

Out of the Past: Episodic Recall as Retained Acquaintance

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When John Dean, former counsel to President Nixon, gave testimony before the House on the Watergate affair, his recall of particular incidents and the contents of conversations that had taken place in the Oval Office was so detailed and so complete that one of the senators dubbed him in disbelief 'the human tape recorder'. Dean denied this, explaining that he claimed no accuracy for the words he used, but merely that he could recount what had gone on and the import of what had been said. Unbeknownst to Dean, the affairs that he testified on had been secretly recorded by Nixon, so the case offers an unusual real-world experiment for work in memory. The psychologist Ulric Neisser (1981) undertook such a comparison of Dean's testimony and the tapes in a published survey. Neisser makes the observation that we have a kind of objective test for Dean's veracity: he was never prosecuted for perjury, nor criticized in any official reports for inaccuracy or misleading testimony; in general the conclusion has been that Dean told the truth. On the other hand, the comparison of tape and testimony reveals that there are significant discrepancies between the two. For example, in some cases, Dean supposes that participants in meetings spoke when they did not; and elsewhere he transposes some familiar turns of phrase and details of plans made from one meeting, in September, to another, earlier in March. So it is not that Dean merely fails to get the words right while still giving the gist, he does not even get the gist of particular meetings right. What he does get right is the general import of the various meetings. For example, at one Nixon does not declare his knowledge of the break-in and the intended cover-up, as Dean has him do, but in the context of the meeting it is clear that Nixon must know these things, even if he does not explicitly say so. In general, the narrative drift of the course of events as told by Dean is accurate, albeit sometimes the tale involves a bias towards Dean himself as occupying centre stage. So there is a clear sense in which Dean is not misleading the House committee, as long as we stand back from assuming that accuracy requires that he should be able to give us the correct details of particular events.

Neisser himself is very cautious about morals to draw from Dean's admittedly extraordinary situation. But one might think that the story invites one to draw a bold conclusion: we are tempted, so the claim might go, to suppose that, when we recount events that we have witnessed, we have some kind of distinctive access to the past. Dean would appear to be someone with an exceptionally good such

memory for his past life. Yet what Neisser's case study suggests is that there is no such fundamental divide between memories which relate one to past episodes that one has witnessed, and memory simply as a store of information about the world. Dean was in a position to know many facts about the general course of events during the Watergate cover-up. When he came to recount particular episodes, he could rely on his general knowledge about what happened and about Nixon's character to reconstruct the episodes as they must have occurred. Rather than supposing that there is a fundamental contrast between episodic memory (or personal memory) of past events in one's life and semantic memory (or factual memory) by which one retains factual knowledge of the world, we should instead simply contrast the different kinds of use that retained information can be put to in memory tasks. In autobiographical memory, one uses the information one has about the past to construct narratives about oneself. Where memory is non-autobiographical, one simply uses that information to describe how the world has been. We have the impression that Dean has special access to past events through having witnessed matters only because, in addition to his having at that time greater factual knowledge about those things than the committee he was reporting to, the story that he told using those facts was a story that featured him as the central agent of the narrative.

Let us call this view about the differences among different kinds of memory *Constructivism*, sceptical as it is about a distinctive divide between memory of facts in general and of one's own past in particular.¹ Such a view need not be sceptical about the veracity, or standards of correctness for memory information (so it is not to be read as claiming that the past is a construct). Rather, construction enters when we try to explain the difference between memories as reports of our own past episodes, versus memory as reflecting our general knowledge of the nature of past happenings. What is constructed is a narrative about one's past deeds: the contrast between personal memory and general knowledge is not laid down in the information retained but rather in the way that reports exploiting that information are constructed.

One will be opposed to this view, if one is inclined to defend the idea that there is an important cognitive distinction to be drawn between episodic memory which relates one to past episodes of which one was a witness, and other kinds of memory where one retains facts or abilities. That there is such a distinction to be drawn is the main thrust of Endel Tulving's work over the last thirty years (Tulving, 1972, 1982; Wheeler, Stuss, and Tulving, 1997). This approach within cognitive psychology to the study of memory stresses the important role that episodic memory plays in an account of memory and consciousness. The stress here on episodic memory echoes the centrality that the parallel notion of personal or direct memory has had in philosophical debates about the nature of memory. It is an interesting question how someone who takes as central the notion of episodic memory should respond to the Constructivist challenge, and indeed a

¹ For an example of such an approach to memory cf. Barclay, 1994.

nice question what they ought to say about the example of Dean. We shall return to Dean at the end of this chapter; for most of what follows I shall be concerned with the question of what substance there is in opposition to Constructivism as I have construed it here. What content is there to this idea of episodic memory as a special kind of contact with the past? What is it about this idea that makes it inconsistent with the claim that we simply construct a self-narrative on the basis of general information about the world when we recount autobiographical memories?

Within the philosophical discussion of memory, there are certain strategies of transcendental argument aimed at showing the fundamental role of episodic memory in our conception of being related to an objective world.² But that is not the concern here. I want to start at a more elementary level and ask why we might initially be resistant to simply accepting Constructivism. What is important about our conception of episodic memory? Can such a conception be made coherent?

In a recent survey paper, Tulving's research group offers a suitably grand picture of what is so central about episodic memory:

One of the most fascinating achievements of the human mind is the ability to mentally travel through time. It is somehow possible for a person to relive experiences by thinking back to previous situations and happenings in the past and to mentally project oneself into the anticipated future through imagination, daydreams and fantasies. In the everyday world, the most common manifestations of this ability can be referred to as 'remembering past happenings'. Everyone knows what this phrase means and what it is like to reflect on personal experiences, past or future, that are not part of the present. (Wheeler, Stuss, and Tulving, 1997: 331)

This suggests that what is central about episodic memory is that it is one component of our experience of time. That suggestion seems to be an interesting echo of a thought that Bertrand Russell had in his first account of memory in 1912, which he soon came to abandon. For at that time Russell took as central to his account of the mind the role of acquaintance with things, and he included on his list of types of acquaintance, acquaintance with the past through memory:

It is obvious that we often remember what we have seen or heard or had otherwise present to our senses, and that in such cases we are still immediately aware of what we remember, in spite of the fact that it appears as past and not present. This immediate knowledge by memory is the source of all our knowledge concerning the past: without it, there could be no knowledge of the past by inference, since we should never know that there was anything past to be inferred. (Russell, 1912: 26)

So Tulving and Russell would seem to give us a direct answer to why we should be resistant to accepting the Constructivist picture straight off: in episodic memory we have experience or acquaintance with the past; we lack such acquaintance in mere semantic memory. If there is no essential difference between

² A starting point here is Strawson, 1966; for a recent application with the above concerns in mind see Campbell, 1997.

episodic and semantic memory, but only a difference in the way information retained is used, either as a story about one's past self, or as an account of how the world in general is, then no such memory has a special link to the past. There can be nothing which counts as experience of the past. If Constructivism is correct, Tulving and Russell are both wrong.

Yet before we can even address that conflict, we need to ask whether there could be anything that counted as a distinctive experience of the past or acquaintance with the past. For certainly Russell's 1912 picture of memory is commonly taken in the philosophical literature to have been incoherent. Russell himself had repudiated it along with the notion of acquaintance by the time he offered a new theory of memory in *The Analysis of Mind* in 1921. In this he has been followed by many other commentators on the problems of memory.³ So, if Tulving's conception of 'mental time travel' is tarred with the same brush, then we have no significant alternative to Constructivism.

The aim of this chapter is to defend the idea that there is a distinctive phenomenology of encounter with past against a charge of incoherence. In the first section, I shall focus on a group of assumptions embedded in our ordinary talk of memory and its connections with knowledge and other cognitive achievements. Philosophers often assume that Russell's picture of memory as acquaintance with the past is driven solely by Russell's strange theoretical assumptions about knowledge. I shall argue that our common-sense conception of memory commits us to the idea of episodic memory as retention of past apprehension. In the second part of the chapter, I turn to the challenge that Russell and others have raised against the idea that we have any distinctive experience of the past in having episodic recall. I shall argue that the challenge rests on a false assumption about the nature of sensation and imagery, and in rejecting that assumption I shall sketch an alternative conception of memory imagery and experiential recall. This, in turn, will give us a way of fleshing out the idea that we have some kind of experience of past in episodic memory consonant both with common sense and Tulving's theoretical approach. In the concluding section I turn back to the challenge that Constructivism poses for this picture, and briefly sketch what I take the consequences of that dispute are for the conception of memory here defended.

