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Quotation and Unquotation in Free Indirect Discourse

EMAR MAIER

Abstract: I argue that free indirect discourse should be analyzed as a species of direct discourse rather than indirect discourse. More specifically, I argue against the emerging consensus among semanticists, who analyze it in terms of context shifting. Instead, I apply the semantic mechanisms of mixed quotation and unquotation to offer an alternative analysis where free indirect discourse is essentially a quotation of an utterance or thought, but with unquoted tenses and pronouns.

1. Free Indirect Discourse is …

There are two main ways to report what someone said or thought. There is direct discourse, where the reporter mimics the original words verbatim, and there is indirect discourse, where the reporter takes the content that was originally expressed and paraphrases that in her own words. In fictional narratives, a third mode of reporting has emerged, which literary scholars have dubbed *free indirect discourse*.

> (1) Ashley was lying in bed freaking out. Tomorrow was her six year anniversary with Spencer and it had been the best six years of her life.[1]

The passage in (1) begins with a third person omniscient narrator telling us about a character named Ashley. The second sentence starts with the paradoxical future−past combination *tomorrow was*. From a narratological perspective, what's happening here is that the narrator reports what the protagonist, Ashley, is thinking, viz. something like *Tomorrow is my six year anniversary with Spencer*, without fully switching over to the character's perspective, as would happen in direct discourse. In fact, the adjustment of tense (*is → was*) and pronouns (*my → her*) to fit the narrator's story telling context, strongly suggest that, if it is a report, it must be of the indirect variety. But then where is the subordinating framing clause, e.g. *she thought that*? And why don't we adjust other indexicals like *tomorrow* (→ *the next day*)?

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[1] fanfiction.southofnowhereonline.com/story/15004/page1.html

The critical contribution of this article is to argue against the emerging consensus among semanticists, according to which free indirect discourse involves interpretation with respect to a shifted context, either by a covert context shifting operator, or otherwise (Sections 2 and 3). Building on recent developments in the semantics of quotation, I then propose that free indirect discourse is essentially quotation with systematically punctured 'holes' (Section 4).

But first, in the remainder of this section, I'll describe four defining characteristics of free indirect discourse (Sections 1.1–1.4). I end the introduction with a brief preview of my own proposal in Section 1.5.

1.1 … a Form of Reported Thought, or Speech

In example (1) above, free indirect discourse is used to report what the protagonist, Ashley, is thinking. Reporting thoughts (or 'stream of consciousness,' if you will) seems to be the primary function of free indirect discourse. However, actual speech can also be reported in free indirect discourse:

(2) My mother reminded me of this every day with a raised eyebrow and sentences that trailed off into a question mark—*she was married at 24, which was already 'up there,' and all my friends back in Tombov had at least one child by now. She was only living to see me married*, she said.[2]

To assist the reader, I will henceforth adopt a notational convention of italicizing (my conservative estimate of) the range of a free indirect discourse. Boldface indicates my added emphasis. I'm mainly using examples from fan fiction, avoiding the usual 19th and 20th century literary canon, combined with the occasional made up or cited example. The reason for preferring fan fiction to professionally-written novels is that these unedited, self-published stories by unprofessional authors are in some sense closer to regular everyday language than the meticulously weighed words and carefully crafted prose of, say, Virginia Woolf.

1.2 … Free

The fact that we're dealing with a report is not clearly marked by a prefixed frame of the form *x said/thought*. This is what the 'free' in free indirect discourse stands for. There is however the possibility of a parenthetical *x said/thought* added as an interjection or afterthought, as illustrated by (3), a variation on (1), and (4), respectively:

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[2] killingthebuddha.com/mag/crucifiction/the-domovoi/ Note that in my eventual, quotational analysis of free indirect discourse, the quotation '*up there*' would constitute a case of quotation inside quotation. This is not uncommon with other varieties of quotation, e.g. mixed quotations can occur inside direct discourse, scare quotes inside mixed quotes, and even mixed quotes inside mixed quotes.

(3) *Tomorrow was her six year anniversary with Spencer*, she thought, *and it had been the best six years of her life*.

(4) Marissa stood in front of her washbowl dumbfounded, still staring at herself in the mirror. *Her wet hair made her look a little bit exhausted. But when did she not look exhausted?* she thought to herself. Then she turned her gaze to the door. *Could that be Alex?*[3]

1.3 ... not Direct Discourse

Let me start with a note on direct discourse. Although typically this term is used for speech rather than thought reports, the mechanism of verbatim quotation (with or without quotation marks) does in fact extend to both:

(5) She walked up to him and kissed him. 'What am I doing? He is going to hate me now,' she thought.[4]

The quoted phrase appears to be a literal representation of what the protagonist was thinking, so we will classify this as a direct discourse. But clearly, the quoted fragment was not vocalized. Metaphorically, such a direct thought report pretends to report a *sub voce* utterance in the 'language of thought', or a part of the character's 'interior monologue'. The pretense of verbatim faithfulness that characterizes direct discourse must be understood modulo translation in the mental language. In other words, I assume that the semantics of literary devices like direct thought reports and free indirect discourse should follow the folk psychological conception of thought as mental utterances in a natural language, with possibilities for expressives, questions, imperatives, grammatical errors, dialects, hedges, etc.

So, both free indirect discourse and direct discourse can be used to report a protagonist's thought, as well as speech. Moreover, like free indirect discourse, direct reports can occur without any reporting frame, or with a parenthetical frame. The passage below illustrates these varieties of direct discourse: (i) fronted direct speech (i.e. frame at the end), (ii) free direct speech, and (iii) free direct thought report (marked in italics in original):

(6) 'Yes, there is something wrong with that,' he told her, though his pride would not allow him to elaborate. He turned off the car. 'And why the hell don't you get your driveway fixed?' *Oh, well done. Take your anger out on her.*[5]

Still, free indirect discourse differs from direct discourse in one important respect (ignoring typographic quotation marking): tenses and pronouns are adjusted to the narrator's point of view, i.e. as in indirect discourse. Compare the tenses and pronouns in (1) with those in the reconstructed direct and indirect paraphrases:

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[3] m.fanfiction.net/s/5238477/6/
[4] mytoushirohitsugaya.deviantart.com/art/Ulquiorra-and-Orihime-Fanfics-143876793
[5] www.fanfiction.net/s/4884694/11/Eric

(7) a. She thought to herself, 'Tomorrow **is my** six year anniversary with Spencer'. [direct]

    b. She thought to herself that the next day **was her** six year anniversary with Spencer. [indirect]

What's more, this adjustment of pronouns and tenses can even lead to constructions that would be ungrammatical in any other environment. Think of third person versions of idioms lexically restricted to the first person (Banfield, 1973):

(8) {I/*you/*she/*they}'ll be damned if …

Due to the adjustments characteristic of free indirect discourse, this idiom may be expected to occur in the third person (and with a past tense) in free indirect discourse. And it does:

(9) Furious, she hurriedly picked up the child and brought him inside so the neighbours wouldn't see—*she'd be damned if she'd become the newest topic of gossip*.[6]

1.4 … not Indirect Discourse

Free indirect discourse differs from indirect discourse, in that everything apart from pronouns and tenses is interpreted as if it were quoted literally from the character's original speech or thought. Although this is well known and universally accepted among both linguists and literary scholars, let me elaborate with a number of examples. Examples like these will provide some crucial evidence against pure context shift analyses, in particular Sharvit's (2008) reduction of free indirect discourse to indirect speech.

We've already seen how non-pronominal indexicals like *tomorrow* behave rather like in direct discourse, referring to the day after the day of the character's thought, rather than the day after the day of narration. Here's another example featuring the indexicals *today* and *here* interpreted as referring to the time and place of the protagonist making a promise to herself.

(10) *Today she was in here to think, no tears would be shed*. She promised that to herself. *She wasn't going to cry today. Not again*.[7]

A close look at all the examples discussed so far, reveals some other features typically excluded from indirect discourse. In (4) we have an interrogative sentence, marked as such by the question mark and subject−auxiliary inversion. But the indirect discourse version of a question does not allow these forms of marking. Moreover, the question started with a conjunction *But*, which is likewise impossible in

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[6] www.fanfiction.net/s/2498414/1/Raven
[7] www.fanfiction.net/s/5476182/1/View_From_the_Bathroom_Floor

a subordination construction like indirect discourse. A similar main clause (and hence direct discourse) indicator, illustrated by (10), is the use of sentence fragments, like *Not again*.

