils the minimal condition of an unresolved species of dualism at work in Husserlian phenomenology. The fact that Deleuze explicitly suggests that his concept of cinema is bereft of dualism implies that it might have less in common with Husserlian phenomenology than one might expect.

The Filmic Duration (of Memory and Change)

Deleuze's suggestion that temporality is afforded a direct presentation in film involves a Bergsonian concept of temporal duration that is comprehensive of the memorial past (of memory), the lived present and the creation of the new. The concept of time presented in the *Cinema* texts is substantively different than that elaborated in other texts like *The Logic of Sense* – in which the putatively discrete temporal domains of past, present and future are explicitly characterised as 'readings' of the various types of (logical, ontological, axiological) relations that obtain among Aion and Chronos. Further, though Deleuze quite comfortably elaborates on the ontological primacy of a synthesis among discrete ontological entities as giving rise to a comprehensive time in *Difference and Repetition*, in the *Cinema* texts, this language of syntheses has fallen by the wayside, having been replaced by discussions of tensions among virtual and actual modes of being as they obtain in the lived present that is expressed in cinema. Though Deleuze had written on Bergson prior to the publication of *Difference and Repetition* (both 'Bergson 1859–1941' and 'Bergson's Conception of Difference'[11] are significant texts which hint at aspects of a robust concept of temporality), it isn't until *Bergsonism* and the commentaries on Bergson in *Cinema 1* and *Cinema 2* that Deleuze's Bergsonian account of temporality receives thorough elaboration. In the *Cinema* texts, Deleuze modifies his prior concepts of temporality to offer an account of duration that involves an ontologically comprehensive nature and a radical capacity to modify existents. Deleuze suggests that we experience this sort of duration in the cinematic art form – which presents the viewing audience with a series of visible contractions among the photographically represented past and the present; a 'well defined tension' (Bergson 1946: 217) among the living present and the memorial past that is expressed in filmic sequences, series, and framings of photographically represented events. What this

implies about the nature of temporality and of the cinematic expression of time is staggering, if for no other reason than that it involves: (1) a reconceptualisation of temporality that establishes an identity relation – i.e., the identity enjoyed by the elements of a multiplicity – among putatively distinct temporal domains; (2) a diminishment of the claim that temporality is reducible to a succession relation of temporal moments, $t_1, t_2 \ldots t_n$; (3) a suggestion that cinema can represent these.

Bergson seems never to tire of modifying his concept of duration. In a few remarkable pages in the second chapter of *Time and Free Will*, the concept (of duration) is variously characterised as a 'multiplicity' of temporal moments, which (strangely) don't enjoy any correlation with measurable points distributed in physical space – i.e., a multiplicity of 'pure number' (Bergson 2001: 78, 89); the form assumed by the 'succession of our conscious states' in moments of recollection (100); an intensive magnitude (106); a mercurial ontological process which seems to be like Merleau-Ponty's concept of the flesh, in the narrow sense that it is primary to substance (111). In *Matter and Memory*, the over-determined concept undergoes further revision. Here, duration is characterised as the continuous flow of mental-states through which psycho-social entities 'insensibly' pass in the 'really lived' experience of a continuity that strangely conditions experience, without revealing itself in its entirety; the dynamic 'tension' that obtains among various putatively discrete mental states (Bergson 1991: 186). This characterisation in particular becomes slightly more fraught when taken in conjunction with Bergson's careful observation that any supposed division among mental states is 'artificial', in the sense that these are comprehended as interrelated aspects of a unified – non-divisible, non-reducible – lived experience (186). The situation doesn't get much better when we come to *Creative Evolution*. Here, Bergson characterises duration variously as the flow of unceasing change (1998: 1–3); as a flux of putatively discrete mental states merging into one another (3); and as the past (characterised as an oddly active and expanding process) which 'gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances' (4). Taken together, this dizzying array of sometimes competing definitions suggest an over-determined concept that threatens to lose any sense of unity.

The plurality of aspects associated with the concept of duration seems to have led to some confusion about the nature of the concept. Rebecca Hill starkly observes that Bergson's duration may be identified as a dualistic relation that obtains among tendencies (i.e., proto-entities, transcendental conditions, disparate forces, poorly identified urges, etc., that are involved in multiple processes of transformation). Hill seems

to undermine her initial identification when she suggests that these tendencies are sexed, in the sense that they are inherently expressive of masculine or feminine characteristics (2012: 92). Though it is the case that since Bergson explicitly characterises durations as involving pre-individuated tendencies (as opposed to clearly defined quantifiable states), it seems odd to identify any particular sexedness – which would be an individuated trait – as an attribute of these. Bergson explicitly notes that the complex concept of duration tends to resist identification as a metaphysical simple (i.e., a state, or an entity, something reducible to one aspect) in numerous places. Perhaps the clearest identification of the involvement of tendencies and duration is found in *Creative Evolution*, in a remarkable passage where Bergson characterises duration as a complex relation of pre-individuated tendencies (1998: 12–13). Deleuze suggests that tendency and duration enjoy an ontological identity, in the sense that both involve pure difference: 'Duration or tendency is the difference of self with itself; and what differs from itself is, in an *unmediated* way, the unity of substance and subject' (2002: 38). In a lecture on Leibniz, Deleuze further identifies duration as a process of differentiation that bears a striking conceptual similarity with *conatus*, in the sense that these involve ontogenetic forces.[12] These two observations – that duration is similar to a tendency and that it is akin to a pre-individuated force (i.e., *conatus*) – are sufficient to demonstrate a confusion involved in the suggestion that duration involves individuated traits. Hill attempts to support her argument by pointing to a 'hierarchical sexuation' implicit in Bergson's use of metaphor in elaborating on the nature of duration. This is unfortunate for at least two reasons. Hill does very little to clarify what a 'sexuated' hierarchy would look like. Confronted with such a linguistic monstrosity, in the absence of any clear definiens, one is just as apt to produce an accurate identification of Bergsonian duration as one is to conjure a profound ontological confusion. It might also be observed that a dualistic relation among any of existents or tendencies would tend to be expressed as parallelism – i.e., an ontological relation ill-fitting the sort of formation implied by reference to any sort of hierarchy, regardless of the identity of its *relata*. Perhaps it should also be observed that Bergson tends to characterise duration in non-hierarchical terms – i.e., as a qualitative multiplicity; an ontological process akin to an organic unity; a psychological 'flux' – all of which tend to be analytically, logically and ontologically discrete to the type of arrangement associated with any form of hierarchy.

