interpersonally. The scope of the book is broad yet it has a sufficient amount of intricate detail to merit the development of a complete theory of trustworthiness. The book is also unique in that the discussion of trust diverts from the typical focus on the victim and instead focuses on a first-person investigation of trustworthiness by analyzing the individual's responsibility to develop the character and dispositions necessary to be trustworthy. Although Potter's theory of trustworthiness does not provide a definitive guide about how to be trustworthy, her account does give the responsible individual some important heuristics needed to develop the virtue of trustworthiness. Trustworthiness is an ideal that we should strive to achieve to develop meaningful relationships. Potter's book brilliantly shows us how to achieve this.

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Walking the Tightrope of Reason: The Precarious Life of a Rational Animal
ROBERT J. FOGELIN
New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, xii + 203pp., $ 22.00

The purpose of Fogelin's book is to examine "the problems inherent in the rational enterprise, that is, problems that make reasoning itself a precarious activity" (p. 1). Though not primarily intended for the so-called professional philosopher, but rather for the educated reader, the work is by no means uninteresting for the former. The treatment of the topics is generally clear and rigorous, and the book is pleasant to read. Fogelin recognizes the profound influence of the writings of Sextus Empiricus, Kant, Hume, and Wittgenstein. The influence of the latter two is the most prominent throughout the work. Besides a preface and an introduction, it consists of seven chapters.

A central thesis presented in the introduction is that the unrestricted use of reason leads to polarized positions that, although conflicting, share a commitment: they consider that some radical choices—such as "either absolute moral standards exist or there is no such thing as morality" and "either something is certain or nothing is even probable"—are not only intelligible, but also compelling and unavoidable. Fogelin's aim is to analyze how such choices emerge and whether it is possible to free oneself from them.

In Chapter 1, Fogelin deals with the principle of non-contradiction and argues that those who accept and those who reject this principle share a misconception about its status, namely, that it is not solely a logical truth but also an ontological law, thus placing a fundamental restriction on reality: they consider this principle to be incompatible with change being real. This is why those who reject it do so because they affirm the reality of change as the most basic feature of the world, and those who accept it think that change is illusory. For Fogelin, the principle of non-contradiction is "trivially" true with no consequences on the reality or unreality of change, simply because it is not an ontological law at all.

In Chapter 2, Fogelin contends that the fact that some systems of rules—such as linguistic, moral, and legal ones—occasionally lead us to dilemmas or paradoxes which cannot be easily or adequately resolved does not determine that they must

be rejected. The reason is that, on the whole, such systems may be indispensable and useful, and the elimination of the inconsistency generally results in the loss of those very aspects of the system that make it rich and functional. Hence, the only remaining option is to find a way of living with inconsistency in the best possible manner. According to Fogelin, those who reject this view do so because they are committed to the "ultra-rationalist" demand that either a system is dilemma-free or it must be wholly rejected. For Fogelin, the unavoidable character of some inconsistencies is one of the aspects that render our rational life precarious.

The third chapter exploits the Kantian notion of "dialectical illusion," dealing with the thesis that radical scepticism, or relativism, and metaphysics are contrary positions sharing the same rationalist ideal and arising when reason is used beyond the limits of experience. This tendency to fall into such dialectical illusions is another aspect of the precariousness of our rationality.

