

# Mathematical Structures of Simple Voting Games

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## **Abstract**

We aim to systematize the quasi-algebraic operations involving simple voting games (SVGs), by constructing an appropriate category, consisting of a class of objects and mappings (morphisms) between these objects, in terms of which all the operations involving SVGs can be defined in a natural way. But what should we take as the objects of the desired category? After trying an obvious solution, which turns out to be a dead end, we present the right solution. All the operations on SVGs fall naturally into place. We discover the remarkable central role played by the operation of SVG composition.

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## Motivation

- Systematize the theory of SVGs and clarify its structure.
- Bring it into line with other mathematical theories: category theory is the *structural* foundation of mathematics.
- Find connections with other branches of mathematics and obtain new results about SVGs

## Terminology, notation

By “game” I mean simple voting game. A game is an ordered pair  $(V, \mathbf{G})$ , where  $V$  is a finite set – the set of voters, aka the *assembly* – and  $\mathbf{G}$  is the set of winning coalitions.

I say that  $(V, \mathbf{G})$  is a game *on*  $V$ .

I often use sloppy notation, omitting  $V$  and writing  $\mathbf{G}$  instead of  $(V, \mathbf{G})$ .

I denote by  $L_V$  the set of all games on  $V$ .

## Operations involving games

- Application of a game as decision rule to a division of the voters into “yes” and “no” voters.
- Composition of games, including the special cases of forming the meet and join of SVGs.
- Formation of Boolean subgames, including the special cases of forming subgames and reduced games.
- Adding dummy voters to a game.
- Transforming an SVG by forming voter blocs, whereby coalitions of voters amalgamate to form new single voters.

## An obvious attempt

Let  $\varphi : V \rightarrow W$  be an arbitrary map from  $V$  to the finite set  $W$ . For any game  $G$  on  $V$ , define  $L\varphi G$  as a game on  $W$  by putting

$$L\varphi G := \{Y \subseteq W : \varphi^{-1}[Y] \in G\}.$$

This seems promising. We do get a category whose objects are the games, and with mappings of the form  $L\varphi$  as morphisms. (The notation ‘ $L\varphi$ ’ anticipates an insight that will transpire later on.)

The mapping  $L\varphi$  is a sort of homomorphism.

$L\varphi G$  is the game on  $W$  resulting from  $G$  by formation of the blocs corresponding to the partition  $\{\varphi^{-1}[\{w\}] : w \in W\}$  of  $V$ .

Moreover, if  $w \in W - \varphi[V]$  (ie,  $\varphi^{-1}[\{w\}] = \emptyset$ ) then  $w$  is a dummy in  $L\varphi G$ .

If  $\varphi$  is injective (one-to-one) but not surjective (onto) then  $L\varphi G$  is essentially  $G$  with added dummies.

So this takes care of bloc formation and adding dummies.

**But it doesn't take care of any of the other operations: application of a game to a division of the voters, composition, Boolean subgames.**





## An insight:

$L\varphi$  is defined “in the same way” not just for one particular game  $G$ , but for all games in  $L_V$  and it maps  $L_V$  into  $L_W$ . This is conveyed by the following diagram:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} V & \xrightarrow{\varphi} & W \\ \downarrow & & \downarrow \\ L_V & \xrightarrow{L\varphi} & L_W \end{array}$$

The significance of the downward arrows will become clear later. Moreover,  $L_V$  and  $L_W$  are lattices, in fact distributive lattices; **and  $L\varphi$  respects the lattice structure.**

So the idea is to look at a category **whose objects are not individual games, but lattices of the form  $L_V$**  for all finite sets  $V$ , and whose morphisms are not just mappings of the form  $L\varphi$  but ***all* mappings between these objects that respect their structure as lattices.** We denote **this category by  $G$ .**

This is analogous to the insight of Peano who – following ideas of Grassmann – realized that to get a satisfactory vector algebra you must take as objects not individual vectors but *vector spaces*, and focus on the mappings between vector spaces that respect their structure, namely *linear mappings*.

Recall the definition of the lattice operations  
in  $L_V$

$$(V, G) \vee (V, H) := (V, G \cup H), \quad (V, G) \wedge (V, H) := (V, G \cap H).$$

## Liberalizing the definition of the $L_V$

For technical reasons that will become apparent later, we must liberalize the definition of the  $L_V$ , admitting games that are usually excluded because they are not useful as decision rules.

