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Justice and the Market

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

A.M. MacLeod*
Affiliation:
Queen's University

Extract

Direct comparison of the ostensibly competing principles embedded in rival theories of Justice is often complicated by differences of view as to the nature and scope of the concrete Judgments a theory of Justice must attempt to illumine. Aristotle's official view, for example, is that Justice is a disposition or character trait. This commits him to scrutiny of Judgments about the Justice of particular actions since it is actions which serve to reveal, and to help form, the disposition in question. But it also stands in the way of any proper recognition of the fact that the competing principles of Justice he examines apply in the first instance neither to actions nor to dispositions but to states of affairs or situations: actions are Just for Aristotle when they help to bring about a Just distribution.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1983

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Footnotes

*

Part of the work on this paper was begun while I was a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities at the University of Edinburgh. Earlier versions were helpfully criticised at seminars and colloquia at Edinburgh, Stirling and Queen's and also at both the annual congress of the Canadian Philosophical Association at Dalhousie in June, 1981 and the 1982 meetings of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association in Columbus.