

The Transparency of Experience

M.G.F. Martin

Abstract: A common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I argue that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sense-datum theories. In the first part of the paper I explore the form of explanation that an intentional theory of perception can offer of this fact, and I contrast this with an alternative picture labelled naïve realism which can also accommodate and explain the fact of transparency. In the second part of the paper I explore the connection between sensory experience and sensory imagining, arguing that various features of sensory imagining support the hypothesis that in visualising a tree one imagines seeing a tree. In the final part of the paper I argue that the conclusion concerning sensory imagination presents an explanatory challenge for intentional theories of perception which parallels the challenge to sense-datum theories.

How can there be debate about perceptual appearances, about how things seem to one? It is common to think that how things appear to one is something obvious to oneself—or at least that it should be obvious if one is suitably attentive to the question. So, one might ask, how can there be sustained debate about what is obvious? Where there is dispute, one should expect that the issue can be settled immediately by reflection on an appropriate example, or that at least one party to the debate is confused, or that the disputants are talking past each other about different experiences.

Nevertheless, there is a long history of sustained disagreement about the nature of appearances. For there are many diverse theories of sense perception which seem to be opposed to each other: some are concerned to show a role for subjective entities or qualities in states of awareness; others are insistent

This material has been presented in various forms to seminars in York, Lampeter, University College London, Canterbury, Sheffield, Glasgow, St. Andrew's, Oxford, Cambridge New York, and Nottingham. I am grateful for comments to the audiences on all of these occasions; to Ned Block, Paul Boghossian, Naomi Eilan, Keith Hossack, Jennifer Hornsby, Paul Noordhof, Mark Sainsbury, Scott Sturgeon and Jerry Valberg for extended discussion of these matters; to Tamar Gendler-Szabo, Owen Jones, Alan Millar, David Owens, Tom Pink, Paul Snowdon, Charles Travis, Alan Weir and Tim Williamson for responses and written comments and discussion on multiple drafts. I am grateful to the British Academy for research leave award during which the research for this paper was carried out.

Address for correspondence: Department of Philosophy, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK.

Email: michael.martin@ulc.ac.uk

that intentional content or concepts must play a role in experience. And these theories are either in part theories of perceptual appearances, or at the very least what they are committed to has consequences for what we should say about what experience is like. For some, it is absolutely evident that we are given something ineffable in experience, beyond words and concepts. For others, it is equally clear that our experience of the world must be representational in character, for it is evident that a mind-independent world is present to us. In each case, the status of these claims as obvious is taken to rest in introspective reflection. Although it is puzzling how there can be any debate about appearances, such debate clearly does exist.

To make sense of this puzzle one needs to look in some detail at the kinds of appeal that philosophers have made to appearances and the introspection of it in defending their view of perception and in attacking the views of others. For in general there has been a tendency to mark two opposing poles within the debate, with some views occupying the extremes, others falling in between. On one extreme is the view that experience is entirely subjective in character, that it involves awareness of certain non-physical or mind-dependent entities, sense-data which are not to be identified with objects in the world around us, or the awareness of certain subjective qualities, qualia or sensational properties.¹ Such experience is not of a mind-independent world and is not representational in character. At the other end of the pole is the view that our experience is the presentation of a mind-independent world and of nothing else, and that it can be so only in virtue of our experience being representational or intentional in character. On this view to experience the world as a certain way is, as with belief or judgement, to take it, or represent it, to be that way.²

In recent discussions it has become common to reject the first extreme, as reflected in pure sense-datum theories of perception, and claim instead that one's experience is of a mind-independent world, and that in order for it to be so, one's experience must be representational. This leads some to endorse the view that experience has both representational aspects and non-representational subjective aspects, and for others to embrace purely representational views. It has been a common assumption that the options are exhausted by non-representational and subjective properties on the one hand, or representational properties, representing a mind-independent world on the other.

