On an argument of Segal�s against singular object-dependent thoughts
- Autores: Teresa Marques
- Localización: Disputatio, ISSN-e 0873-626X, Vol. 2, Nº. 21, 2006, págs. 1-19
- Idioma: inglés
- Enlaces
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Resumen
This paper discusses and criticizes Segal�s 1989 argument against singular object-dependent thoughts. His argument aims at showing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant. My criticism of Segal�s argument has two parts. First, I appeal to common anti-individualist arguments to the effect that Segal�s type of argument only succeeds in establishing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant for those aspects of subjects� behaviour that do not require reference to external objects. Secondly, Segal�s view on singular thoughts is at odds with his view on the semantics of proper names, which favours the singularity and object-dependency of the truth-conditions of sentences in which they occur. In particular, his views are at odds with a position he holds, that truth-conditional semantics can adequately account for all aspects of speakers� linguistic competence in the use of proper names.
