In this paper I defend the idea that deliberately pursuing a lucrative career in order to donate a large proportion of one's earnings is typically ethically preferable to a career within the charity sector. Final version published in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice here: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10677-013-9433-4#page-1

In this paper, we discuss Iason Gabriel's recent piece on criticisms of effective altruism. Many of the criticisms rest on the notion that effective altruism can roughly be equated with utilitarianism applied to global poverty and health interventions which are supported by randomised control trials and disability-adjusted life year estimates. We reject this characterisation and argue that effective altruism is much broader from the point of view of ethics, cause areas, and methodology. We then enter into a detailed discussion of the specific criticisms Gabriel discusses. Our argumentation mirrors Gabriel's, dealing with the objections that the effective altruist community neglects considerations of justice, uses a flawed methodology, and is less effective than its proponents suggest. Several of the criticisms do not succeed, but we also concede that others involve issues which require significant further study. Our conclusion is thus twofold: the critique is weaker than suggested, but it is useful insofar as it initiates a philosophical discussion about effective altruism and highlights the importance of more research on how to do the most good.

What I seek to do in this paper is to reemphasize what I see as the forgotten or neglected other half of the effective altruist equation. Effective altruists need to take seriously the ways in which their actions contribute to systemic inequality and structural violence. Charitable donation is not enough to create a paradigm shift or stop systemic injustice. In tackling systemic injustice, the ascetic response may allow effective altruists to attack the roots of the problem more directly. Further, the cost-benefit analysis and randomized controlled trials favored by the movement can produce distinctly biased perceptions that leave effective altruists blind to the political dimensions of many types of harm. Balancing ascetic approaches to combating suffering may temper the overzealous focus on cost-effective charities and make room for the support of the causes this narrow focus excludes. Ultimately, this paper defends the basic tenets of effective altruism: that we have a duty to reduce suffering in the world and that we should apply our powers of reason in order to make our labors maximally effective.

aBsTracT altruism is embedded in our biology and in our culture. we offer our bus seats to the disabled and elderly, give directions to disoriented tourists, and donate a portion of our income charity. Yet for all the good it does, there are deep problems with altruism as it is practiced today. nearly all of us, when asked, will say that we care about practicing altruism in a way that effectively improves the lives of others. almost none of us, when asked, can honestly say that we have made a serious effort to ensure that we are practicing altruism in a way that effectively improves the lives of others. disparities like these are indicative of flaws in our cognitive architecture-biases which ensure that the traditional practice of altruism is incongruous with our own values. This disconnect between our values and our actions causes our altruistic efforts to help fewer people to a lesser extent than they otherwise could. i argue that traditional altruism is in need of reformation and defend a social and philosophical movement aimed at achieving this reformation known as effective altruism. The reason effective altruism is such a promising alternative to traditional altruism is its application of economic thinking to the realm of altruism and morality. an econo-mist's mentality is, i suggest, a necessary instrument for bridging the gap between our values and our actions, allowing us to practice altruism in a way that more effectively improves the lives of others.

A review essay on Singer, _The Most Good You Can Do_ and MacAskill, _Doing Good Better_.

Policy Exchange (London)

I propose an experiment to determine the effects of priming for Value by Calculation and Value by Feeling on giving to effective charitives. I first develop a model for charitable giving when an individual is allocating between two charities, one more effective and one less effective, and discuss how changes in parameters would lead to different giving outcomes. I propose a lab experiment to determine the effects of valuation priming and to test to the theory that more System 2-oriented individuals would give to more effective charities than would more System 1-oriented individuals.

Effective altruism is a philosophy and a social movement that aims to revolutionise the way in which we do philanthropy. It encourages individuals to do as much good as possible, typically by contributing money to the best-performing aid and development organizations. Surprisingly, this approach has met with considerable resistance among aid practitioners. They argue that effective altruism is insensitive to justice insofar as it overlooks the value of equality, urgency and rights. They also hold that the movement suffers from methodological bias, which means that it takes materialistic, individualistic and instrumental approach to doing good. Finally, they maintain that effective altruists hold false empirical beliefs about the world, and that they reach mistaken conclusions about how best to act for that reason. This paper weighs the force of each objection in turn, and looks at responses to the challenge they pose.

In an online experiment, I test whether presenting donors with arguments for the relevance of effectiveness information makes them more likely to access information about charity effectiveness and, in response, to make more effective donations. Subjects were offered to donate part of their experimental endowments to one of three organizations benefitting children in African countries, and effective donations were measured as the average contribution to the most effective charity. I do not find any evidence for the main hypothesis, indicating that donors were unconvinced by this particular intervention, may be fundamentally more motivated by other considerations, and/or may be skeptical of the quality of effectiveness information. Improving donors' interest in effectiveness and thus the quality of their donations may be difficult through the means of simple arguments. Informing subjects of the irrelevance of overhead costs did not make them less likely to access overhead information, either. In contrast to previous studies, I do not​ ​ find​ ​ the​ ​ main​ ​ effects​ ​ to​ ​ be​ ​ masked​ ​ by​ ​ heterogeneities.