W0RLD VIEW AND THEORY 1 1 IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Edited by Piotr Balcerowicz Wl\RSL\W lfiDOLOGICL\L STUDIES VOLUME E d Piotr i t o S r: Balcerowicz Wl\RSL\W 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface ...................................................... 7 Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 WORLD VIEWS IN CONTENTION AND EXCHANGE JOHANNES BRONKHORST: Buddhist Thought Versus Brahmanical Thought ................... 21 VINCENT ELTSCHINGER: Apocalypticism, Heresy and Philosophy .......................... 29 EMILIO GARCiA BUENDiA: Parmenides and the Sat-kiirya-viida Doctrine of Sarilkhya ........... 87 WORLD VIEWS AND SYSTEMS ANDREW J. NICHOLSON: Doxography and Boundary-Formation in Late Medieval India ....... 103 LAWRENCE MCCREA: Rationalisation and Sincerity in Mimamsii Hermeneutics . . . . . . . .... 119 TAKANORI SUZUKI: On the Variety of Commentarial Approaches among the Commentators of the Padartha-dharma-samgraha: A Reconsideration of the Notion of the Ｇｖ｡ｩｳ･ｾｫ＠ School' ......... 137 ERNST PRETS: A Review of the Early Nyiiya Fragments ........................ 155 PIOTR BALCEROWICZ: When Yoga is not Yoga. tradition and the Artha-siistra ............... 173 The ｎｹｩ｡Ｍｖｳ･ｾｫ＠ WORLD VIEWS AND PERSONS JONARDON GANERI: Buddhist Individuals and Inward Empathy ....................... 249 JOERG TUSKE: ｓｩｮｴ｡ｲｫｾ＠ on the Emotions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 263 JEAN-MARIE VERPOORTEN: Some Aspects of Atman , According to Prabhiikara and Siilikaniitha ........................ 277 TIMOTHY LUBIN: The Polity of the Philosopher-Bureaucrat: Brahmanical Virtue as a Qualification for Public Office ............ 299 SHUJUN MOTEGI: The Concept ofNon-Possession in the Molcya-dharma ............. 327 PAOLO MAGNONE: Aho kausalam apiirvam. Hermeneutical wrigglings about the Ｏｓｯｰ｡ｮｩｾ､＠ _ ................... 349 THEORY OF WORLD VIEW CLAUS OETKE: 'World View' as a Topic of Research in Indian Studies ............ 369 BRENDAN GILLON: The Correspondence Principle ................................. 381 STEPHEN H. PHILLIPS: Cannibalising Nyiiya Epistemology ............................. 399 HIROSHI MARUI: The Meaning of a Diversity of Established World Views or Tenets (siddhanta) in the Science of Debate: With Special Reference to Jayanta's Interpretation of the Abhyupagama-siddhanta (NS 1.1.31) and its Evaluation in the Development ofNyiiya System ................. 407 GENERAL INDEX ............................................... 433 Aho kausalam apiirvam. Hermeneutical wrigglings about the ｩｳｯｰ｡ｮｾ､＠ PAOLO MAGNONE The Upani$ads are the common repository from which the classical systems oflndian thought (with the exception of the ｎｹ｡Ｍｖｩｳ･ｾｫＩ＠ draw their fundamental tenets, ending up, however, in utmost diversity. To confine ourselves to the Vedanta school, Badarayal)a's attempt to summarise and homogenise their bewildering riches in the Vedonta-sutras failed to succeed because of its ambiguity, which has in turn given rise to the most diverse interpretations by the bha$ya-koras, ranging from Satikara's absolute monism all the way to Madhva's dualism, through various intermediate degrees of monism-cum-dualism represented by the ｂｨｾｹ｡ｳ＠ of Bhaskara, Ramanuja, Nimbarka and Vallabha. But 'What did the Upani$ads really say?' (to mimic the title format of many a popular book). Of course, the question admits of no ultimate solution. T h e meaning of the Upani$ads does not exist as such, but manifold meanings are always there for the manifold interpreters to reach after, always on the run ahead of-or behind-them along the circuitous path of the hermeneutical circle that governs interpretation. Interpretation, as Gadamer made finally clear, can never be a direct and linear process of going and grasping the meaning that was always there, but is the result of a Horizontverschmelzung, or an interactive fusion between the horizon of the interpreter's pre-comprehension and the horizon of the interpretandum, each with its own historical situatedness. This interaction is a recursive process (the 'hermeneutical circle') which results in ever renewed pre-comprehension enabling more and more subtly attuned comprehension of the interpretandum. Thus, the interpreter's world view is an inescapable precondition to his actual theoretical practice of interpretation; at the same time, it must not straitjacket it, but it is essential to the circularity of the process that it must remain open-ended to what comes from the sphere of the datum. Along these lines, the commentatorial practice on the Upani$ads provides an excellent example of the splendours and miseries of interpretation in an Indian setting. In particular, the isopani$ad, on account of its extreme pithiness, is singularly suited to demonstrate the fruitful impact of the different world views of the individual masters in fostering the comprehension of specially World View and Theory in Indian Philosophy Warsaw Indological Studies 5 (2012) 349-365. PAOLO MAGNONE 350 enigmatic passages, and at the same time the length they are willing to go to make an authoritative text square each with his own preconceived philosophico-religious outlook. In the following we are going to review a few instances of the different interpretations produced by the great bhii$ya-kiiras of the three conflicting Vediintic schools: Saiikara for the Advaita, Vediintadesika for the ｖｩｳｾｴ｡､ｶ＠ and Madhva for the Dvaita. The latter's commentary is typically very succinct, consisting of a literal gloss and a (pseudo )-scriptural quotation from some often untraceable Snqti, 1 so that we shall usually have to resort to the sub-commentator Jayatirtha for enlightenment. For the sake of the subsequent analysis, in order to facilitate the reader with a ready confrontation with the original I will premise in each case the root mantras, with the advertence, however, that the editorial requirement to dispense with the Devanagari, coupled with the common practice of separating words in transliteration, is liable to introduce a modicum of unwarranted interpretation: as we shall see, in fact, even the actual shape of the interpretandum cannot be taken for granted, as commentators are apt to differ even in the ways they scan the script to isolate the individual words from the uninterrupted strings of graphemes that make up the original scriptio continua. And first of all the opening stanza (IU 1): isii viisyam 2 idam sarvam yat kim ca jagatyiim jagat I tena tyaktena bhuftjithii mii grdhal;t. kasya svid dhanam !!3 1 The problem with Madhva's more often than not untraceable citations is a wellknown one. Cf. ROCHER (2008) for a comprehensive retrospect of the question, originating with 'Varadaciirya's reference to quotations kaiScid, that are svakapolaka/pita ("word of his own mouth"-P.M.), and [Vedantadesika's] dismissal of unnamed quotations invented by ｰｩＣｨｾＧ＠ (2008: 603) (possibly but not certainly aimed at the Dvaita master); and especially with Appayadilqita's wholesale dismissal of Madhva's 'idiosyncratic' theories on the grounds, among others, of his quoting in support totally unknown (atyantaprasiddha) sources, of which he lists 29 from Sruti and 11 from Smrti. In recent times the debate has been taken up again by MESQUITA, on the side of Madhva's critics, with his 1977 monograph, imputing to him the fabrication of untraceable sources but absolving him of the fraudulent intent, on the grounds that he bona fide believed himself an Avatara of ｖｩｾｑｵ＠ (through the mediation of Viiyu), hence empowered, like his fellow Vyiisa, to compose scriptures for the enlightenment of the kali-yuga people. On the other side, SHARMA, as a staunch Madhva supporter, has tried to exonerate his master from the allegations in his 1961 monograph (revised ed. 2000), and has taken issue with MESQUITA's criticism in a 2001 paper. Most recently, MESQUITA has published a further monograph (2007) collecting a massive corpus of date in support of his conclusions. 