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Witnesses

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Abstract

The meaning of definite descriptions is a central topic in philosophy and linguistics. Indefinites have been relatively neglected by philosophers, under the Russellian assumption that they are simply existential quantifiers. However, a robust set of patterns suggest that this assumption is wrong. In this paper I develop a new approach to (in)definites which aims to capture these patterns. On my theory, truth-conditions are classical. But in addition to truth-conditions, meanings comprise a second dimension, which I call bounds. It is at the level of bounds, not truth-conditions, that the characteristic coordination between indefinites and definites takes place. My system has a classical logic, thus avoiding serious problems which face the most plausible extant account of these patterns, namely, dynamic semantics. More generally, my approach yields a new perspective on the relation between truth-conditions and dynamic effects in natural language.

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Notes

  1. See Egli (1979) for some history, which goes back to Stoic logic.

  2. See e.g. Geach (1962), Evans (1977), Parsons (1978), Cooper (1979), Neale (1990), Heim (1990), Ludlow (1994), Büring (2004), Elbourne (2005); see Lewis (2012, 2021b), Mandelkern and Rothschild (2020), Lewerentz (2020) for more recent developments and criticism.

  3. E.g. Karttunen (1976), Kamp (1981), Heim (1982), Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991), Dekker (1993, 1994), van den Berg (1996), Muskens (1996), Aloni (2001), Beaver (2001), Nouwen (2003), Brasoveanu (2007), Charlow (2014).

  4. I will explain this presently vis-à-vis dynamic semantics; see Mandelkern and Rothschild (2020) for this point in the context of e-type theories.

  5. (Corner) quotes are omitted for expressions of formal language.

  6. I will not discuss e-type approaches here. E-type approaches struggle to deal with Partee pairs in general. The issue is that in a pair like (3), the relationship of being a twin is equally salient, linguistically and cognitively, in both constructions, but only ‘has a twin’, not ‘is a twin’, licenses subsequent anaphora to the twin. Dynamic treatments of these contrasts have been developed much more explicitly, and so make a more effective foil.

  7. There are different ways to define validity in dynamic semantics, but double negation elimination is not valid on any of them. A common approach says that the inference from p to q is valid just in case for any context c, \(c[p]=(c[p])[q]\) whenever both sides are defined. But \(c[\lnot \lnot p]\) will not always equal \((c[\lnot \lnot p])[p]\). For instance, when p is ‘Sue has a\(_x\) child(x)’ and x is novel in c, \(c[\lnot \lnot p]\) will be the set of points \(\left\langle {g,w} \right\rangle \in c\) where Sue has a child in w, while \((c[\lnot \lnot p])[p]\) will be the set of points \(\left\langle {g,w} \right\rangle \) such that g(x) is a child of Sue’s in w and for some \(\left\langle {g',w'} \right\rangle \in c: w=w'\) and g agrees with \(g'\) except on x.

  8. My system crosscuts the standard boundaries between dynamic vs. static systems. At the level of truth-conditions, everything is purely static. But, as we will see, the projection of bounds is calculated by way of recursively specified local contexts, which, while not formulated in the traditional functional or relational architecture of dynamic semantics, is still a tool characteristic of dynamic semantics. There are various precise criteria of dynamicness (see van Benthem (1996), Rothschild and Yalcin (2015), Rothschild and Yalcin (2016)), as well as various broader heuristics for what counts as dynamic (cf. Chierchia 1995). An interesting question, which I leave for further work, is where my system falls vis-à-vis those criteria, and more generally whether we should think of it as a dynamic theory or not.

  9. See Dekker (2000, 2002, 2004a, 2004b, 2008), Dekker (2012) for developments; see Jäger (2005) for a type-theoretic implementation. The most salient difference between Dekker’s system and mine is that Dekker’s system is developed with a conjunction which is capable of extending the input sequence, and (thus) with a negation which quantifies over possible extensions of the input sequence; in the resulting system, double negation elimination is logically invalid, as in dynamic systems. Dekker (2001, 2015), however, develops the system so that anaphora resolution is sensitive to information structure, in a manner that could be used to deal with double negation and disjunction.

