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Expertise as Argument: Authority, Democracy, and Problem-Solving

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Abstract

This article addresses the problem of expertise in a democratic political system: the tension between the authority of expertise and the democratic values that guide political life. We argue that for certain problems, expertise needs to be understood as a dialogical process, and we conceptualize an understanding of expertise through and as argument that positions expertise as constituted by and a function of democratic values and practices, rather than in the possession of, acquisition of, or relationship to epistemic materials. Conceptualizing expertise through argument leads us to see expertise as a kind of phronetic practice, oriented toward judgments and problems, characterized by its ability to provide inventional capacities for selecting the best possible resolution of a particular problem vis-à-vis particular expectations regarding the resolution of a problem. At its core, expertise thus comes to exist in reference not to epistemic but to dialogical, deliberative, democratic practice.

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Notes

  1. See also Bohman (1996), Calhoun (1993), Cohen (1997), Dryzek (2002), Fishkin (1991), Gutmann and Thompson (1996) (particularly pp. 95–127), Ku (1998), Welsh (2002).

  2. Here, problems are not a “given”: they have to be problems to or for somebody, and so the application of expertise would have to be argument which can include the relevant voices that define the scope of problems and their solution.

  3. Earlier, he states that “phronesis is not concerned with universals only; it must also take cognizance of particulars” (1141b).

  4. One of the authors (Keith) has been a strabismus patient since childhood, and his experiences, including his evolving translational expertise, provide the background for this section.

  5. Certainly, improved vision is possible; while, for example, Dr. Barry had an amazing outcome (recovering her steropsis as well as effortless alignment and fusion), that is not likely for most adult strabismus patients.

  6. For then, again, patients would either need to know the technical aspects of strabismus on par with their physician’s knowledge, or content themselves with deferring decisions to others, or acquire an alternative technical expertise whose knowledge-claims they can refer to strabismus, neither of which would be consistent with the fact that patient values and preferences are an irrevocable part of the judgments and choices in strabismus treatments.

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Correspondence to Zoltan P. Majdik.

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Majdik, Z.P., Keith, W.M. Expertise as Argument: Authority, Democracy, and Problem-Solving. Argumentation 25, 371–384 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-011-9221-z

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