2 Madhva: isaviisyam. 3 E.g. 0LIVELLE(l998: 407): 'This whole world is to be dwelt in by the Lord, whatever living being there is in the world. So you should eat what has been abandoned, and do not covet anyone's wealth.' HERMENEUTICAL WRIGGLINGS ABOUT THE iS6PANI$AD 351 This stanza elicits at once discordant interpretations when subjected to the pre-emptive force of the distinctive world views of the different commentators. It could not be otherwise, as it condenses the relationship between the three principles-supreme self, world and soul-whose different articulation is paramount to the respective doctrines of the three schools. would seem to To an unbiased look (if such thing exists at all) the ｕｰ｡ｮｩｾ､＠ lend itself more to an interpretation positing some sort of real distinction, which would suit better its theistic perspective. According to the tenets of Advaita, Supreme Atmanhowever, the three principles are of course but ｯｮｾｴｨ･＠ Brahman. Therefore, we may predict that it is particularly Sallkara who will have to strain the letter of the text in order to distil his desired meaning. The very first word, isii, instmmental of is ('the Lord' or 'the divine Person'), is bent by the Advaitin Acarya to mean the Paramatman, the impersonal the universe from within, as being one with the supreme self who rules Ｈｩｾｦ･Ｉ＠ inner self of every creature (pratyag-iitmatayii). But the next word is again a major stumbling block for the Advaita perspec7 tive: given that the Paramatman is the sole reality, and the world merely ｩｬｵｾ＠ sory appearance, what could possibly be the relationship obtaining between the two, conveyed by the word vasyam4? Not a relation of immanence, as the term would naturally seem to suggest: the real cannot abide in the unreal. Rather, according to Sallkara's glossing viisyam with acchadaniyam, the supreme self must be made to 'clothe' or 'cover' the unreal world, paradoxically veiling illusion in order to reveal the truth, hiding appearance to make reality reappear. This is in fact the gist of the simile employed by Sallkara to exemplify the peculiar nature of the acchiidana ('covering'): as a piece of fragrant sandalwood may develop an unpleasant smell owing to dampness-a smell which is not its own, and can be easily 'covered' by its own quintessential fragrance stirred up by rubbing-just in the same way the illusory appearances superimposed on the self by the necessities of empirical intercourse can (and must) be 'covered' by the realisation of his true essence which alone is supremely real. 5 One cannot but remark that this interpretation rests on the bold oxymoron of a cover that uncovers. According to common understanding, deceit is unmasked by uncovering it, i.e. getting rid of the cover-up to pierce through to the underlying truth. But Sankara here invites us not to uncover the Advaitic core of reality but rather to recover it by literally re-covering illusion, as it were, by a 4 Viisya can be derived as a gerundive from at least two homophonic roots (and from their causatives), hence meaning, as the case may be, 'to be indwelt, entered into, worn (as a cloth), clothed or enveloped' etc. The commentators play on this ambiguity to distil each his desired meaning. s Sankara, iU 1 4.2-5: yathii candandgarv-iider udakddi-sambandha-ja-k/edddi-jam aupiidhikam daurgandhyam ｴ｡ＭｳｶｲｩｰｮｧｨｾＧｬＩ･､｣ｹ＠ svena piiramiirthikena gandhena tadvad eva hi svdtmany adhyastam sviibhiivikam kartrtva-bholctrtvddi-lakya'l)am jagad-dvaitariipam ... paramortha-satydtma-bhiivanayii tyaktam syiit. PAOLO MAGNONE 352 further coating of reality. On the other hand, covering consists in placing something on top of something else: this, however, is exactly what is precluded by non-dual vision. Furthermore, ·what is covered is occluded by the covering, which prevents the apparition of the true form of the covered by replacing it with mere semblance. On the contrary, according to the peculiar acchadana postulated by Saiikara, covering and covered cease to be two; the covering is the same covered that becomes uncovered or unveiled 're-vealing' itself by itself with its true form, which discloses itself occluding or covering not itself but its mere semblance. Vediintadesika's and Madhva's interpretations of isa vasyam do not differ significantly6 in spite of their different wording: according to the former, the world 'must be pervaded' (ryapyam), whereas for the latter it is 'fit to be indwelt' (vasa-yogyam), by the Lord. The third pada (tena tyaktena bhunjithaM is interpreted in markedly different ways by the three commentators. The most straightforward reading from a grammatical viewpoint is Vedantadesika's: 'by renouncing that [world], enjoy'. In everyday life what is enjoyed is the world itself; but here the Svamin characterises 'that [world]' as an object of illusory enjoyment, which is therefore fit to be renounced when its manifold shortcomings become apparent. Since the natural object of fruition, the world, has thus been given up, the injunction bhunjithal;i must needs be qualified 'according to the [suitability of the] meaning and the subject matter': 7 enjoyment must be limited to that group of permissible objects of fruition which are exclusively instrumental in supporting a body serviceable for yoga. Renouncement of the world is not required by Madhva, who accordingly takes pada C to mean 'enjoy [by] what is given by Him [i.e. the Lord]', interpreting 'tyaktena as 'handed over' or 'devolved' rather than 'renounced', and tena as an agentive governing the passive past participle instead of as an instrumental agreeing with its predicate. This requires some twist of the grammar, which the subcommentator Jayatirtha implicitly acknowledges by observing that Madhva's explanation was indeed necessary, as the passage is awkward (durgam artham 8): the reference of tena is indeterminate,9 and it is not proper to say that something 'renounced' (tyakta) could be a means of fruition. 