Next, in free indirect discourse we find so-called speaker-oriented terms that are not clearly indexical, and that can occur in both direct and indirect discourse, but whose interpretation is as in direct discourse: i.e. relative to the reported speaker/thinker. In (11) we see a long stream of free indirect discourse, containing a lot of expressive elements typically classified as speaker-oriented (my boldface).

> (11) Samantha Puckett stood in the convenience store, glaring at the condoms that she had bought no less than two months and a week prior. *Today was supposed to be the last day of her period. She was supposed to be pissed off that the **disgusting** fluids were still … oozing from her body and ruining her life, but instead, she was looking at the supposed contraception that obviously didn't work since she was standing here looking like a **fucking idiot.*** […] She let out a sigh. *Who **the hell** was she kidding? She was a good liar, but she couldn't fool herself. She had all the typical symptoms … No period, sore tits and today she started puking all over the damn place like a drunk after a bar fight*.[8]

The use of these expressives here does not signal a negative attitude of the narrator, but rather of the protagonist, Samantha. Similarly, the reader is led to imagine the negative connotations of the choice of the words *tits* and *puking* to reflect the state of mind of Samantha. In the same vein, Eckardt (2012) demonstrates a shifted speaker-orientation of the subtle semantic/pragmatic contribution of German discourse particles (*überhaupt*, *ja*) in free indirect discourse.

On a somewhat different level, consider also the 'interpretation' of typographically marked pauses and hedges. In free indirect discourse these indicate hesitation or disfluency on the part of the protagonist, not the narrator:

> (12) She wondered if he was still asleep, *how did she even fall asleep and on top of him?! Was he … shirtless? Oh … he was …* [9]

Finally, in free indirect discourse a protagonist's nonstandard dialect can be retained inside a narrative that is otherwise written in standard English.

> (13) He [Big Boy] remembered the day when Buck, jealous of his winning, had tried to smash his kiln. *Yeah, that ol sonofabitch! Naw, Lawd!* […] *Cussin the dead! Yeah, po ol Buck wuz dead now. N Lester too. Yeah it wuz awright fer Buck t smash his kiln. Sho. N he wished he hadnt socked ol Buck so hard tha day*.[10]

In this, free indirect discourse again patterns with direct rather than indirect discourse:

(14) He remembered that day vividly. *He thought to himself that it wuz awright fer Buck t smash his kiln.

1.5 … Mixed Quotation with Unquotation

I propose that the logical form of a free indirect discourse like (1) is roughly as in (15):

(15) Ashley was lying in bed freaking out. 'Tomorrow [was] [her] six year anniversary with Spencer and it [had] been the best six years of [her] life.' [cf. (1)]

The quotation marks are the *mixed quotation* marks of Geurts and Maier (2005), which signal a meaning shift: the quoted words are used to mean whatever the reported speaker, in this case the protagonist, used those very words to mean. Put differently, the effect of mixed quotation is to *defer* the interpretation of the quoted phrase to the quoted speaker. The square brackets indicate *unquotation*, a device used overtly in certain genres of factual reporting. The effect is a temporary suspension of the verbatimness requirement of direct or mixed quotation and thereby allows adjustment to the surrounding text.

Both mixed quotation and unquotation are independently motivated mechanisms that can also occur overtly in other contexts. Moreover, mixed quotation, like free indirect discourse, commonly occurs without report frames, or with parenthetical frames. Most importantly, my quotational proposal is not committed to an underlying grammatical distinction between pronouns/tenses and other context dependent expressions. The semantics I will sketch below tells us how mixed quotation and unquotation as in (15) are interpreted, but which elements in the sentence get unquoted is a matter of pragmatics.

In the following I first review the alternative semantic proposals for analyzing free indirect discourse currently on the market. I then argue against them with new data that are incompatible with the strict grammatical dichotomy these theories presuppose. Finally I present my quotational alternative analysis which, crucially, replaces the hard grammatical dichotomy with a more flexible pragmatic bias.

2. Free Indirect Discourse and Direct Discourse as Context Shift

2.1 The Demonstrative Analysis of Direct Discourse

The first attempt at a formally precise analysis of the syntax and semantics of free indirect discourse is Banfield (1973). At the heart of the proposal lies Partee's (1973) analysis of the distinction between direct and indirect discourse: indirect discourse

follows the syntax of sentential complementation, with semantics similar to that of an attitude report or modal operator; direct discourse consists of two independent sentences, the one featuring a suppressed demonstrative (*this*) referring to the second sentence as a whole:

(16) John said, 'It's raining'
      (logical form:) John said this. It's raining.

For current purposes, one relevant advantage is that we can explain the fact that main clause phenomena are allowed in direct but not in indirect discourse: indirect discourse takes a complement clause, expressing only a proposition, while a direct report features a whole new independent sentence, which may naturally contain exclamatives, expressives, question marks, imperatives, fragments, etc.

One immediate problem is that indexicals and expressive elements in a direct report are intuitively to be interpreted from the perspective of the reported speaker, i.e. the subject rather than the actual utterer of the introductory framing clause. In the demonstrative paraphrase we would lose this crucial feature:

(17) a. Mary said, 'I am a fool'.
      b. Mary said this. I am a fool.

Philosophers following this same demonstrative analysis of quotation, maintain that the second sentence in such paraphrases is not to be understood as an assertion in a discourse, but merely the display of a token in the context (e.g. Predelli, 2008). Partee (1973) however points out that anaphora and ellipsis cross such quotational boundaries without problem. Take (18) (where we are assuming that the boss is not already part of the common ground before the utterance).

(18) 'Don't worry, my boss likes me! He'll give me a raise' said Mary, but given the economic climate I doubt that he can.

Apparently, expressions within a direct quote (*my boss*) can set up discourse referents in the global domain of discourse that can be picked up by anaphoric expressions later on (*he* and, arguably, the elided VP in *can*). In other words, direct discourse is not just the semantically inert display of a token. But then, if we are to interpret the quoted sentence, we need a mechanism to shift the context of interpretation between the two consecutive sentences in (17b).

2.2 Context Shift in Two Steps (Banfield, 1973, 1982)

Banfield achieves a full context shift in two steps: first, there is a grammatical feature, which can attach to a sentence root node with the effect of shifting the interpretation of first and second person pronouns and the present tense to the subject, indirect object, and tense of the report introduction clause. This will take care of the problem noted with (17) in Section 2.1.

But the shifting in direct discourse is not limited to pronouns or tenses. To take care of all the other indexical elements, Banfield introduces a second mechanism, a

rule that associates all 'expressive' elements in a sentence with a unique 'center of consciousness', which gets linked to the subject of the introductory (or parenthetical, or even covert) reporting frame.

It is important to note that Banfield's notion of an 'expressive element' must include all other indexicals (*tomorrow*, *here*), as well as evaluative expressions (*that bastard*, *amazing*), and presumably more covertly indexical elements like discourse particles (cf. Eckardt, 2012). In fact, the specific language, disfluencies, spelling errors, or dialect of a protagonist should be considered expressive features as well, because even that can shift in the switch from narration to direct discourse (cf. Section 1.4 for free indirect discourse analogues of this).[11]

With the context shift mechanism split in two, free indirect discourse can be defined as a partial context shift: as in direct discourse, the framing clause demonstratively refers to the report clause, which is analyzed as an independent main clause. But now, only the second context shifting mechanism applies, i.e. pronouns and tenses remain in narrator mode, but all other expressive/indexical elements are shifted to the center of consciousness represented as the subject of the framing clause.

2.3 Features and Binding (Schlenker, 1999)

Schlenker (1999) integrates some of the basic ideas of Banfield into a much more general account of indexicality and context shifting. Where Banfield's division of labor between the two independent mechanisms of shifting seems rather *ad hoc*, Schlenker sets out to properly motivate the different behavior of pronouns and tenses on the one hand, and other indexicals and expressives on the other.