¹ For example, see Russell, 1912 Ch. 1; Moore, 1959; Moore, 1957; Broad, 1923 Chs. VII, VIII; Broad, 1925 Ch. IV; Broad, 1956; Ayer, 1940 Chs. 1–2; Ayer, 1973 Ch. V; Price, 1932; Price, 1940. For more recent versions of sense-datum theories see, Jackson, 1977; O'Shaughnessy, 1980 Vol. 1, Ch. 5; O'Shaughnessy, 1985; Perkins, 1983; Foster, 1986; Robinson, 1994; and Maund, 1995. For views which appeal solely to qualia see, Lewis, 1929 and in addition Tye, 1984.

² For example of *pure intentionalist* accounts of sensory experience see Harman, 1990; Tye, 1992; Dretske, 1995; Tye, 1995.

In this paper I want to question whether these really do exhaust the options. I shall suggest instead that there are reasons to think that one's experience relates one to the mind-independent world, and yet does so in a non-representational manner. These reasons come from reflection on appearances—that is, on what our sensory experiences are like—and how these relate to sensory imagination.

I shall approach these matters through exploring one particular dispute about perception which focuses on the claims philosophers make about appearances, what we might call the argument from phenomenal transparency. At heart, the concern is that introspection of one's perceptual experience reveals only the mind-independent objects, qualities and relations that one learns about through perception. The claim is that one's experience is, so to speak, diaphanous or transparent to the objects of perception, at least as revealed to introspection.³ This observation is used in support of intentional views of perception, which ascribe to it representational properties and against purely sense-datum views of experience, which would take it to be purely subjective.

The argument offers both reasons for rejecting sense-data and reasons for endorsing an intentional approach. The diaphanous character of experience would seem to indicate a lack of evidence for the existence of sense-data at a point where one would expect to find it. At the same time, introspection seems to reveal aspects of experience which a sense-datum account is ill-equipped to explain, but which can be explained in the terms of an intentional theory.

So we have here a dispute which turns precisely on what one might otherwise have thought should have been obvious to us: the introspectively available character of experience. One might have thought that proponents of a sense-datum view would have been as likely to attend to their own experience of the world as their critics now are. So, at first blush, it looks as if either sense-datum theorists have simply been confused, or that their critics are confused, or that the inner lives of philosophers are far more varied than we had prior reason to suspect.

In fact, the central proponents of sense-datum accounts were well aware of this kind of phenomenological observation. What they resisted was the need to draw the kind of conclusion that their critics do. Typically, such a theorist would seek to make a distinction between our initial naïve response to introspection of experience, and our corrected judgement when we think about

³ See Harman, 1990; Tye, 1992 and McCulloch, 1993 and for discussion of the objection, Shoemaker, 1996, lecture 3. Talk of the diaphanous nature or transparent nature of experience traces back to Moore's infamous attack on idealism (Moore, 1922), but it is not clear that its current usage really matches what Moore had in mind (after all, Moore himself endorsed a form of the sense-datum theory of perception). It is much closer to Grice's discussion of intrinsic qualities of experience, see Grice, 1962.

how experience must really be.⁴ For example, one common response to these concerns has been to distinguish the sensory core of experience from the interpretation of that core. The sense-datum theorist may claim that in pressing the phenomenal transparency objection, we are mistaking a report of experience as interpreted with a report of the uninterpreted sensory core of experience.

This suggests that there is, after all, some room for debate about the nature of appearances: perhaps there can be different interpretations or explanations of even the most superficial phenomena that we report on in making introspective judgements. However, one might feel that this response to the transparency objection requires us to mark a distinction between how appearances really are, and how at first they seem to us to be. One might reasonably think that this distinction is of dubious standing.

In that case, one might better represent the force of the phenomenal transparency objection against sense-data thus: given our initial reports of experience, a sense-datum account of perception could only be correct if those initial impressions were incorrect, or at best seriously misleading. But surely it is preferable, if possible, to endorse a theory of perception which better fits the introspective data than this. The intentional theory might be taken to preserve as literally true the kind of introspective observations that the transparency objection rests on—if one's experience represents the presence of a bush, then that may explain why introspection of one's experience reveals the bush to one.⁵ So, one is offered a choice: stick with a sense-datum view of experience and reject the deliverances of introspection, or take appearances at face value and endorse an intentional account of perception.