Arguing from more stable conceptual ground, Jean Hyppolite suggests that Bergsonian duration is identical to memory, in the sense

that it involves an interrelation of non-discrete moments that are temporally prior to the present.[13] Leonard Lawlor echoes this view when he summarily characterises Bergson's concept of duration as akin to memory, albeit in senses that involve subtle modifications of all of its nature, the objects of recollection, and the purposiveness implied by various acts of recollecting (2003: 80). Indeed, in *Creative Evolution*, Bergson explicitly identifies memory and duration when he observes that 'duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances' (1998: 4). Bergson's choices of metaphor and verb tense suggest a conceptualisation of memory as a process that is substantively different from the concept of memory as a mental repository of prior experience – i.e., a 'mind palace', a mental labyrinth that is accessed through the repetition of a mnemonic device (the calming rhythms of 'the thread of a tune' that guides one to a 'shelter' which contains the memories of one's childhood (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 310)) – that is typically used in filmic attempts to visualise memory. (This concept of memory as a repository has been referenced so often that it has become a filmic trope. Recent filmic examples include: the 'mental map' used by Sherlock Holmes in the television episode *The Hounds of Baskerville* (2012); the mesmerising sequence in Ridley Scott's *Blade Runner* (1992), in which Deckard uses the sepia-coloured photographs on his piano to unlock the memories of his childhood – memories which resist washing away into oblivion 'like tears in the rain'; the hellish industrial furnace where K retreats to the memories of childhood in Denis Villeneuve's *Blade Runner 2049* (2017).) The primary difference between Bergson's concept of duration and the type of memory illustrated in these filmic representations is that though memory palaces tend to be illustrated as domains of relative stasis, duration is dynamic. In *Matter and Memory*, Bergson elucidates memory's activity of 'gnawing' into the future through reference to the mental activity of 'recording' occurrences in the temporal present, for the purpose of forming habits (which might become involved in shaping a psycho-social entity's behaviours at a future moment) (1991: 83). The dynamic aspect of memory is further illustrated by Bergson's careful observation that habit (i.e., all of what is remembered; the constantly expanding content of memory) participates in the formation of moral obligation (1935: 29). Bergson further elaborates on the aims of memory (i.e., its functional goal or end) when he notes that each of the moments of our lives 'is a kind of creation' (1998: 7). When taken in conjunction with the stipulation that each temporal moment of existence involves both the content of memory and the ongoing organisation of

this content, Bergson's observation yields the implication that memory is involved in the dynamic creation of the utterly unique. No longer identified as merely the repository of now past, slowly fading moments, memory, Bergson suggests, is identical to duration, in the sense that all of its nature, processes and purpose are involved with the creation of something without ontological correlate or precedent.

Deleuze clarifies the role of duration in the production of difference with his elucidation of Bergson's 'third thesis' (of movement and change) in *Cinema 1*. Though there is no explicit mention of the identity relation among duration and memory in these densely argued passages, one might forgive this apparent oversight, if for no other reason than the identity of these had already been stipulated in *Bergsonism*.[14] Deleuze formulates Bergson's third thesis as the complex claim that 'not only is the instant an immobile section of movement, but movement is a mobile section of duration, that is of the Whole, or of a whole' (1997a: 8). Bergson explicitly notes – in *Creative Evolution* – that a movement of entities in space involves a transformation of that space.[15] Bergson's complex ontological argument involves: (1) the stipulation of a distinction among the processes of transformation and translation; (2) positing an uncontentious distinction in kind – i.e., a categorical distinction – among qualities and quantities; (3) the observation that the process of translation involves quantitative change – i.e., it is a translation of quantitative values; (4) the inference that transformation involves the modification of particular qualities; (5) the observation of the corollary that movements in space involve qualitative changes; and finally, (6) the assertion that a transformation of a particular quality implies a qualitative change to the generality that comprehends the particular. Taken together, these yield the profound claim that the displacement of spatiotemporally extended entities implies a fundamental change to the nature of space itself. In this sense, the domain (or medium) that comprehends movements of particulars is revealed to be ontologically correlated with a modification of the qualities of any particular. These are the sorts of ontological transformations that have been illustrated to such terrifying effect in both horror literature and film. Robert Wise's *The Haunting* (1963) – which is an adaptation of Shirley Jackson's *The Haunting of Hill House* (1959) – chronicles the anguish of Eleanora as she resides in a gothic mansion that alters all of its physical dimensions, lighting and interior temperature in response to her memories of childhood trauma. A similar sort of physical change to space brought about by qualitative change is also illustrated in the fiery end of the Overlook Hotel in Steven King's novel (1977), though the hotel remains standing

at the end Stanley Kubrick's *The Shining* – a film that is vastly superior to King's derivative novel, because it explicitly correlates the physical changes of the hotel to the mental states of Jack, Wendy and Danny, as well as the memorial history of the Colorado Rocky Mountains, i.e., the qualitative elements of various domains. Thomas Allen Nelson elaborates on how, in Kubrick's film, changes to the hotel's spatiality are directly correlated with – i.e., responses to, expressions of, doublings of – the characters' internal states (2000: 202–8). One cannot help but think of the spatiotemporal discontinuities evident in some of the film's most memorable scenes: the elevator of blood that erupts when Jack, Wendy or Danny feel rage or terror; the appearance of the bloated corpse of a nude crone that greets Jack's aberrant sexual desires in room 237; the ominous appearance of an ancient scrapbook next to Jack's typewriter as he struggles to recall the plot of his horribly repetitive manuscript; the disquieting appearance of the twin girls (the Grady twins) who promise to play with Danny 'forever and ever'; the shifting patterns on both the hallway carpet and the Native American murals in the Colorado Lounge; the population and de-population of the Gold Room; the alteration in lighting of the hotel bar when Jack gets a glass of bourbon; the shifting spatial dimensions of the hedge maze; the strange appearance of a room full of skeletons as Wendy is confronted with memories of Jack's abuse of her and Danny; the deeply disturbing appearance of an entity dressed as a bear performing fellatio on a man in 1920s formal attire as Wendy witnesses a temporally prior event in the hotel (the 1921 New Year's Eve party). All of these spatiotemporal modifications (modifications to the hotel and its surrounding area) are reflective of qualitative variations of various character's mental states. Each of them expresses a spatiotemporal translation of particulars (a quantitative translation). All involve a fundamental qualitative transformation of the whole. These moments of horror have been adduced to aptly illustrate the ontological modification suggested by Bergson's third thesis on the nature of space in relation to qualitative alteration.