Chapter 4 is devoted to scepticism, a certain amount of which Fogelin considers to be a central and positive element of rationality. He makes it clear that the kind of scepticism dealt with in this chapter is not the same as that examined in the third, since the former arises from our ordinary standards of rationality. The problem of scepticism emerges when these standards are applied without restrictions, with the result that the edifice of knowledge is undermined. Fogelin regards this as the third threat with which our rational life is faced. He examines three kinds of scepticism he calls "cartesian [sic] skepticism," "Humean skepticism," and "Pyrrhonian skepticism." I should like to focus on Fogelin's discussion of this last form of scepticism. He endorses what has been called the "urbane" or "sober" interpretation of Sextus Empiricus's scepticism, according to which the Pyrrhonist would only direct his sceptical assail against the philosophico-scientific beliefs, while accepting the ordinary or everyday beliefs. Fogelin affirms, for instance, that "nothing that the Pyrrhonian skeptic says leads to a skeptical critique of common belief" (p. 115). The reason for his adoption of this kind of interpretation seems to be based solely upon Michael Frede's examination of the subject (see p. 183, n.14) rather than upon close analysis of Sextus Empiricus's texts themselves, which is true also of his *Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), where he defends the same view. Such an analysis would have shown him that there are several crucial passages that support the interpretation that Pyrrhonism is "rustic," i.e., that the Pyrrhonist suspends his judgement on all kinds of beliefs about the real nature of things or about matters of objective fact. The main obstacle for the urbane interpretation is that one finds deeply dogmatic beliefs in the most important areas—ethics and religion, for example—regarding which ordinary people hold beliefs. Sextus himself explicitly says that the Pyrrhonist suspends judgement regarding the nature and existence of the good, the bad, and the indifferent (e.g., *Pyrrôneioi Hypotypôseis* [*PH*] III 178, 182, 235; *Adversus Dogmaticos* [*AD*] V 111, 144) and regarding the existence of gods (*PH* III 6–9; *AD* III 59, 191). In addition, there are other important common-sense beliefs from which the Pyrrhonist withholds his assent, such as the beliefs in the existence of motion (*PH* III 65, 81; *AD* IV 45, 49, 168), of increase and decrease (*PH* III 82), of change (*PH* III 108), of place (*PH* III 119, 135), and of time (*PH* III 136, 140). With these remarks I am not affirming that Sextus's whole work straightforwardly supports the rustic interpretation, but that it is necessary to be aware that the urbane interpretation is faced with a considerable num-

ber of texts which undoubtedly show that at least most of our everyday beliefs are reached by the Pyrrhonian assault. It must be noted that at one point Fogelin himself recognizes that the generality of the "Five Modes of Agrippa" may support the rustic interpretation (p. 184, n.18). However, he does not say that when, presenting the mode deriving from disagreement, Sextus points out that among philosophers *as well as in ordinary life* there has been an undecidable dissension, which leads the sceptic to suspension of judgement (*PH* I 165).

I wish to make two final minor remarks on Fogelin's discussion of Pyrrhonian scepticism. First, he makes a mistake in saying that Sextus attributes the Five Modes to Agrippa (p. 116), since Sextus only points out that these arguments are handed down by "the more recent skeptics" (*PH* I 164). It is Diogenes Laertius (IX 88) who ascribes them to Agrippa. Second, when enumerating Sextus's writings, Fogelin refers to "a series of *Against* works: *Against the Logicians*, *Against the Mathematicians*, *Against the Grammarians*, *Against the Professors*, and so on" (p. 114). Actually, *Against the Professors* is a single work composed of six books, two of which are *Against the Mathematicians* and *Against the Grammarians*.

In the fifth chapter, Fogelin contends that the three threats to the rational enterprise examined arise when "the intellectual [is detached] from all nonintellectual controlling constraints" (p. 127), so it becomes necessary to impose non-conceptual restrictions by interacting with the world. He points out that what stands in the way of radical scepticism and the dialectical illusion of relativism are the undeniable scientific and technological advances. It is precisely in this field that one clearly sees how non-conceptual elements constrain our theories. Regarding the threat of paradox, he observes that, though not fully avoidable, it may be reduced by the "embodiment [of thought] in mechanisms, instruments, and the like" (p. 143). It is important to note that Fogelin recognizes that the obstacles that arise from the unrestrained use of reason are "completely intelligible and wholly unanswerable," and that his considerations are only intended to explain how this does not end in "intellectual disaster" (ibid.).