But these two poles do not exhaust the options. Even if we reject a pure sense-datum approach to perception, we can find an alternative conception of perceptual experience to the intentionalist, associated with so-called 'disjunctive'

⁴ The need to contrast what our vulgar first thoughts about the senses are and what sophisticated theory must say about them is bruited in Hume's discussion of scepticism with regard to the senses, in particular, Hume, 1758; 1975 Sec. XII. Hume's claims that there is actually a mistake in common sense concerning the nature of perception, in this he has been followed by only a few other philosophers, see for example, Prichard, 1950 and Broad, 1956.

The introduction of a contrast between the genuinely sensory core of experience and its cognitive interpretation has been more popular. See, for example, Broad's distinction between the sensory given and perceptual acceptance (Price, 1932 Ch. 6); and more generally Firth's discussion of the differences between sense-datum and percept theories (Firth, 1965). For a very sophisticated development of this line of thought see O'Shaughnessy, 1985.

⁵ Both Harman and Tye advocate forms of intentional theory in the works cited in the first footnote; for other versions of the approach see Dretske, 1981 Ch. 6 cf. the more recent, Dretske, 1995; Searle, 1983 Ch. 2; Peacocke, 1990; Peacocke, 1992 Ch. 3; Burge, 1986; Burge, 1993. Anscombe proposed the intentionality of perceptual phenomena in Anscombe, 1962 and one can see an early variant of intentional theories of perception in the belief-analyses of perception proposed by Armstrong (Armstrong, 1968 Ch. 10); and Pitcher (Pitcher, 1971).

theories of perception.⁶ Furthermore, the disjunctivist can mount a challenge to the intentional approach which parallels the transparency objection to sense-data. Reflection on the similarities and differences between perceptual experience and sensory imagination—for example vision and visualising—gives us reason to endorse the non-representational conception of experience associated with these disjunctive theories of perception. Just as an intentional theorist may use the initial phenomenal transparency argument against a sense-datum theory, the disjunctivist can use an analogous argument turning on the introspectible character of visualising against the intentional theory.

In the first part of the paper, I spell out in more detail the transparency objection and the means by which an intentional theory may seek to explain the phenomena in question. In the second part, I introduce the disjunctivist alternative, and sketch its contrasting approach to the nature of transparency and immediacy of perceptual experience. The third part turns to the issue of the relation between sensory imagination and experience, and there I argue that for a wide of range of cases we sensorily imagine an object through imagining an experience of it. This provides us with materials in the next part to apply a form of the transparency objection relating to sensory imagination to the intentional approach of perception. In conclusion I sketch out the different forms of error-theory of perception that result.

1. The Transparency Objection

When I stare at the straggling lavender bush at the end of my street, I can attend to the variegated colours and shapes of leaves and branches, and over time I may notice how they alter with the seasons. But I can also reflect on what it is like for me now to be staring at the bush, and in doing so I can reflect on particular aspects of the visual situation: for example that at this distance of fifty metres the bush appears more flattened than the rose bush which forms the boundary of my house with the street. When my attention is directed out at the world, the lavender bush and its features occupy centre stage. It is also notable that when my attention is turned inwards instead to my experience, the bush is not replaced by some other entity belonging to the inner realm of the mind in contrast to the dilapidated street in which I live. I attend to what it is like for me to inspect the lavender bush through perceptually attending to the bush itself while at the same time reflecting on

⁶ Disjunctivism is particularly associated with the work of John McDowell. See McDowell, 1982 but see also his, McDowell, 1986, 1994 and 1995. McDowell's account has recently been endorsed by Putnam in his Dewey Lectures (Putnam, 1994). There are different varieties of disjunctive approach to perception, see also Hinton, 1973; Snowdon, 1980–81; and Snowdon, 1990. Whether such views should be construed as peculiarly disjunctive in form, or rather better construed as non-conjunctive is an issue raised by Williamson, 1995.

what I am doing. So it does not seem to me as if there is any object apart from the bush for me to be attending to or reflecting on while doing this.⁷

It is observations of this form which have prompted an argument against sense-datum theories based on the transparency of experience, and which has been used as evidence in favour of intentional approaches to perception. Consider, first this passage from Michael Tye in a discussion of an argument for the existence of visual qualia:

Standing on the beach in Santa Barbara a couple of summers ago on a bright, sunny day, I found myself transfixed by the intense blue of the Pacific Ocean. Was I not here delighting in the phenomenal aspects of my visual experience? And if I was, doesn't this show that there are visual qualia?

