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Abstract

This essay examines judicial decision-making from the perspective of Whiteheadian ‘process philosophy’. As such, it seeks to demonstrate how the explanatory categories of process thought can be applied to law and legal reasoning in such a way as to expose the nature of the processes that constitute their development. The essay begins with a description of the judicial task drawn from contemporary theorising about legal argumentation, identified in terms of the separation of contexts of decision-making: discovery and justification. In light of this discussion, the essay then adopts Whiteheadian terminology to provide the basis for an alternative understanding and description of the way that a discrete instance of judicial decision-making develops and is maintained within the decision-making process. In this way, independent of any debate over the separation of contexts, the essay seeks not only to expose and unpack the otherwise hidden micro-processes that contribute to and constitute a legal decision but also, by utilising the same conceptual categories of Whiteheadian process thought, to provide a coherent and consistent account of the macro-processes more commonly observed on the level of law as a social realty. The essay argues that the explanatory power of the categoreal scheme of process thought provides a better tool for understanding these relations on all levels.

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Notes

  1. The novel possibilities felt or grasped through conceptual prehensions are the pure potentials of the universe, those eternal objects that forever remain constant much in the way that red-ness remains unchanged even though the different things that we refer to as red change. Properly understood, prehension is a kind of selective filter producing emphasis or de-emphasis: prehensions are either positive or negative. Negative prehensions exclude certain past occasions of experience or possibilities from the process of concrescence. In this way, each present actual occasion of experience is understood to achieve an objective immortality, passing from subject to object: past occasions are synthesised with conceptual prehensions into a subjective aim before being returned to the sphere of data available for physical prehension by future occasions. But, while all prior occasions of experience internally determine the present occasion in some way, nonetheless, each present occasion experiences the freedom to achieve its own ‘satisfaction’ in its own way; each feeling of desire to conform to the past is accompanied by a lure to novel adventure. In this way, too, we can make sense of our common perception that ‘things’ change over time? Accepting, first, the implication that this appears to suggest towards atomism, Whitehead is able to evade the same charge through developing the notion that groupings of occasions of experience, or societies, can together exhibit some kind of enduring pattern or order that is reproduced in each occasion within a particular society: as long as this commonality persists then a society, or society of societies, may change over time. Evolving in this way, they too, like individual occasions of experience, are never really truly defined until their existence is past.

  2. In higher grade occasions, this third phase of concrescence grows more complex as the concrescing occasion feels the metaphysical proposition as a new datum for the concrescence, reacts to it, and the concrescence prolongs into sub-phases. Note that consciousness, or capability for language, is only a sufficient and not a necessary condition for the prehending or feeling of metaphysical propositions.

  3. See [14, pp. 120–124] for a description of how habitus may be understood to operate in the judicial institutional context. .

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MacLean, J. Transcending the Discovery—Justification Dichotomy. Int J Semiot Law 25, 123–141 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-011-9244-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-011-9244-7

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