Schlenker's starting point is the classical formal semantic framework of character and content, designed by Kaplan (1989) to model the behavior of indexicals. Departing from Kaplan, Schlenker makes a principled distinction between two types of indexicality:[12] (i) classical, referential indexicals and demonstratives (e.g. *here*, *now*, *tomorrow*, *that*), which are lexically specified to get their denotation from the actual context (represented overtly in the 1999 formal system as an individual constant); and (ii), pronouns and tenses, which are represented as variables. To regulate the binding behavior of these variables, they are decorated with semantic features that specify person (1,2,3) and tense (past, present, future), among other things. Variables can only be bound by antecedents that satisfy their features. For example, a pronoun like *she* is no more than the surface realization of a variable, say x, carrying features that indicate that it needs to be bound by a third person singular female antecedent. Notation: $x^{3.\text{sg.fem}}$. When variables are bound by coordinates of the actual context $c = < s_c^{1.\text{sg}}, a_c^{2.\text{sg}}, t_c^{\text{pres}} \ldots >$ (where s_c denotes the actual

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[11] Cf. Recanati, 2000, for a more thorough discussion of context shifting and 'language shifting' in quotation.

[12] Actually, the system is much more fine-grained than that—there are also differences in whether the indexical can or must be bound/shifted by attitude operators, but we leave attitude operators aside for now.

speaker/thinker, a_c the addressee, t_c the time of the utterance), they behave essentially as referential indexicals.

Free indirect discourse is described by tweaking the context coordinate's features:[13] the speaker and addressee coordinates now carry third person features, the tense coordinate a past tense, i.e. $c' = < s_{c'}{}^{3.sg}, a_{c'}{}^{3.sg}, t_{c'}{}^{past} \ldots >$. The result is that when *He was sick today* is interpreted in a free indirect discourse context c', *he* gets bound by the first context coordinate (the speaker of c'), and the *past* tense morpheme gets bound by the time coordinate (the utterance time of c'). Crucially, *today*, a true Kaplanian indexical, is oblivious to features and binding and simply picks out the day surrounding the time coordinate of c'. That is, *He was sick today* in free indirect discourse means that the one who utters it is sick at the day surrounding the time of its utterance. Assuming finally a Banfield/Partee-style mechanism of context shift to the protagonist (via demonstrative linking, or otherwise), we ensure that c' is indeed the protagonist's context and get the right result.

To sum up, for Schlenker (1999), as for Banfield, direct discourse and free indirect discourse involve an independent main clause that is interpreted with respect to a shifted context of utterance. Moreover, for both Schlenker and Banfield there are essentially two types of indexicals, which behave differently with respect to this shifted context. Schlenker improves on Banfield in explaining why pronouns and tenses might be expected to behave differently: they are not simply indexicals, but *variables*, i.e. they are referential-like when bound by the context, but they are also bindable by, for instance, quantifiers within the sentence. The other indexicals are simply individual constants, which get their interpretation from the context of utterance, as Kaplan would have it.

Before investigating the predictions of this distinction between pronouns/tenses and other indexicals, I want to discuss a slightly different and more influential analysis of free indirect discourse by Schlenker, which however is based on the same underlying distinction.

2.4 Double Context–Dependence (Schlenker, 2004)

Schlenker (2004) recasts his 1999 theory in a framework where contexts are moved out of the formal language. The idea of contexts carrying features and thereby binding 'indexical variables' is replaced with a system where semantic interpretation is systematically relativized to two separate context parameters, the Context of Utterance, and the Context of Thought. The Context of Utterance (v) is the context in which a sentence, in particular, a direct, indirect or free indirect report, is uttered. The Context of Thought (θ) is the point where a speech or thought originates. Normally, $v = \theta$, but in some forms of reporting they can come

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[13] I will not discuss how Schlenker seeks to motivate this features adjustment; I merely want to demonstrate that it seems to give the right results. I will argue against the account and its descendants on other, empirical grounds, in Section 3 below.

apart. Free indirect discourse is a case in point. The Context of Utterance is the context of the omniscient narrator, the writer who is telling the actual reader or listener a story about some real or fictional characters. The Context of Thought is the context at which a protagonist thinks or speaks. In other words, θ is what we have been referring to as the shifted context, representing the protagonist's point of view. Free indirect discourse is characterized by the fact that everything is interpreted with respect to θ, except all tenses and pronouns, which are interpreted in v.

Schlenker (2004) retains his earlier division of Kaplanian indexicals in two semantically distinct types: tenses and pronouns are variables, carrying semantic features that restrict their binding possibilities, while other indexicals simply get their referent from the context from which they originated, i.e. the shifted, protagonist context θ. In (19) I paraphrase Schlenker's definition of the lexical semantics of the two different types of context dependent expressions. Note that, as variables, pronouns really get their values from an assignment function f. The semantic features they carry are interpreted as *presuppositions*, i.e. definedness conditions, which, crucially, are to be satisfied in v, rather than θ.

(19) a. pronouns:[14]

    i $[\![\text{I}]\!]^{v,\theta,f} = [\![x^{1.\text{sg}}]\!]^{v,\theta,f} = f(x)$ if $f(x)$ is the speaker of v; undefined otherwise

    ii $[\![\text{you}]\!]^{v,\theta,f} = [\![x^{2.\text{sg}}]\!]^{v,\theta,f} = f(x)$ if $f(x)$ is the addressee of v; undefined otherwise

    iii $[\![\text{she}]\!]^{v,\theta,f} = [\![x^{3.\text{fem.sg}}]\!]^{v,\theta,f} = f(x)$ if $f(x)$ is a female individual in v, and $f(x)$ is neither the speaker, nor the addressee of v; undefined otherwise

  b. other indexicals:

    i $[\![\text{yesterday}]\!]^{v,\theta,f} =$ the day after the time of θ

    ii $[\![\text{here}]\!]^{v,\theta,f} =$ the location of θ

The result is that a free indirect discourse gets analyzed and interpreted as follows:

(20) He was sick today.

  a. $x^{3.\text{masc.sg}}$ be-t^{past} sick today

  b. $[\![(20a)]\!]^{v,\theta,f}$ is defined iff
    $f(x)$ is a male in v, distinct from the speaker/thinker and addressee of v and $f(t)$ is in the past of v.

  c. If defined, $[\![(20a)]\!]^{v,\theta,f}$ is true iff
    $f(x)$ is sick at $f(t)$ and $f(t)$ covers the day of θ.

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[14]   And similarly for plural pronouns, and for tenses.

Simply put, *he* and *was* are interpreted (presuppositionally) from the point of view of the narrator, v, while *being sick* and *today* are interpreted from the point of view of the protagonist, θ.

I conclude that both Banfield and Schlenker rely on (i) a mechanism of a secondary, non-actual (shifted) context parameter that helps shift all indexical/ expressive elements, including even the spelling and/or dialect,[15] to the protagonist's point of view; and (ii) a fundamental semantic distinction between pronouns/tenses and other indexical/referential expressions. I will not address the independent plausibility of these two assumptions here.

In the next section I will show that the second assumption, drawing a strict line between pronouns and other referential expressions, makes wrong predictions about the actual behavior of these items in free indirect discourse. Then, in Section 4, I will present an alternative analysis that relies on neither of the assumptions, but instead builds on quotation and unquotation.

3. Pronouns and (Other) Referential Expressions in Free Indirect Discourse

The essential empirical test for a Schlenkerian approach to free indirect discourse, is whether it is indeed the case that in free indirect discourse all and only pronouns and tenses are interpreted 'transparently', i.e. from the point of view of the narrator. The answer is a double no. Restricting attention to the person domain, I show in this section that (i) not all pronouns are fully transparent, and (ii) not only pronouns are transparent.[16]

3.1 All Pronouns Transparent? Confusions about Gender

We've seen that a third person pronoun in free indirect discourse can be used to refer to the agent of a speech or thought act, or its addressee. But utterances and thoughts may also involve pronominal reference to third persons, and typically these are represented in free indirect discourse by third person pronouns as well. Schlenker's (2004) analysis correctly captures the resulting ambiguity of third person in free indirect discourse, because, with a semantics like (19), *any* pronoun in a free indirect discourse report is necessarily interpreted with respect to the narrator's context. In fact, this

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[15] Schlenker doesn't explicitly discuss spelling/dialect shift, but he does liken the context shift in free indirect discourse to a speaker shift in (quasi-) dialogue (Schlenker, 2004, p. 285), which suggests that he would follow Banfield in treating such language shifts the same as other indexical and expressive shift phenomena.