10 Now here goes the explanation: tena must logically be construed to refer to isa mentioned in the first pada, in spite of the latter being the subordiExcept for Madhva's peculiar reading of the phrase as compound of isa and iivasyam. Vedantadesika, p. 4.21: [artha-]•prakarai:tiibhyiim sidhyati. [a The word artha, missing through some oversight, has been restored from an editorial footnote to the passage as well as from a literal citation in the translation on p. 34.19.) 8 Jayatirtha, p. 6.29. 9 Jayatirtha, p. 6.28: tena iti pariimarsasya ｶｩｾ｡ｹｯ＠ na pratiyate. 10 Jayatirtha, p. 6.28: tyaktasya ca bhoga-siidhanatvam ayuktam. 6 7 HERMENEUTICAL WRIGGLINGS ABOUT THE iS6PANI$AD 353 nate member of a compound11 (which would usually prevent it from being directly referred to by another word). Furthermore, because this world is incapable of activity in itself-and for this very reason must be permeated by the Lord, who alone is svatantra, or capable of spontaneous activity-whatever we experience can only be 'devolved' by the Lord, and not secured by our own endeavour: therefore, tyakta must mean datta, 'given' by the Lord, i.e. spontaneously obtained (yadrcchaya labdham ). For his part, in accordance with the strictly ascetic, world-denying stance of his Kevaladvaita, Saiikara bars any kind of enjoyment whatsoever for him who has the adhikara, or 'qualification', for supreme knowledge, and for whom this first mantra is intended. As a consequence, his interpretation of the pada cannot but be highly idiosyncratic: 'by renouncing that [world], protect your Self. Here his understanding of tena tyaktena is similar to Vedantadesika's, except that he adds the logical remark that, properly speaking, something 'renounced' or 'abandoned' (as a dead son or servant), being a purely negative entity, cannot entertain any positive relationship; therefore, we should read tyaktena ('renounced') to mean tyagena ('renouncement'): for while what is renounced no longer exists, renouncement itself is a positive entity capable of affecting us. But it is what comes next, the injunction: bhuiijithii'Q, 'enjoy', that poses a real difficulty for the Advaita master. Surprisingly enough, especially after all the fastidiousness of the foregoing elucidation, here Saiikara does not spend many words to smooth out the problem, just one to gloss bhuiijithab with palayetha'Q, 'protect yourself; nor does Anandagiri make up for the concision. Jayatirtha takes issue with this explanation, remarking that the meaning 'to protect' is not proper for the root "bhuj in the middle voice (atmane-piida; according to Pfu}.ini I.3.66); but one modern commentator, B.K. IYER (1995: 8), is quick to exonerate Saiikara on the grounds that Pfu}.inian rules do not apply to Vedic passages. We now come to the two parallel triads of stanzas iU 9-11 and 12-14, whose enigmatic diction has given rise to widely diverging interpretations. The first triad runs as follows: andharh tamab pravisanti ye 'vidyiim upasate I tato bhuya iva.te tamo ya u vidyiiyarh ratiib II 9 II anyad evahur vidyayanyad ahur avidyaya I iti suiruma dhirarJ.arh ye nas tad vicaca/cyire II 10 II vidyarh cavidyiirh ca yas tad v.edobhayarh saha I avidyayii mfYurh tirtva vidyayamrtam a8nute II 111112 11 Jayatirtha, p. 29-30: samase upasarjani-bhiitasyapi isasya buddhyii vivekenayam paramiirsa/;I. As noted above (n. 6), Madhva reads the first piida as a ｴ｡Ｍｰｵｾ＠ compound (isa + iiviisyam). · 12 E.g. 0LIVELLE(l998: 407, 409): 'Into blind darkness they enter, people who worship ignorance; and into still blinder darkness, people who delight in learning. It's far different from knowledge, they say, different also from ignorance, we're told-so have we heard 354 PAOLO MAGNONE At first sight, the gist of the passage would seem to teach the inadequacy of both avidya ('ignorance', literally 'non-knowledge') and vidya ('knowledge') taken separately, and the ensuing necessity of their association, but the manner of expression is striking, and ascribing a positive agency to ignorance or a deluding power to knowledge are paradoxes that require 1an explanation. Like Vedantadesika, Sankara overcomes the former difficulty by understanding avidya as 'other than vidya' , 13 viz. karman, exemplified by ritual works. Even so, in conformity with his strictly monistic stance he cannot accord any positivity whatsoever to the performance of rituals, which in his view do nothing but help perpetuate attachment to the illusory world. Not recognising any value in works, Sankara cannot accept in any way the doctrine ofjfianakarma-samuccaya ('cumulative practice of knowledge and works') as a means towards liberation-which doctrine would however seem to be taught by the passage under consideration. How does Saitlcara acquit himself of his duty of allegiance to the Sruti without renouncing his fundamental tenet, that knowledge of the supreme Reality alone is all that is required to attain liberation? His solution is a radical one: he simply denies that the instruction here promulgated is meant for the mumu'lcyu, or the 'seeker after liberation'; on the conthe worldly-minded trary, such instruction he takes to be meant for ｴｨ･ｪｩｶｾｵＬ＠ 'life lover', recalling the distinction previously made by jfiana-ni#ha ('stand on knowledge') and ｫ｡ｲｭＭｮｩｾｦｨ＠ ('stand on works'), or nivrtti-marga ('path of inactivity') and pravrtti-marga ('path of activity'). According to Saitlcara, the ｕｰ｡ｮｩｾ､＠ under discussion does not present a uniform teaching, but contains two different sets of teachings meant for people with different adhikaras, or 'qualifications'. In his view, for instance, whereas the first mantra teaches Advaita and renouncement of actions for those entitled to supreme knowledge, the second mantra teaches dutiful performance of rites for those entitled to action; and to a hypothetical objector marvelling at the partition Saitlcara reminds the opposition 'unshakeable as a mountain' 14 previously established between knowledge and works. Thus, in harmony with the aforesaid partition, he begs to take this triad (as well as the following one) as teaching karma-marga ('path of works') to the worldly man, which stance has a further consequence on the interpretation of vidya. By definition, the worldly man is not entitled to metaphysical knowledge; hence the vidya here in question cannot possibly be atma-jfiana ('knowledge of Self), which is a prerogative of the world-renouncer, but only some kind of inferior knowledge open to any and all: namely, devata-jfiana, or 'knowledge of the deities', as Saitlcara clarifies. from wise men, who have explained it to us. Knowledge and ignorance-a man who knows them both together, passes beyond death by ignorance, and by knowledge attains immortality'. 13 Saiikara, p. lu 1 10.6: vidyiiyii anyii 'vidyii. 