Berkeley's views on time are clearly expressed, succinctly stated, and quite untenable. In view of these facts it is strange to find him consistently misunderstood, and often praised. In particular, A.A. Luce, Berkeley's most committed commentator, gets him completely wrong, attributing to him a doctrine which he explicitly rejects.

Berkeley's views on time must be garnered from sparse references to the topic in the Philosophical Commentaries, in two sections of the Principles, in the correspondence with Johnson, and in the First Dialogue. Time is not discussed in De Motu, rather surprisingly, though this fact is seldom noticed. Thus, H.G. Alexander, in his introduction to the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, writes:

Like fish with chips, philosophical discussions of space usually consort with discussions of time, and there is a strong tendency to assume that argument patterns employed, and conclusions reached, in the one may be transferred, with minimal changes, to the other.