I

Tulving is noteworthy among psychologists of memory, in that the divisions he draws among kinds of memory correspond to distinctions drawn by philosophers in their discussions of memory. And arguably the distinctions he makes echo

³ Russell appears to have abandoned the view by 1917, see Pears, 1975 for discussion of this. For criticisms of ideas related to the 1912 view, see Ayer, 1956; Anscombe, 1974; Pears 1975, 1990. An exception to this attack is Evans, 1982: chs. 5 and 8, where Evans develops the idea of an information link with the past, analogous to Russell's idea of acquaintance; Judson, 1987–8, exploits Evans's ideas in a critique of Pears.

distinctions we are ordinarily inclined to note in our ordinary speech about remembering or recall. Where Tulving writes of episodic memory, semantic memory, and procedural memory, philosophers have talked of personal or direct memory, factual memory, and practical or habitual memory. Of these, philosophers have been most interested in personal/direct memory, what Tulving more aptly calls episodic memory. Typically, such memory is singled out through two marks. First, only such memories can be properly reported by using the form, 'S remembers/recalls [x] f-ing', as in 'Mary remembers John falling asleep in the talk', 'Jo remembers being inoculated for smallpox'. Secondly, it is held that such statements about memory can be true only where the person remembering meets what we can call the Previous Awareness Condition: that one can remember an event only where one previously witnessed it or was the conscious agent of it (Shoemaker, 1984: 19; Wheeler, Stuss, and Tulving, 1997: 333).

The focus of discussion here has been on one aspect of the Previous Awareness Condition, that the original witness should be the very same the person as is now remembering. It has been asked whether this condition is merely a prejudice embedded in English and similar natural languages, or whether the way we talk about memory reveals something interesting about the nature of memory itself. Those who wish to appeal to the notion of psychological continuity, and in particular to the role of episodic memory in such continuity, as central to an account of personal identity have been keen to argue that the identity condition is mere convention; their opponents have questioned whether we can make sense of the Previous Awareness Condition without this identity condition attached.⁴ But few have stopped to ask why the locution in question should be associated with the Previous Awareness Condition, or indeed why this condition should hold for any form of memory at all.

Just as some psychologists have questioned whether there is any unity to the notions of consciousness and attention (cf. Allport, 1992), we can ask what the varieties of memory that we mark out in natural language have in common that should make them all memories. I want to suggest that we can give at least a limited answer to this question which reveals why the Previous Awareness Condition should apply to memories which are properly reported with the locution indicated above. Such reflection on the concept of memory in general will lead us to the idea of episodic memory as relating us to past experience as past in a way which echoes Russell's conception of memory as acquaintance with the past.

Consider the following range of locutions:

- (1) Mary remembers that Pompeii was destroyed by a pyroclastic flow
- (2) Sam recalls what the number is to open the safe
- (3) Ellen remembers where to put the key when going out
- (4) Arnold recalls the view from the Giralda
- (5) Sophie remembers Bernard

⁴ Shoemaker, 1984, introduces the idea of quasi-memory as a notion of memory with the identity condition removed; Parfit, 1985, exploits the idea further in constructing an account of personal identity; Evans, 1982: ch. 7, and Wiggins, 1995, attack the very notion of quasi-memory as incoherent.

In each case we can replace the words 'remembers' or 'recalls' with 'knows' or 'knew' and preserve significance—that is, the resulting sentences make perfect sense—and in many of these cases, the resulting sentences are true if the original is. From this, one might first conjecture that the objects of memory (i.e. the 'grammatical' objects of memory ascriptions—what can be remembered) are simply the same objects as those of knowledge (what can be known). It is common for philosophers to distinguish various kinds of knowledge. There is propositional or factual knowledge, where one knows that or whether something is the case; practical knowledge, where one knows how to do something; and knowledge by acquaintance, where one knows some individual, place, or thing. Factual or semantic memory would just seem to be the correlate in memory of the former. Procedural memory or habitual memory seems to mirror practical knowledge. And as we have knowledge of things so we can remember them.

But one might also conjecture a tighter link than just this. For people can only remember that something is or was the case where we can also say of them that they know it. This suggests that in the case of factual memory, remembering is simply retained knowledge, or knowledge preserved.⁵ However, this proposal needs some clarification if it is not to be trivially falsified: that a subject knows something at the time of recall, and must previously have known it in order to recall it, does not require that he or she know it throughout the intervening period. For example, a subject may forget something and then later recall it. In general, there seems to be an accessibility condition on knowledge, so that where a subject simply cannot answer a relevant question when needed (not necessarily verbally—the answer to the question may require appropriate action from them guided by the answer), then we are inclined to say that the subject does not know the fact in question, and must have forgotten it. Such forgetting is quite consistent with later recall, and hence with the knowledge having been retained, in the relevant sense of retention.⁶

However, a focus on factual knowledge and memory obscures the complexity of the link. For it need not be true in all cases of remembering that the occasion

⁵ Cf. Squires, 1969 and Williamson, 1995, who suggests that 'remembering that p ', like 'can see that p ', is a determination of the determinable knowledge. The idea that memory is a form of preservation is also a central theme in Burge, 1993a and 1997. This conception of factual memory is attacked by Harman in (1973: ch. 12). See also the critical discussion of this idea in Peacocke, 1986: ch. 10.

⁶ A related type of example can be constructed from so-called cases of lost knowledge—for this idea see Harman, 1973; Ginet, 1980; Dretske and Yourgrau, 1983. Arguably, one can come to fail to know something without having forgotten it, but simply through acquiring misleading evidence which one reasonably takes to refute what one knew. I may mislead you into thinking that you don't know that *The Family of Darius Presented to Alexander* is in the National Gallery, since you can give me allegedly conclusive evidence that it is merely a copy the museum possesses. If convinced by you, I may no longer be said to know that the painting is there. On the other hand, if later I discover your malicious falsehoods, I may then be said to remember that the painting is in the gallery, and so to have retained the knowledge after all that I had earlier acquired. The issue also has bearing on Peacocke's critique of a pure preservative conception of factual knowledge. An irresponsible or unreliable subject who is as liable to exploit mere false opinion as knowledge acquired may not be counted as having proper access to the knowledge that he or she would otherwise have retained through memory.

of recall counts as a case of current knowledge, and that it is bound to do so with factual memory reveals something distinctive of our grasp of facts as opposed to those cases where we know, or are acquainted with, things. (Note the point here concerns knowing an individual or place, not knowledge *of* or *about* an individual or place.) Spurred to think about my schooldays, I may recall several of my classmates. If I have lost touch with them, and not concerned myself in the interval with their progress in the world, then I might comment that I did know S or X but that I know them no longer. On the other hand, I can certainly correctly report myself as remembering them. The contrast is even clearer when we turn to our relation to the dead. I cannot now know my maternal grandmother, for she died twenty years ago, but I did know her, in contrast to my paternal grandmother who died when I was first born. On the other hand I can certainly remember my maternal grandmother, and cannot remember my paternal one.

At least part of the difference here comes from the difference in the *object* of knowledge—that one knows an individual or place rather than a fact. For objects and places exist within time and can come to be, alter, and cease to exist over time. In contrast we tend to think of facts as immutable and eternal; if they hold as things actually are, then there is no time at which it will no longer be the case that something was true of a particular time. Now in relation to factual knowledge, it has often been pointed out that we think that someone who has knowledge thereby has to be sensitive to the holding of a certain truth if they are to be credited with knowledge of it: they must track this truth in order to know it.⁷ Since facts are immutable, the conditions for tracking a truth at one time need not be different at any later time, so there seems no particular extra condition which must be met in order for one to continue to count as knowing the fact. We require more when it comes to knowing individuals or places, rather than merely knowing of them, or facts concerning them. In general (but not invariably, for this is a context-sensitive matter) knowing an individual requires having met them, and knowing a place requires having visited. But since both individuals and places may change, continued knowledge of an object or place seems to require more: that one be sensitive to or track alterations in that object or place. Where one fails so to track, then one may once have known the person or place, but can no longer be said to do so. For example, I do not know now anyone that I first went to school with; I once knew the town of Camberley but no longer do. Furthermore, where an individual dies, or a place is destroyed, then while one may have known them, one can no longer do so: as noted above, while I once knew my maternal grandmother, I cannot know her now simply because she died twenty years ago.

