‘직관의 문제’는 현대 윤리학의 중요한 쟁점의 하나이다. 최근의 과학적 연구는 도덕적 직관에 대해 비판적인 입장을 취할 새롭고도 강력한 이유를 제공하고 있다. 도덕적 직관의 프레이밍 효과에 대한 연구는 도덕적 직관이 도덕적 옳고 그름의 결정과 무관한 프레임 제시 방법에 의해 좌우된다는 것을 보여주며, 그린의 연구는 도덕적 상황에 대한 직관적 반응의 차이가 조상의 진화적 적응의 환경에서 진화된 정서적 견인력의 차이에서 비롯된 것임을 설득력 있게 보여준다. 이러한 직관에 대한 과학적 연구 결과는 직관의 신뢰성과 일관성에 심각한 의문을 제기한다. 그것은 직관에 기초한 윤리학과 반직관주의 윤리학의 논쟁에서, 그리고 롤즈의 반성적 평형 모델과 헤어의 도덕적 사유의 두 수준 모델 사이에서 반직관주의 윤리학과 두 수준 모델이 현대 과학의 연구 성과와 더 정합적임을 보여준다.
The problem of intuitions is one of the most important issues in contemporary ethics. Recent researches on moral intuitions in empirical psychology and neuroscience provide us with new and cogent reasons for taking a critical stand toward moral intuitions. Research on framing effects shows that moral intuitions rely on the framing as wording or context which is irrelevant to what is morally right or wrong. And Joshua D. Greene's research in neuroscience shows that the differences of moral responses to moral situations come from the differences of emotional pull which had been evolved in our ancestors's evolutionary adaptedness environment. These scientific researches throw a serious doubt on the reliability and consistency of intuitions. They suggest that the anti-intuitionist ethics and R. M. Hare's two-level model of moral thinking are more coherent to contemporary scientific researches than the intuition-based ethics and John Rawls' model of reflective equilibrium.
The problem of intuitions is one of the most important issues in contemporary ethics. Recent researches on moral intuitions in empirical psychology and neuroscience provide us with new and cogent reasons for taking a critical stand toward moral intuitions. Research on framing effects shows that moral intuitions rely on the framing as wording or context which is irrelevant to what is morally right or wrong. And Joshua D. Greene's research in neuroscience shows that the differences of moral responses to moral situations come from the differences of emotional pull which had been evolved in our ancestors's evolutionary adaptedness environment. These scientific researches throw a serious doubt on the reliability and consistency of intuitions. They suggest that the anti-intuitionist ethics and R. M. Hare's two-level model of moral thinking are more coherent to contemporary scientific researches than the intuition-based ethics and John Rawls' model of reflective equilibrium.