[16] I leave in-depth discussion of analogous and other data in the temporal domain for future research. The reason is that, due to interactions with other phenomena (mood, aspect, historical present, sequence of tense), it is much harder to get a clear picture of the relevant data and what they show.

simple analysis makes some stronger, more problematic predictions regarding the interpretation of pronouns in free indirect discourse.

First of all, we should expect that first and second person pronouns are possible, although they do not denote the protagonist or her addressee (in θ), but rather the storyteller and his addressee (in v). This is in direct conflict with Banfield's (1982) intuitions, according to which the first person must corefer with an explicit addressee argument of the frame. In fact, as Schlenker shows, the matter is more subtle than that, as witness (21b):

(21) [situation, roughly: protagonist (*she*) thinks the narrator is a very nice guy]
    a. #Oh how extraordinarily nice I was! she thought (Banfield, 1982).
    b. Oh how extraordinarily nice I was, she told my father, without realizing that I was listening to their conversation (Schlenker, 2004).

I agree with Schlenker that the reason (21a) is bad is not a matter of grammar, but of the 'pragmatics of narration' (i.e. there is a conflict between being an omniscient narrator and taking part in the story). I conclude that transparent interpretation is not limited to third person pronouns, and that pragmatic principles play a role in determining when we can transparently refer to someone in a free indirect discourse.

Another significant prediction of Schlenker's semantics of pronouns is that third person pronouns refer to the third person that satisfies their gender feature *in the narrator's context*. This is not borne out, as Schlenker himself illustrates with the following example (attributed to an anonymous referee):

(22) [Mary wrongly believed that Robin was male. In fact, Robin was a woman.] Where was he this morning, for instance? (Mary wondered) (Schlenker, 2004).

In (22), Robin is a woman according to the narrator (in v), but a man according to the protagonist (in θ). The use of *he* (and the infelicity of *she*) shows that at least the gender feature is not interpreted transparently but rather evaluated with respect to the thought-context of the protagonist.

Schlenker (2004, p. 291) tries to save his account by suggesting a parallel with some other well-known instances of third person pronouns behaving unexpectedly. In particular, he speculates that this *he* may be a 'pronoun of laziness', i.e. a pronoun that is really just a misleading piece of morphology representing an elided definite description (e.g. *the man*) underneath. Without further motivation, or indeed a proper understanding of why and how some pronouns are sometimes not really pronouns but descriptions, this manoeuver seems decidedly *ad hoc*.[17]

Sharvit (2008) follows up on this gender confusion scenario. She proposes to account for it by letting free indirect discourse shift the interpretation of (free) third

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[17] Schlenker himself recognizes as much when he says, 'Whether the problem we encountered with gender features can be handled in terms of pronouns of laziness is as yet unclear' (2004, p. 291).

person pronouns, along with many other expressions, to the protagonist's thought context. Technically, this is achieved by means of a hidden operator that shifts context-assignment pairs. The effect is that third person pronouns like *he* in (22) are systematically evaluated from the protagonist's point of view.

I agree with Sharvit that (22) shows a genuine third person pronoun interpreted from the protagonist's perspective. However, I disagree with the details of the analysis she proposes. The problem, as I see it, is that she treats free indirect discourse as a kind of indirect discourse, i.e. as representing only the content of what was originally thought or uttered. As the data in Section 1.4 show, free indirect discourse reports in fact retain almost all the fine-grained surface aspects of the reported speech act (whether *sub voce* in mental language, or actual speech). A hidden indirect speech operator, shifting contexts or possible worlds, may be able to predict the behavior of indexicals, and perhaps even expressives, but not the more subtle cases discussed in Section 1.4 with different dialects, hesitations, exclamations and fragments. More fundamentally, however finegrained the notion of semantic content targeted by the indirect discourse analysis, it is rather unlikely to do justice to Schlenker's observation that free indirect discourse reports are 'faithful to the words':[18] [19]

> 'From: *Tomorrow Peter or Sam would come, Ann thought* it seems much harder to infer: *Tomorrow Sam or Peter would come, Ann thought*. Somehow one gets the sense that at most one of these sentences should be true of a given thought act, exactly as with quotations' (Schlenker, 2004, p. 285).

For these reasons I will ignore Sharvit's (2008) proposal in the remainder of this section and instead focus on the predictions of the Banfield/Schlenker approach.

3.2 Only Pronouns Transparent? Proper Names in Free Indirect Discourse

Another prediction of Schlenker's semantics is that *only* pronouns are transparent, everything else is interpreted with respect to the protagonist's context. In particular,

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[18] Interestingly, Sharvit (2008) first seems to endorse Schlenker's judgment in this (§4.3), but in the end (§7.6) fails to provide any account of this faithfulness aspect of free indirect discourse. After fundamentally misrepresenting Potts (2007a) as holding that 'even the semantics of SID [standard indirect discourse] is able to handle quotation', she explicitly chooses to ignore any 'faithfulness constraints' (Sharvit, 2008, p. 391).

[19] I might add that Sharvit's main motivation for her alternative analysis (apart from data in the temporal domain which I ignore throughout) revolves around another aspect of third person pronouns. She claims that, just like in English indirect discourse, third person pronouns can be read *de se*. However, I find her one crucial introspective data point (a free indirect discourse with a parenthetical frame quantifying over protagonists, in a mixed *de re/de se* scenario) inconclusive at best. More importantly, if Sharvit's data *is* correct, it could be easily accommodated in my own proposal, where, in line with Stokke (2013) and Sharvit, I eventually introduce a (covert) indirect discourse operator, thus allowing any account of *de se* reporting in indirect discourse to carry over into free indirect discourse. I will briefly return to this in fn. 39.

proper names in free indirect discourse represent that exact name in the original thought or utterance, they cannot be used by the narrator to represent the protagonist's use of a first or second person pronoun. This prediction follows from the fact that in Schlenker's view of referential expressions, names are not pronouns, they are not logically represented as variables with presuppositional features, and hence are not interpreted in v according to the lexical entries in (19).

As a matter of fact, I claim that, under certain circumstances, free indirect discourse does allow proper names to represent a first or second person pronoun in an original speech or thought.[20] The first such circumstance is where the standard free indirect discourse representation of a local speech/thought context would lead to ambiguity. A case in point is (23), where an addressee within the fictional story context is not quite salient enough to be easily picked out by a third person pronoun:

(23) He [=Arnie] dialed Leigh's number from memory. Mrs Cabot picked the phone up and recognized his voice immediately. Her pleasant and rather sexy come-hither-thou-fascinating-stranger phone voice became instantly hard. *Arnie had had his last chance with her*, that voice said, *and he had blown it*.[21]

To paraphrase, Mrs Cabot picks up the phone, realizes who's calling and her voice turns hard with anger. The harshness of the voice conveys a clear message to Arnie: he should stay away from Mrs Cabot's daughter. If we are to reconstruct a direct version of what Mrs Cabot's voice conveys to Arnie, we'd get a second person pronoun rather than the name of the object of the anger.[22]

(24) 'You've had your last chance with her,' that voice said, 'and you blew it.'

We can try to manipulate the kind of ambiguity that would necessitate the use of a name. For instance, when there are two equally salient individuals of the same sex, just introduced in a simple conjunction, we can expect a proper name to be preferred over a third person pronoun, even in the case of a free indirect discourse directed to an addressee, as in (25):

(25) Bill and Eric were fighting, when Sookie stepped between them. *Did Bill really think he could challenge his boss like that?* she demanded, before turning to Eric. *And what the hell was HE thinking?*

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[20] Fludernik (1995) also mentions this as a possibility, adding that it is 'very rare indeed' (p. 136). She lists three literary examples, whose free indirect discourse status, however, seems somewhat debatable.

[21] Stephen King (1983) *Christine*. New York: Viking.