If we apply the idea of memory as preservative to knowledge by acquaintance, this would suggest that occasions of recall are examples of knowing the

⁷ The idea that there is a tracking condition on propositional knowledge is developed in detail by Robert Nozick (1981: ch. 3). One tracks the truth of a proposition p , where it is true of one that one wouldn't believe p were it not the case that p , while one would still believe p to be so, given relevantly similar circumstances to the actual one in which p does hold.

individual or place recalled. But our discussion gives us reason to deny this: I recall my grandmother but do not now know her. However, this does not overthrow the original suggestion, but reveals an extra aspect to it. What is preserved is one's original knowledge of them, one's knowing of them when they were alive and still in appropriate contact with them. In the case of factual memory, past knowledge is sufficient for current knowledge, so there can be no contrast here; but as we have seen, the same is not so for knowledge by acquaintance. In this case, preserving knowledge from the past does not amount to current knowledge, it is rather current recall of an object with which one had acquaintance.

Consider, in turn, the case of episodic memory. The first point to note in this case is that we cannot conceive of such remembering as the preservation of *knowledge*, for one cannot have known what one now recalls in episodic memory.⁸ In cases such as:

(6) Mary remembers John falling asleep in the talk

where the derived nominal here picks out an event or episode which is being recalled, there is no well-formed substitution using a term for knowledge.

(7) *Mary knows/knew John falling asleep in the talk

is simply not English. Likewise while

(8) Jo recalls being inoculated for smallpox

makes perfect sense,

(9) *Jo knows/knew being inoculated for smallpox

is not something that can be used to say anything in English, although one might have some sense of what someone using it might be getting at. While this lack of parallel might incline someone sceptical of a general shape to the concept of memory to reject the idea that there is any role for the idea of preservation or retention of something in remembering, we should pursue the idea further, for in doing so we will highlight something of interest about the concept of knowledge itself.

Note, though that while we can find no knowledge ascriptions of an appropriate form that are true at an earlier time of the person remembering, there are other truths about them which seem relevant to the truth now of a memory ascription. For the Previous Awareness Condition itself would direct us towards an obvious class of statements: on the one hand, statements about what the person remembering has perceived:

(10) Mary heard John falling asleep in the talk;

⁸ Roger Squires notes that episodic memory poses this problem for the general proposal that memory is retained knowledge, but heroically attempts to retain the thesis unmodified (1969: 188–90).

on the other, statements about the person remembering as conscious agent, or about events through which the subject lived:⁹

(11) Jo was/lived through being inoculated for smallpox.

Using a variant on Russell's talk of acquaintance, let us talk of these all together as cases of *apprehension*.¹⁰ We apprehend events through either perceiving the events or through being their conscious agent. Episodic memory, then, traces back not to past knowledge, but past apprehension.

We might then restate the general condition on memory as that of preserving either past knowledge or past apprehension. Put so baldly, the proposal may seem objectionably *ad hoc*: why should knowledge and apprehension be grouped together in this way to be preserved for posterity in memory? That worry will be laid to rest, if we can show some appropriate unity between knowledge and apprehension.

On this matter, first note that we are reluctant, to say the least, to talk of knowing events or episodes. I can know Paris, and I can have known the exhibition *Picasso's Picassos* drawn from the contents of the Musée d'Orsay, but I cannot be said to have known the Vietnam War, I can only have lived through it, or witnessed it (see footnote for an important qualification, though).¹¹ Why shouldn't we be able to know events?¹² To answer this we need both to reflect on the link between apprehension and knowledge, and to think about the kind of cognitive contact we generally assume we can have with events. Apprehension is episodic: seeing, feeling, tasting something are all events or occurrences. Knowledge itself is a standing condition—although one can come to know something at a particular time, knowledge itself is not episodic. Nevertheless the state of knowledge is closely linked to episodes of apprehension: one must have apprehended individuals at some time to know them, and to continue knowing them one must have the possibility of further apprehension of them. Now, while we can apprehend events through perceiving them or living through them, in general we do not take

⁹ Note that in order to count as remembering an event, one must have been conscious during it or witnessed it. Even if it had happened to one, one could not recall being abducted by extra-terrestrials, if the abduction involved being unconscious throughout. Cf. the discussion of the concept of experience in Hinton, 1973: ch 1.

¹⁰ The early sense-datum theorists such as Price used the terms acquaintance and apprehension pretty much interchangeably: see Price, 1932: ch. 1. But in English the terms mark a difference significant for our discussion. Apprehension unlike acquaintance is episodic. Acquaintance like knowledge seems to be a standing state: one can be acquainted with someone over a long period, involving a number of different encounters with him or her; it sounds odd to claim that one was acquainted with someone for only five minutes. Russell slides over this distinction in his use of the term 'acquaintance' for something, which by his own lights seems to require something episodic.

¹¹ There is a sense in which a historian can know the Vietnam War but not the Korean War without having lived through either, simply from knowing enough about it. In this sense of knowing an event, one cannot properly be said to have known the event, the locution is much closer to our talk of knowledge of or knowledge about a subject matter.

¹² Note that we can hardly think of the question here as one about logical form: there seems nothing different in form between the noun phrase 'the war in the East' and 'the exhibition of Picasso's works', yet one can know the latter but not the former.

ourselves to be in a position to re-apprehend them. Hence, apprehension of an event is not a precursor to a standing condition of cognitive contact with what is apprehended, and so does not lead to knowing the event, although one will, of course, tend to acquire knowledge of the event.¹³

There is reason to think of apprehension and knowledge as closely connected—the former is the episodic counterpart of the latter standing condition. Taken together the two have in common that they are forms of cognitive contact with an object. It is not *ad hoc*, therefore, to suppose that the general preservative function of memory applies across the range of cognitive contact, to both standing conditions and episodes. Just as we can differentiate the kinds of cognitive contact and the objects that they have, so too we can differentiate the kinds of memories that result. We can then conceive of memory in general as the preservation of cognitive contact in general and not just the narrower condition of knowledge.

This proposal easily distinguishes the kinds of memory we started with and the conditions on them. With factual memory the antecedent cognition is that of factual knowledge, where knowing a fact does not seem to require apprehension of any of the objects or events that the fact concerns.¹⁴ Hence, we would predict that it is not a condition on remembering a fact that one has had any particular prior episode of apprehending the fact in question. On the other hand, memory of individuals or places seems to require that there has been a particular form of past knowledge: knowledge by acquaintance with the individual or place. In most such cases knowledge by acquaintance derives from apprehension of the individual, or place, in question, but commonly one will have encountered them more than once. Having had the knowledge may require that there has been apprehension in the past, but the knowledge itself need not rest on any one particular such encounter. The corresponding memory, then, need not trace back to any particular episode recalled. When we come to episodic memory, on the other hand, precisely what is being remembered is a previous event. For reasons rehearsed above, the only antecedent cognitive contact one can have had with an event is apprehension and not knowledge, so it is only this which can be required in the antecedent conditions required for such memory. This is just what the Previous Awareness Condition expresses. We can, after all, see it merely as a special case of a more general feature of memory.

¹³ At first sight, it may seem easy to think of cases of re-encounter with events: one might see the ball hit the stumps, and then seconds later hear it; one might have intermittently watched the funeral of Diana on the television; one might have gone for a number of tours of the Vietnam War, and in the interval isolated oneself entirely from any information about it. But, interestingly, these still seem to contrast with our talk of apprehensions of continuants. In the latter case the various viewings of an object are not intuitively aggregatable into a superordinate event, one's viewing of the object. In contrast, there is such an event for the viewing of any event. For example, there is an event of one's viewing of Diana's funeral, which seems to take all the viewings of parts of the funeral as something like proper parts. The relevant notion of re-apprehension here requires that the events in question be entirely distinct and not related as parts to any superordinate viewing.

