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Acting without knowledge
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 March 2018
Abstract
I question whether psychological effects that an agent is unaware of can express her values and, if they can, whether this allows us to hold her responsible in the range of cases that we would like to.
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- Open Peer Commentary
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018
References
Doris, J. M. (2002) Lack of character: Personality and moral behavior. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Doris, J. M. (2015b). Talking to our selves: Reflection, ignorance, and agency. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Frankfurt, H. (1969) Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. Journal of Philosophy
66:829–39.Google Scholar
Maibom, H. L. (2014) Knowing what we are doing. In:
Moral psychology and human agency, ed. D'Arms, J. & Jacobson, D., pp. 108–22. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Target article
Précis of Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency
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