The Davidson–Quine Dispute on Meaning and Knowledge: A Concise Guide
DOI: https://doi.org/10.46938/tv.2007.426
Abstract
The paper addresses the debate between Donald Davidson and W. V. O. Quine on the nature of meanings and knowledge. It is argued that Davidson’s misgivings, though interesting, are not devastating for Quine’s version of empiricism, which is not easily translateble into traditional philosophical categories.
Keywords
Quine, Davidson, epistemology
Full Text:
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TEORIE VĚDY / THEORY OF SCIENCE – journal for interdisciplinary studies of science is published twice a year by the Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences (Centre for Science, Technology, and Society Studies). ISSN 1210-0250 (Print) ISSN 1804-6347 (Online) MK ČR E 18677 web: http://teorievedy.flu.cas.cz /// email: teorievedy@flu.cas.cz