¹⁴ *Contra* Russell's notorious suggestion that one must be acquainted with all constituents of a proposition to understand it: Russell, 1912: ch. 5.

The picture of episodic memory we have ended up with from the discussion above has echoes both of Tulving's idea that we have mental time travel with episodic memory, and of Russell's talk of acquaintance with the past. In the case of factual memory, what is preserved is the past knowledge of the fact. Since no further condition for knowledge need be met, one's past knowledge of fact can also be one's current knowledge of the same fact. As we have seen, in the case of cognition of things within time, objects, and events, the assimilation of past cognition to current cognition does not necessarily hold. We may think of our memory of a place as retaining the knowledge we had of the place, but at best that is past knowledge, and by itself is not sufficient to show that we now still do know the place in question. So, when we turn to episodic memory, if we are to ask what it is that is retained in such memory, the answer would, by parity, seem to be the past apprehension of the event now recalled. One's memory of the episode is simply the retained apprehension or acquaintance with a past happening. It has an experiential component in the idea of retention of apprehension, and it has a temporal component in the suggestion that what is retained is past apprehension, not current perception.

We should not accuse either Tulving or Russell of simply coming up with some theoretical notion of experience of or acquaintance with the past which has no grounding in our ordinary thoughts about memory. If their conceptions of memory are problematic, then there may equally be something problematic about how we ordinarily think of memory. So, is there something suspicious about the idea of retention of past experience?

II

Remembering someone is not the same as now knowing him or her: one can remember those who one does not now know. Likewise, episodic memory is not now apprehension of a past episode, but rather the retention of a past apprehension of that episode. But what sense can we make of this distinction between retained past apprehension and current apprehension?

Here is an arch example illustrating the need to draw the distinction. Suppose Miriam the astronaut bids her lover a fond farewell. Since she is never to return, NASA have set up an intricate system of image intensifiers and reflectors along the path of her journey, so that at various stages she can catch a glimpse again of her lover's fond farewell, by looking in the right direction towards a mirror. We allow that we can see the sun and the stars, even though what we see on these occasions is very distant and in our past. So it is conceivable in this situation that we should count Miriam as continuing to see her lover's farewell when she looks in the right direction. NASA have offered Miriam a way of sustaining possible apprehension of that event receding into her past, but they do not thereby seem to give her a new form of recall of her lover's farewell. So, one can ask, what is the difference between sustained

apprehension, courtesy of NASA, and retained apprehension courtesy of one's powers of recall?¹⁵

Of course, Miriam's sustained powers of apprehension of her lover's farewell differ markedly in their causal ancestry from how we normally conceive of recall. The causal mechanisms which make it possible for her to catch a glimpse of fond tears again and again lie outside of her own body, and rely on the planning and design of NASA physicists. By contrast, her own powers of recall of the same event rely on mechanisms internal to her body. Some philosophers have claimed that the idea of a memory trace is in play within our conception of memory, and in that case Miriam's sustained apprehension of her lover's farewell will fail to be memory for at least that reason (C. B. Martin and Deutscher, 1966: 186–91).

Nevertheless, this does not get quite to the key problem here. The above consideration does not bear directly on the character of Miriam's state of mind. Wheeler, Stuss, and Tulving, in talking of 'mental time travel', emphasize the idea that in episodic memory one has a different kind of experience in recall from that which one has in perception of the world around one. Inasmuch as we can describe both Miriam's recall of her lover's farewell and her glimpse in the image intensifier as cases of apprehension of the same event, we play down any experiential difference between them. In both cases we simply have the apprehension of a past event. But just as retained past knowledge of an individual is not current knowledge of them, retention of past apprehension is not current apprehension either. But what can the difference amount to? If episodic memory is to be the experience of the past, and play any role in explaining our grasp of the concept of the past, as Russell claims it must, then in memory we need to have experience of past events as being past.

It is in the light of this demand that the whole conception of episodic memory as giving one some distinctive experience of the past is liable to seem incoherent. In fact, in *The Problems of Philosophy*, Russell states the essence of the problem that has been repeated again and again in discussions of this idea. At one point, Russell insists that memory and memory imagery need to be sharply distinguished:

memory of an object is apt to be accompanied by an image of the object, and yet the image cannot be what constitutes the memory. This is easily seen by merely noticing that the image is in the present, whereas what is remembered is known to be in the past. (Russell, 1912: 66)

Russell's argument here turns on a particular assumption, one which he shares with many of the parties to this debate who otherwise disagree with him. This is an assumption about the nature of imagery, sensation, or occurrent experiential aspects and what role they can play in perception, imagery, or experiential recall. In this context, the assumption is just that anything that deserves to be called

¹⁵ Given our discussion above, we have an answer concerning our talk of why we would not count this as *re*-apprehension. The glimpses in mirrors would all count as parts of the one superordinate event of seeing her lover's farewell. But that point alone would not address the challenge in the text.

imagistic in the episode of recall must simply be an aspect of the present event describable purely in terms of the present moment.

The key problem that this assumption generates here can be posed as a dilemma. If we hold on to the idea of memory as retention of what was experienced in the past, then we should be inclined to suppose that the recall is more faithful to the original event the more it matches in character the initial experience which is allegedly retained. In that case, one might suggest, the current episode of recall should be just like a case of current perception in experiential character if it is entirely faithful. This both goes against our knowledge of episodes of recall, which in general are very different in character from ordinary perception, and against the suggested role of such recall as experience of the past. This may incline one to insist that there must be some essential phenomenological distinction between episodes of recall and episodes of current apprehension. But this forces one onto the second horn of the dilemma. To the extent that one insists on there being a genuine sense of past associated with the episode of recall, then one will not locate that in what is retained from any antecedent experience, but rather in some characteristic of the current episode of recall. For when Miriam originally saw her lover's farewell, the experience then had no character of pastness associated with it: the events were all as if located in the present. Any sense of the past comes to be associated only with an episode of recall, not with the original experience recalled. Hence, on this conception, the idea of acquaintance with a past episode as being in any way explanatory of a sense of pastness drops out, and we may as well appeal to something which can perfectly well exist simply in the present. We seem to be faced with a choice: either we insist on the idea of episodic memory as retained apprehension or experience, in which case we can have no distinctive experience of the past as past; or we insist on the idea that the episodic memory has a distinctive phenomenology associated with the past, but thereby give up the idea that this has anything to do with retaining something from earlier experience.¹⁶

This, I suggest, is the central challenge to Russell's idea of memory as acquaintance with the past. Without an answer to it, we can have no way of literally spelling out the idea of episodic memory as the retention of past apprehension in the way that we might think of factual memory as the retention of past knowledge. Many philosophers have thought this simply to be a problem about Russell's own theory. But our observations in the last section suggest that this is not so. If there is a problem for Russell here, there is a problem for the common conception of episodic memory we have, at least as reflected in our ordinary talk about memory and recall. So the challenge would seem to suggest that there is something incoherent in the way we ordinarily think about episodic recall. Before we rush to such a pessimistic conclusion, we need to look more closely at the assumptions this argument turns on.

¹⁶ Cf. also Ayer's attack on the role of imagery in memory (1956: 138–42).

III

The dilemma posed above will be unanswerable as long as we are held by one particular conception of the role that imagery, sensation, or, more generally, occurrent experiential elements can play in mental episodes such as those of perception, imagery, or experiential recall. The dilemma is imposed on us, once we assume that if memory is to be the retention of earlier apprehension, then the experiential element of the episode of recall and the original perceptual experience recalled would have to be the very same. Once we grant this assumption, our options for explaining the phenomenological differences between the two kinds of episode are heavily restricted. If we conceive of the experiential element as purely sensational or qualitative, then the differences could amount to no more than differences in degree of intensity or determinacy of the qualities. On the other hand, if we conceive of the experiential element in representational terms, then the differences can amount only to how vague or replete the information contained in the one or the other episode can be. Since these are at best differences in degree and not kind, one may then be inclined to insist that any distinction in kind between episodic recall and perceptual experience would have to be drawn in terms of something extrinsic to the experiential character of the episodes; namely in the kind of functional roles that they play within the mind, or in the associations they have with particular beliefs about the present or the past.