14 Safilcara ad iU 2, p. 5.9:jniina-karmal)or virodham parvatavad akampyam yathOktam 1 na smarasi kim. HERMENEUTICAL WRIGGLINGS ABOUT THE i$6PANI$AD 3SS In sum, according to Sailkara the purport of the passage is to teach some sort of jiiana-karma-samuccaya o n 1 y for the ordinary man, as the renouncer has no use soever for karman. On the other hand, the ordinary man has no right to supreme vidya; the passage, then, must be understood to teach that the worldly man should not indulge the practice of rituals alone for their exclusive sake, lest he should plunge into deep darkness; but he should not even be satisfied with mere theoretical knowledge ·of the gods gained from study of the scriptures, shunning the actual practice of rites, lest he should enter darkness even deeper. He should, instead, combine both, in order to reap their distinct fruits: by the practice of karman he overcomes death, i.e. by ritualised action he sublimates natural desire-impelled action binding to death and samsara, and by devata-jiiana he attains immortality, i.e. oneness with the ｩｾＯ｡Ｍ､･ｶｴ＠ ('deity of one's choice'). This latter goal, of course, in Sailkara's perspective can only mean relative immortality, not to be confused with the absolute and definitive immortality of final emancipation in the attainment of oneness with brahman. As anticipated, Vedlintadesika concurs with Sankara in taking avidya to mean karman, but the agreement ends here. The synthetic conception of ｖｩｳｾｴ｡､ｶ＠ views the world as really existing and rooted in brahman; accordingly, Vedlintadesika is willing to grant actions their rightful place in so far as they are performed to fulfil one's duty 15 and without attachment, in conformity with the doctrine of ｮｩｾｫ｡ｭＭｲ＠ ('desireless action') propounded in the Bhagavad-gita. Therefore, unlike Sailkara, Vedlintadesika accepts the doctrine of jiiana-karma-samuccaya ('cumulative practice of knowledge and works') in some form, namely, as spe.cified later in the text, as ｶｩｾ｡ｭﾭ samuccaya or 'asymmetrical accumulation': that is to say, he accepts Sailkara's dictum that in conformity with the scriptures knowledge alone is required for liberation, but admits that such knowledge may be enhanced by the subsidiary practice of good deeds. In this view, thus, works are subservient to liberation, though not on a par with knowledge, and their 'asymmetrical association' may be recommended. 16 Hence, unlike Sankara, Vedlintadesika finds _no inconvenience in the passage in question, which he interprets to the effect that 'worshippers of ignorance plunging into darkness' are performers of actions for the sake of fruits, and 'devotees o knowledge plunging into darkness even deeper' are followers of knowledge alone who neglect their practical 15 Vedantadesika, p. 18.S: atravidyii-sabddbhihitam van;idsrama-vihitam karma (quoting which the translator takes to mean 'the Commentator on the Vedanta Sutras (Sri Riminuja)' (iU2 : SS). 16 He further specifies the flavour of the doctrine he favours, known as samnipatyopakiiraka, or of the 'proximate subserviency': works perfonn their ancillary function indirectly, by proximate synergy in furthering kriowledge by removing obstacles to it-in contradistinction to Bhiiskara-'s favoured flavour, known as iiriid-upakiiraka, or of the 'remote subserviency': works bring about their own result directly, as an ingredient of the final global result. the ｢ｨｾｹ｡ＭｫｩｲＬ＠ 356 PAOLO MAGNONE duties and fail to nurture knowledge with ｮｩｾｫ｡ｭＭｲ＠ ('desireless action'). The next stanza (iU 10), however, does posit a problem for him. In fact, if literally translated as 'one thing [is obtained] by means of knowledge, another by means of works', it would imply the joint efficiency of both knowledge and works on an equal footing, i.e. the doctrine of sama-samuccaya, or 'symmetrical accumulation', which Vediintadesika rejects as disproved by the scriptures, which unanimously declare the competence of knowledge alone to grant liberation.17 So, it is now his turn to exhibit his hermeneutical adroitness: he contends that, according to the grammatical rule allowing transposition, here the instrumental case must be read as a replacement of the ablative, which must be supplied in order to satisfy the regimen of anya ('other, different'); in other words, he begs to take the couple vidya/ avidya as governed by anya, and accordingly interprets '[the means of liberation] is different from [mere] knowledge, different from [mere] works'. It is, indeed, knowledge furthered by works, where the two, however, stand in angangi-bhava, or in 'a relationship of subordinate and principal'. This would only seem to postpone the difficulty to the third stanza, which again seems to unambiguously state that vidya and avidya are two independent means to attain two separate goals. 18 But Vedantadesika spares no effort to show that the discreteness of.the means and goals is only apparent. With respect to the means: in reality, avidya is just karman as an anga ('subordinate') of vidya, 19 hence not separate but included in it; if it is mentioned as independent and equal, this is only because it must be viewed as such from the viewpoint of practice, 20 in so far as both the principal and the subsidiary, though essentially one, must be practised independently and equally. With respect to the goal: 'crossing death' and 'attaining immortality' both amount to the same, i.e. attainment of liberation: however, there is no redundancy in the passage, 17 According to this view, advocated by Yidavaprakisa, knowledge and works do not entertain a relationship of principal and subsidiary, with works merely assisting knowledge considin reaping the one and only fruit-immortality (i.e. deliverance). Rather, they ered each as a distinct means in its own right, leading to a distinct goal of its own; see VARADACHARI-THATHACARYA (1975: 36). The doctrine of sama-samuccaya is rejected by Vedintadesika on scriptural grounds, on the strength of 'the number of Srutis, Smrtis and Siitras clearly declaring the relationship of principal and subsidiary obtaining beｴｷｾ＠ J,cnowledge and works, and the crossing of death by knowledge alone' (Vedintadesika, mrtyu-taral)am ca vyaktam pratipap. 18.3: karma-jf!anayor angangi-bha,vam ｶｩ､ｹ｡ｾ＠ dayadbhifl sruti-smrti-siitra-gal)aifl). Satikara, as we have seen, does not face such problems, as for him the passage is not meant for the mumu/cyu ('seeker after liberation') in the first place. . 18 As per a literal readi,ng ｾｦｴｨ･＠ mantra, '[he who practices the samuccaya ('accumulation')] having crossed death by works, by knowledge attains immortality'. 19 Vedintadesika, p. 16.9: avidyam tad-anga-bhiita-kannatmakam. 20 Vedintadesikl;l, p. 16.10: anganginor amqfeyatva-samyat. are HERMENEUTICAL WRIGGLINGS ABOUT THE iS6PANI$AD 357 and the apparent duplicity is justified, in so far as the first expression (mrtyum tirtva, 'having crossed death') lays stress on the destruction of obstacles21 in the form of natural action leading to rebirth (and 'redeath'), whereas the second expression (amrtam aanute, 'attains immortality') lays stress on the final achievement ensuing from such destruction of obstacles. 