The Metaphysicians of Meaning: Russell and Frege on Sense and Denotation

List of abbreviations p. ix Introduction p. 1 Part I Russell p. 9 1 Russell's first theory of denoting p. 11 I The elements p. 11 II The mathematical context p. 13 III Denoting, definition and identity p. 16 IV Three essential elements p. 17 V Post-PoM developments p. 20 2 The collapse of the first theory and the discovery of the theory of descriptions p. 22 I Introduction: the obscure passage in 'On Denoting' p. 22 II The argument: the 'substantial' round p. 24 (i) C2 is a different entity from C1 p. 25 (ii) C1 cannot be a constituent of C2 p. 26 (iii) 'But this cannot be an explanation', I p. 28 (iv) The third charge p. 32 III The argument: the 'symbolic' round p. 33 (i) The twin phenomena p. 34 (ii) Use and mention p. 37 IV 'But this cannot be an explanation', II p. 38 (i) The burden of proof p. 38 (ii) A survey of theoretical possibilities p. 38 (iii) C2 as a description of C1 p. 39 (iv) Denoting and other logical relations p. 41 V The transition p. 42 VI The discovery of the theory of descriptions p. 45 3 The place of 'On Denoting' in Russell's development p. 52 I 'On Denoting' and Russell's ontological development: some preliminaries p. 53 II Russell's case against Meinong p. 58 III Russell's ontology in PoM reconsidered p. 61 IV Methodological developments: 'every word must have some meaning' p. 66 V Contextual definition p. 68 VI The notion of an incomplete symbol p. 69 VII The role of language p. 73 VIII Some positive remarks p. 76 Part II Frege p. 79 4 From Begriffsschrift to sense and reference p. 81 I Introduction p. 81 II The problem p. 82 III Frege's solution in Bs. p. 90 IV 'Sinn und Bedeutung': the collapse of the first theory p. 94 V 'Sinn und Bedeutung': the new solution p. 101 5 Further considerations regarding sense and reference p. 106 I The priority of the distinction for proper names p. 106 II Sense and indirect speech p. 109 III Sense as a route and empty senses p. 112 IV Sense determines reference, I: the question of relativization p. 117 V Sense determines reference, II: the conceptual model p. 121 VI The application of Russell's argument in OD to Frege's distinction p. 127 Part III Russell and Frege p. 133 6 Russell and Frege compared p. 135 I Introduction: the strategy p. 135 II The PoM theory of denoting and the theory of sense and reference: some preliminaries p. 137 III The common ground: propositionalism, sensism and the implied metaphysical model p. 139 IV The differences, and further similarities, in relation to the metaphysical model p. 144 V An apparent gap in Frege's argument p. 148 VI Can all expressions have sense? p. 151 VII The taxonomic difference: a diagnosis of Frege's position p. 155 VIII Frege's suppressed premise: are all names on a par? p. 157 IX The theory of descriptions versus sense and reference: an adjustment on the Russellian side p. 164 X Frege's description operator and the theory of descriptions p. 169 XI The progression towards transparency p. 173 7 The Russell-Frege enterprise and natural language p. 179 I Introduction p. 179 II Ordinary names and logically proper names p. 180 III What morals can we draw from illustration? p. 182 IV The revisionary nature of the Russell-Frege enterprise p. 187 V Logic as metaphysics p. 191 VI The latency of the metaphysical facet p. 197 VII Concluding remarks: the nature of the enterprise p. 199 Appendix A p. 203 The text of the obscure passage from 'On Denoting' p. 203 Appendix B p. 206 Russell's example in the latter half of paragraph (D) of the obscure passage p. 206 Appendix C p. 208 Some recent discussions of the obscure passage p. 208 I Searle, Blackburn and Code, and Hylton p. 208 II Pakaluk p. 210 III Kremer p. 213 IV Noonan p. 219 Bibliography p. 223 Index p. 227.