I am not convinced . . . I experienced blue as a property of the ocean not as a property of my experience. My experience itself certainly wasn't blue. Rather it was an experience that represented the ocean as blue. What I was really delighting in, then, were specific aspects of the content of my experience. It was the content, not anything else, that was immediately accessible to my consciousness and that had aspects that were so pleasing . . . (Tye, 1992, p. 160).

Just as no non-physical sense-data replaced the lavender bush for me, as I directed my attention inwards to my own state of mind, so nothing replaced the Pacific Ocean and its colour for Tye when his attention was directed at what pleased him about his visual experience. He uses the example to rebut the claim that one delights in the subjective qualities of one's experience when taking pleasure in some visually presented scene. The charge here is that qualia (or equally sense-data) are absent from any introspective search of the mind and that this conflicts with the hypothesis that such things need to be posited as objects of awareness in explaining the phenomenological character of sensory experience.

Now there is one line of response to this charge which I wish to ignore for the purposes of this discussion. A defender of a pure sense-datum view might be inclined to reject Tye's observation about his experience. How is he so sure that it is the Pacific Ocean that he delights in when he turns his attention inwards, and not some mind-dependent blue expanse similar in character to how Tye takes the Pacific to be? After all, the response might go, how could introspection alone show that the objects and entities that Tye can identify must be mind-independent, physical objects. The objector may

⁷ In fact, these kinds of observation create problems in particular for certain forms of qualia-based or adverbialist accounts of sensory experience, for more on this see Martin, 1998. For a sophisticated response to these phenomena on behalf of sense-datum, see O'Shaughnessy, 1985.

concede that we typically are inclined to believe that we are presented with mind-independent objects in experience, but what they question is whether that belief can be adequately supported by introspection of experience alone. There is a nice question here, and while I think it is right that we need to answer the question and indeed think that we can, I don't want to pursue the point further here. For I am less concerned in this paper with how the sense-datum theorist can respond to the challenge than how a defender of an intentional view should develop it.

That brings us to a second riposte, a kind of *tu quoque*. The sense-datum theorist may accept that it is not manifest to one that there are sense-data or subjective qualities when one attends to one's experience, but, he may then point out, no intentional content or representational properties is manifest either. Even if the sense-datum theorist's account of the phenomenal character of experience is not self-evident, still he will claim that he is no worse off than a defender of an intentional account.

Now at first sight, Tye himself would seem to deny this, for he claims that he is aware of the content of his experience. Tye uses the term 'content' in the modern sense in which it combines with 'representational' or 'propositional', as a term which picks up on what otherwise is talked of in terms of propositions. This contrasts with an older tradition of talk of content in contrast with form, and also talk of the contents of consciousness or the mind (Cf. Frege, 1977, pp. 14–15; Schlick, 1979). In as much as one is aware of the Pacific Ocean and its blue colour through seeing it and in reflecting on one's conscious experience of them, these are both contents of the mind or consciousness in this older sense. But it is not at all clear that they count as contents or aspects of content in the modern sense of 'content', meaning propositional or intentional content. On many views of the latter we need sharply to distinguish between contents and what the contents are of or about.⁸ Given such conceptions of content, delighting in the blue of the ocean will *not* be delighting in an aspect of the content of the experience. It is true that if one endorses a 'Russellian' conception of propositional content, one might make some sense of taking the objects and properties that the content is about as its literal constituents. In that case, one might endorse the thought that one delighted in an aspect of content, but unless we also assume that in being aware of a constituent of a content one is thereby aware of the content, it still won't follow from being aware of the ocean and its blueness that the experience's 'content is immediately accessible' to one's consciousness.