[22] To check more thoroughly that we're really dealing with free indirect discourse rather than direct or indirect discourse, note (i) the lack of quotation marking, and the change of second to third person (in the pronouns following the name), which rules out direct discourse; and (ii) the parenthetical frame, which rules out indirect. The German translation (by Bodo Baumann, 1983, Bastei-Lübbe Verlag) reinforces the latter point, as indirect discourse there requires a complementizer (*dass* 'that') and a change in word order, which we don't see *Arnie hatte seine letzte Chance bei ihr gehabt, sagte diese Stimme, und er hatte sie verdorben.*

The speech act that (25) intends to report, can be represented in direct discourse as (26), where a second person pronoun takes the place of the name:

> (26) Sookie to Bill: 'Do you really think you can challenge your boss like that?' then to Eric: 'And what were YOU thinking?'

To find more examples, we turn to other linguistic domains where proper names tend to be more common than in English literary fiction. For instance, in stories written for small children proper names are a useful tool to reduce ambiguity. Moreover, free indirect discourse is not at all uncommon in children's stories. In the following Dutch example Marte's thoughts upon encountering a giant are presented in free indirect discourse:

> (27) Nee, Marte heeft nog nooit zulke grote voeten gezien. En ook nooit, nee nooit, zulke grote tenen.
> No, Marte has never seen such big feet. And never, no never, [has she seen] such big toes either.[23] [24]

Clearly it's not the narrator who is expressing her excitement and/or incredulity by saying *No, […] never, no never*—this is a report of Marte's thought. These same markers of expressivity immediately exclude any analysis in terms of indirect discourse. Finally, the actual thought reported here must have been first person, as represented in direct discourse in (28):

> (28) 'No, I have never seen such big feet,' Marte thought to herself, 'And never, no never, such big toes either.'

So, (27) is an unmarked, unframed verbatim quote, except for a single referential term used to refer to the thinker of the thought herself: arguably then, (27) is a free indirect discourse with a transparent proper name.

One more example to show that this is not an isolated case:

> (29) 'Heb je hem gezien?' vroeg Haas bedaard.
> Nee, Kikker had hem niet gezien, maar hij had wel iets gehoord.
>
> 'Did you see it?' Hare asked calmly.
> No, Frog had not seen it, but he had heard something.[25]

The second sentence in (29) represents Frog's reply to Hare's question in free indirect discourse. The name, *Frog*, as well as the tenses (past perfect) and pronoun (*he*) are

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[23] Huug Schipper (2001) *Marte: een sprookje voor de allerkleinsten*. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Kimio.

[24] I'm ignoring the issue of tense here. A textbook case of free indirect discourse would have a past perfect rather than a present perfect. In this case, throughout the narrative, the narrator has not distanced himself temporally from the story, i.e. it's as if he is telling the story while it's happening. I will leave this apparent interaction between the historical present and free indirect discourse for another occasion.

[25] Max Velthuijs (1994) *Kikker is bang*. Den Haag: Leopold B.V.

narrator-oriented, but the *No* is clearly not the narrator's speech, but an echo of Frog's answer. Rendered in direct speech, that answer would have to be something like '*No,' said Frog, 'I didn't see it, but I did hear something.'*

The examples above should suffice to show the naturalness of narrator-oriented proper names in genres or linguistic environments where proper names are less marked for independent pragmatic reasons. We can go one step further. Some full-fledged languages are also known to have much weaker constraints on the use of proper names when in competition with pronouns. That is, in such languages proper names will be entirely unmarked in places where English speakers would prefer a pronoun or a reflexive. Japanese is a case in point (Nakao, 2004). So, we might expect to find more proper names representing protagonists and addressees in Japanese writings. As a matter of fact, this is attested and has even been a matter of some debate among Japanese narratologists. Consider the following early example of a Japanese free indirect discourse from the novel *Ukigumo* ('A Floating Cloud', 1887) by Shimei Futabatei, as cited and discussed by Suzuki (2002):

(30) Oyoso sôai-suru futatsu no kokoro-wa, ittai bunshin de koritsu-suru mono demo naku, mata shiyô tote dekiru mono demo nai yue ni, […], kesshite sogo-shi kankaku-suru mono de nai to kyô ga hi made Bunzô-wa omotte ita ni, *ima **Bunzô**-no tsûyô-o Osei no kanzenu-wa dôshita mono darô. Dômo ki-ga shirenu, **Bunzô** niwa heiki de sumashite iru Osei no kokoroiki-ga nomikomenu.*

Bunzô had always believed that two people in love were bound together and could not act separately […], they could never disagree, never be out of harmony. Believing this, *how could **Bunzô** explain the fact that Osei did not sympathize with him in his present ordeal? **Bunzô** could not understand it. He could not comprehend why Osei was indifferent to him.*

In direct discourse, Bunzô's thought must have been the Japanese version of (31), i.e. with first person pronouns where the report had the protagonist's full name:[26]

(31) Bunzô: 'How can **I** explain the fact that Osei doesn't sympathize with me? **I** don't understand it. […]'

It seems that not only pronouns are evaluated from the perspective of the narrator. In free indirect discourse, as in regular, non-reportive discourse, narrators prefer proper names to third person pronouns whenever the context (or the register, or the language) demands it. Combined with the result from Section 3.1, I conclude that free indirect discourse does not treat pronouns fundamentally differently from other referential expressions. Although there is a no doubt a strong bias (in English, adult

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[26] Interestingly, Suzuki's English translation, quoted above, leaves the first occurrence of the pro- tagonist's name, which should already be changed to *he* according to the Schlenker/Banfield account. It's not clear whether this should count as a genuine observation about free indirect discourse in English, or a matter of faithful translation.

fiction, at least) towards narrator-oriented interpretation of all and only pronouns and tenses, the data in this section show that the actual pattern is more subtle and essentially context and language dependent.[27] The data here refute Schlenker's (2004) semantics as summarized in definition (19) because it assumes a hardcoded grammatical distinction between pronouns and other referential expressions.

By contrast, in my own proposal below there are no multiple contexts, or context shifting, and every pronoun, name or indexical just has its customary semantic interpretation (presuppositional, directly referential—whatever your preferred analysis of reference and context dependence). Instead, I put the burden of capturing the specific free indirect discourse behavior on the quotation and especially the pragmatically driven unquotation mechanisms. My main claim then is that what gets interpreted from the perspective of the narrator or the protagonist is, despite the *prima facie* clear pattern, not to be hardcoded in the syntax-semantics interface, but left for pragmatics to decide.

4. Free Indirect Discourse as Mixed Quotation

I want to return to the null hypothesis, viz. that free indirect discourse really is just direct discourse except for a certain small class of lexical items, typically including pronouns and tenses. I will show how advances in research into the semantics of quotation have made it possible to capture this in a natural way.

4.1 Pure Quotation

There are various forms of quotation. The most relevant types for the purposes of this article are pure quotation, direct discourse, and mixed quotation.

Pure quotation is a way to refer to an utterance token, a word, a phrase, or even any arbitrary string of letters or sounds:

(32) 'John' has four letters.

Pure quotation marks indicate that the expression inside them is mentioned rather than used, i.e. it refers to itself, qua linguistic entity, rather than to a (set-theoretic) object in the world. Instead of the demonstrative analysis discussed for direct discourse in Section 2.1, I will assume the so-called disquotational analysis on which the quotation marks in a pure quotation, henceforth indicated with corner quotes (⌜ … ⌝), turn a string of phonemes/letters into an expression referring to that string.