  10. See Avigad and Zach (2020) for a general overview of the epsilon calculus. Superficially, in our system, indefinites and definites are sentence operators, not terms as in the epsilon calculus. But deep differences remain even if we translate our approach into something syntactically more like the epsilon calculus. For instance, we don’t validate the characteristic epsilon axiom \(\exists x Px \equiv P(\epsilon x Px)\). Of course, is not well-formed for us anyway, but we could naturally extend our system by making a term by letting iff \(g(x)\in \mathfrak {I}(P,w)\), \(\bot \) (an object of which everything is false) if \(\mathfrak {I}(P,w)=\varnothing \), and \(\#\) otherwise. By contrast, in the epsilon calculus, \(\epsilon x Px\) is an assignment-insensitive thing in \(\mathfrak {I}(P,w)\), if \(\mathfrak {I}(P,w)\ne \varnothing \), and otherwise some arbitrary individual. So, for instance, \(P(\epsilon x Px)\) will be true whenever \(\mathfrak {I}(P,w)\ne \varnothing \), while , on the proposed interpretation, can be undefined, invalidating the characteristic axiom of the epsilon calculus.

  11. So \(A(x_1, x_2, \dots x_n)\) is false at \(\left\langle {g,w} \right\rangle \) if g is undefined at any \(x_i: i\le n\).

  12. See Herzberger (1973), who credits Buridan, and Karttunen and Peters (1979) for classical multi-dimensional approaches to presupposition; see Dekker (2008) for a multi-dimensional approach to anaphora.

  13. An alternative would be to develop this system in a one-dimensional but trivalent setting, by treating unsatt sentences as lacking truth-values. I discuss this route in Mandelkern (t.a.). Spector (2021), however, points out a serious problem for that implementation, and develops a one-dimensional system along different lines, using plural assignments. There is much more here to explore, and hopefully future work will bring out the pros and cons of various implementations.

  14. Many thanks to Keny Chatain for suggesting this formulation of the witness bound, based on a much more tortuous earlier version.

  15. Plausibly, there is also a uniqueness-presupposing definite. Schwarz (2009) has influentially argued that these are two different lexical items. A uniqueness-presupposing definite can of course straightforwardly be incorporated into our system. I will continue to focus on the familiarity-definite throughout, since it is that definite whose interaction with indefinites is of particular interest.

  16. Of course, the context can be updated by other means. I assume, following Stalnaker, that the context is in some sense derivative on joint attitudes of some kind, so that e.g. commonly believing p suffices for the context to entail p.

  17. A reviewer for this journal suggests an interesting idea: perhaps the familiarity requirement is a presupposition, not a bound, and presuppositions can be identified as just those bounds that must be satisfied throughout a context, rather than at a given point in a context.

  18. Of course, definites can also be accommodated, as Heim (1982) and others discuss.

  19. On this approach, a disjunct can contain locally novel definites without that making the sentence unsatt, as in . This will be satt at \(\left\langle { c,g,w} \right\rangle \) when \(g(x)=\#\) and nothing is F and G in w, even if y is novel in c, since the restrictor of \(\iota x\) (that is, \(\top x\)) is not true here. Still, if y is novel, then this sentence will be equivalent to whenever satt, which will suffice to account for its infelicity via standard theories of redundancy.

  20. I focus on conjunction here, but the same points apply to sequences, and to any substitution instances of FxGx, and Hx by formulae free in x.

  21. p and q are logically equivalent whenever, for any index i in any intended model, p is true at i iff q is true at i.

  22. Thanks to a reviewer for suggesting this helpful terminology.

  23. In addition to being bound-equivalent, there is another, stronger sense in which (20-a)–(20-c) are equivalent: if any one of (20-a)–(20-c) is satt and true, then all three are satt and true.

  24. See e.g. Heim (1982), Root (1986), Rooth (1987), Schubert and Pelletier (1989), Chierchia (1992, 1995), Kanazawa (1994), Champollion et al. (2019).

