Cognitive Metascience: A New Approach to the Study of Theories
Marcin Miłkowski
Polish Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy and Sociologyhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-7646-5742
Abstrakt
In light of the recent credibility crisis in psychology, this paper argues for a greater emphasis on theorizing in scientific research. Although reliable experimental evidence, preregistration, methodological rigor, and new computational frameworks for modeling are important, scientific progress also relies on properly functioning theories. However, the current understanding of the role of theorizing in psychology is lacking, which may lead to future crises. Theories should not be viewed as mere speculations or simple inductive generalizations.
To address this issue, the author introduces a framework called “cognitive metascience,” which studies the processes and results of evaluating scientific practice. This study should proceed both qualitatively, as in traditional science and technology studies and cognitive science, and quantitatively, by analyzing scientific discourse using language technology.
By analyzing theories as cognitive artifacts that support cognitive tasks, this paper aims to shed more light on their nature. This perspective reveals that multiple distinct theories serve entirely different roles, and studying these roles, along with their epistemic vices and virtues, can provide insight into how theorizing should proceed. The author urges a change in research culture to appreciate the variety of distinct theories and to systematically advance scientific progress.
Słowa kluczowe:
theory crisis, cognitive metascience, cognitive artifact, theoretical virtue, epistemic criteriaBibliografia
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Polish Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7646-5742
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