Deleuze suggests that filmic duration does something more profound than merely present photographic examples of differentiation through photographic and aural means. In 'Bergson's Conception of Difference', he explicitly identifies duration as the internally differentiated process that involves the capacity to 'englobe' (i.e., ontologically comprehend) ontologically distinct entities (2002: 39). This suggests that the particular filmic species of duration has the capacity to comprehend modifications within entities which are ontologically discrete from filmed persons, settings and other photographically represented states of affairs. The

implication here is that filmic duration involves the capacity to affect – qualitatively modify – the audience. Roland Barthes echoes this suggestion when he observes that some films involve qualitative modifications that will 'bruise' the viewer. The claim is that some images, as well as sequences of images (due to their preternatural powers to foment change), will modify the bodily experience of those who behold their spectacle – this is more than the work of a mere example.[16]

Cinema's seemingly magical capacities to modify the physical states of those who behold its spectacle hint at a complex analogy between duration and Walter Benjamin's concept of an aura. Rodowick observes that Benjamin's historical reflections on the development of photographic art suggests a similarity among what Benjamin characterises as the photographic aura and the filmic duration (1997: 8). Though Miriam Bratu Hansen cautiously observes that Benjamin's identification of the concept of aura is notoriously difficult to isolate, in the sense that Benjamin seems to subtly modify the term throughout his 'Little History of Photography', *On Hashish* and the *Arcades Project*, one might observe that the concept seems to involve two discrete aspects. The strength of the analogy between duration and aura is demonstrated by shared aspects.[17] Benjamin's first elucidation of the nature of an aura is the consequence of his experimentations with hashish (on 5 March 1930). Here, Benjamin cautiously observes that, though it is distinct in kind from the 'spruced-up magical rays' that populate the fantastic visions of spiritualists, a 'genuine aura' enjoys a similarity with 'an ornamental halo [*Umzirkung*], in which the object or being is enclosed' (2006b: 58). The suggestion here is that an aura is a sort of energy field that has the capacity to comprehend existents. The ontologically comprehensive nature of an aura is akin to duration's capacity to 'englobe' entities. In this sense, comprehensiveness is an aspect that is common to Bergsonian duration and Benjamin's concept of an aura. Elaborating on the sublime nature of Eugène Atget's surrealist photographs of Paris, Benjamin explicitly characterises their aura as involving a 'strange weave of space and time: the unique appearance or semblance of distance, no matter how close it may be' (2005: 518). Here, one may identify a parallel aspect in duration's involvement with memory's ability to qualitatively modify spatiotemporally extended existents and the nature of their circumstances – i.e., all of psycho-social entities and their circumstances, the content of the lived experience of humans, and their environment, however broadly construed. Remarking on the sort of auras that accompany represented photographic objectivities, Benjamin suggests that photographic auras have the capacity to involve themselves in an intentional relation with

the memories of those who behold them – i.e., to 'look back' into the minds and prior lived experiences of those who get transfixed by their unblinking gaze.[18] This observation echoes the suggestion that duration modifies the qualitative aspects of the thought content of people who participate in cinematic duration (through the concrete act of viewing a film).

Nascent Forms of Time's Direct Expression

Deleuze – in some of the most beautiful passages of *Cinema 2* – suggests that filmic art enjoys the power to modify the qualitative experience of viewers, because it has the capacity to present direct images of time. Perhaps the most enigmatic of the concepts Deleuze develops in the *Cinema* texts, the direct time-image is as mercurial as it is essential to understanding the complex nature of temporality in film. Deleuze starkly identifies the direct time-image as presenting a 'little time in its pure state', only to clarify that this pure state is 'the unchanging form in which the change is produced' (1997b: 17). The suggestion here is that time is the general form of variation that comprehends and is expressed in any particular change. Deleuze further observes that this form of time is a nascent aspect of filmic motion pictures that has only recently enjoyed a greater tendency to filmic realisation with the advancement of cinematic art. He writes that direct time-images involves a 'Proustian dimension where people and things occupy a place in time which is incommensurable with the one they have in space' (37). The claim here seems to be that the direct time-image involves aspects of memory, in various senses of the term (i.e., the psychological memories of individuated psycho-social existents, as well as the non-individuated – ontological – memory that comprehends the entirety of the past of all existents). Deleuze illustrates the development of this peculiar concept of time through reference to Robbe-Grillet's critical remarks about the role of mimesis in artistic representation, as well as the natures of the (oddly named) pure optical and sound situations.

One might observe that the concept of a direct presentation of anything in film seems flummoxing, if for no other reason than that the entities of a film are explicitly visually accessible entities presented as elements of a filmic universe. It might further be observed that the entirety of the filmic universe (i.e., all its constituent elements) are represented by photographic means in service of a director's purposes (which usually amounts to presenting a narrative, but may also involve explorations of the artistic possibilities afforded cinema as an artistic medium).[19]

One could suggest that cinematically represented objects seem to be distinguishable from objects which enjoy direct presentations. It would seem that recognition of the validity of either a metaphysical distinction between original and copy, or an aesthetic distinction between an object and its representation (by artistic means), would suffice to adduce a critique of the notion that anything is presented directly in filmic art. These would be perhaps even more substantive when they involve something that has non-physical aspects – i.e., any of a species of relation; an 'ideal' entity; a spiritual existent; a process involving non-physical entities; a continuum of abstract terms or relations; in short, many of the sorts of existents we tend to associate or identify with temporality. One could wonder how the immaterial form of time, or any of its (also immaterial) constituent elements, could enjoy direct presentation by cinema.

Deleuze addresses these concerns through reference to Robbe-Grillet's theory of artistic description. The solution here is complex, in the sense that Deleuze invites the reader to have more than a passing understanding of all of Plato's and Aristotle's aesthetics – because a hybrid of these functions as the unspecified target of Robbe-Grillet's critique – as well as the mathematics involved with architectural singularities (which Robbe-Grillet references, but neglects to develop) (Deleuze 1997b: 44–5). Deleuze marshals these to suggest that temporality enjoys direct presentation in film as a type of intrinsic singularity that expresses a sort of variation that is non-mimetic. He stipulates that there is a difference in kind among representations and expressions, in the sense that each is a different kind of aspect of cinematic art. Perhaps one of the most magical qualities of cinema is that it has the capacity to represent entities and processes that enjoy existence in a mode of reality external to that of the filmic universe, as well as the ability to express entities and processes wholly intrinsic to its mode of presentation (i.e., existents that enjoy no correlation with anything outside the film; a spectacle that is entirely new, in the sense that it does not represent anything in the real world). Though each may be an aspect of the same entity, this does not imply that either is reducible to the other. Time enjoys direct presentation in film because film expresses a change relative to the states of affairs in the film. In his essay 'Time and Description in Fiction Today', Robbe-Grillet offers an account of descriptions that diminishes the Ancients' suggestion that art tends to be mimetic (i.e., reducible to the representation of objects, objectivities or processes). Robbe-Grillet cautiously observes that, though it might have been the case that filmic and literary narratives seem to involve duplication (producing a copy or representation) of the real world, in contemporary films and literature the mimetic func-

