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The nature of crime

Is cheating necessary for cooperation?

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Abstract

The classical social theorist Emile Durkheim proposed the counterintuitive thesis that crime is beneficial for society because it provokes punishment, which enhances social solidarity. His logic, however, is blemished by a reified view of society that leads to group-selectionist thinking and a teleological account of the causes of crime. Reconceptualization of the relationship between crime and punishment in terms of evolutionary game theory, however, suggests that crime (cheating) may confer benefits on cooperating individuals by promoting stability in their patterns of cooperation.

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Richard Machalek and Lawrence E. Cohen are professors of sociology who collaborate in the application of evolutionary and ecological reasoning to traditional domains of sociological research. Machalek’s primary research interests pertain to the evolution of sociality across species lines, and Cohen studies patterns of crime and crime causation.

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Machalek, R., Cohen, L.E. The nature of crime. Human Nature 2, 215–233 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02692187

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02692187

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