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An Ethical Interpretation of the Nash Choice Rule

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Abstract

This paper provides an ethical intepretation of the Nash choice rule. In a setting in which (cardinal) utilities are interpersonally comparable, this procedure is characterised by an impartiality requirement and by the assumption that choices are not responsive to the agents' relative ability to convert resources into utility.

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  1. Department of Economics, University of Exeter, Streatham Court, Rennes Drive, Exeter, EX4 4PU, United Kingdom

    Marco Mariotti

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  1. Marco Mariotti
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Mariotti, M. An Ethical Interpretation of the Nash Choice Rule. Theory and Decision 49, 151–157 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005234101607

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005234101607

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