tion seems to enjoy only a diminished role, in the sense that it has been supplanted by a creative function.[20] One might balk at this suggestion, with the observation that mimesis has been taken to be a crucial aspect of art since Plato's observation – in the *Republic*, 604e–605a – that it is the artist's job to produce 'multicolored imitations' of various tangible and intangible aspects of reality (1997: 1209). It might further be noted that Plato's entire condemnation of bad artists presupposes the validity of the metaphysical claim that there exists a true reality (which good art putatively represents).[21] Robbe-Grillet modifies this characterisation of the function of art by radicalising the artist's creative capacities. Though it must be noted that theories of imitation do involve aspects of artistic creation, in the sense that they tend to identify the artist as creating an adequate description of a reality that is extrinsic to the work of art's reality, this is characterised as a secondary, dependent process. Robbe-Grillet radicalises this creativity when he suggests that the work of art is akin to an architectural 'point' of invention (i.e., a singular point, a singularity, a point of inflection) (1965: 148). Bernard Cache carefully observes that architecture involves two analytically discrete kinds of singularities, extrinsic singularities and 'points of inflection' (or intrinsic singularities). An extrinsic singularity is a hypothetical point with which the tangent of the physical curve, were it conceived as an ideal curve, would be perpendicular (it is the point of a hypothetical y-axis which is involved in the specification of one part of the curve's coordinates). An intrinsic singularity is identified as a point along the curve that 'designates a pure event of curvature' (Cache 1995: 16). Intrinsic singularities are actualised (or at least illustrated) by the ogives that are so often instantiated in the architecture of medieval European churches. Architectural works, it might also be observed, are a particular species of the general class of artwork. Here, it seems that Robbe-Grillet is stipulating that the property of a particular – in this case, the property of having intrinsic singularities as elements of the particular's formal ontological content – may be generalised as the property of a class. Given that the property of a class may gain expression in any particular species or member that is comprehended by the class, this yields the substantive observation that films and novels (because they are also works of art) involve intrinsic singularities. Robbe-Grillet further observes that intrinsic singularities tend to gain artistic expression as diegetic moments of radical upheaval, profound correction, or bifurcation into non-compossible series of events. Robbe-Grillet explicitly notes that his conceptualisation of artistic description is distinct from the mimetic relation through direct reference to temporality when he observes that

the types of temporal changes expressed in films need not correlate with the temporality evidenced by the quantitative measurement of physical (as opposed to artistically presented) clocks and calendars (1965: 151).

It should be observed that Robbe-Grillet's suggestion implies a subtle reformulation of Aristotle's observation that art tends to involve moments of great dramatic reversal. In *Poetics*, Aristotle suggests that lyric poems tend to represent reality adequately, in the sense that they involve περιπέτεια (reversals). Robbe-Grillet seems to suggest that these moments of great reversal in the lives, fates and fortunes of the characters evidence a rupture from the mimetic order, in the sense that none of these needs to be representative of any circumstance in the world. These profound shifts involve an element of temporality, in the senses that they occur within time, evidence a temporal duration and express a moment in temporal continuum. This suggests that a direct expression of time involves the illustration of these sorts of changes, characterised as any of the properties (or attributes) of the relation that obtains among entities in the artwork; thus it is discrete from the sorts of modification that obtain as a property of the mimetic relation that might or might not obtain between these and entities in the physical world. Stated again, the direct expression of temporally saturated change is immanent to the relation among fictive *relata*, which is different in kind and content from the sort of changes that are involved (as attributes, immanent conditions or emergent properties) in the relation that obtains among artistically presented objects and their correlates in the universe populated by physical entities and psycho-social entities with physical attributes.

Deleuze observes that analogous disjunctions may be found in pure optical and acoustic situations, which are constituted by 'opsigns' and 'sonsigns'. In *Cinema 1*, he explains that these situations (and their correlated signs) are filmic precursors to the direct presentation of time (1997a: 210). Properly speaking, both opsigns and sonsigns are indicative of a breakdown of the sensory-motor order (i.e., the sequence of shots, montage) that tends to be identified with realist cinema. Each of these discrete types of sign – though they may be, and often are, present in the same shot, sequence or film – indicates a disjunction among any of the photographically expressed entities relative to one another, as well as any of the narrative, implied character arc, or thematic content attributed to a film or its aspects. In these senses, opsigns and sonsigns are intrinsic singularities that stand apart from (i.e., enjoy a disjunctive relation with) other aspects of the film.[22] Deleuze elucidates the natures of these peculiar moments of filmic upheaval when he observes that these sorts of purely optical and acoustic situations force any of the

characters or spectators of the film to encounter 'something intolerable and unbearable . . . a matter of something too powerful, or too unjust, but sometimes also too beautiful, and which henceforth outstrips our sensory-motor capacities' (1997b: 18). Deleuze further observes that a character immersed in such situations behaves as though they don't know how to respond to their circumstance, as though they are wandering through a terrain that – for whatever reason or confluence of causes – has diminished their capacities to navigate its labyrinthine contours.[23] Though Deleuze suggests that opsigns and sonsigns emerged with striking prominence in Italian Neo-realist films, it would be a mistake to associate them only with the films of a particular historical period. These signs are evident in films from as diverse a set of directors as Roberto Rossellini, Michelangelo Antonioni, Andrei Tarkovsky and Wim Wenders. To think of a clear expression of a purely optical and acoustic situation, one need only recall, for example, the profound alienation (from her dead son, her overly judgemental mother, her utterly oblivious husband, and the seductive charms of socio-economic privilege) evidenced on Ingrid Bergman's face as she wanders through the monolithic factory in *Europe '51* (Rossellini 1952); or Harry Dean Stanton's desperate wandering through the nameless – and seemingly limitless – desert during the mesmerising opening sequence of *Paris, Texas* (Wenders 1984); or the strange industrial wasteland surrounding the petrol-chemical plant which causes an existential crisis for Monica Viti's character in *Red Desert* (Antonioni 1964); or Alexander Kaidanovsky's wandering though the strange wasteland after an accidental alien visitation in Tarkovsky's masterpiece *Stalker* (1979). Taken together, these filmic expressions illustrate something more significant than the mere psychological or physical displacement of a character; the travails of each can be adduced as evidence of a comprehensive alienation. It is a profound indeterminacy that is reflected in these cinematic moments of profound upheaval. Here, the claim is that the pure optical and sound situation presents a filmic representation of the crisis of indeterminacy; its purity is a perfection of a world without answer – a perpetual vagueness without temporal cessation; a comprehensive lostness in which characters are separated from the world of which they are putative inhabitants.