However, we can simply resist the dilemma if we adopt a different conception of the way in which the experiential or phenomenological can be common among perception, imagery, and remembering. We should think of experience, imagery, and memory as being phenomenologically the same not in terms of literally sharing experiential properties, but in virtue of a representational or intentional connection between them—imagery is experientially the same as perception through being the representation of such a perceptually experiential event; and memory can be experientially the same as perception through being the representational recall of such an experiential encounter.

In developing this alternative conception of the link between perception and imagery it is interesting to look at a very different tradition on these matters, to be found in Sartre's development of the phenomenological tradition. Towards the end of *The Psychology of Imagination*, Sartre asserts:

Now, the hypothesis of the imaginative consciousness is radically different from the hypothesis of the consciousness of the real. This means that the type of existence of the object of the image *as long as it is imagined*, differs in nature from the type of existence of the object grasped as real. And, surely, if I now form an image of Peter, my imaginative consciousness includes a certain position of the existence of Peter, insofar as he is now at this very moment in Berlin or London. But while he *appears to me as an image*, this Peter who is in London *appears to me absent*. This absence in actuality, this essential nothingness of the imagined object is enough to distinguish it from the object of perception. (Sartre, 1991: 261)

It is clear from this that Sartre is rejecting the background assumption that we isolated above: that imagistic experience or consciousness is a neutral core common to perception and imagery. According to him we must deny that there is a form of experiential consciousness common to both perception and imagination. On the other hand, it is not entirely clear what it is that he wishes to put in its place. Sartre's talk of Peter having different types of existence is hard to make much sense of. The idea that there are different types of existence is sometimes proposed in relation to discussion of the contrast between figments of fiction and concrete objects such as tables and chairs, or between the latter and such abstract things as numbers or sets. Yet in such contexts it is difficult to make any more sense of this idea than in terms of the claim that there are just different kinds of object, all of which exist in just the same, unequivocal way. Sartre's position cannot be reformulated in these terms, though. For it is not as if Peter can be a different object from Peter. Yet according to Sartre the very same individual has a different type of existence as imagined and as perceived.

I want to develop out of Sartre's suggestion a way of making sense of this without having recourse to different types of existence. (The terms in which it will be developed, however, may well be unacceptable to followers of the phenomenological tradition in philosophy.) In this I draw on a suggestion made some time ago by John Foster (1982: 101–3), that we should see the fundamental difference between sensory experience and imagery in terms of the way one's state of mind relates one to its objects. The idea here is that although perceptual experience and imagery may coincide with respect to the objects of experience, the events or qualities which are present to the mind, they will still differ in the manner by which these objects are given or presented to the mind. In general, perceptual experience allows for the presentation of objects and qualities, where imagery allows only for the re-presentation of such things.

The key difference here can perhaps best be expounded by example. Consider a feeling of itchiness in one's left knee. This is a case which philosophers have a tendency to think of as involving *subjective* qualities. It is common to assume both that there can only be an instance of itchiness in a knee if someone feels the itch—awareness here is necessary for its object. And it is also common to suppose that feeling an itch is sufficient for there to be an itch: nothing more is demanded of the world than that one feel the itch for there to be one. Now, one can imagine 'from the inside' such a feeling of itchiness in one's left knee (i.e. one can imagine feeling an itch rather than just seeing someone else who looks like they have an itch) just as one can imagine seeing an apple. Conscious imagery has some similarities with conscious experience of the same objects or qualities. We are inclined to group together both the imagining of an itch and the feeling of an itch in talking of what they are like. But we also have reason to think that they are distinct in kind. For, while we might think that the feeling of an itch is sufficient for an instance of itchiness, we do not suppose that merely imagining an itch thereby makes it the case that there actually is an itch, however faint. So, we cannot suppose that what explains the similarity between feeling an itch

and imagining an itch involves them both having the same qualities, and at the same time suppose that those qualities are sufficient for there being an itch.

Imagining an itch consciously involves the imagined qualities of a feeling of an itch, yet does not amount to the existence of an itch. If having an experience of itchiness is sufficient for the existence of an itch, then imagining an itch does not consist in having such an experience. So we should conclude that imagining an experience is not the same as actually feeling one—there is not a common experiential core to both kinds of episode, even though there is a phenomenological similarity between them. How, then, are we to explain this similarity? Imaginings are related to experiencings through a kind of representational relation to them. We characterize imagining by the qualities of the experience imagined, but we do not suppose that those qualities, or what is dependent on them, is actually realized when we imagine. Instead we think of the imagining as a way of representing, or bringing before the mind in absence, the kind of situation that would be present in sensory experience of it. Imagining is the representing of what experience is the presenting. More exactly, it is the re-presenting of the experiential presentation of such an event. When one imagines the itch, one represents the itch as it would be felt.

The point here is not to reduce the notion of imagining a scene to a more generally understood notion of representation. Clearly there are plenty of ways in which one can represent the situation of itchiness in a knee without thereby having a state of mind with the relevant similarity to feeling the itch: in writing the last sentence, presumably I did just that. So if imagining is representing experience, it is a particular or peculiar kind of representing. Foster marks the difference by talk of 'transparent conceiving', but this is just a label for the position rather than an explanation of the difference. It is unclear how, starting from a purely general conception of representation which covers both linguistic representation and imagery, one can explain what is distinctive of imagistic representation rather than merely label the difference as Foster does.

This limitation does not undermine the central reasons for claiming that imagining is a form of representing, though. When one has a sensory experience of some state of affairs, it is for one just as if that state of affairs is present (spatially related to one's point of view). When one imagines an itch, one neither feels the itch, nor does it even seem to one as if there is an itch there. Where sensory experience is *presentational*, it is as if its object must exist and be present. Imagination is *representational* inasmuch as that it allows for objects, events or qualities to be before the mind and yet in a way which does not require them actually to be present, or to be instantiated.

In the case of subjective qualities of bodily sensation, it is easy to see that the object of imagining is something internally related, or even an aspect of, some sensory experience. But there is also good reason to extend the model to other cases of sensory imagining where the objects of experience are taken to be mind independent. Arguably, when we think of examples such as visualizing, we can only explain the similarity between visualizing and visual experience in the same

kind of terms: visualizing takes visual experience as its object. Where seeing involves the apprehension of objects in a visual manner, visualizing involves imagining so apprehending objects.

For example, when one visualizes a red light as to the left, it need not be that one visualizes it as actually to the left of where one is (that requires the projection of one's images), rather one visualizes it as to the left of the point of view within the imagined situation. We can think of the perspectival elements of the visualizing as aspects of the imagined visual experience. Were one actually visually experiencing the lights, then one would experience them as if to one's actual left or right. When one visualizes them, one need only visualize them as to the left or right in the imagined situation. Perspective in vision determines the actual orientation of objects relative to the subject, but does not do so in visualizing. We can explain this on the hypothesis that visualizing relates to visual experience as on the model suggested above for imagining and feeling an itch: we imagine visual experience in visualizing a scene. In general, then, we should think of sensory imagining along the lines proposed by both John Foster and Christopher Peacocke. One sensorily imagines things to be a certain way through imagining a conscious experience of them as being so:

(DT) When one sensorily imagines a *f*, one does so through imagining consciously experiencing a *f*.

This Berkeleian hypothesis of course prompts ready objections about imagining unseen trees, but I do not want to explore here the extent to which one must accept or deny restrictions on what one can imagine given (DT).¹⁷

We can re-construe Sartre's talk of two types of existence in terms of this contrast between different ways in which an object may be given to the mind. When Sartre can see Peter, Peter is before the mind as actually present. It seems as if one couldn't so be related to Peter and Peter not be there. When Sartre visualizes Peter, however, it does not seem to him as if Peter must actually be present. He is merely representing such a presentation of Peter's presence. There is a difference not in the way that the object of these states of minds exists, but in the way in which the agent's mind relates to the object of sensory experience or imagination. There can, then, be no such common core of imagery between experience and imagination.

