Abstract
The primary aim of this article is to develop and defend a conceptual analysis of safety. The article begins by considering two previous analyses of safety in terms of risk acceptability. It is argued that these analyses fail because the notion of risk acceptability is more subjective than safety, as risk acceptability takes into account potential benefits in a way that safety does not. A distinction is then made between two different kinds of safety—safety qua cause and safety qua recipient—and both are defined in terms of the probability of a loss of value, though the relationship between safety and the probability of loss varies in each case. It is then shown that although this analysis is less subjective than the previously considered analyses, subjectivity can still enter into judgments of safety via the notions of probability and value. In the final section of this article, it is argued that the difference between safety and risk acceptability is important because it corresponds in significant ways to the difference between consequentialist and deontological moral viewpoints.
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Notes
This is one way in which the analysis defended here differs from a recent analysis of safety by Niklas Möller, Sven Ove Hansson, and Martin Peterson. They claim that there is both an absolute and a relative concept of safety; something is safe in the absolute sense only if it poses no risk whatsoever [1, p. 420].
Though the notion of risk acceptability does not feature in the final analysis, the more general notion of risk does play a role, at least so long as risk can be understood in terms of the probability of a loss of value.
There are at least eight recorded expeditions that attempted to reach the summit before Hilary and Norgay succeeded [4, pp. 585–682]. At least thirteen people died on these expeditions and a larger number of people turned back (it is hard to find an exact figure, in part because the numbers and names of the Sherpa people involved do not seem to have been particularly well documented and in part because it is hard to determine whether all of the members of a team should be counted, or only those members who attempted the final climb to the summit).
George Mallory is famously reported to have quipped, during a tour of America, that he wanted to climb Mount Everest simply “because it is there.” [4, p. 106]. Surely the real reason had more to do with something like a sense of achievement, simple enjoyment of the activity, or a desire to leave one’s name in the history books.
An historical example that seems relevant here is that of the many people who escaped slavery in the southern states before the American Civil War. These people generally risked severe punishment, sometimes even death. It was almost certainly not safe for them to attempt to escape, but to the many people who attempted it, the nature of their circumstances made it an acceptable risk [5].
Möller, Hansson, and Peterson make a similar point: they claim that if the “severity” of an unwanted event is below a certain level, “it does not count as a safety issue” [1, p. 421].
Möller, Hansson, and Peterson also claim that the common practice amongst engineers “of adding an ‘extra’ safety barrier even if the probability that the barrier will be needed is estimated to be extremely low” is evidence for the relevance of epistemic uncertainty to the notion of safety [1, p. 422]. The view taken here is that the best explanation for this practice is that in the relevant situations, safety is very important, and engineers include extra barrier because they recognize that, firstly, mistakes can be made, either in their calculations or in the implementation of their designs, and secondly, that even if mistakes are not made, a low probability of failure is not an impossibility of failure.
References
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Hájek, A. (2003). Interpretations of Probability. In E.N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Stanford, CA, USA
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Macpherson, J.A.E. Safety, Risk Acceptability, and Morality. Sci Eng Ethics 14, 377–390 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-008-9058-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-008-9058-5