A Direct Presentation of Temporality: Crystals of Time

If the pure optical and acoustic situations presented in film offer a disquieting glimpse into the nature of time characterised as a singularity

– a moment of change – then film's various hyalosigns (a linguistic play on the Attic Greek ὕαλος) further develop the claim that time's direct expression in film amounts to a direct expression of variation. Deleuze carefully elaborates time's direct expression through identification of the natures of time and its relation to filmic expressions of change through reference to filmic 'crystal-images'. It is important to note that crystal-images are unities of analytically discrete processes. The ontological implication here is that the time crystal (which is a representation of the nature of time itself) is constituted by a series of mutually implicated processes: (1) the continual exchange among the couple of the virtual and the actual; (2) the relation among 'the limpid and the opaque'; and (3) the generative relation of 'seed and the environment' (Deleuze 1997b: 71). Deleuze further identifies a close conceptual proximity among the exchange of virtual and actual, and the relation of limpid and opaque, in the sense that the terms seem to enjoy transposability: virtuality is akin to opacity; that which is actual (in film) tends to enjoy visibility (71). It will be further observed that these imply a diminishment of the relevance of temporal succession to the nature of time. The third process – involving seed and environment – suggests a temporal continuum of ceaseless variation. Each invites elucidation.

Deleuze elaborates on the nature of each of these processes through reference to Bergson and Proust. The suggestion that film has the capacity to express time directly is hinted at by Bergson in *Matter and Memory* and 'Memory of the Present and False Recognition' (Bergson 1991, 2012). In *Matter and Memory* he explicitly characterises the act of recollection as akin to the mechanism of a camera focusing on a vaguely determined intentional object.[24] The metaphoric allusion to filmic (or perhaps, theatrical) art is continued with Bergson's observation that the process of recollection tends to yield the psychological sensation of neurotic depersonalisation – i.e., the disquieting feeling that one is standing apart from oneself, a participant in the life of another, as though they were merely an actor, a sentient simulacra reciting the lines and performing the actions associated with someone else's lived experience.[25] Bergson further alludes to a relation between film and the virtual when he observes that the recollected past appears to consciousness as the changing image reflected in 'a moving-mirror' (2012: 165). In addition, he observes that the recollected content of the past gradually appears to one as the ill-defined content of dream-states, deliriums and hallucinations – i.e., as though 'they were phantoms superadded to solid perceptions and conceptions of our waking life, will-o-wisps which hover above it' (154). Perhaps it is worth observing that the visual image

of mirrors as well as the content of their optical reflections have been used throughout the history of cinema to fulfil the diegetic function of revealing something essential about the nature of particular characters. In some of the most profound uses of this visual metaphor of the mirror, these revelations involve a character coming to terms with their past. In film, it tends to be the case that when there is a mirror present, someone is undergoing a profound modification. The presence of mirrors in the history of western cinema is evidenced by their prevalence in the films of Orson Welles, Robert Clouse, Martin Scorsese and Wim Wenders. Here, one cannot help but think of Rita Hayward's riveting elaboration of her past as she stumbles blindly through a hall of mirrors in *The Lady from Shanghai* (Welles 1947); Bruce Lee's recollection that 'the enemy is only images and illusions' as he battles infinitely recurring images of a phantasmal foe in *Enter the Dragon* (Clouse 1973); Robert De Niro's psychotic self-examination in *Taxi Driver* (Scorsese 1976); or Harry Dean Stanton's heart-breaking elaboration of his past to his ex-wife through a two-way mirror in the penultimate sequence of *Paris, Texas*. In each, there is a visual linkage among the mirror, hallucination and moments of profound modification of at least one character. Though it might be observed that these instances of mirrors in film prioritise visual expressions of change, it should be pointed out that both Bergson and Deleuze explicitly stipulate that change is an aspect of temporality. When coupled with the observation that the filmic representation of mirrors tends to be concomitant with change in some sense of the term (as a modification of a character's sense of self, a variation of the identities or motives of other characters, or a change to other elements of the filmic universe), this implies an involvement of aspects of temporality, and (thus) is a cinematic representation of time. Bergson's textual allusions to mirrors and the mercurial elements of the past expressed in their reflected contents, when coupled with the plurality of filmic representations of mirrors, suggest a conceptual foundation for Deleuze's elaboration of the nature of time through reference to filmic expression.

Ronald Bogue observes that Deleuze identifies filmic sequences involving mirrors as the most basic expression of virtual and actual exchange involved in crystal-images (2003: 121). Deleuze explicitly notes that crystal-images afford a direct presentation of time. What does it mean to suggest that time may be the sort of metaphysical entity that may be presented directly? Deleuze contends that crystal-images express two claims about the nature of temporality (which he formulates negatively): (1) that temporal ordering is 'not made up of succession' (1997b: 274); (2) that time is non-reducible to an isolated temporal instant (i.e., a static

moment isolated from a temporal continuum or temporal flow). The suggestion that it would be inaccurate to artificially isolate the object presented as a temporally extended element of a duration is uncontentious on ontological grounds – parts are non-identical to wholes. Deleuze's claim that crystal-images diminish the importance of linear temporal succession ($t_1, t_2 \ldots t_n$) invites explanation. The claim is that temporality is non-reducible to succession. It is important to point out that Deleuze is *not* denying that linear temporal ordering appears to obtain in film (as it does in the non-filmic world). In this sense, Deleuze's distinction is analogous to Aristotle's identification – in *Physics IV*, 219b2–219b9[26] – that time may be characterised as something other than either what is measured (i.e., the motion of existents) or the linear succession of numbers that one uses when one measures the motion of existents. Deleuze modifies Aristotle's distinction to suggest that the measure of the movement of existents is ontologically secondary to the form of temporality. Deleuze's claim here is that linear temporal succession is ontologically dependent on a more fundamental ontological relation. It is this fundamental relation that is directly expressed by the crystal-image. Deleuze is suggesting that there is an ontological process more fundamental to temporality than the succession of temporal moments; though there still may be the succession of scenes in a film (just as the succession of minutes, hours and years seem to obtain as adequate measures of the moments of the durations enjoyed by the real entities that may or may not be represented in film), there is some ontological process primary to these. It is this process that is presented in the crystal-image; the direct-image of time is a filmic representation of the ontologically primary process of time.

Deleuze's elaboration of the direct presentation of time through filmic hyalosigns is a Bergsonian film philosophy that Bergson never got around to writing. This philosophical lineage is evidenced by Deleuze's observation that crystal-images illustrate an ontologically primary 'indivisible unity of an actual image and "its" virtual image' (1997b: 79). Each of these terms and the relation between them cries out for clarification. Bergson elucidates the complex nature of the relation through reference to the metaphor of an object and its reflection in a mirror.[27] Bergson makes two stipulations about the natures of the *relata*: the objects reflected by the mirror enjoy an actual mode of existence; the reflected images are virtual. These two modes of being may be distinguished from one another by their respective properties (or predicates). Bergson explicitly identifies materiality and (by implication) material causal efficacy as the relevant predicates. The claim is that both causal

