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Naturalism and Scepticism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

Martin Bell  and
Marie McGinn
Martin Bell
Affiliation:
University of York
Marie McGinn
Affiliation:
University of York
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Extract

In this paper we argue that a dominant view of Humean naturalism involves a fundamental misconception of Hume's naturalist project. We shall show that the naturalist project as Hume conceives it is philosophically much more interesting than the form of naturalism commonly attributed to him. We shall also argue, however, that Hume's commitment to principles of empiricist epistemology prevented him from bringing his naturalist project to a satisfactory conclusion. Finally, we shall suggest that Wittgenstein shares Hume's conception of a philosophically satisfactory form of naturalism, and that, unencumbered by empiricist doctrines, Wittgenstein was able to provide the sort of undogmatic unravelling of the sceptical problem that eluded Hume.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 65 , Issue 254 , October 1990 , pp. 399 - 418
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1990

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References

1 Strawson, P. F., Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties, Methuen, London, 1985.Google Scholar

2 Ibid., 11.

3 Ibid., 14.

4 Ibid., 12.

5 Ibid., 11.

6 Ibid., 11.

7 Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, Selby-Bigge, L. A. & Nidditch, P. H. (eds) (OUP, Oxford, 1978).Google Scholar

8 Ibid., 183.

9 Hume, David, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principle of Morals Selby-Bigge, L. A. & Nidditch, P. H. (eds) (OUP, Oxford, 1975).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

10 Empiricus, Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, PY trans. Bury, R. G., Loeb Classical Library, London, 1933.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

11 Ibid., I, 23.

12 Popkin, R. H., The High Road to Pyrrhonism, Watson, R. A. & Force, J. E. (eds) (Austin Hill, San Diego, 1980, pp. 117, 129–30).Google Scholar

13 Treatise, 218.Google Scholar

14 Ibid., 269.

15 Op. cit., 12.

16 Ibid., pp. 112–13.

17 Ibid., 12.

18 Stroud, B.Hume (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1977).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

19 Ibid., 249.

20 Ibid., pp. 248–9.

21 Ibid., 249.

22 Treatise, 89.Google Scholar

23 Stroud, , op. cit., 53.Google Scholar

24 Ibid., 53.

25 Treatise, 103.Google Scholar

26 Enquiries, 41–2, (our emphasis).Google Scholar

27 Ibid., 44–5.

28 Ibid., 151.

29 Treatise, 193.Google Scholar

30 Ibid., 193.

31 See Wittgenstein, L., On Certainty, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1969.Google Scholar

32 Ibid., para. 248.

33 Ibid., para. 204.

34 Ibid., para. 110.

35 For further discussion of this interpretation of Wittgenstein see McGinn, Marie, Sense and Certainty (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).Google Scholar