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Alethic Functionalism and Our Folk Theory of Truth

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Abstract

According to alethic functionalism, truth is a higher-order multiply realizable property of propositions. After briefly presenting the view’s main principles and motivations, I defend alethic functionalism from recent criticisms raised against it by Cory Wright. Wright argues that alethic functionalism will collapse either into deflationism or into a view that takes “true” as simply ambiguous. I reject both claims.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, 101 Manchester Hall, 344 Mansfield Road, Storrs, CT, 06269-2054, U.S.A

    M. P. Lynch

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  1. M. P. Lynch
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Correspondence to M. P. Lynch.

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Lynch, M.P. Alethic Functionalism and Our Folk Theory of Truth. Synthese 145, 29–43 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-1771-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-1771-2

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