efficacy and materiality may be predicated of actual objects. Virtual entities enjoy none of the capacities to be influenced by entities that characterise physical material existence; virtual entities are immaterial and neutral with respect to material causation. In contradistinction, an entity is actual if it is causally relevant in a material circumstance. If one were to characterise materiality and causal efficacy as ontological conditions which must be met for an object to enjoy actuality, then one must observe that virtual entities do not obtain as actual, because they fail to fulfil these. Bergson positively identifies the virtual as the ontological domain which most closely resembles 'the plane of a dream' (2012: 165) (i.e., the domain populated by phantasmal entities that – for all their apparent reality – lack the capacity to affect actualised entities). The specification that virtual entities enjoy the predication of immateriality seems to invite a comparison of virtual entities to either of any of the species of abstract entities (i.e., *abstracta*) or possibilities. Virtual entities are none of these. Citing Proust's formulation, Deleuze insists that virtuality is 'real without being actual, ideal without being abstract' (1991: 96; Proust 1982: 902). He observes that the possible may be conceptualised as that which subsists in opposition to the real, in the sense that what is possible is not yet realised: the possible does not obtain as something realised, in the sense that it obtains as either that which is ontologically prior to that which is realised or that which is a potential result of a deduction that has not yet been made. The suggestion here is that possibility enjoys a modality that is categorically distinct from that enjoyed by real entities – i.e., 'the possible has no reality' (Deleuze 1991: 96). Deleuze further specifies that the virtual may be identified as a species of ideality, in the sense that it enjoys the property of immateriality – a property that tends to be associated with ideal objects. Here, it is essential to note that the property of immateriality does not imply indeterminacy. The quality of immateriality implies only that an entity is not subject to quantitative determination. If Ingarden has demonstrated anything, it is that immaterial entities – like reflections in mirrors, literary characters, photographically represented objectivities – are subject to rigorous qualitative determination. A viewer of *Cool Hand Luke* (Rosenberg 1967) knows the exact nature of the protagonist, right down to how many hard-boiled eggs he can eat. Because virtual entities may be qualitatively determined, they enjoy none of the ontological ambiguity that tends to be associated with abstract entities. It is perhaps worth noting that the metaphysical conditions implied by the distinction between virtuality and actuality are adequate, in the sense that were they denied, the result would be an existential terror of the

kind evoked by certain horror movies. Here one cannot help but think of the virtual image clawing its way out of a television screen in David Cronenberg's *Videodrome* (1983), or the terrifying moments of monsters materialising out of reflective surfaces in the trilogy of Japanese *Ring* films (Nakata 1998, 1999; Tsuruta 2000). The terror elicited by these scenes of the virtual being actualised as material is sufficient to demonstrate the metaphysical truth of the complex distinction between the virtual and actual.

The crystal-image involves a relation of the virtual memory and the actual present. The tension of these is the content of time's direct expression in cinema. Bergson suggests that the past emerges as a moment of temporal bifurcation, a relation among the virtual and actual that yields a division of the instant into 'two jets exactly symmetrical, one of which falls back toward the past, whilst the other springs forward to the future' (2012: 160). Deleuze explicitly characterises this relation as the simultaneous creation of two discrete temporal modalities (the memorial past and the fleeting present).[28] The staggering implication is that the past does not follow after the lived present – one's memory of an object obtains simultaneously with one's perception of the object. Proust beautifully illustrates this through reference to the lingering scent of madeleines:

> But let a noise or scent, once heard or once smelt, be heard or smelt again in the present and at the same time in the past, real without being actual, ideal without being abstract, and immediately the permanent and habitually concealed essence of things is liberated and our true self which seemed – perhaps for long years seemed – to be dead but was not altogether dead, is awakened and reanimated as it receives the celestial nourishment that is brought to it. A minute freed from the order of time has re-created in us, to feel it, the man freed from the order of time. And one can understand that this man should have confidence in his joy, even if the simple taste of a madeleine does not seem logically to contain within it the reasons for this joy, one can understand the word 'death' should have no meaning for him; situated outside time, why should he fear the future?
>
> But this species of optical illusion, which placed beside me a moment of the past that was incompatible with the present, could not last for long. The images presented to us by the voluntary memory can, it is true, be prolonged at will, for the voluntary memory requires no more exertion on our part than the turning over of the pages in a picture book. (Proust 1982: 906)

Perhaps what is most remarkable about this eloquent elaboration of the function of a time-crystal is that it seems to involve a denial of the

hypothesis that a dependency relation obtains among the present and the past; the past does not subsist from the present; the two (characterised as any of past and present, virtual and actual, perceived object and content of recollection) emerge in immanent relation to one another as ontological correlates, each designating a discrete temporal modality. Perceptual moments of quantifiably existent entities are co-created as virtual entities that obtain as existing qualities. Further, Deleuze carefully notes that a crystalline-image never reaches a state of completion – it never obtains as 'altogether dead' – in the sense that its process of producing the virtual and actual never ceases. That is, the crystal involves an 'indiscernible exchange [that] is always renewed and reproduced' (1997b: 274). The suggestion here is that time is continually regained in the ongoing process of generating the past and the present simultaneously. This is a regeneration of discrete modes of time, in which each enjoys a temporal difference from what was immediately prior as well as an ontological difference from the other. In this sense, the attribute of finitude cannot be predicated of time. Though the relation among the virtual and the actual is stabilised in the form of a relation, this stability does not imply any temporal, logical or ontological cessation. In the most general sense, one cannot predicate an end to time – i.e., temporality is an ongoing relation, a continuum of differentiation. Taken together, these elucidations reveal that the direct-image of time involves four non-competing aspects: (1) the fundamental indeterminacy of a singularity; (2) virtuality and actuality, which enjoy a categorical distinction (as is demonstrated by their non-reducible properties); (3) a simultaneous creation of the past and present, each of which is characterised as a non-reducible (non-subsistent, relatively autonomous) way of time's being; (4) its expression as an ongoing stable relation (i.e., a continuum) that is akin to the process of a seed involved in a germination, in the sense that it produces difference, in multiple senses.

Concluding Remarks: The Time of Cinema

Perhaps there has been no greater change in the visual arts than the tectonic shift of the camera recording the movements of the workers leaving the Lumière brothers' factory. No more were we condemned to simply viewing the arrested movements of entities in repose. No more was all visual art a still life. No more was the realism of art forced to capture entities arrested in time. The birth of cinema changed everything for those who were able to apprehend entities expressing themselves as singular moments of time.

In his *Cinema* texts, Deleuze suggests that the changes heralded by cinema involved a change to our conceptions of time. Film reveals temporality to be a singularity. The cinema is a temporal art form, in the sense that it conveys the actions of entities over a temporal duration, and these effect qualitative changes in the lives of the audience for an extended duration of moments in time. Deleuze observes that some of cinema's most sublime moments – the pure optical and acoustic situations – suggest a deeper involvement with temporality and cinema. In these, the viewer is treated to a glimpse of time's radical indeterminacy. When a character looks into a mirror or catches a reflection of themselves in the window of a passing streetcar, this reveals a further aspect of the nature of temporal change. With the proliferation of crystal-images, cinema reveals time to be something other than the mere succession of temporal instants. The image in the mirror illustrates an exchange of the virtual and the actual – an occurrence that is ontologically primary to a succession of existents. Further, it is observed that this relation of virtual and actual involves the strictly simultaneous and continual creation of past and present as correlated modalities of time.