22 On the face of it, Madhva would seem the most scrupulous of the three commentators in that he provisionally adheres to the literal meaning of the terms involved, taking both vidya and avidya at their face value, as '[metaphysical] knowledge' and 'ignorance' to start with; but the net result is an even more liberal amount of unwarranted speculation in the overall interpretation of the passage. 23 The keystone is in the instrumentals in the second and third stanzas, seemingly specifying vidya and avidya as different means to different fruits. Now, it is implicit in the instrumental case that the instrumentality thereby expressed should be carried out by way of position (as contrasted to negation) of the relevant term. 24 For example, when we say that 'the house was burnt by fire', we obviously mean 'by kindling a fire' (or something of the sort), and it would be preposterous to suppose that we should mean 'by quenching a fire'; this, however, is exactly how Madhva begs us to understand the instrumental of avidya in the passage being considered. In fact, like his fellows, Madhva is unable to find any value in ignorance as such, let alone the capability of producing positive fruits. Therefore, he boldly proceeds to tum the instrumental of avidya inside out, so to speak, by simply postulating the ellipsis of a negative term: avidyaya, according to him, must stand for avidyanindaya, hence means not 'through ignorance' but 'through the blame of ignorance'! To be precise, Madhva does not produce this amazing piece of sleight of hand in explicit terms, for he confines himself to alleging an untraced Snqti passage to support his claim, as he is wont to do in similar circumstances. But this is what the commentator Jayatirtha makes of it. 25 For his part, the subcommentator Vadiraja is well aware of the venturesome nature of such interpretation, and tries his best to defend it with a fourfold argument. 26 21 Vedantadesika, p. 17.8-9: mrtyum tirtvety asyopiiya"-virodhi-taraf)a-paratviit. [a Sc.: moqopiiya-0 .] 22 Vedlintadesika, p. 17.9: amrtam asnuta iti ｰｲｩｴＭｶｯ､ｨｮｬ｢ｏｫ･ｾＮ＠ 23 As Jayatirtha (ad iU3 9, p. 21.10-12) summarises the argument: yathiivat paramatmajiiiinam moqa-siidhanam ity uktam. na kevalam tat. kim niima. anyathii-jiiiina-nindiisamu<c>citam evety etad-artha-pratipiidakam iidya-mantra-trayam-'Right knowledge of the supreme self has been said to be the means for deliverance-but not just that. What then, pray? It must be associated with censure of false knowledge: this is the purport of the first triad'. 24 Of course, this is but a particular case of the general 'positivity' oflanguage. 25 Jayatirtha ad iU3 10, p. 22.8: avidyayii anyathii-jiiiina-niridayii ca iti yiivat. 26 Vadiraja ad iU3 10, p. 22.12-16: avidyayii anyathii-jiiiina-nindayii itY atra avidyayii moqtiika-desa-priipter asambhaviit avidyii-nindanasya priik-prastutatviic ca yathii-srutaｶｩ､ｹ｡ｯｾ＠ bhinna-phalatvasya sarva-sammatatvenavaktavyakatvac• cavidyayii mrtyum tirtvii iti moqtiika-dda-riipa-phalasya vaqyamiinatvac ca nindayii iti padam adhyiihrtya PAOLO MAGNONE 358 This notion of avidyii as something instrumental to liberation not through its application but though its rejection reflects back on the interpretation of the first stanza. Here there is no question for Madhva of the feasibility of jiianakarma-samuccaya, as was the case with Saiikara and Vedantadesika, since he does not share their interpretation of avidyii as works, whether to be cumulated or not with knowledge. In what respect is, then, vidyii by itself inadequate, and 'leading to even deeper darkness' than avidyii? Because although those who resort to avidyii, here in its rightful meaning as 'false knowledge'-or, through the lenses of Madhva's theistic perspective, worship of other (false) gods (anyathOpiisanii)-are bound for darkness, they do not fare better who just pay allegiance to vidyii or 'true knowledge' (sc. knowledge of the true God) w i t h o u t at the same time rebutting avidyii. Indeed, Madhva' s peculiarly sectarian and proselytising stance is clearly evinced by the probably made-up Smrti he adduces by way of running commentary to the three stanzas, to the effect that, although the worshippers of any god but ｖｩｾｊＬｬｵ＠ may plunge into darkness, even deeper darkness awaits those ｖ｡ｩｾｊＬｬｶ＠ devotees who refrain from denouncing misbelievers. Vidyii and avidyii (in the aforesaid negative sense) should be practised jointly, because each is capable of producing its distinctive fruit. As Jayatirtha clarifies, vidyii and avidyii are upala/cya1,1as ('implicit designations') for 'adherence to God's true essence', and, respectively, 'due condemnation of false knowledge': 27 by the latter one crosses over ignorance and sorrow expressed by the word 'death', while by the former one attains knowledge and happiness conveyed by the word 'immortality'. Even more difficult for the three commentators proves the interpretation of the second triad, running thus: andharh tamaQ pravisanti ye 'sarhbhuti m upiisate I tato bhuya iva te tamo ya u sarhbhutyiirh ratiiQ II 12 II anyad evahuQ sarhbhaviid anyad iihur asarhbhaviit I iti susruma dhirii1,1iirh ye nas tad vicaca/cyire 11 13 11 sarhbhutirh 28 ca viniisarh ca yas tad vedobhayarh saha I vyakhyiitam iti bhavab.-'By ignorance, i.e. by censuring false knowledge: here the commentator has supplied the word "by censuring" by way of explanation, because [l] ignorance as such cannot possibly be a partial factor for the attainment of deliverance; [2] the blame of ignorance has been mentioned previously [and therefore it cannot be implicitly praised here]; [3] as per the current notion of knowledge and ignorance, it would be pointless to declare their fruits to be different, this being a matter of common agreement; and, finally, because [4] in the next verse ignorance will actually be mentioned as a partial factor of deliverance [which by itself it cannot possibly be, a8 said previously]'. The original incorrectly reads 0 avaktavyaktatvac through dittography.] 27 Jayatirtha ad iU3 11, p. 22.29-30: vidya-padam iSvarayathatmyasya avidyii-padam ca c· anyathii-jniina-nindyatvasya ｵｰ｡ｬ｣ｹｾｭＮ＠ 28 Sailkara: (a)sambhiitim. HERMENEUTICAL WRIGGLINGS ABOUT THE iS6PANI$AD 359 viniisena mrtyum tirtva sambhutyamrtam29 aSnute1114113° At first sight, this triad appears to duplicate the structure of the previous one, literally reproducing it word for word but for the substitution of the pair of opposites vidyalavidyii with the new pair sambhuti ('origination') I asambhuti ('nonorigination'). A couple of discrepancies, however, do exist: apart from the ablatives (sambhaviidlasambhavad) in the place of the instrumentals (vidyayiil avidyayii) in stanza 13, the most conspicuous difference is the looseness in the designation of the new pair of opposites, which are termed in turn sambhuti ('origination')/asambhuti ('non-origination'}, sambhava ('becoming')lasambhava ('non-becoming') and (on the face of it) sambhuti ('origination')/vinasa ('destruction'). Vedantadesika and Madhva, for their part, do not make much of such discrepancies, assuming an obvious correspondence between the two triads. Such correspondence, however, does not suit Saiikara, whose interpretation totally disrupts the parallelism with the help of sophisticated arguments which elicit Jayatirtha's caustic remark alluded to in the title of this paper. To start with, there is no agreement among the three commentators on the meaning of sambhuti and asambhuti. 