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Commodification or Compensation: A Reply to Ketchum
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 March 2020
Abstract
I defend the permissibility of paid surrogacy arrangements against the arguments Sara Ketchum advances in “Selling Babies and Selling Bodies.” I argue that the arrangements cannot be prohibited out of hand on the grounds that they treat persons as objects of sale, because it is possible to view the payments made in these arrangements as compensation for the woman's services. I also argue that the arguments based on exploitation and parental custodial rights fail to provide adequate grounds for prohibiting the arrangements.
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- Copyright © 1989 by Hypatia, Inc.
References
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