More precisely, we have a language with expressions that consist of a sequence of letters in a given alphabet of phonemes $\{a, b, \dots\}$. The letter combinations that

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[27] For related, but slightly different, reasons, narrator-centric proper names are equally problematic for Sharvit (2008) and Eckardt (2012).

correspond to words in the language receive a category label (e.g. $<$ John, NP $>$), the rest will get the dedicated label $\star$ (e.g. $<$ asoidj, $\star$ $>$). Important for a proper analysis of mixed quotation below, are the strings that correspond to others' words, which may not have a lexical interpretation in the framing language, but which are nonetheless understood to fulfill a specific grammatical function, e.g. $<$ misunderestimate, $V_{transitive}$ $>$. A grammar will combine the terms to form complex parsetrees representing well-formed sentences. What pure quotation does is to turn any simple or complex expression, $< \alpha, \text{Cat} >$, including meaningless strings labeled $\star$, into a well-formed expression of category Q: $<^\ulcorner < \alpha, \text{Cat} > ^\urcorner, Q >$. For readability I will often leave out the category labels, so that $^\ulcorner \alpha ^\urcorner$ abbreviates $<^\ulcorner < \alpha, \text{Cat} > ^\urcorner, Q >$. The semantic interpretation of pure quotation is given by $[\![^\ulcorner \alpha ^\urcorner]\!] = \alpha$, i.e., as announced in the preceding paragraph, an expression in quotes refers to the quoted expression.[28]

A second form of quotation is the direct discourse mode of reported speech (or thought) that we have been discussing throughout this article. It is tempting to reduce direct discourse to pure quotation as follows: the quotation marks turn the direct discourse complement into a term referring to a string of phonemes, and the semantics of the say-frame relates an individual to a string of phonemes just in case the individual uttered (a phonetic realization of) that string. Partee's (1973) observation that direct discourse allows significant interaction between the quote and its surroundings (e.g. ellipsis, anaphora, cf. Section 2.1) refutes this view. I will assume that direct discourse is instead a special case of a third type of quotation: mixed quotation.

4.2 Mixed Quotation

Mixed quotation is the use of quotation marks to simultaneously use and mention a certain phrase (Davidson, 1979; Cappelen and Lepore, 1997). The prototypical case is a mixture of direct and indirect speech reporting like (33):

(33) Romney said that Newt Gingrich is an 'influence peddler'.

In this case, there is an underlying indirect report that we can retrieve by ignoring the quotation marks, which paraphrases the proposition originally expressed in the reported speech act (e.g. *You're just an influence peddler, Newt!*). We will call this the *use-component* of the meaning of (33). But the quotation marks add a second layer of meaning: they indicate that a specific phrase (*influence peddler*) was literally a part of the original speech act. This is the *mention-component*.

Ever since the phenomenon of mixed quotation was put on the philosophical agenda, there has been debate about how to model these two levels of meaning. It is clear that both aspects play an important role. The mention-component would be called on to explain the direct speech characteristics of mixed

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[28] More precisely, $[\![<^\ulcorner < \alpha, \text{Cat} > ^\urcorner, Q >]\!] = < \alpha, \text{Cat} >$ (cf. Maier, 2014b).

quotes, such as the possibility of incorporating nonstandard dialects and shifted indexicals:

(34) Ann said that this music was 'not mah cup o' tea'.

The use-component on the other hand would help explain the transparency with respect to constituency structure (i.e. a mixed quoted VP is itself a VP, rather than a referential term referring to that VP) and anaphora resolution.

A crucial feature of the interaction between the two components is that the mention-component typically *projects*, i.e. when it occurs embedded under an operator that would normally cancel semantic entailment, the mention-component survives as an entailment of the complex structure:

(35) Most Republicans disagree that Gingrich is an 'influence peddler'.

If the mention-component were just ordinary truth conditional content, interpreted *in situ*, (35) would be predicted to entail that most Republicans disagree that the phrase *influence peddler* was used. But it doesn't. The reading we get entails that someone uttered those words, in this case presumably Romney, if we take this sentence as a continuation of (33). The two most prominent types of projective content in semantics are presuppositions and conventional implicatures, which give rise to two well-known mixed quotation analyses: Geurts and Maier (2005) and Potts (2007a), respectively. Following Simons *et al.* (2011), a third alternative presents itself: the mention-component projects in examples like (35) simply because it is 'not at issue', i.e. it does not answer a salient question under discussion.

For the purposes of this article I wish to remain as neutral as possible on this issue while also avoiding tedious details of formalization. Therefore, I'm choosing a somewhat abstract two-dimensional representation format, which leaves open how exactly to account for the projection behavior. Furthermore, I follow Geurts and Maier's (2005) intuition that '*influence peddler*' means *whatever some contextually salient x used* ⌜influence peddler⌝ *to mean*. Two-dimensionally: (i) the use-component is a mere property variable P, ranging over semantic objects of the type that corresponds to the syntactic category of the quoted phrase; and (ii) the mention-component states that x used ⌜influence peddler⌝ to refer to P. I'll sketch the one- and two-dimensional logical representations of the truth conditions below in italicized paraphrase.[29]

(36) ⟦(34)⟧ = *Ann said that this music was* < P ; *x used* ⌜not mah cup o' tea⌝ *to refer to property P* >

Note that the first dimension, the use-component, is the contribution that participates in the compositional derivation. Depending on the context, this underspecified P may or may not be the dictionary assigned interpretation of

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[29] For a more detailed, proper formalization, see Maier, 2014a.

influence peddler, but, given the syntactic/semantic integration of mixed quotations in their surrounding clauses, it must be something of the same type, i.e. a property.

An independent projection and/or resolution mechanism eventually turns such a two-dimensional structure, within its discourse context, into a proper proposition. Important steps are resolving context dependent elements (like x in (36)), and collapsing the two dimensions into a conjunction. Skipping over the details, the final truth conditions of (34) then become:

(37) *Ann used* ⌜not mah cup 'o tea⌝ *to refer to property* $P \wedge$ *she said that this music was* P.

Note that in the resolution process, we resolved the previously unspecified source of the words, x, to the subject of the reporting clause, Ann, since in the context she is the most salient and the most likely to have uttered the quoted phrase.

For completeness, consider also the embedded influence peddler example:

(38) *Most Republicans disagree that Gingrich is a* $< Q$; x *used* ⌜influence peddler⌝ *to refer to property* $Q >$

The sentence itself does not provide a likely antecedent for the anaphoric x, so eventually an antecedent will have to be retrieved from the larger context. Since the previous utterance (33) seems to have put precisely these words into Romney's mouth, we can equate x with Romney. The resulting truth conditions would be as follows:

(39) *Romney used* ⌜influence peddler⌝ *to refer to property* $Q \wedge$ *most Republicans disagree that Gingrich is a* Q

4.3 Unquotation in Natural Language

According to Gutzmann and Stei (2011) it is an empirical fact that 'there are no *schmotation marks* that mean that the schmoted expression is interpreted as it usually is'. But in some registers of written language, especially the kind of factual reporting where we also find lots of mixed quotation, there *is* a typographical convention that does precisely that:

(40) Kim says the task of somehow becoming 'as loony tunes as [his] dad' is a daunting one.[30]

Reconstructing the reported utterance[31] would give something like *It will be difficult for me to somehow become as loony tunes as my dad*. Apparently, the writer wants to incorporate the phrase 'as loony tunes as my dad' verbatim, while adjusting or

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[30] www.theonion.com/articles/kim-jongun-privately-doubting-hes-crazy-enough-to\%2C18374/

[31] Of course, the conversation reported here never took place: the article is a fiction, as are most of the examples in this article. The point is that a report allows the hearer to infer what original speech act would have made the report true, regardless of whether or not it actually *is* true.

compressing the beginning of the sentence. A good compromise would be a mixed quote:

> (41) Kim says the task of somehow becoming 'as loony tunes as my dad' is a daunting one.

But editorial style guides mandate that the shifted use of 'my' to refer to someone other than yourself be avoided, if possible. The preferred tactics to avoid such shifted pronouns (and tenses) are switching to full direct or indirect discourse, or shrinking the mixed quote so the offending phrases fall out. When these are ruled out, as in (41), the last option is adjustment with square bracketing.

But where exactly does the strong preference against mixed quoted indexical shift come from? According to *The Chicago Manual of Style*,[32] 'in quoting verbatim, writers need to integrate tenses and pronouns into the new context' (§11.14). Their example to illustrate pronoun integration by bracketed adjustment:

> (42) Mr Graham has resolutely ducked the issue, saying he won't play the game of rumor-mongering, even though he has 'learned from [his] mistakes.'