31 Sankara takes asambhuti to mean the 'ingenerate; which is the cause of generated effects, i.e. the unmanifest Nature (pralqti); and sambhuti to mean the 'generated', i.e. the effect-brahman (i.e. the creator god Brahma) in the form of the 'golden germ' of creation (hira'f)yagarbha). As was the case with the former triad, Saiikara considers this triad also as meant for the worldly man, who is directed to meditate both on Nature and on Brahma to reap the respective fruits. The fruit ensuing from meditation on Brahma is the attainment of siddhis or 'supernatural powers' 32, as Sankara 29 30 Saitkara: tirtvasambhutyamrtam. E.g. OLIVELLE (1998: 409): 'Into blind darkness they enter, people who worship nonbecoming; and into still blinder darkness, people who delight in becoming. It's far different from coming-into-being, they say, different also from not coming-into-being, we're toldso have we heard from wise men, who have explained it all to us. The becoming and the destruction-a man who knows them both together, passes beyond death by the destruction, and by the becoming attains immortality' 31 Other commentators are also at variance as to the meaning of the terms. According to Uvata (p. 55.4 ff.), asambhuti means 'non-(re)birth' after death (mrtasya satab punafl sambhavo nasti), and Lokii.yatikas (materialists) are targeted as zealots of this doctrine; Mahidhara (p. 55.16 ff.) concurs, but identifies partisans of asambhuti as Bauddhas. On the other hand, both identify sambhuti as iitman and censure .its exclusive devotees (Uvata, p. 55.10 ff.; Mahidhara, p. 55.18 ff.) for their intellectual pride (Uvata, p. 55.11: sva-buddhim adbhutiim vibhiivayantab-'fancying their own mind very smart'; Mahidhara, p. 55.19: svabuddhi-liighavam ajiiniiniib-'not realising the triviality of their mind') which leads them to regard jiiiina-kiiT)</.a ('[Vedic] department of knowledge') alone, neglecting karma-kiirJ<f.a ('[Vedic] department of ritual works'). 32 Siddhis or vibhutis are traditionally reckoned as eight, but their identification is not uniform. The nine candidates include: arJiman ('parvification'), mahiman ('magnification'), 360 PAOLO MAGNONE specifies further on. The fruit of meditation on Nature consists in the condition of pra/qti-laya ('merged into Nature'), described by the subcommentator Anandagiri as an unconscious state akin to deep sleep, a sort of mock isolation desirable on account of the absence of pain inherent in samsara. 33 Now, the problem arises how to make this interpretation of sambhuti ('origination') and asambhuti ('non-origination') square with stanza 14, which states the fruits of sambhuti and vinasa ('destruction'). Since sambhuti is expressly brought up by name, the inference lies near at hand that vinasa should be a replacement for asambhuti, as indeed understood by the other commentators. The stanza would therefore connect meditation on asambhuti with crossing over death, and meditation on sambhuti with attaining immortality. But this is unacceptable for Saiikara, who identifies, as we have seen, sa1hbhuti with Brahma: the god cannot grant immortality, but only the siddhis ('supernatural powers'), which can but help overcome death consisting in powerlessness and finitude. On the other hand, since asambhuti has been identified with Nature, meditation on it can truly be said to grant the sort of immortality consisting in absorption in the unmanifest ground of being. So, according to laghiman ('levitation'), gariman ('gravitation'), prapti ('extensibility'), prakiimya ('unhindered will'), iSitva ('supremacy') vasitva ('subjugation'), kiimlivasayitva/satya-sarhkalpatva ('self-realising wish'). They are hinted at in siitra 45 of the Vibhiiti-pada of the Yoga-siitra (YS 4), but there are discrepancies among the lists given by different commentators. Vyiisa (YBh 4.45) with Viicaspatimisra (TVai 4.45), ｖｩｪｮ｡｢ｨｫｾｵ＠ (YV 4.45) and ｂｨｩｶｧｾ･ｳ｡＠ (YSP 4.45) omits gariman, Riimiinanda (YSMP 4.45) and Sadiisivendra (YSuK 4.45) reduce satya-sarhkalpatva/ kiimlivasayitva) to prakiimya, while Niigojibhatta (YSVr 4.45) apparently reduces it to vasitva. Bhagavata-pural)a 11.15.4-5 (cit. in YV 4.45) likewise has a list without gariman. As for Bhoja (YRM 4.45), according to some editions he actually lists all nine, but since the disagreement with the traditional number of eight is inadmissible, the variant reading of Jiviinanda Vidyiisagara's edition (YS 3) should probably be accepted, omitting prapti but subsuming its content under prakiimya. Cf. MAGNONE (1991: 131 f. ). 33 Anandagiri ad Iu1 14, p. 13 .18-19: sarhsari-dubkhlinubhavlibhavena ca siquptivat pra/q'ti-layasya purtqel)lirthyamanatapy upapadyate. Pra/q'ti-layas ('merged into Nature') are mentioned also in YS 1.19 (together with videhas, or 'incorporeal') as a class of beings experiencing a sort of spontaneous non-cognitive enstasis (asarhprajfiata-samadhi), which, however, is inferior to the corresponding condition acquired through yoga in that it only yields temporary results and not ultimate molcya. According to Vyiisa, prakrti-layas are those 'whose mind together with its object has dissolved into Nature, so that they experience a sort of isolation, until they come back by the compulsion of their [still unaccomplished] object' (pra/q'ti-layab sadhikare [= acaritarthe (Viicaspatimisra)] cetasi pra/q'tiline kaivalya-padam ivlinubhavanti yavan na punar avarttate 'dhikara-vasac cittam). Viicaspatimisra (TVai 1.19) expands explaining that pra/q'ti-layas, having identified with prakrfi or its intermediate evolutes, have their internal organ permeated with the corresponding unconscious habits (viisana), and dissolve into them after the fall of the body. However, their object (i.e. the attainment of discriminative knowledge) being unfulfilled, they are again differentiated by the force of their unaccomplished task, much in the same way as dried-up frogs metamorphosed into lumps of clay revive again with their former frog body when sprinkled with rain; cf. MAGNONE (1991: 39 f.). HERMENEUTICAL WRIGGLINGS ABOUT THE iS6PANl$AD 361 his own preconception, Saitkara would rather have the stanza say quite the reverse of what it actually does-and he accordingly proceeds to turn it the other way round: i.e. sambhiiti must be metamorphosed into asambhiiti, and vinasa, contrary to all plausibility, must be the same as sambhiiti. The latter part is not difficult: as hira1J.ya-garbha ('golden germ' of creation) had previously been termed sambhiiti34 in so far as generated, just so is he now termed vinasa 35 in so far as destructible; he is, in fact, apara-brahman ('lower Brahman') or karya-brahman ('effect-Brahman'), hence, as an effect, liable to both generation and destruction. The former part, however, poses more of a problem: how to turn the two occurrences of sambhiiti into asambhiiti? Sandhi comes in handy for the second occurrence: because word boundaries need not be acknowledged in the script, tirtva sambhiitya can conveniently be read as tirtvasarhbhiitya, i.e. a conflation of tirtva and asambhiityii. The first occurrence, though, is more resilient to possible manipulations, being the very first word of the stanza; but here Sallkara performs a veritable coup de theatre, apparently bringing to bear the guf,la vowel of the ending of the previous stanza to postulate an avagraha of privative 'a' in the next one. 36 Of course, rules of external sandhi do not normally obtain across major metrical bounda- ries, and so it is not surprising that the dvaitin Jayatirtha should sarcastically applaud the hermeneutical exploit as a specimen of apiirva-vyiikaral)a-kausala ('unprecedented grammatical skill'). 37 34 Saiikara adfU 1 12, p. 12.3-5: sambhavanam sambhUtib sii yasya kiiryasya sii sambhiitifl. ... bahutaram iva tamab praviSanti ya u sambhiityam kiirya-brahmal)i hiral)ya-garbhakhye ratiib. 35 Satikara ad iU 1 14, p. 12.12-13.4: vinasena viniiso dharmo yasya kiiryasya sa tena dharminabhedhenocyate viniisa iti. tena tad-upiisanena ... hira1)ya-garbh0piisanena hy al)imadi-priiptib phalam. 36 Saiikara ad iU 1 14, p. 13.5-{): sarhbhiitirh ca viniiSarh cety atrava71)a-lopena nirdeso ､ｲ｡ｾｦｶｹ｢Ｎ＠ pralqti-laya-pha/a-sruty-anurodhiit.-'[In the chunk] sarhbhiitirh ca viniiSarh ca the reference must be understood with the elision of an a, in compliance with what has been heard as the fruit of absorption into Nature.' Once again, IYER ( 1995: 36 f.) goes out of his way to justify Saitkara, adducing arguments in support of his explanation from other commentators as well as his own to the effect that: (1) by the rule that utpattimad vastu viniisi avasyam ('what is originated must needs be perishable'), viniiSa must mean sarhbhiiti, hence sarhbhiiti must be read as asarhbhiiti to avoid repetition; (2) elision of a is permissible acｹ｡ｴｨｏｰ､ｩｾｦｭ＠ (A 6.3.109) allowing the elision and mucording to the rule ｰｲｾｯ､｡ｩｮ＠ is the tation of letters in vedic usage; (3) by Jaimini's rule sarhdigdhe tu Ｈｳ｡ｲｨ､ｩｧ･ｾｵ＠ (MS original reading, which however IYER (1995) quotes as sarhdigdhe tu) ｶｩｫｹ｡Ｍｳ･ｾｴ＠ 1.4.29: 'In case of doubt, the meaning should be gathered from the context.')-in this case, the traditional doctrine about prakrtilayas and their reward. His final verdict is: 'Sri Saitkaracirya' s interpretation of the mantras gives the correct purport of the mantra and is in perfect agreement with the siistras [!]'. 37 Jayatirtha ad iU 14, p. 25.9-10: akiira-lopena sarhbhiitir avyiilqtam ity apiirvarh 3 vyakartll}a-kausalam ity iistiim.-'As to [the submission that] the word sarhbhiiti means the Unevolwd (i.e. Nature] through loss of an a,· here is [a specimen of] unprecedented gramllllllicllstill--aod so let it remain•. 362 PAOLO MAGNONE Madhva's explanation of the triad, however, is no less idiosyncratic, beginning from his interpretation of the meaning of the couple sambhuti/asambhuti. Actually, even for this triad, as for the foregoing, his gloss consists in one long running quotation from the Kurma-purii1Ja, presumably forged, as is so often the case with Madhva's quotes, since the passage cannot be traced in the published text. Jayatirtha explicates Madhva's intent to the effect that sambhuti means 'creator' by metonymy (i.e. as the cause of sambhuti or 'creation') whereas asambhuti, as is plain to see, by the same token must mean 'un-creator'38! The stanza, therefore, threatens darkness and more darkness for those who do not acknowledge ｖｩｾｊｽＮｕ＠ as creator, or one-sidedly recognise him as creator o n I y , whereas he is both creator and destroyer. 39 The knowledge of ｖｩｾＹｵＧｳ＠ true nature is not confined to the need of avoiding negative consequences, it also yields positive fruits: by the knowledge of ｖｩｾｊｽＮｕ＠ as destroyer one destroys the bonds to the body (and so crosses death), whereas by the knowledge of him as creator of all good things one attains immortality in the form of sameness and identity with ｖｩｾＹｵＬ＠ which not even the liberated can enjoy. Vedantadesika puts forward still another interpretation of the couple sambhuti/ asambhuti. The former he takes to mean 'communion' (i.e., literally, 'being together') with brahman, on the strength of scriptural passages. This choice, however, leaves him in an awkward position when it comes to understanding the latter member of the couple. As he remarks himself, it would not be proper to understand asambhuti in an obvious way, as either prior or subsequent nonexistence of sambhuti (i.e. as its not yet/no longer being there respectively before/after its achievement), because how could the absence of sathbhuti-a means towards immortality-conceivably represent in itself a means for crossing death (as said in the third strophe of the triad)40? Therefore, here is the solution advanced by the Svamin: the word asambhuti, while excluding sambhuti, must mean something that, although not (yet) communion, is proximate to it as its precondition in the form of removal of obstacles: this is the meaning that is 38 Jayatirtha ad iU3 12, p. 23.20: asarhbhutirh ｪ｡ｧｴＭｳｲｾｦ･＠ akartiirarh, with the subcommentator's gloss: na vidyate sarhbhutir yasmiid (Vidirija ad /oc.). 39 Madhva ad iU3 12, p. 23.12-15: (... ) evarh ｳｲｾＡｩＭｫ｡ｴｶｨ＠ niingi-kurvanti ye hareJ:i I te 'pi yanti tamo ghorarh tathii sarhhiira-kartrtiim II niingi-kurvanti te 'py evarh tasmiit sarva-gu1,1atmakam I ｳ｡ｲｶｾｫｴｩｭ＠ iSesarh sarva-sarhhiira-kiirakam II Here the root expression ye 'sarhbhutim upiisate is boldly taken as tantamount to ye [harim] sarhbhutim nopiisate. 40 Vedintadesika ad iU2 12, p. 19.9-10: na catrasarhbhuti-sabdena sambhuter anutpattir viniiso vii pratipiidyaJ:i. amrta-priipti-hetutayoktiiyii/:I sambhute/:I priig-abhiivasya pradhvarhsasya vii mrtyu-tarQl)a-hetutvena vaktum ayuktatviit. HERMENEUTICAL WRIGGLING$ ABOUT THE iS6PANI$AD 363 gathered by the subsequent substitution of the word vinasa for asambhuti41 , as well as for want of a better interpretation. The foregoing review, albeit cursory, may perhaps suffice to give a fair idea of some of the sophisticated hermeneutical strategies devised by the three commentators-Le. Sankara, Vedantadesika and Madhva-to justify their vastly different interpretations. And so, in the end, 'What did the ｕｰ｡