The moral to emphasize at this point is just that the assumption at work in so much philosophical discussion of memory is that the phenomenological or the sensational must be a common element to experience and imagery can and should be denied. We should not accept that there is a common core of sensation which is neutral between perception and imagination or memory of such perceptual encounter. Imagination and memory relate to perception not through replicating

¹⁷ Peacocke (1985) puts forward a similar principle concerning the link between sensory imagination and experience and also discusses in detail the consequence of this kind of connection; see also Martin mss for a more extensive discussion of these issues and their consequences for the theory of perception.

the sensational or imagistic component of perception, but through being a form of representing such experiential encounter with the world. We are now in a position to resolve the problems indicated above for the idea of memory as direct acquaintance with the past.

IV

As Russell noted, it is common to think of some episodes of recall as involving imagery. Russell offers an argument to think that any such imagery must accompany and not constitute remembering. Now, in rejecting the idea that there is a simple common core to imagery and perception we are already in a position to reject one aspect of the dilemma about memory as a copy of past perception. It is possible, on the view of imagery sketched above, for perception and imagery to relate one to the very same objects and qualities, and so to that extent share a content, but yet be phenomenologically distinct. So there is no immediate route to the conclusion that, where recall is a faithful copy or retention of what was experienced, it must also be a case of perceptual experience.

If we apply this to the example of Miriam the astronaut, we can explain the essential phenomenological difference between her recall and re-encounters so. When she looks through the image intensifiers she is presented (again) with the same farewell: each glance at the screen is a re-encounter with the same event.¹⁸ In contrast, when Miriam recalls the event as a fond farewell, her episode of recall is a representing of a past experience of the farewell, not an occurrent presenting of the episode. The two coincide in object, the event of departure, but they relate to it in different ways. It is this difference in the manner in which something is present to the mind that accounts for the intrinsic difference in consciousness.

But if the account so far enables us to explain how there can be a fundamental phenomenological difference between imagery and perception, and consequently episodic recall and perception, does it do so through assimilating episodic recall to imagery? Should we think of experiential episodes of recall as simply examples of imagery put to use in recalling the past, or should we think instead of there being some intrinsic phenomenological difference between mere imagery and genuine recall of the past?

In fact, we will not get a proper view of the way in which we can think of episodic recall as retaining something from earlier perception until we recognize the ways in which recall can be different from pure imagery, a way which exploits Russell's idea of acquaintance with the past. For there is something that both sensory perception and episodic recall share which is lacked by pure imagery. As a first stab at this, we might put the difference as follows. In both perception and

¹⁸ More strictly, each glance at the mirror is a further part of her encounter with the event, given the points noted in n. 13 above, that we treat different encounters with the same event as parts of our overall apprehension of it and not just different encounters with the same entity.

in memory we are related to aspects of reality or actuality: matters as they are now present to the mind, or as they once were present to the mind. In pure imagination, on the other hand, we are related to things only as they are conceivably, or can possibly be, not as they really are. If there is an intrinsic difference between experiential recall and mere imagery, then it must lie in the way in which the former relates us to actuality and the latter to mere possibility.

Put in these terms it is difficult to see how any difference between the actual and the possible could be a phenomenological difference within conscious experience itself. Surely our experience of the world can only be of the actual not the possible. Experience can only tell us how things actually are, not how they must be. So, in what way can our experience reveal to us that something is merely possible? The answer to this problem is to consider the different ways in which experiential states of mind can be particular or specific in their content; that is to say, the ways in which they can present to us particular objects or specific events.

When I see or taste an apple, there is a particular object, and indeed a specific event involving that object, which I come to perceive. Two episodes of seeing might present objects indistinguishable in their qualities, in the same relative locations to the viewer, and yet be experiences of different objects and different events. When we turn to imagery, however, the particularity and specificity drops away. If asked to visualize a green apple, you may well succeed in bringing to mind an image of an apple. But, in many contexts, it is simply inappropriate to press the question which apple you have imagined. In visualizing an apple, there need be no particular apple which is imagined.

This is not to say that particularity cannot be injected into our imagery. One can, if one wants, imagine the very green apple now nestling in A. A. Gill's pocket. For we can use imagery for particular imaginative projects, for particular tasks; and in such cases it is entirely appropriate to take the imagery to be the imagining of the particular objects or events that one sets out to have in mind. The important point, however, is the account that we can give of the ways in which imagery can be particular. Whether I recognize it or not, my current visual perception of an apple is a perception of a particular apple; the perception is veridical or misleading to the extent that that apple is as it looks to me to be. As one might say, the actual context of perception is such that it is sufficient to fix the particular objects and specific events that the perception concerns. On the other hand, with imagery there is no sense to the answer of what an image is an image, independent of the purposes to which the image is put in imagining a scene. Here the subject's intentions in so imagining determine the particularity of the imagined scene, and the imagery carries no intrinsic particularity or specificity of its own.¹⁹ There is no room, then, for the agent to be corrected with respect to which object is being imagined. All that can determine what is being

¹⁹ cf. here Ishiguro, 1966, Wittgenstein 1980: §115, Peacocke, 1985: 26-7, and Budd, 1989: 114-15.

imagined is what he or she intends to imagine. If he or she knows what is intended, then he or she also knows what is imagined.

We might, with some caution, appeal to an analogy with painting: a naturalistic depiction of a scene need not be a picture of one scene rather than another. It could be the depiction of a purely imaginary scene, and what would make it the depiction of one landscape or another would rather be how, as we might say, the picture has been labelled, to be used as the portrait of one scene rather than an identical one. Likewise, I suggest, what is the essence here of the purely imagined scene is simply that there is no specific scene that has been imagined: different actual scenes could equally well play the role of the event perceived were this not an imagined perceptual encounter but an actual one (cf. Goodman, 1969; Wollheim, 1980: ss. 11–13).

So the conjecture for the case of episodic recall is simply that any experiential aspect to it, in contrast to pure imagery, is particular or specific in character. In this way episodic recall would be analogous to perceptual experience, and would contrast with imagery. When one in fact recalls someone's throwing a ball at one, then one is recalling some specific episode of having a ball thrown at one, given that one's recall is genuine, and the ball which is represented before the mind is whichever ball it was that was then thrown. Memory imagery has a specific or particular content intrinsic to it, regardless of any construal one is inclined to place on it: one correctly recognizes what one recalls where one realizes that it is indeed that particular event which is now again before the mind.

Indeed, we should draw out one further aspect of this. We started with the idea that episodic recall should be the retained apprehension of a past event. We raised the question how this could differ from current apprehension of that event, the answer was that in recall one represents the original encounter, rather than having the experience over again. Now we can ask: In what sense is this present imagistic representation the retention of what was there before? Here the answer comes from seeing the way in which such recall can be particular or specific in content: one's current episode of recall comes to be an awareness of the past event, which was once apprehended, through being the retention of that very apprehension. The particularity of memory experience is a derived particularity, arising from the retention of the cognitive aspects of the initial experience.²⁰

This offers a further response to Russell's observation that any imagery involved in recall must be wholly in the present and hence distinct from any acquaintance with the past. In connection with the first point, one might reason that, since the episode of recall occurs at a later time than the original episode recalled, then that very episode of recalling could have occurred whether the antecedent experience occurred or not. So any experiential or imagistic aspect of that episode of recall would be entirely independent of whether there actually was

²⁰ That there is such a derivational link between memory and experience is suggested in Evans, 1982: chs. 5 and 7; and Campbell, 1994: ch. 7. Neither, however, indicates how such a connection may be reflected in the phenomenological differences between the two.

an earlier sensory experience being recalled. This supports the thought that there can be nothing about the imagistic element of an episode of recall which is essentially linked to the past. If this conclusion is right, then although the Previous Awareness Condition can be applied to determine whether an episode apparently of recall is indeed a genuine case of memory, the applicability of the condition does not indicate anything distinctive about the phenomenology or experiential aspect of recall, since anything phenomenological could be present whether one is recalling or not.