Here is an analogous tense adjustment example, from *The Copyeditor's Handbook*,[33] which calls the tense shift that would result from verbatim quoting 'unsettling' and 'awkward':

> (43) As early as the 1950s, 'middle class Americans' twin obsessions with automobiles and single family homes conspire[d] to make housing less affordable'

Whatever the exact basis and form of such stipulative editorial rules, I'm assuming that they reflect an underlying pragmatic bias against verbatim, unadjusted present tenses and local pronouns in mixed quotations. For now I take this bias as a given—further research into the pragmatics of pronouns and intersentential reference shifting/quotation is required to reduce it further to more primitive pragmatic principles of cooperative communication. Unquotation, marked by square brackets, is suggested as one of the ways to resolve the tension between this bias and the verbatimness requirement of (mixed) quotation.

I claim that unquotation is more than a superficial typographical invention of modern day editors. Although its overt appearance may well be restricted to a very specialized genre of written text, it marks a genuine semantic operator that occurs, covertly, in many other registers of written and spoken communication as well. Some cases that have been argued to contain covert unquotation are listed in (44) (examples taken from Maier, 2014a):[34]

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[32] *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th edn., 2003, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[33] Amy Einsohn (2000) *The Copyeditor's Handbook*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp. 206–7.

[34] Shan's (2011) analysis of nonconstituent quotation provides a less obvious class of covert unquotation. In particular, Shan argues that *she allowed as how her dog ate 'strange things, when left to its*

(44) a. And I even pissed off the youngest one so much that he told me to 'stick a lamp up my ass'.
   ≈   ... told me to 'stick a lamp up [my] ass'.[35]

  b. When asked, Bob Dylan said that he continues his music career because 'he made a vow years ago, he sold his soul and must keep up to his end of the bargain.'
   ≈   ... because '[he] made a vow years ago, [he] sold his soul and must keep up to [his] end of the bargain.'

  c. Who did Mary say that she would 'never misunderestimate ever again'?
   ≈   Who$_i$ did Mary say that she would 'never misunderestimate [t_i] ever again'?[36]

From here it is but a small step to the positive claim of this article, that the perspective mix in free indirect discourse is the result of a similar mix of quotation and unquotation.

4.4 The Semantics of Unquotation

Having established in Section 4.3 that there is such a thing as unquotation in natural language, it's time to sketch a proper semantics for it. In this section I adapt Shan's (2007) analysis of unquotation to fit the current framework.[37]

The trick is that not just full constituents can be mixed quoted, but also *constructions*, i.e. constituents with a number of holes punched in. In other words, constructions are functions from expressions to expressions: *learned from ... 's mistakes* is a construction that takes as argument an NP (e.g. *Kim*, *she*, *I*)[38] and returns a VP. We could even define functional category labels for such constructions, e.g. NP → VP.

(45) learned from ... 's mistakes(Kim) = learned from Kim's mistakes

Semantically, such a construction can be straightforwardly interpreted as a functional object: ⟦learned from ... 's mistakes⟧ is a function that takes an individual to yield a property, in effect making it a two-place relation:

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  own devices' (Abbott, 2005) is best analyzed as *she allowed as how her dog '[ate] strange things, when left to its own devices'*.

[35] An anonymous reviewer suggests that to strengthen the case that this really is mixed quotation in the first place, we could mix in some idiolectal speech peculiarities, as in: *And I even pissed off the youngest one so much that he told me to 'shtick a lampe up mein Arsch'*.

[36] What's unquoted in (44c) is the trace t_i, left behind after wh–movement. Put differently, the wh–word *who* generated in direct object position of the verb *misunderestimated* is first unquoted and then moved to the front.

[37] Shan (2011) provides an alternative that treats mixed quotation as a means to embed a different language (with its own lexicon, syntax and semantics) into the main language of the reporter. Unquotation is a kind of dual: a means to embed the original language in the shifted one. I'm following here Maier's (2014a) adaption of Shan's (2007) analysis in terms of quoted constructions.

[38] I'm assuming that, as a matter of morphology/phonology, *I's* surfaces as *my* and *she's* as *her*.

(46) $[\![$learned from … 's mistakes$]\!]$ $([\![$Kim$]\!]$) $=$ $[\![$learned from Kim's mistakes$]\!]$

Because constructions have such a well-defined semantics, they can be mixed quoted just like regular constituents. Moreover, since mixed quoting preserves the syntactic category/semantic type, a mixed quoted construction can take the same kind of arguments as the original. In our example, the mixed quoted construction still denotes a two-place relation between individuals, but what relation that is exactly is left underspecified, but constrained by the mention-component:

(47) $[\![$'learned from … 's mistakes'$]\!]$ $= < R$; x *uses* $\ulcorner$learned from … 's mistakes$\urcorner$ *to refer to relation R* $>$

We can now model the journalist's use of square brackets as a rough shorthand for applying a mixed quoted construction to an argument outside the quotes:

(48) 'learned from [his] mistakes' := 'learned from … 's mistakes'(he)

Putting it all together and projecting/resolving the mention-component gives the following truth conditions of a simple indirect report containing the mixed quotes and unquotes of (48):

(49) $[\![$Graham said that he 'learned from [his] mistakes'$]\!]$ $=$ *Graham used the construction* $\ulcorner$learned from … 's mistakes$\urcorner$ *to refer to relation R* $\wedge$ *Graham said he stands in relation R to himself*

4.5 The Semantics of Free Indirect Discourse

Now, we have all the ingredients to formulate precisely the intuition that free indirect discourse is like direct discourse with holes for tenses and pronouns. The logical form I announced in Section 1.5 was this:

(50) Ashley was lying in bed freaking out. 'Tomorrow [was] [her] six year anniversary with Spencer.' [cf. (1)]

By now we know what the added punctuation really does: the quotation marks indicate mixed quotation, inducing a two-dimensional interpretation; and the square brackets indicate unquotation, i.e. application of a quoted construction to a number of arguments outside the quote:

(51) a. 'Tomorrow … … six year anniversary with Spencer.'(was)(her)
     b. $[\![$(51a)$]\!]$ $= < P$; x *uses* $\ulcorner$ Tomorrow … … six year anniversary with Spencer $\urcorner$ *to refer to P>* *(was)(her)*

To turn the preliminary logical form in (51) into an actual account of the semantics of free indirect discourse, some fine-tuning of this general application of quotation and unquotation is required.

First, the fact that we're dealing with a thought report here requires that we extend the notion of 'using an expression to refer to something' to cover mental acts of using

an expression. But more importantly, we have to assume (with Sharvit, 2008 and Stokke, 2013) that the logical form actually harbors a hidden attitude operator (*Ashley thought that …*) in the use component of (51). Otherwise we'd predict that the narrator, although not responsible for the exact wording, is responsible for the truth of the thought. This would make it impossible for the narrator to continue as follows:[39]

> (52) But actually she was confused about the date, their anniversary wasn't until two weeks later.

With the extension of quotation to thoughts (conceptualized as inner speech), and the addition of the covert attitude operator, we derive the following eventual truth conditions for the example discourse:

> (53) *Ashley was lying in bed freaking out* ∧ *Ashley used the construction* ⌜ tomorrow … … six year anniversary with Spencer⌝ *to refer to P* ∧ *Ashley thought that P(was)(her)*

To paraphrase this even further: Ashley was lying in bed and (i) 'uttered' (internally) the construction 'tomorrow … … six year anniversary with Spencer', thereby expressing property P; and (ii) Ashley thought that P applied to herself (*her*) in the past (*was*). So, what is this P? Its value is semantically underspecified in (53), but if we assume that Ashley's thoughts while she was lying in bed are (presented as) articulated in a relatively standard variety of English,[40] P is probably something like the property of having one's six year anniversary with Spencer the day after the current day, where *the current day* refers to the day at which the quoted thought was in fact uttered, i.e. the day of the lying in bed and freaking out. In the terminology of a context theorist this would mean that *tomorrow* gets evaluated with respect to the shifted or protagonist context, but note that in the current setup we achieve this shift not by postulating a second Kaplanian context, but by the rather different mechanism of mixed quotation, which effectively defers the interpretation of a quoted item to the reported speaker or thinker.

Other examples work similarly, but to flesh out the proposal let's discuss a number of prima facie complications.

