-
Views
-
Cite
Cite
Eric Margolis, Stephen Laurence, Lewis’ Strawman, The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 52, Issue 206, January 2002, Pages 55–65, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00252
- Share Icon Share
Abstract
In a survey of his views in the philosophy of mind, David Lewis criticizes much recent work in the field by attacking an imaginary opponent, ‘Strawman’. His case against Strawman focuses on four central theses which Lewis takes to be widely accepted among contemporary philosophers of mind. The theses concern (1) the language of thought hypothesis and its relation to folk‐psychology, (2) narrow content, (3) de se content, and (4) rationality. We respond to Lewis, arguing (amongst other things) that he underestimates Strawman’s theoretical resources in a variety of important ways.