The picture of memory developed here gives a rather different perspective on matters. For we have claimed that what is distinctive of experiential memory, in contrast to imagery, is that it has an intrinsic particularity of content inherited from earlier sensory experience, and it is this which is lacking in pure imagery. This fits with a picture of experiential content where intrinsic particularity originates in an original experiential episode. And this means that in any case where one has an apparent memory with no antecedent experience, then it will lack any intrinsic particularity. If pure imagery lacks an appropriate context to provide it with an intrinsic content, then the same will be true of mere apparent memories. Unlike pure imagery, though, a properly misleading false memory might seem to link one back to some past event. It is this purported link to a particular episode which marks the phenomenological differences between mere imagery and apparent recall.

Given this, we should deny that our episodic recall is such that it could have occurred whether we are genuinely remembering or not. For if it is intrinsic to my current episode of recall that I apprehend some particular event, then I could not have been just like this in a case of mere apparent memory.²¹ This gives a sense in which even though episodes of recall happen at one time, they can intrinsically link one to another: for on this view, one could not have been in the state that one now is in without the antecedent event which one now recalls.²² At least one aspect of how the world is now depends non-causally on how it was before.

²¹ P. F. Snowdon (1990), who endorses the increasingly popular disjunctive approach to perception, questions whether there can be such grounds in the case of memory. If we think that being intrinsically of a particular episode is essential to a mental event, then the discussion in the text gives us a reason to endorse disjunctivism about memory episodes. On the other hand, one might here wish to follow Burge's account (1996b) of singular reference for perceptual states, and thereby resist disjunctivism, while admitting that imagery *per se* is not the common element.

²² Does this commit us to claiming that there is no distinction to be drawn between an apparent memory of past perception and a genuine memory which traces back to a mere hallucination? In neither case will there be an original perception which links to a specific event involving particular objects, so the episode of recall, apparent or actual, will lack genuine specificity. Despite this, we are still in a position to contrast the two situations: with a genuine memory of a mere hallucination there is no external event which one can recall; but one does recall a genuine event of merely hallucinating an external event, and that fixes the memory as linked to a genuine past episode in the way that no mere apparent memory could be.

A similar point holds for the recalling of past imagining. Clearly in this case there is a specific event to be recalled, one's imagining, but the image recalled will not itself have any intrinsic particularity. This indicates a further difference between imagery and experiential recall which flows from positing the intrinsic particularity of the latter. Arguably the imagery involved in imagining *j*-ing and imagining imagining *j*-ing is the same: after all one way of representing representing is just to instantiate it.

This discussion puts into place all the elements needed to rebut the charge of incoherence. When one recalls an episode, on the current account, one recalls the original episode of apprehension. That episode has as its object events which one perceived, or of which one was an agent. At the time that they are objects of apprehension, one is then in a position to attend to and respond to the various elements given to the mind. In recalling such an episode, the objects of that episode are recalled as the objects apprehended at that earlier time. Although an episode of recall has as its object the initial experience which was the apprehending of the event, it has thereby as a proper part of its content what was then apprehended. To that extent, one need not deny that in principle episodic recall and original sensory experience could coincide entirely in content. Of course, there are plenty of reasons to deny that such coincidence would in fact ever occur—recalling both tends to be more indeterminate than perception, and to involve elements through the process of retrieval that were no part of the original event. The point here is just to stress that we need not rely on an appeal to these differences in explaining how there can be a difference in kind between the phenomenology of episodic recall and sensory experience.

In the initial statement of the puzzle, the mere possibility that recall and experience might coincide in content raised the worry that the phenomenology of recall might then have to be identical with that of sensory experience. This would seem to rule out the claim that there could be any distinctive phenomenology of the past associated with episodic recall. The comparison with imagery shows that that is not so. In perceptual experience, one is presented with its object as present to one, in some relation to one's actual point of view. In episodic recall, although one is related to the same objects and qualities, one is not presented with them, rather one represents them, or rather recalls them as once presented to one's point of view. This phenomenological contrast, between objects as present in current sensory experience and as represented in recall, gives us a cognitive link to the past. In retaining the particularity of an earlier encounter, we retain a current cognitive link to a past encounter.

In the first section of this chapter I argued that we can find embedded in our ordinary talk of episodic memory something which echoes both Russell's idea that we have a distinctive experience of the past and Wheeler, Stuss, and Tulving's talk of mental time travel. Philosophers have been quick to dismiss such talk as fanciful and ultimately incoherent. I have suggested that we can trace this resistance to a very narrow conception of how distinct phenomenological

So the contrast between these two imaginative projects is one at the level of the use or context to which the imagery is put. The same cannot be true of recall experience, though, since it has a particular content. So there is a difference in content between recalling *j*-ing and recalling recalling *j*-ing and so on.

On many theories of episodic memory, the retention of a memory requires that it be rehearsed and re-encoded. Someone who was utterly indifferent to what they recalled, such that there was no emotional difference for them from different rehearsals, could be in otherwise indistinguishable states which would be on the one hand recallings of recallings (of recallings) or simply some lower level of recalling.

states can be related and share a content. Once we embrace a conception of imagery as representational of sensory experience, then we can see distinctively memory imagery as that which represents particular encounters in sensory experience from the past. The distinctive phenomenology of our past experience is, then, the re-presentation of particular episodes in contrast, on the one hand, to the presentation of particular episodes in perception, and, on the other, to the non-particular representation of experienced episodes in sensory imagination.

V

Let us look back at the ideas from which we started and how the highly abstract philosophical account I have been spinning fits with a psychological theory of the structure of long-term memory. At various times in the development of his theory of episodic memory, Tulving has stressed different aspects of episodic memory, and one could think that the different theses could be developed by competing theories which took on board one rather than another of these claims. In the light of the above discussion, I suggest we can see how each of these different approaches illuminates a different aspect of the same phenomenon: all of them are needed in order to explain the sense in which we can have something like experiential memory.

In his earliest formulations (1972), Tulving stressed the idea of episodic memory as memory of events, of specific episodes in an individual's life. We can see the point of this within the terms of our account in two ways. First, if we think of instances of episodic recall as distinctively phenomenological occurrences, rather than simply whatever prompts a judgement in answer to a task, then specificity of what is recalled is essential in marking the contrast between memory and mere imagination. At the same time, I have claimed that we should think of experiential recall as the recalling, and hence representing, of a prior, specific experience. In later formulations, Tulving stresses the distinctive way in which episodic memory is connected to self consciousness. This, too, is reflected in the conception of memory offered here. To comprehend what one is doing when one recalls, one must recognize that one is not having the experience in question but merely recalling it. Hence the metarepresentational aspects of 'auto-noetic consciousness', as Tulving calls it, will be essential to understanding what remembering is, and how one can be justified in making past-tensed judgements on the basis of such recall.²³ Finally, if we go back to the quotations with which we started, we can see the appeal of thinking of recall as a form of time travel: what one does in recalling some event is re-present the events that once one apprehended. One has here an immediate sense of the contrast between that which once was present and

²³ At the same time, however, the view leaves open the exact relation that must be claimed between self-consciousness and the ability to recall episodically. On metarepresentational accounts of episodic recall it has been claimed that a necessary condition of such recall is that one be able to represent one's own states of mind, cf. e.g. Perner and Ruffman, 1995 and Owens, 1996.

is no more, and the present as actually experienced rather than represented as being experienced.

Discussion of the idea of a subjective feeling or quale of the past to be associated with memory has aroused much controversy recently. In part, theoretical opposition to it rests on the thought that our ability to make judgements about the past is a complex one, which could hardly be thought to be grounded in the presence or absence of a simple feeling of pastness. Our current picture indicates a way of respecting that thought while still holding on to the idea that there is an experiential element to our grasp of the concept of the past. For, on this account, consciousness of the past involves two things: (i) the representation in recall of apprehension rather than the occurrence of apprehension itself; (ii) representation which links one to an actual episode apprehended, rather than merely to a type of episode. We can then think of the plight of the infant in coming to have a full grasp of the notion of the past, one which is applicable directly to its experiential memories, as taking the following form. The infant needs to make sense of how there can be specific, and hence actual, events of which it has knowledge or conscious awareness, but which are nevertheless not part of the present scene. We can point to two things which might help it in this predicament: first a grasp of a concept of time as a causal structure in which earlier events cause later ones; secondly, an understanding of itself as located within that causal structure, such that recalled experiences have to possess a causal location prior to that of the present episode of recall. Past events are no less actual than current ones, but they are located in a different part of the structure that is time. The infant can have access to those different parts of time through the causal traces that the past events leave on it in memory.