First, like Taylor and Zwicker in *Simple Games*, we admit into each  $L_V$  a *bottom* and a *top* game which are, respectively, a game in which no coalition is winning, and a game in which every coalition (including the empty one!) is winning:

$$\perp_V := (V, \emptyset), \quad \top_V := (V, \wp V).$$

And we insist that morphisms of our category  $\mathbf{G}$  respect these trivial games; so if  $f : L_V \rightarrow L_W$  is a morphism of  $\mathbf{G}$ , it must not only respect the lattice operations  $\vee$  and  $\wedge$ ,

$$f(G \vee H) = fG \vee fH, \quad f(G \wedge H) = fG \wedge fH,$$

but also obey

$$f\perp_V = \perp_W, \quad f\top_V = \top_W.$$

In addition, unlike anyone else, **we admit the degenerate object  $L_\emptyset$ , the lattice of games without any voters.** There are exactly two such ‘rubberstamp’ games,  $\perp_\emptyset$  and  $\top_\emptyset$ . They play the role of truth values, *false* and *true*.

For  $A \subseteq V$  we denote by  $\lfloor A \rfloor$  the game that has  $A$  as its sole minimal winning coalition (MWC). In this game a bill is passed iff all members of  $A$  vote for it. The voters in  $V - A$  are dummies. In lattice-algebraic terms,  $\lfloor A \rfloor$  is a *principal* member of  $L_V$ .


In particular, if  $a \in V$ ,  $\lfloor \{a\} \rfloor$  is the *dictatorial* game with  $a$  as dictator.

Here is what the 3 simplest objects of  $\mathbf{G}$  look like:


$L_{\emptyset}$



$L_{\{a\}}$



$L_{\{a,b\}}$





## Characterization of the $L_V$

**Theorem** *Any game  $G$  on  $V$  can be presented as a join of a set of pairwise incomparable principal games:*

$$G = \bigvee_{i=1}^k [A_i], \text{ where } k \geq 0 \text{ and } i \neq j \Rightarrow A_j \not\subseteq A_i.$$

*Moreover, this presentation is unique (up to the order of the  $A_i$ ).*

But a principal game  $[A]$  can be presented as a meet of dictatorial games:

$$[A] = \bigwedge_{x \in A} [\{x\}].$$

Hence we have:

## Characterization of the $L_V$ (continued)

**Join normal form theorem** *Any game  $G$  on  $V$  can be presented as*

$$G = \bigvee_{i=1}^k \bigwedge R_i, \text{ where } k \geq 0 \text{ and each } R_i \text{ is a set of dictatorial games}$$

*such that  $i \neq j \Rightarrow R_j \not\subseteq R_i$ .*

*Moreover, this presentation is unique (up to the order of the  $R_i$  and the order of the dictatorial games in each  $R_i$ ).*

This provides a characterization of the  $L_V$ : Let  $L$  be a bounded lattice. Suppose there are  $n$  elements in  $L$  – call them ‘atoms’ – such that any element  $g$  of  $L$  has a unique JNF presentation as a join of meets of atoms similar to the above, then  $L$  is isomorphic (in the category of all bounded lattices) to  $L_V$  with  $|V| = n$ .

# The category $\mathbf{G}$ ; Main Lemma

Recall that  $\mathbf{G}$  is the category whose objects are the  $L_V$  for all finite sets  $V$  and whose morphisms are the mappings between these objects that respect their structure as bounded lattices.

**Main Lemma** *A morphism  $f : L_V \rightarrow L_W$  is uniquely determined by the images under  $f$  of the dictatorial games  $\{[\{v\}] : v \in V\}$ . Moreover, these images, namely  $\{f[\{v\}] : v \in V\}$ , can be chosen freely as arbitrary games in the codomain  $L_W$ .*

So in  $\mathbf{G}$  the dictatorial games play a role of *free generators*, analogous to a basis of a vector space in the category of vector spaces: to determine a linear transformation, you can choose freely the images of the basis vectors, and this determines the transformation uniquely. But a vector space has infinitely many bases, whereas in  $L_V$  the dictatorial games are the only ‘basis’.

We have an explicit formula for  $fG$ , where  $G \in L_V$ , in terms of the  $f[\{v\}]$ :

$$fG = \{Y \subseteq W : \{v \in V : Y \in f[\{v\}]\} \in G\}.$$

Another form of this is

$$\forall Y \subseteq W : Y \in fG \Leftrightarrow \{v \in V : Y \in f[\{v\}]\} \in G.$$

## The category $\mathbf{G}$ ; Another way of writing $f\mathbf{G}$

Without loss of generality, we take  $V = \hat{n} := \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ . (This is the *canonical* assembly of cardinality  $n$ ).

Let  $W$  be any finite set and let  $f : L_{\hat{n}} \rightarrow L_W$  be a morphism in our category.

Let us put  $H_i := f[\{i\}]$  for all  $i \in \hat{n}$ . Then using our formula for  $f\mathbf{G}$  we get, for all  $\mathbf{G} \in L_{\hat{n}}$  :

$$f\mathbf{G} = \mathbf{G}[H_1, H_2, \dots, H_n].$$

Here we use the notation for game composition defined (for a special case) by Shapley (1962) and in complete generality by Felsenthal and Machover (1998).