Notes

1. Referring to Deleuze's *Essays Critical and Clinical* and *The Logic of Sense*, Williams observes that in these 'concepts and artwork grow inwards and explode outwards together, in a style with more rhythm, texture, complexity of pace, and linguistic invention' than is evident in either of Deleuze's books on *Cinema* (2011: 161).
2. With his suggestion that Deleuze seems to bear an affinity to various phenomenologists and explicitly phenomenological claims, Schrader is hardly a voice in the wilderness. Particularly interesting recent studies advancing similar theses include Somers-Hall 2019; Wambacq 2017; Lampert 2015; Bryant 2008; and Shores 2014. It should be pointed out that most of these tend to focus on Deleuze's early work – primarily *Difference and Repetition* – while leaving aside Deleuze's critiques of Husserl (and the Husserlian concept of 'natural perception') in *The Logic of Sense*, *Cinema 1: The-Movement Image*, and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*. François Zourabichvili suggests that when one takes Deleuze's characterisation of 'becoming' – particularly, the various cinematic becomings that are evidenced by the changes in the way films are made, as well as the ways cinematic narrative style has altered with the French New Wave – Deleuze's conceptual distance 'from phenomenology and its heirs' becomes apparent (Zourabichvili 2012: 173).
3. Cook offers a lovely, condensed history of the art form, including its genesis from the zoetrope (2016: 7–14).
4. Perhaps due to their brevity, Sartre's observations have generated scant critical analysis. Dana Polan is one of the few to have elaborated on Sartre's 'occasional' thought on cinema (Polan 1987).

5. Here, Deleuze mentions Merleau-Ponty's remarks in *Phenomenology of Perception* (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 68). Wambaq notes that Merleau-Ponty also makes passing reference to cinema in a few other texts (2017: 233 n.3).
6. Typically, the illusion of perceived motion is achieved by projecting still images at a rate of rate of twenty-four frames per second. Settling on this frame rate was the result of a fraught history of technological evolution that spanned almost two-thirds of the nineteenth century: beginning with the invention of Plateau's Phenakistoscope (1832), progressing through Horner's Zoetrope (1832), Muybridge's Zoopraxiscope (1879) and Edison's Kinetograph (1891), to finally be perfected with the Lumière brothers' Cinématographe (1895).
7. Spiegelberg observes that Husserlian intentional directedness at an object involves four discrete characteristics: (1) objectivation; (2) identification; (3) connection; (4) constitution. The intentional act of fulfilling schematised aspects occurs in the intuitive fulfilment of an entity which appears as an incomplete – not yet fully determined – form. This tends to be associated with the intentional process of connection (Spiegelberg 1971: 108–11). Mitscherling presents an excellent elaboration of the complex process of fulfilling schematised aspects that are presented in literary works of art. The model presented here is analogous to the process of natural perception. Mitscherling writes: 'When consciousness attends to (or "intends") a particular object, it is usually the case that only some of the "aspects" of that object are presented immediately to consciousness, and these aspects are said to be either fulfilled or unfulfilled. For example, when we look to a table from above, the table presents us with the aspect of "table-top" and "table-bottom", and the former is fulfilled while the latter remains unfulfilled. When we look at the table from beneath, the former (table-top) aspect is unfulfilled, and the latter (table-bottom) is fulfilled. A similar situation obtains in the case of the literary work of art, but here the reader is often forced to fulfil for herself many of those aspects that are presented by the author as unfulfilled, and she does so with regard to those aspects that are presented more fully, i.e., as fulfilled. The latter provide the reader with a direction to follow in her intentional activity of fulfilling these unfulfilled aspects, which are said to have been presented as "schematised". This intentional activity of the fulfilment of schematised aspects is a central component of the general activity of "concretisation". As no character, for example, can ever be exhaustively presented by an author – no character, that is to say, can ever be portrayed as fully and completely determined – the manner in which this concretisation is to proceed can only be schematically determined by the literary work through its stratum of these schematised aspects' (Mitscherling 2010: 143–4, n.10).
8. Deleuze elaborates on Walter Ruttmann's masterful sequence during a lecture on the movement-image (Deleuze 1982).
9. Husserl writes: 'to the extent, however, that every-consciousness is "consciousness-of", the essential study of consciousness also includes that of consciousness-meaning and consciousness-objectivity as such. To study any kind of objectivity whatever according to its general essence (a study that can pursue interests far removed from those of knowledge theory and the investigation of consciousness) means to concern oneself with objectivity's modes of givenness and to exhaust its essential content with the process of "clarification" proper to it' (1965: 90–1).
10. Dastur writes: 'because, even if transcendental phenomenology remains dualistic in spite of Husserl's efforts toward monism, its purpose is not to assert dualism dogmatically, but rather to demonstrate, in line with the phenomenological way of thinking, that unity can only be given pretheoretically (*vortheoretisch*): the awakening of thought splits this unity irrevocably into pieces. That

is why, for Husserl, dualism never ceases to be a problem – a problem which pointed to itself as the most thought deserving' (1983: 65).

11. In Deleuze 2002: 22–32 and 32–52.
12. Deleuze observes: 'In other words, if I want to speak in more scholarly terms, mathematical or physical terms borrowed from Leibniz's terminology, movement in the process of occurring implies a differential, a differential of movement. The unity of movement in the process of occurring is, in the first place, the differential of movement, that is, the difference between the movement that has just occurred and the one that's occurring, or between the one that is occurring and the one that is going to occur. We can call this differential effort (or urge); in Latin, we will call it *conatus*, that is, effort, or urge, or admit that Bergson is not far off when he calls it tendency' (Deleuze 1987).
13. Hyppolite observes: 'This [Bergsonian] duration – which is pure succession, the extension of the past into the present, and therefore already memory – is not a series of distinct terms outside of one another, nor a coexistence of past with present' (2003: 112).
14. Here Deleuze observes: 'Pure duration offers us a succession that is purely internal, without exteriority; space, an exteriority, without succession (in effect, that is the memory of the past; the recollection of what has happened in space would already imply a mind that endures)' (1991: 37).
15. Bergson writes: 'The wholly superficial displacements of masses and molecules studied in physics and chemistry would become by relation to that inner vital movement (which is transformation and not translation) what the position of a moving object is to the movement of that object in space' (1998: 37).
16. Barthes characterises this capacity as the *punctum* of an image. Barthes elaborates: 'it is this element which rises from the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me. A Latin word exists to designate this wound, this prick; this mark made by a pointed instrument . . . *punctum*; for *punctum* is also: sting, speck, cut, little hole – and also a cast of the dice. A photograph's *punctum* is that accident which pricks me (but also bruises me, is poignant to me)' (1981: 26–7).
17. Hansen highlights the fraught nature of a hermeneutic investigation of the nature of Benjamin's concept when she observes: 'Anything but a clearly delimited, stable concept, aura describes a cluster of meanings and relations that appear in Benjamin's writings in various configurations and not always under its own name; it is this conceptual fluidity that allows aura to become such a productive nodal point in Benjamin's thinking' (2008: 339).
18. Benjamin elaborates on the disquieting experience one might have when viewing the haunting gazes of subjects in Daguerreotype images of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – i.e., the sorts of images that would have most certainly been familiar to Bergson when he was conceptualising the nature of duration and the effect of the 'cinematographic illusion'. Benjamin writes: 'Experience of the aura thus arises from the fact that a response characteristic of human relationships is transposed to the relationship between humans and inanimate or natural objects. The person we look at, or who feels he is being looked at, looks at us in turn. To experience the aura of an object we look at means to invest it with the ability to look back at us' (2006a: 338).
19. Avant-garde films tend to be at the vanguard of these explorations of the possibilities of filmic representation. Though rarely enjoying critical or commercial success, these films – which are often rich in symbolic meaning and dream sequences that confound the passive viewer – truly show the way for future cinematic artists. Maya Deren's and Alexander Hammid's *Meshes in the Afternoon* (1941) is a wonderful example.