The exact story here clearly needs more development and justification, but the idea that some such story needs to be told and can be told offers a response to the debate about qualia of pastness. We can deny that claiming that there is an experiential marker for the past or present means that one has to oppose the idea that coming to have a concept of the past is coming to have a theoretical understanding of time. We can see how the two claims are, instead, complementary. In this picture, there is a phenomenological difference between the experience of episodic recall and sensory experience, and a difference between both of these and mere sensory imagination. The difference is not one of the presence or absence of some simple quality, but rather a structural difference. And it is in this way that the need for sophistication in acquiring a concept of the past and of remembering it can mesh with the intuition that there is something phenomenologically distinctive in recalling past events. The phenomenological markers of past and present require that one come to have a theoretical grasp of time in order that such experience can appropriately ground tensed judgements.

Note that on this view the direction of time is not explicitly marked in consciousness: the past is given as not present but actual; on some views of the metaphysics of time, one might think of both the past and the future as equally actual. So, an objector might point out, there would be nothing to distinguish

experiential representings of future apprehensions of particular events from my account of cases of recall. This is indeed a consequence of the view, but the objection raises no worry of substance. I take it that it is a deep fact about the world and us, that we can only be appropriately related to our past experiences and not to our future ones.²⁴ So we could not be creatures who had specific represented contact with future experiences. If indeed it is a metaphysical possibility that there could be creatures with such precognition of their own future perceptions, then on the account offered here, they could not have a conception of the past which is quite the same as ours. For we can immediately determine that anything we recall is in our past, and that where an event is recognized as past, that we must be recalling it; but such creatures would not be able to make such inferences. For remote contact with a specific event would for them, *ex hypothesi*, as easily relate them to the future as the past. I see no reason to think that our experience of the direction of time's arrow should require some feature which would be in common between us and these creatures. So the mere imaginability of their possibility does not give us reason to think that there is anything more to experience of the passage of time than I have indicated.

VI

How then, does this all relate to the challenge from Constructivism and the case of John Dean? Dean's example makes vivid something that we all already are well aware of: that in many of our memories, often our most treasured ones, there are fabrications. What seems to be recall of an episode may instead derive from earlier tales about it. To some extent, the idea that there are mechanisms involved in constructing narratives of our past exploits in the maintenance of long-term memory should not by itself threaten the idea that episodic recall which results is still retained acquaintance with the initial events. In the case of perception we are well aware that there are neurophysiological and psychological mechanisms which underpin our awareness of the world around us; we should not endorse any conception of acquaintance inconsistent with this. So, too, we can think of many of the mechanisms of memory as simply underpinning or supporting the preservative function of remembering.

But our recognition of what happens in Dean's case, and our sense of unreliability in many of our treasured memories, reflects something more than just that. It is difficult to read Neisser's description without feeling that Dean is in part responsible for the rewriting of his past encounters into memories congenial to

²⁴ One might suggest, though, that there is a sub-class of future events which we can be cognitively related to as particulars: namely those we intend. In making a decision, we might suggest I move from treating a future event as merely possible to definitely actual. To the extent that my will is indeed effective, my decision may give me knowledge of the future as memory can of the past. This does not affect the point in this chapter: it rather shows a way in which a different causal link might underpin awareness of specific episodes from that evident in perception and memory.

his self-conception. In a more pedestrian way, the same thought is reflected in the idea that in many episodic memories we 'see' ourselves in the scene, and often we cannot distinguish elements of the scene as then apprehended from the commentary or gloss on it we later are inclined to add. It is already part of our general conception of episodic memory that we ourselves have a hand in shaping it, and not merely that there may be unconscious psychological mechanisms involved in laying down memory traces and preserving them.²⁵

Yet the thought that at the very least the ideal or central conception of what episodic memory is for us is a kind of direct contact with the past is still consistent with the idea that there is much fabrication in recall. This idea is what a purely Constructivist model of memory would enjoin us to give up. Of course, such a model may be concerned with keeping track of the sources of information—for it is important that one's information about events in the past should be reliable—but that concern will affect equally autobiographical and non-autobiographical memory. Such source monitoring notwithstanding, the main constraints on developing a self-narrative need have nothing to do with special access to past events in one's life. While examples such as Dean's memory provide support for the role of fabrication in memory of the past, they do not definitely show that a Constructivist view must be right. To settle the matter between a view which holds on to the idea of episodic memory as contact with the past and a view which just stresses the role of construction of self-narrative, we will need to look elsewhere.

For all that has been said here, a Constructivist model might turn out to be the best description of the mechanisms of episodic memory. The aim here has been just to spell out a coherent picture of what it is that matters for us in our recall of the past, and what would be lost if episodic memory had no special status in an account of our epistemic links with the past. If we can think of at least some of the mechanisms of memory not as purely fabricating stories drawn upon in recall, but rather as being means of retaining the kind of acquaintance we once had with events, then we can better understand the craving for such genuine episodes of contact with the past. The manifest fact that so much of our memories retain an emotional role for us while lacking that stamp of authenticity may reflect no more than that the picture of experiential memory sketched here is an ideal to which we can only sometimes conform, but which nevertheless informs centrally one aspect of why we value episodic memories in the way that we do.

This paper is based on talks to the HRB project on Consciousness and Self Consciousness; University of Hatfield; Scottish Graduate Conference at the University of Edinburgh; and a seminar in UCL. I am grateful to audiences there, and for discussion of these issues to John Campbell, Tim Crane, Jérôme Dokic, Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack, Tony Marcel, David

²⁵ For further discussion of the role of reconstruction in episodic recall among normals in comparison with confabulators see Burgess and Shallice, 1996.

Owens, Christopher Peacocke, Gabriel Segal, Paul Snowdon, and Timothy Williamson.

M.G.F.M.

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Attributing Episodic Memory to Animals and Children

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The term 'episodic memory' was first introduced in the psychological literature by Tulving (1972), and has persisted despite some subsequent difficulties in defining and measuring this type of memory. It is a term that many psychologists have been reluctant to abandon, perhaps because it captures an important aspect of our common-sense understanding of memory (see Martin, Ch. 10, this volume). In this chapter, episodic memory is considered in the light of different ways in which a connection can be made between the central themes of this book (time and memory). These considerations have implications for whether or not we wish to attribute episodic memory to animals and to children.

The attribution of episodic memory to animals or very young children is controversial. On the one hand, claims that some animals may have episodic memory, or at least 'episodic-like' memory, have received much attention recently. Most notably, Clayton and Dickinson have argued that their studies of memory in jays amounts to 'the first conclusive behavioral evidence of episodic-like memory in animals other than humans' (1998: 274). On the other hand, in the child development literature there have been recent attempts to link the emergence of episodic memory with 'theory of mind' understanding which is generally assumed to appear relatively late in development (Perner, 1991, 2000 and forthcoming; Perner and Ruffman, 1995; see also Dokic, Ch. 8, this volume).

Of course, how one interprets these claims hinges on the description one gives of what it is to remember episodically. A common description of episodic memory is that it involves recollecting a specific event from one's past. Episodic memory is contrasted with various other types of memory, and I mention just three of these contrasts here. First, episodic memory can be distinguished from factual or semantic memory. For example, although one may have acquired knowledge of a certain fact as a result of a specific learning event, remembering that fact need not involve recalling that event. Secondly, episodic memory can also be contrasted with generic memories about events. Episodic memories are always memories for specific events, whereas one may have more generalized memories about recurring events, such as remembering what one used to do at Sunday lunchtimes when one lived in London, or remembering the sequence of events that usually occur at staff meetings (of course, it is possible to view generic event memory as a type of factual memory). Thirdly, episodic memory is also sometimes contrasted with the familiarity-based responding involved in