ｮｩｾ､＠ really say' has proved once again a hopeless question, like the squaring of the (hermeneutical) circle. In any case, whatever it did say, in the original setting of master and disciple, when the sacred power of the Word (brahman) was called upon 'to sustain them both, to nourish them both, so that their joint effort might be fruitful, and their study might be bright' (to paraphrase the auspicious invocation that would inaugurate their meetings)42-and most of all, when the inordinate quibbling of the commentators was not yet there to spoil ＴＳ Ｍ｡ｬｳＬ＠ the truth of the Word (ma ｶｩ､ｾ｡ｨＯＩ is no longer for us to grasp. Which, incidentally, may retrospectively justify the ancient Indian aversion for committing the Word to the written leaf, where it would be helplessly exposed to the vagaries of both haters and (misguided?) well-wishers-the same aversion that was shared by Plato, when he wrote about the logoi that once written down 'go about everywhere, among the knowledgeable and the ignorant alike, and if faulted or treated unfairly must appeal to their father for help, because, left to their own devices, they can neither defend nor support themselves ... ' 44 BIBLIOGRAPHY = Prupni: ａｾＯ｡､ｨｹｩＮ＠ A Anandagiri IU Srisa Chandra Vasu (tr.): The ａｾＯ｡､ｨｹｩ＠ of Pii1)ini. Sindhu Charan Bose, Benares 1897. See: IU 1• = Anandagiri: ｬｳｯｰ｡ｮｩｾ､Ｍ｢ｨｹｦｫＮ＠ = ｩｳｯｰ｡ｮｾ､＠ ｛Ａｓ｡Ｍｶｩｳｹｯｰｮｾ､｝Ｎ＠ (1) S. Subrahmanyashastri (ed.): srimad-anandagirySriSankaracarya-viracitam ｵｰ｡ｮｦｹ､Ｍ｢ｨｾｭ＠ acarya-krta-fikaya ｫ｡ｴｨＭｭｩＱＩＴＬｵｹｲ｢ｾＮ＠ prasi- Vedantadesika adiU2 12, p. 19.6-8: tam [sambhiitim]paryudasyann ayam asambhiititad-asanna-pratibandha-vinasam abhidhatte. sambhiitim ca vinasam ca ity api hy anantaram ucyate. 42 saha nav avatu. saha nau bhunaktu. saha viryam karavavahai. tejasvi nav adhitam astu-so prays the santi-mantra of the ｋｲｾＱｊ｡＠ Yajur-veda, which would be recited before every session of study of the ｕｰ｡ｮｩｾ､ｳＮ＠ 43 Santi-mantra of the ｋｲｾＱＩ｡＠ Yajur-veda. Literally 'let us not be hostile to each other', but interpreted by some in the given context as 'let us not entertain conflicting views'. 44 Plato, Phaedrus 275e (somewhat abridged and adapted). 41 ｳ｡｢､ｾ＠ 364 PAOLO MAGNONE ddhliciirylintara-fikabhib safika-taittiriya-viirtikena ca samiiｬｾｭｱｴ｡Ｎ＠ Khal)r!ab J. Mahe8a Anusandhana Sathsthanam Ｈｓｲｩ､｡ｫｾｬｽＮｭｴ＠ Matha Prakiisana), Varanasi 2004. (2) K.C. Varadachari; D.T. Thathacarya (eds.): isiiviisyopani.yadbhii.yyam by Sri Vedanta Desika. Critically edited with introduction, translation and notes by ... Vedanta Desika Reasearch Society, Madras 1975. (3) Shrisha Rao (ed.): isii-viisyopani.yad-bhii.yya-tikiiprakiiSika-khal)r!lirthii'l;t sankara-bhii.yyam ca. [With Madhva's Bhii.yya, Viidiriija's fikii, Jayatirtha's Vivaral)a and Raghavendrayati's Khal)r!lirtha]. www.dvaiti.org [2007]. (4) B.K. Iyer (ed.): isiiviisyopani.yad. Including the original verses, Sankarabhii.yya text with a literal word by word English translation, copious notes and introduction. Vrajajivan lndological Studies 2, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, Delhi 1995. (5) Aciirya Sivaprasiida Dvivedi (ed.): isii-viisy6pani.yat. Hindy-anuviida-pariSilana-samvalita-siiilkara-bhiil)l6petii. Caukhambii Surabhiirati Granthamiilii 171, Caukhambii Surabhiirati Prakiisana, Viiriil}.asi [no date]. (6) Devendranath Pandey (ed.): isii-viisy6pani.yad- bhii.yya-samgraha. Sankara-bhii.yyam, Uvata- 0, Siiyal)a- 0, Mahidhara-0, Prakiisa- 0, Yogapalcyyiyam Prakiisa- 0, Sviimidayaniinda-0, R. Madhva. Roy, Griffith ki fikii sapadlirthlinvayab hindi vyiikhyii sahita. Jagdish Sanskrit Pustakalaya, Jaipur 2001. IYER 1995 Jayatirtha Madhva MAGNONE 1991 Mahidhara MESQUITA 1977 MESQUITA 2007 =See: iU4. = Jayatirtha: ｩｳＭｶｹＶｰ｡ｮｾ､ｲｬＩＮ＠ See: iU3• = Madhva: isopani.yad-bhii.yya. See: iU3 • = Magnone, Paolo (ed. & tr.): Pataiijali. Aforismi de/lo Yoga (Yogasiitra). [With Bhoja's Riija-miirtal)r!a commentary, introduction and subcommentary by ... ]. Magnanelli Promolibri, Torino 1991. = Mahidhara: isii-viisy6pani.yad-bhii.yya. See: iU6 • = Mesquita, Roque: Madhva und seine unbekannten literarischen Quellen. Einige Beobachtungen. Publications of the De Nobili Research Library 24, Institut fiir Siidasien-, Tibet- und Buddhismuskunde der Universitiit Wien, Wien 1997. = Mesquita, Roque: Madhvas Zitate aus den Puriil)as und dem Mahiibhiirata: Eine analytische Zusammenstellung nicht identifizierbarer Quellenzitate in Madhvas Werken nebst Ubersetzung und Anmerkungen. Publications of the De Nobili Research Li- MS OLIVELLE 1998 Phaedrus brary 24, lnstitut fiir Siidasien-, Tibet- und Buddhismuskunde der Universitiit Wien, Wien 2007 = Jaimini: Mimiimsii-siitra. B.D. Basu (ed.); Mohan Lal Sandal (transl.): The Kuniimsii Siitras of Jaimini. The Sacred Books of the Hindus 27,1. Sudhindre Nath Basu, Allahabad 1923. = Olivelle, Patrick (ed. & tr.): The Early ｕｰ｡ｮｩｾ､ｳＮ＠ Oxford University Press, New York 1998. =Plato: Phaedrus. J. Burnet (ed.): Platonis Opera. Tomus II tetra/ogias III-IV continens. Oxford Classical Texts, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1922. HERMENEUTICAL WRIGGLINGS ABOUT THE !S6PANl$AD ROCHER2008 365 =Rocher, Ludo: 'Review of Madhvas Zitate aus den Purar)as und dem Mahabharata: Eine analytische Zusammenstel/ung nicht identifizierbarer Quel/enzitate in Madhvas Werken nebst Obersetzung und Anmerkungen. By Roque Mesquita', Journal of the American Oriental Society 128,3 (2008) 603--{;06. SHARMA 1961/2000 =Sharma, B.N.K: History ofthe Dvaita School of Vedanta and its Literature. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 2000 [first edition: Bombay 1961). = Sharma, B.N.K: My Latest Four Research Papers. Published by SHARMA2001 the Author, Mumbai 2001. saiikara See: IUi. IU3, IU4, IU5• = Saiikara: ｩｳｯｰ｡ｮｾ､Ｍ｢ｨｹＮ＠ TVai = Vacaspatimisra: Tattva-vaisaradi. See: YS 1• Uvata = Uvata: ｩｳ｡Ｍｶｹｯｰｮｾ､｢ｨＮ＠ See: IU6• VARADACHARI= Varadachari, K.C.; Thathacarya, D.T.: 'Introduction' to IU2, pp. THATHACARYA 1975 1-39. See: IU2 • = Vedantadesika-sviimin: ｬｳ｡ｶｹｯｰｮｩｾ､Ｍ｢ｨＮ＠ Vedantadesika = [Vyiisa (ascribed):] ｙｯｧ｡Ｍ｢ｨｾｹＮ＠ See: YS 1• YBh = Bhoja: Yoga-raja-martarJ<f.a. See: YS2. YRM = Pataii.jali: Yoga-sutra. (1) Gosviimi Diimodara Siistri (ed.): YS Samkhya-yoga-darsanam arthat pataiijala-yoga-darsanam. [With the scholium of Vyiisa and the commentaries Tattva-vaisaradi, Pataiijala-rahasya, Yoga-varttika and Bhasvati by Viicaspati Misra, Riighavananda Sarasvati, Vijiiiina ｂｨｩｫｾｵ＠ and HarihariinandiiraI)ya]. Edited with introduction, notes, indices, appendices etc. by ... Kashi Sanskrit Series 110, Chaukhambha [sic] Sanskrit Sansthan, Varanasi 1989. (2) PaI)<;lit I;>hW)c.Jhiriija Siistri yoga-sutram. [With the com(ed.): ｍ｡ｨｲｾｩＭｰｴｪｬＩｭ＠ mentaries Riija-miirtafJ<!a, Pradipikii, V(tti, Mar)i-prabha, Candrikii YSMP YSP YSuK YSVr YV = = = = = and Yoga-sudhakara by Bhojariija, BhiiviigaI)esa, Niigoji Bhatta, Ramiinanda Yati, Anantadeva and Sadasivendra Sarasvati). Kashi Sanskrit Series 83, Chaukhambha [sic] Sanskrit Sansthan, Varanasi 1982. Riimananda Yati: Yoga-sutra-mar)i-prabha. See: YS 2• BhiiviigaI)esa: Yoga-sutra-pradipika. See: YS 2. Sadasivendra Sarasvati: Yoga-sudha-kara. See: YS 2 • Nagojibhatta: Vrtti. See: YS2. ｖｩｪＮ｡ｮ｢ｨｾｵＺ＠ Yoga-varttika. See: YS 1•