In Chapter 6, Fogelin presents Hume's argument of the variability and subjectivity of taste, and the "sceptical" solution Hume offers. This solution consists in pointing to the uniformity in the way we perceive the world, uniformity that makes it possible to reach a universal consensus regarding the qualities of the objects we experience. Fogelin accepts Hume's solution with the reservation that he does not think one can speak of "universality" with respect to standards of taste, but rather of a stable consensus within each culture, which allows us to avoid (an extreme) perspectivism. For Fogelin, this is made possible once again by the non-conceptual constraints we put on our judgements of taste when we do not lose contact with the very objects these judgements are about.

Following Hume, Fogelin points out in the last chapter that, despite the discouraging problems we encounter when doing philosophy, one can find pleasure in this activity and, above all, it allows us to become aware of our intellectual limitations, which in turn prevents us from falling into illusions. But he makes it clear that "precariousness is a permanent feature of our intellectual lives" (p. 169), so that it is necessary that we constantly guard against the threats of inconsistency, dialectical illusions, and scepticism through the imposition of non-conceptual restrictions.

Fogelin's general stance may be described as that of the middle way, which, at least in some cases, seems to be a sort of moderate or mitigated scepticism: he is

well aware of the conundrums faced by the rational enterprise and their ultimate insolubility, which prevents him from endorsing any full-fledged dogmatism, without at the same time adopting the radical sceptical view that our rational endeavours are wholly hopeless. He himself characterizes his outlook as a "circumspect rationalism" (p. 70). In this book, the reader will find someone who is doing philosophy, that is, someone who is thinking about some crucial problems and attempting to offer tentative responses to them.

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L'ouverture au probable. Éléments de logique inductive
IAN HACKING
Traduit de l'anglais par MICHEL DUFOUR
Paris, Armand Colin, 2004

Cet ouvrage est la traduction de *An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic* publié en 2001 par Cambridge University Press. Il contient une pléthore d'exemples adaptés au milieu français. La surcharge des cas concrets veut traduire le caractère élémentaire de cette introduction et on doit espérer que le néophyte s'y retrouvera dans les dédales de la logique inductive. Il s'agit en réalité d'une initiation en douceur aux notions fondamentales de la théorie des probabilités et de la logique inductive; le lecteur n'y trouvera guère de traitement avancé ou de discussions sophistiquées sur les questions difficiles de la logique inductive.

On reconnaîtra dans cet ouvrage le style de l'auteur qui privilégie la trame historique des problèmes plutôt que leur formalisation dans un cadre théorique actuel. Ian Hacking est un archéologue de la probabilité, comme on l'a désigné à propos de son ouvrage *L'émergence de la probabilité* (Seuil, 2002), aussi traduit par Michel Dufour à partir de *The Emergence of Probability* (Cambridge University Press, 1975). Ce dernier ouvrage, dont l'auteur dit qu'il a été inspiré par Michel Foucault, son prédécesseur au Collège de France, trouve en réalité peu d'échos dans *L'ouverture au probable* qui a plutôt une destination pédagogique.

Dans une première partie intitulée «Logique», on retrouve les éléments de la logique classique ou booléenne qui constitue aussi la base logique de la théorie (classique) des probabilités. La logique inductive dans ce contexte est simplement l'analyse des arguments risqués (plus ou moins sûrs) à l'aide des probabilités (p. 26).

La deuxième partie, «Comment calculer les probabilités», est consacrée aux notions probabilistes élémentaires, de la probabilité conditionnelle (chap. 5) au théorème, formule ou règle de Bayes (chap. 7) dont on sait qu'elle constitue le fondement de la théorie des probabilités subjectives ou personnelles ou, mieux, épistémiques à laquelle on opposera la théorie fréquentiste (chap. 4). Le chapitre 13 porte précisément sur les probabilités personnelles et l'évaluation numérique — la traduction dit chiffrage — des degrés de croyance propres à chaque personne ou sujet épistémique. La règle de Bayes en logique épistémique ne signifie rien de plus que ceci : la probabilité postérieure d'un événement passé est proportionnelle au produit de la probabilité antérieure et de la vraisemblance que l'événement survienne (cf. p. 189).