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The irrelevance of belief to rational action

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This paper has profited from comments by many people. In particular I would like to thank David Gauthier, Carl Hempel, Mark Kaplan, Isaac Levi, Nicholas Rescher, Wesley Salmon and Teddy Seidenfeld.

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Maher, P. The irrelevance of belief to rational action. Erkenntnis 24, 363–384 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00205021

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00205021

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