⁸ This is clearly the case on views which take contents to be pure abstract entities, such as Fregean views, which are particularly insistent on distinguishing entities at the level of reference 'what contents are about' and entities at the level of sense 'such as contents themselves'. The distinction also needs to be in play on nominalist views of content which grant the existence of token utterances, inscriptions or believings and relations of having the same content, but no entities which are contents.

Indeed, one might complain not only that it is not clear that in being aware of the ocean and its colour one is aware of the experience's representational properties, but also that the only obvious candidate examples of being aware of representational properties would seem to land us back with the kind of view that Tye wishes to oppose.⁹ When I look at a notice on the wall, I may come to be aware that it informs me that the management reserve the right of admission, and hence come to be aware of the representational properties or content of the sign; when I look at a postcard of Trafalgar Square, I may see that it depicts hoards of tourists there, and hence come to be aware of its representational properties. In both of these cases of awareness of public representations, I come to be aware of the item's representational properties through also being aware of some of its non-representational properties, including those properties which act as a medium for this representation. But if this applied also to the case of awareness of one's own representational states of mind, then we would be back with the picture that Tye is keen to reject, on which awareness of how one's experience represents the environment as being is mediated through awareness of some of the properties in virtue of which it represents them.

For all that, the initial riposte that representational properties are no more evident than sense-data is misplaced and an intentionalist such as Tye needn't, and shouldn't, claim that one is aware of the representational properties of one's experience as such when one introspects one's experience. For the kind of grounds that an intentionalist can appeal to in defence of his or her view are quite consistent with only external objects being present to the mind in introspection of one's experience; and such a view does not need to posit representational items or properties as the objects of inner awareness.

A sense-datum view of experience posits sense-data or subjective qualities as the immediate objects of awareness and as the determinants of what one's experience is like.¹⁰ The challenge from introspection creates problems on two fronts for this view. First, as we have already noted above, introspection seems to reveal experience to have less than the sense-datum theory predicts—there does not seem to be some private entity corresponding to each object of perception, or a subjective quality to correspond to each perceived feature of such

⁹ Note, of course, that the representational properties of the experience are properties of the experience, and hence not to be identified with the ocean or any of its properties. They must rather be the properties the experience has of representing things to be a certain way.

¹⁰ This is one point at which sense-datum views and qualia-based approaches tend to come apart. Defenders of qualia-based views tend to deny that qualia are the objects of awareness, refusing to reify aspects of experience. Nonetheless they do give them the role of determining the character of experience and typically they also suppose that they are accessible to introspection.

objects.¹¹ Secondly, introspection reveals that there is more to the character of experience than one would anticipate on the basis of a pure sense-datum or qualia-based view. For the public, mind-independent objects of perception and their features are not banished from one's attention just because one shifts one's interest from how things are in the environment to how things are experientially. So, one may complain, there is an explanatory gap between the phenomena revealed by introspection and the materials that the sense-datum theory has to hand to explain those phenomena: how can positing purely subjective entities of awareness explain how mind-independent objects come to be the objects of attention?

Tye's comments in the above passage relate particularly to the negative complaint: the absence of evidence for the presence of sense-data or qualia. But the grounds for accepting an intentionalist account of experience arise instead from the positive demand for an explanation of how mind-independent objects can feature in an account of what experience is like. The guiding motivation here is much the same as that which drives sense-datum theories: a concern with illusions or hallucinations.¹² In the example cited, Tye is actually staring out at the Pacific Ocean, and so the blueness that he delights in is the actual blue of that ocean (assuming that we allow for the moment that physical objects literally have colours). However, it seems quite conceivable that he should have had an hallucination as of a blue expanse of water indistinguishable for him from the perception he actually enjoyed. In that case it would have seemed from his point of view, as if there was actually some such blue expanse of water in which he could delight. Given that this is in fact a case of hallucination, however, there is no blue expanse before him in which he can delight. At this stage, a sense-datum theory is liable to insist that there must actually be some blue expanse of which he is aware and in which he can delight, and hence that there must be some non-physical expanse present to him. In contrast, the intentional theorist appeals to an analogy with belief

