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Superexplanations for counterfactual knowledge

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Abstract

I discuss several problems for Williamson’s counterfactual-theory of modal knowledge and argue that they have a common source, in that the theory neglects to elucidate the proper constraints on modal reasoning. Williamson puts forward an empirical hypothesis that rests on the role of counterfactual reasoning for modal knowledge. But he overlooks central questions of normative modal epistemology. In order for counterfactual reasoning to yield correct beliefs about modality, it needs to be suitably constrained. I argue that what is needed is, specifically, information concerning the nature or essence of things. By integrating this information, essentialist deduction arguably provides a better account of our knowledge of modality. Furthermore, I argue that essences have distinctive causal and explanatory powers—indeed, essences are superexplanatory for how things are. Compared to Williamson’s counterfactual-theory, superexplanatory essentialism clarifies what the proper constraints on modal reasoning are, and why they have such a special status.

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Notes

  1. I will mostly speak of knowledge of modality. However, what I say should be applicable to more modest epistemological targets, such as justified belief or understanding of modality, and to be neutral enough to accommodate internalist as well as externalist broader epistemological perspectives.

  2. Note that the criteria for what counts as a correct supposition or scenario may thus vary depending on whether we are considering practical everyday possibility, or rather metaphysical possibility, as the relevant constraints may vary (more below). Talk of “correctness” here refers to modal truth broadly understood.

  3. In quantified contexts, the following two equivalences also hold:

    (N)q

    □A ≡ ∀p (p □→ A)

    i.e., something is necessary IFF whatever were the case, it would still be the case,

    and

    (P)q

    ◊A ≡ ∃p ¬ (p □→ ¬A)

    i.e., something is possible IFF it is not such that it would fail in every eventuality (159).

  4. Similarly, Jenkins (2008) has argued that, even granted that the logical equivalences hold, it does not follow that we know metaphysical modality through the same cognitive processes by which we know counterfactuals.

  5. Along analogous lines, Ichikawa (2016) points out that Williamson's equivalences could be used to define any type of modality.

  6. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this objection.

  7. Thanks to David Papineau for helpful discussion of this point.

  8. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me on this.

  9. I take principle (E) to be a priori like Kripke (1980) originally suggested. For further discussion: Jago (2018); Mallozzi (2018a); and Vaidya and Wallner (2018).

  10. Of course this does not imply that the many superficial features and behaviors that are caused by the essence are also necessary. Those could easily vary due to environmental conditions (in fact even at the actual world, in exceptional cases, they do), or by assuming that certain laws might have been different.

  11. The ideas in this section are further developed in unpublished work with Marion Godman and David Papineau.

  12. Papineau (2013) makes a similar point. Interestingly, though, he concedes that intuitions of possibility are in general philosophically important not as a source of evidence for or against our theories, but rather as a means to clarify our thinking.

  13. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.

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Acknowledgements

I am grateful to David Papineau and one anonymous referee at Philosophical Studies for helpful comments on a previous draft of this paper. Thanks also to Michael Devitt, Sonia Roca-Royes, Jonathan Schaffer, Anand Vaidya, and Michael Wallner for helpful conversation.

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    Antonella Mallozzi

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Mallozzi, A. Superexplanations for counterfactual knowledge. Philos Stud 178, 1315–1337 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01477-0

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