20. Robbe-Grillet writes: 'Description once served to situate the chief contours of a setting, then to cast light on some of its particularly revealing elements; it no longer mentions anything except insignificant objects, or objects which it is concerned to make so. It once claimed to reproduce a pre-existing reality; it now asserts its creative function' (1965: 144–7).
21. It would be difficult to overstate either the longevity or importance of Plato's identification of art as mimetic. Charles Sanders Peirce offers only a slight modification of Plato's suggestion with his observation that visual art tends to represent 'iconic signs' of the real (1982: 53–4). John Hyman develops the epistemological aspects of Plato's claim by insisting that one can only understand the truth of a painting – i.e., understand its sense – through reference to the immaterial or material objects that it represents (2009: 495–8). This is not to say that Robbe-Grillet is a voice in the wilderness. Echoing John Ruskin, E. H. Gombrich observes that visual art tends to involve a creation of the 'innocence of the eye' (1960: 296). One implication of Gombrich's suggestion is that such innocence might not pre-exist the viewer's participation with the work of art. This further suggests that art is non-mimetic, in the sense that it cannot resemble (or copy) that which does not exist.
22. Deleuze continually modifies his concept of singularity. It seems each of the books following *The Logic of Sense* – in which Deleuze first uses the term – witnesses a further evolution of the nuanced nature of singularities. Though Manuel DeLanda suggests that singularities may be characterised as 'spaciotemporal dynamisms' and 'passive selves', these attempts at definition seem inadequate, in the sense that both of these are profoundly opaque, and perhaps even involve definitional aspects that would confound any assertion of identity (2002: 206–7). Steven Shaviro observes that Deleuze tends to identify singularities as 'acategorical' entities, in the sense 'that they cannot be categorized in any terms broader than their own . . . they cannot be fitted into a hierarchy of species and genera, of the particular and the general: just as they cannot be derived as instances of any larger, more overarching and predetermining structure' (2012: 89, n.11). Daniel W. Smith traces Deleuze's concept of singularities to a modification of Albert Lautman's suggestion – in his *Essay on the Notions of Structure and Existence in Mathematics* – that points on a geometric curve may be distinguished from one another in terms of whether or not they are involved in a change of direction in the curve: ordinary points do not radically alter the direction of the curve; singular points (or singularities) are moments on the curve at which the trajectory of the curve alters (2012: 302). Smith further observes that Deleuze generalises the variability implied in Lautman's strictly mathematical definition, to suggest qualitative and affective components. It should be noted that not all of these need be temporal, in the sense that some have suggested that mathematical entities enjoy an a-temporal existence. Taken together, these suggest that a singularity may by rigorously characterised as any of a temporal or non-temporal moment of variation or difference (i.e., change). It is conceivable that such moments could be visually or aurally represented in film. This is plainly the case in films involving profound crisis, if it is granted that these are not – and perhaps never aspired to be – copies, imitations or duplications of a world marked by the striking appearance of continuity, banality or putative normalcy, all of which might be characteristics of a circumstance bereft of profound variation. It might be further observed that all of these apparent traits of normalcy could obtain as representations in film – the typical, even quotidian, has often been the subject matter of some of the more fascinating films of the last hundred years of cinema; e.g., the films of Antonioni, but this would not negate (or otherwise diminish) the possibility of singularities

being present in these, as long as one acknowledges that the seemingly banal may involve understated crises, which are – for all their subtlety – just as profound as those expressed in the most bombastic Hollywood blockbuster.

23. Deleuze elaborates: 'These are pure optical and sound situations, in which the character does not know how to respond, abandoned spaces in which he ceases to experience and act so that he enters into flight, goes on a trip, comes and goes, vaguely indifferent to what happens to him, undecided as to what must be done' (1997b: 272).
24. Bergson writes: 'Whenever we are trying to recover a recollection, to call up some period of our history, we become conscious of an act *sui generis* by which we detach ourselves from the present in order to replace ourselves, first, in the past – a work of adjustment, something like the framing of a camera' (1991: 133–4).
25. Bergson writes: 'The more he analyses his experience, the more he will split into two personages, one of which moves about on the stage while the other sits and looks. On the one hand, he knows that he continues to be what he was, a self who thinks and acts comfortably to what the situation requires, a self-inserted into real life, and adapting itself to it by a free effort of the will; this is what his perception of the present assures him. But the memory of this present, which is equally there, makes him believe that he is repeating what has been said already, seeing again what has been seen already, and so transforms him into an actor reciting his part' (2012: 169).
26. It is important to observe the limited scope of this analogy. The conceptual differences between Deleuze's and Aristotle's respective philosophies of time are substantive, as are the differences in their metaphysics. Daniel W. Smith (2001) elaborates on the differences between Deleuze's and Aristotle's metaphysics.
27. Bergson writes: 'The memory seems to be the perception of what the object in the mirror is to the object in front of it. The object can be touched as well as seen; acts upon us as well as we on it; it is pregnant with possible actions; it is actual. The image is virtual, and though it resembles the object, it is incapable of doing what the object does' (2012: 165).
28. Deleuze observes: 'What constitutes the crystal-image is the most fundamental operation of time: since past is constituted not after the present that it was but at the same time, it has to split itself in two at each moment as present and past, which differ from each other in nature, or, what amounts to the same thing, it has to split the present in two heterogeneous directions, one of which is launched toward the future while the other falls into the past' (1997b: 81).

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