  25. See e.g. Karttunen (1976), Roberts (1987), Kibble (1994), Frank (1996), Brasoveanu (2007), Brasoveanu (2010), Hofmann (2019).

  26. A harder case comes from what Kibble (1994), citing Paul Dekker, calls negative subordination—cases like (24):

    1. (24)

      John doesn’t have a car so he doesn’t wash \(\left\{ \begin{array}{c} \underline{\text {it}} \\ \underline{\text {the car}} \end{array}\right\} \).

    I am not sure what to make of cases like this, which are not straightforwardly accounted for in our account, even with the cross-world witness bound. One possibility is to appeal to something like Heim’s (1982, 1983) notion of local accommodation, or, relatedly, to analyze this as a kind of meta-linguistic negation. Obviously this needs further exploration; while I don’t think my view shines any special light on this issue, I think it is amenable to whatever general solution one prefers. See Lewis (2021a) for interesting further problems involving negation.

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Correspondence to Matthew Mandelkern.

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In writing this paper I have been the lucky beneficiary of a great deal of tremendously helpful feedback. I am very grateful to seminar participants at UCL, the ILLC, the NYU Semantics Group, the Virtual Language Work in Progress group, Oxford, and NYU; and to Kyle Blumberg, David Boylan, Simon Charlow, Cian Dorr, Peter Fritz, Ezra Keshet, Lukas Lewerentz, Karen Lewis, Craige Roberts, Philippe Schlenker, Ginger Schultheis, Benjamin Spector, and Anna Szabolcsi. Thanks to two fantastic reviewers, to my editor Paul Dekker, and to Chris Barker, Patrick Elliott, Matthew Gotham, Milo Phillips-Brown, and Nathan Klinedinst for extremely helpful comments on earlier drafts. Thanks, finally, to Keny Chatain, Daniel Rothschild and Yasu Sudo for crucial discussion and help throughout the project.

Appendix: Semantics

Appendix: Semantics

For ease of reference, I summarize the semantics given in the text. We specify the truth-conditions for our language, relative to pairs of a world and a variable assignment: where g is a variable assignment, w a world, and p a sentence, \(\llbracket {p}\rrbracket ^{g,w}\) is the bivalent truth-value of p at \(\left\langle {g,w} \right\rangle \). We simultaneously specify the bounds of sentences relative to a context (a set of assignment-world pairs), an assignment, and a world. Bounds never influence truth-conditions, so contexts play no role in determining the latter. For any context c and sentence p, \( c^p\) is the set of world-assignment pairs in c where p is true and satt relative to c. \(\mathfrak {I}\) is an atomic valuation taking n-ary atoms and worlds to sets of n-tuples.

  • Atoms:

    \(\llbracket {A(x_1, x_2, \dots x_n)}\rrbracket ^{g,w}\)\(=1\) iff \(g(x_1), \dots g(x_n)\) are all defined and \(\left\langle {g(x_1), \dots g(x_n)} \right\rangle \in \mathfrak {I}(A,w)\), 0 otherwise

    \(A(x_1, x_2, \dots x_n)\) is satt at \(\left\langle {c,g,w} \right\rangle \) iff \(g(x_1), \dots g(x_n)\) are all defined

  • Conjunction:

    \( \llbracket {p \& q}\rrbracket ^{g,w}\)\(=1\) iff \(\llbracket {p}\rrbracket ^{g,w}\)\(=\llbracket {q}\rrbracket ^{g,w}=1\)

    \( p \& q\) is satt at \(\left\langle {c,g,w} \right\rangle \) iff p is satt at \(\left\langle {c,g,w} \right\rangle \) and q is satt at \(\left\langle {c^{p},g,w} \right\rangle \)

  • Disjunction:

    \(\llbracket {p\vee q}\rrbracket ^{g,w}\)\(=1\) iff \(\llbracket {p}\rrbracket ^{g,w}\)\(=1\) or \(\llbracket {q}\rrbracket ^{g,w}=1\)