¹¹ However, one might complain here that the evidence is not quite as strong in Tye's favour here as he claims. A *pure intentional theory* of perception claims that all aspects of the phenomenological character of experience can be explained by the intentional properties of experience. Tye favours such an account, as does Harman, and recently Dretske. The transparency argument provides only limited support for such a view: that a few choice examples of visual experience do not definitely reveal the presence of qualia or sense-data does not show that no experience possesses qualia or involves the awareness of sense-data, yet this latter claim is what pure intentionalists are committed to. An intentional theory which is not a pure intentional theory affirms the presence of intentional properties, and denies that perceptual experience could be explained purely in terms of sense-data or qualia: Peacocke in Peacocke, 1983, defended a form of intentional theory that was not a form of pure intentionalism.

¹² Compare here Burge's claim at the outset of Burge 1986: 'I begin with the premiss that our perceptual experience represents or is about objects, properties, and relations that are *objective*. That is to say, their nature (or essential character) is independent of any one person's actions, dispositions, or mental phenomena. An obvious consequence of this is that individuals are capable of having perceptual representations that are misperceptions or hallucinations . . .', p. 125.

or judgement: when young Mary is confronted with a *Smarties* tube she may well believe that the tube contains sweets, and she may believe this even in a case in which it only contains pencils. In the latter case, her belief is false, and there will be no sweets of which she believes that they are in the cardboard tube before her. Nevertheless we are not inclined to suppose that her belief must instead be about some non-physical sweets. Rather, we are happy to accept that whether her belief is true or false, it is a belief about how things are in the world. It can be so because the belief is a representational state, and so can relate to the state of affairs it represents whether or not that state of affairs obtains.

Applying this model to the case of perceptual experience, we can say that Tye's experience is of, or as of, a blue expanse even when he has an hallucination because his experience represents the presence of a blue expanse of water in his environment. It can represent that state of affairs even if it does not obtain. The phenomenological character of his experience is determined by how the experience represents the environment to be. It is determined by the experience's intentional content. So his experience can have the same phenomenological character in a case of hallucination as in a case of perception, and in both cases that character involves an actual or possible state of affairs in the mind-independent environment.

There are two distinct aspects to the dispute between an intentional approach and a sense-datum approach: they disagree about what can be present to the mind; and they disagree about how whatever is present to the mind in experience can come to be so present. The sense-datum theory claims that whatever one is aware of in having experience—whatever is present to the mind—must actually exist in order for one's experience to be so. Hence, the sense-datum theory also claims that only non-physical entities and qualities can be present to the mind, since one's experience can be so even when one has an hallucination.¹³ The intentional theory, on the other hand, insists that mind-independent objects and qualities can be present to the mind when one has experience. In the light of examples of hallucination or illusion, it claims that the manner in which such mind-independent objects can be present to one in experience does not require that they actually exist or be instantiated: they are rather present merely intentionally.¹⁴

¹³ Of course, it doesn't follow simply from the claim that one is aware of non-physical entities in the case of hallucination that one is aware of such entities even in the case of perception, as Austin was keen to stress (see, Austin, 1962, p. 52). Nonetheless, one can construct a reasonable argument to this conclusion if one accepts what the early sense-datum theorists denied, namely that such non-physical entities are also dependent on one's awareness of them. For more on this see Martin, forthcoming.

¹⁴ What does this amount to? Does it require us to posit the existence of strange entities, intentional objects in addition to physical objects? If it did, then that would hardly be preferable to a sense-datum view. Talk of intentional objects should be seen as indicating a feature of how we do in fact talk about a range of mental phenomena: when we say 'James asked Santa Claus for an AT-AT', we talk as if there is a genuine object to which

So, when a defender of the intentional approach to perception appeals to the phenomenal transparency of experience, we can see that appeal as operating in two ways. First, the view points out the lack of manifest presence of non-physical objects and qualities, and thereby throws doubt on the sense-datum theorist's positive claim that non-physical entities must actually be objects of awareness for us, or somehow present to the mind. Secondly, it emphasises that when one's attention is directed inward mind-independent objects seem to be aspects of our experience, and so the approach indicates the need to account for how mind-independent objects could feature in the phenomenological character of experience given the argument from illusion. The appeal to representational or intentional content is his answer to that question.

