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On the Mind Dependence of Truth

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Abstract

The claim that truth is mind dependent has some initial plausibility only if truth bearers are taken to be mind dependent entities such as beliefs or statements. Even on that assumption, however, the claim is not uncontroversial. If it is spelled out as the thesis that “in a world devoid of mind nothing would be true”, then everything depends on how the phrase ‘true in world w’ is interpreted. If ‘A is true in w’ is interpreted as ‘A is true of w’ (i.e. ‘w satisfies A’s truth conditions’, the claim need not be true. If on the other hand it is interpreted as ‘A is true of w and exists in w’ then the claim is trivially true, though devoid of any antirealistic efficacy. Philosophers like Heidegger and Rorty, who hold that truth is mind dependent but reality is not, must regard such principles as “A if and only if it is true that A” as only contingently true, which may be a good reason to reject the mind dependence of truth anyway.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Torino, Via S.Ottavio 20, 10123, Torino, Italy

    Diego Marconi

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  1. Diego Marconi
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Correspondence to Diego Marconi.

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Marconi, D. On the Mind Dependence of Truth. Erkenntnis 65, 301–318 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-0002-2

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