    \(p\vee q\) is satt at \(\left\langle {c,g,w} \right\rangle \) iff p is satt at \(\left\langle {c,g,w} \right\rangle \) and q is satt at \(\left\langle {c^{\lnot p},g,w} \right\rangle \)

  • Negation:

    \(\llbracket {\lnot p}\rrbracket ^{g,w}\)\(=1\) iff \(\llbracket {p}\rrbracket ^{g,w}=0\)

    \(\lnot p\) is satt at \(\left\langle {c,g,w} \right\rangle \) iff p is satt at \(\left\langle {c,g,w} \right\rangle \)

  • Indefinites:

    iff \( \llbracket {\exists x( p \& q)}\rrbracket ^{ g,w}=1\) iff \( \exists a: \llbracket {p \& q}\rrbracket ^{g_{[x\rightarrow a]},w}=1\)

    is satt at \(\left\langle {c,g,w} \right\rangle \) iff \( \exists g': p \& q\) is satt at \(\left\langle {c,g',w} \right\rangle \) and \( \llbracket {\exists x(p \& q)}\rrbracket ^{ g,w}=1\rightarrow p \& q\) is true and satt at \(\left\langle {c,g,w} \right\rangle \)

  • Definites:

    \(\llbracket {\iota x (p,q)}\rrbracket ^{g,w}\)\( =\llbracket {p \& q}\rrbracket ^{g,w}\)

    \(\iota x (p,q)\) is satt at \(\left\langle {c,g,w} \right\rangle \) iff \(\forall \left\langle {g',w'} \right\rangle \in c: p\) is true and satt at \(\left\langle {c,g',w'} \right\rangle \) and, if p is true at \(\left\langle {c,g,w} \right\rangle \), then q is satt at \(\left\langle {c^p,g,w} \right\rangle \)

  • Quantifiers:

    \(\llbracket {\textsc {every} x_\delta (p,q)}\rrbracket ^{g,w}\)\(=1\) iff \( \forall \left\langle {a,g'} \right\rangle \in g(\delta ): \llbracket {p}\rrbracket ^{g'_{[x\rightarrow a]},w}=1 \rightarrow \llbracket {p \& q}\rrbracket ^{g'_{[x\rightarrow a]},w}=1\)

    \(\textsc {every} x_\delta (p,q)\) is satt at \(\left\langle {c,g,w} \right\rangle \) iff

    • \(\forall a: \exists ! \left\langle {a',g'} \right\rangle \in g(\delta ) : a'=a;\)

    • \(\forall \left\langle {a,g'} \right\rangle \in g(\delta ): p\) and \( p \& q\) are satt at \(\left\langle {c,g'_{[x\rightarrow a]},w} \right\rangle \); and

    • \(\forall \left\langle {a,g'} \right\rangle \in g(\delta ) : g'\sim _{c} g\), where \(g'\sim _c g\) iff \(g'\) agrees with g on the values of all variables which are not novel in c.

    \(\llbracket {\textsc {most} x_\delta (p,q)}\rrbracket ^{g,w}\)\(=1\) iff \( \frac{|\{\left\langle {a,g'} \right\rangle \in g(\delta ): \llbracket p \& q\rrbracket ^{ g'_{[x\rightarrow a]},w}=1\}|}{|\{\left\langle {a,g'} \right\rangle \in g(\delta ): \llbracket p\rrbracket ^{g'_{[x\rightarrow a]},w}=1\}|}> .5\)

    \(\textsc {most} x_\delta (p,q)\) is satt at \(\left\langle {c,g,w} \right\rangle \) iff

    • \(\forall a: \exists ! \left\langle {a',g'} \right\rangle \in g(\delta ) : a'=a;\)

    • \(\forall \left\langle {a,g'} \right\rangle \in g(\delta ): p\) and \( p \& q\) are satt at \(\left\langle {c,g'_{[x\rightarrow a]},w} \right\rangle \); and

    • \(\forall \left\langle {a,g'} \right\rangle \in g(\delta ) : g'\sim _{c} g\).

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Mandelkern, M. Witnesses. Linguist and Philos 45, 1091–1117 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-021-09343-w

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