Abstract
According to divine-command metaethics (DCM), whatever is morally good or right has that status because, and only because, it conforms to God’s will. I argue that DCM is false or vacuous: either DCM is false, or else there are no instantiated moral properties, and no moral truths, to which DCM can even apply. The sort of criticism I offer is familiar, but I develop it in what I believe is a novel way.
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Maitzen, S. A semantic attack on divine-command metaethics. SOPHIA 43, 15–28 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02780509
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02780509