What this means is that *the most general morphism* in our category  $\mathbf{G}$  produces as image of any game  $G$  in its domain the composition of  $G$  with the images (in its codomain) of the dictatorial games in its domain.

This result surprised us. We knew that composition is important; but we had not realized *how* important. It is the most general operation on games!

I shall now show how the other operations listed in the beginning are obtained as special cases, by special choice of the  $f[\{v\}]$ .

# Bloc formation revisited

To define a morphism  $f : L_V \rightarrow L_W$ , we may choose the images  $f[\{v\}]$  of the dictatorial games in  $L_V$  to be *completely arbitrary* games in  $L_W$ . Let us now see what happens when we choose the latter to be *arbitrary dictatorial* games (in  $L_W$ ).

So – as in our first obvious attempt (which led nowhere) – let us take any map  $\varphi : V \rightarrow W$ , and consider the morphism  $f$  such that

$$\forall v \in V : f[\{v\}] = [\{\varphi v\}] \text{ in } L_W.$$

Putting this in our formula for  $fG$ , we obtain

$$fG = \{Y \subseteq W : \varphi^{-1}[Y] \in G\},$$

which is exactly the same as what we had for our old  $L\varphi G$ . So this  $f$  is our old  $L\varphi$ . As we know, it yields the operation of bloc formation, with optional added dummies.

The reason our first attempt failed is that game composition cannot be obtained as a special case of bloc formation, because the exact opposite is true.

# The old diagram revisited

We draw the old diagram with some added decoration:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} V & \xrightarrow{\varphi \text{ (in } \mathbf{FinSet})} & W \\ L \downarrow & & \downarrow L \\ L_V & \xrightarrow{L\varphi \text{ (in } \mathbf{G})} & L_W \end{array}$$

**FinSet** is the category of finite sets, with set mappings (such as  $\varphi$ ) as morphisms. Those familiar with category theory will see at once that  $L$  is a *functor* from **FinSet** to **G**.

In fact,  $L$  is the left part of an adjointness relation; the corresponding right adjoint is the forgetful functor

$$F : \mathbf{G} \rightarrow \mathbf{FinSet}.$$

# Boolean subgames

Let  $A$  and  $N$  be disjoint subsets of  $V$  and let  $W = V - (A \cup N)$ . In their book, Taylor and Zwicker define, for any game  $G$  on  $V$ , *the Boolean subgame of  $G$  determined by  $N$  and  $A$* , which we (but not they) denote by  $\sqsubset_N^A G$  as the game on  $W$  given by

$$\sqsubset_N^A G := \{Y \subseteq W : Y \cup A \in G\}.$$

**Explanation** Consider  $G$  is a decision rule with  $V$  as its set of voters. Suppose that voters belonging to subsets  $A$  and  $N$  of  $V$  are committed in advance to voting “aye” and “nay” respectively, come what may. When a bill is put to the vote, the outcome will then depend only on the votes of the remaining voters, members of  $W = V - (A \cup N)$ . We are left with a decision rule with  $W$  as the *de facto* set of voters. This rule is precisely  $\sqsubset_N^A G$ .

Special cases are:

- $A = \emptyset$ . Then  $\sqsubset_N^\emptyset G$  is *the subgame of  $G$  determined by  $W$* .
- $N = \emptyset$ . Then  $\sqsubset_\emptyset^A G$  is *the reduced game of  $G$  determined by  $W$* .



## Boolean subgames (continued)

It turns out that  $\sqsubset_N^A$  is a morphism of  $\mathbf{G}$ . We obtain the morphism

$$\sqsubset_N^A : L_V \rightarrow L_W$$

by choosing:

$$\sqsubset_N^A[\{v\}] := \begin{cases} \top_W & \text{if } v \in A, \\ \perp_W & \text{if } v \in N, \\ [\{v\}] \text{ on } W & \text{if } v \in W. \end{cases}$$

## A very special case

With  $V$ ,  $A$  and  $N$  as above, suppose  $W = \emptyset$ , so  $V = A \cup N$ . Then

$$\sqsubset_N^A : L_V \rightarrow L_\emptyset.$$

In fact we obtain,

$$\sqsubset_N^A G = \begin{cases} \top_\emptyset & \text{if } A \in G, \\ \perp_\emptyset & \text{if } A \notin G. \end{cases}$$

So  $\sqsubset_N^A$  is the operator that, when applied to the game  $G$ , yields the output (truth value) under  $G$  of the division of  $V$  in which  $A$  is the coalition of “aye” voters and  $N$  is the coalition of “nay” voters.