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[39] This observation is due to Schlenker (2004, p. 289). Cf. Stokke, 2013, for a criticism of Schlenker's analysis based on it. As pointed out, Sharvit (2008) likewise posits a covert attitude operator. She puts it to use to account for some apparent *de se* and sequence of tense phenomena. To follow up now on the claim made in fn 19: given the independently necessary covert operator amendment, the current analysis predicts that unquoted tenses and pronouns in free indirect discourse should behave exactly as in indirect discourse. It follows that the current proposal correctly predicts Sharvit's crucial data in both the tense and the person domain. For reasons of space I will not go into the details of the data and the various semantic accounts of sequence of tense and *de se* reporting.

[40] Recall that I don't claim that thought *is* linguistic in nature, just that in certain narratives conducive to free indirect discourse the writer *presents* the protagonist's thoughts or even stream of consciousness as such.

First of all, note that we are committed to assigning a semantic type to each sentence, discourse, or construction that we can have in a direct or free indirect discourse. For simplicity we might cut up quoted discourses into conjunctions of quoted sentences. But still, not every well-formed sentence is evidently of the proposition-expressing type. To deal with phenomena like expressives, imperatives, and questions in free indirect discourse we have to extend the semantics with suitable model-theoretic objects that could serve as denotations for these phenomena in the semantics—pragmatics interface. It seems that this leaves us more than enough room to plug in a variety of well established analyses (e.g. Potts's (2007b) two-dimensional analysis of expressives, Schwager's (2005) propositional analysis of imperatives, and Hamblin's (1958) classic partition semantics of questions).

What's more, for examples like (54), we need to be able to assign types to constructions in non-standard dialects, although, crucially, we need not be able to determine what the other's words mean:[41]

(54)   He remembered the day when Buck, jealous of his winning, had tried to smash his kiln. 'Yeah, that ol sonofabitch! Yeah it wuz awright fer Buck t smash [his] kiln. Sho. N [he] wish[ed] [he] hadnt socked ol Buck so hard tha day.' [cf. (13)]

The interim conclusion is that with only minimal theoretical adjustments, a two-dimensional semantics of mixed quotation as developed by Potts (2007a) or Geurts and Maier (2005), coupled with a semantics of unquotation (Shan, 2007; Maier, 2014a) is powerful enough to correctly capture the truth conditions of a free indirect discourse thought or speech report. But keep in mind that what we have here is just a semantics, i.e. a way to formally represent the truth conditions of free indirect discourse. Unlike Schlenker, I'm relying on an additional pragmatic mechanism which tells us exactly what to unquote. For now we can assume that this mechanism just encodes a bias for unquoting tenses and pronouns.

Given the general conception of unquotation as governed by pragmatics, the account here is significantly more flexible than its rivals. The data in Section 3 show that this flexibility is indeed required. We've seen there that not all and not only pronouns and tenses are exempt from shifting to the protagonist's perspective. I end this section by showing how the current framework accommodates these actual data.

In the current framework there is no grammatical necessity to apply unquotation to all third person pronouns. In the gender confusion cases faithfulness to the exact wording is exceptionally relevant and can therefore overrule the bias for pronoun integration.

(55)   [Mary wrongly believed that Robin was male. In fact, Robin was a woman.] 'Where [was] he this morning, for instance?' Mary wondered. [cf. (22)]

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[41]   For this reason we have allowed meaningless but well-formed expressions into the language already in Section 4.1. In cases of pure gibberish in quotation, we'd have no syntactic category (⋆), so mixed quotation would be impossible.

In fact, this is a little too simplistic. If Mary was originally referring to Robin directly as *you* we can still use the third person pronoun in free indirect discourse:

(56) [Mary was talking to Robin, who she believes to be a man, but who is actually a woman] Where had he been all morning, for instance? Mary asked her.

If this judgment holds up, we can capture it by assuming a decomposition of pronouns into feature bundles, where each feature has a specific semantic contribution and can therefore be quoted/unquoted independent of the others. Specifically, *he* is the morphophonological surface realization of *pro-3.sg.masc* (roughly as in the exposition of Schlenker's analysis in Section 2, but without his commitment to the pronouns-as-variables analysis). We've actually already been assuming something like this for possessives (*his* = *he*+'*s*), and I propose to do the same for tenses.

(57) 'Where be-[3.sg.past].perfect pro–[3.sg].masc all morning, for instance?' Mary asked her.

In the remainder of this article, I'll revert to the sloppier notation that perhaps overestimates the extent of the unquotation for the sake of readability.

Unquotation is not restricted to third person pronouns and past tenses. We've seen an example of a first person in free indirect discourse in Section 3.1:

(58) 'Oh how extraordinarily nice [I] [was],' she told my father, without realizing that I was listening to their conversation. [cf. (21b)]

In fact, there is no need to restrict it to pronouns and tenses. In Section 3.2 I have provided examples of proper names originating with the narrator rather than the protagonist.

(59) '[Arnie] [had] had [his] last chance with her,' that voice said, 'and [he] [had] blown it.'

Note that although many examples of overt unquotation in newspapers involve pronouns and tenses (*pace* the editorial style policies quoted above), they are by no means limited to those. A quantitative study of unquotation bracketing in newspaper text has yet to be carried out, but I expect names and descriptions to be the most natural candidates for bracketed editorial adjustment, after pronouns and tenses. The reason for unquoting names would be disambiguation or clarification, as described for free indirect discourse names in Section 3.2, rather than avoiding the 'awkwardness' of unintegrated pronouns described in Section 4.3.

5. Conclusion

Free indirect discourse is a form of reported speech or thought that differs from (i) direct discourse, in that present tense and local pronouns are adjusted to fit the narrator's point of view; and (ii) indirect discourse, in that it is effectively a main clause that

preserves everything except tenses and pronouns as quoted verbatim (i.e. indexicals, expressives, questions, hedges, dialect, etc.).

Previous attempts at characterizing the semantics of free indirect discourse started by positing a fundamental distinction between pronouns/tenses and other indexical/referential elements. This split then serves as the basis for the relevant distinction between unshiftable, narrator-oriented elements and shiftable, protagonist-oriented elements. In this essay I have shown that this dichotomy fails to capture the empirical facts about free indirect discourse. In particular, we have seen how names may report a first or second person pronoun use by the protagonist, while third person pronouns sometimes literally quote the protagonist's views on a third person in the story.

My alternative proposal does away with lexical distinctions between pronouns/tenses and other indexicals. Instead I analyze free indirect discourse as an interaction between quotation and unquotation. This account captures the many similarities between direct discourse and free indirect discourse by treating the latter as quotations of thoughts or utterances, but with 'holes' to allow the adjustment of person and tense morphemes to the surrounding narrative.

The mechanism of person/tense adjustment in mixed quotation that constitutes the semantics of free indirect discourse, corresponds to a phenomenon that is clearly visible in other domains of writing, viz. as quotation marks and unquotation brackets. This is not to deny that there are differences between free indirect discourse and those more familiar examples of quotation and (covert or overt) unquotation. Different realizations of the same underlying semantic mechanism of mixed quotation occur in different genres, modalities, or domains, which in turn come with their own pragmatic biases as to what is marked or unmarked and what may be quoted or unquoted. Common to all domains seems to be a bias to restrict unquotation to expressions with minimal (or minimally relevant) descriptive/lexical semantic content, i.e. pronouns and tenses, but also, arguably, interrogative pronouns and in certain contexts proper names.

In free indirect discourse, more so than in the other types of quotation, the bias to unquote pronouns is so strong that it may look like a hard rule of grammar. The data discussed in Section 3 show that such a grammatical approach is altogether on the wrong track. Despite an admittedly strong bias, pragmatic factors clearly influence what gets unquoted both in newspaper-style mixed quotation and in free indirect discourse.

In a sense it is only natural that my semantics for free indirect discourse is more modest than its rivals. On my view, the semantics proper should be content with specifying the logical forms of a free indirect discourse report, and systematically assigning the right truth conditions to these forms. My proposal achieves this by appealing to the semantic mechanisms of mixed quotation and unquotation. It's the job of pragmatics to further analyze the assumed bias that determines what exactly gets unquoted. In this area, there is still a lot to be done.

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