The intentional theorist's explanation of the character of experience makes appeal to the notion of representation or representational content. There are at least as many varieties of intentional theories of perception as there are different accounts of representation and content. But there is one aspect of the approach which tends to get obscured, perhaps because of a possible ambiguity in the way that philosophers talk about representation. On one way of talking about representation, beliefs and judgements both count as representational, while such states as hopes and desires do not.¹⁵ Likewise, one might think that indicative sentences used to make assertions or say something count as representational, whereas interrogative sentences used to ask questions, or imperatives used to request something, do not.¹⁶ On this construal, for something to be representational is for it to put something forward as the case or to take it to be so, or to be apt for either role. In believing or accepting something I am thereby taking it to be so, and in asserting something I am

James can stand in the asking relation, but this implication we take back when we add, 'Of course, James is going to be disappointed because Santa Claus doesn't exist'. (Compare here Dummett, 1992, p. 226.) It is simply a fact about our discourse that we are prepared to talk in this way. The philosophical problem is to explain the underlying coherence of such talk, and explanations differ with respect to the amount that they appeal either to pragmatic or semantic phenomena in attempting to do this. One would be misconceiving the task here if one simply thought that there is some kind of contradiction in the way we talk, and that the philosophical project here is to require us to talk differently.

One way of seeing the intentional theorist's strategy here, then, is to note that we engage in this kind of double-talk when talking of a subject's beliefs or demands of people or hopes and then to point out that just the same kind of double-talk is involved in describing how things are experientially for a subject taking into account things from that subject's point of view.

¹⁵ More precisely, one might say that a desire does not represent (in this sense) what it is a desire for. If one accepts Dennis Stampe's intriguing theory of desire (see Stampe, 1987) desires are perceptions of one's need for what is desired, and they would then count as representational in this sense with respect to the presence of that need.

¹⁶ This formulation is intended to be entirely neutral over Davidson's account of mood and force, whereby such sentences are an example of parataxis of two purely truth-conditional elements, one representing the speech act which the speaker thereby presents themselves as performing, see his Davidson, 1984.

putting it forward as so. In contrast, in merely entertaining the proposition, or hoping that it should be so, I am not thereby taking it to be so, and in making a request I am not putting something forward as so.

But in talking of representational or intentional content, one might have a broader sense of the notion in mind. One on which desires, hopes, and non-indicative sentences all count as representational as well, since they are all about (or of, or involve reference to) objects, properties and states of affairs, even though they do not present anything as being the case. Let us call this the *semantic* conception of representation, and the narrower conception of representation we can call the *stative* conception.

If one employs only the semantic conception, then the analogy drawn between experiential states and beliefs or judgements is also one which they share with desires or hopes. One is appealing solely to the fact that these states of mind are about, or refer to, objects and properties in the subject's environment in order to explain their phenomenological character. On the other hand, if the stress is rather on the stative conception of representation, then the analogy is more strictly with belief and judgement, and not with desire. The claim is then not merely that in some sense or other perceptual experiences refer to mind-independent objects or qualities, but that they involve taking the world to be the way that the content of experience represents them to be.

There are familiar reasons for not identifying experiencing things to be a certain way simply with judging or acquiring the belief that they are that way: it is quite possible to experience things as being a certain way, and yet not to believe that they are so. When one looks at an example of the Ponzo illusion, the top horizontal line will appear longer than the bottom horizontal line, even though they are equal in length. Someone familiar with the illusion will certainly not believe the lines to be unequal, yet the lines will still look unequal to them, and that is how they will report how things appear.¹⁷ Yet it would be a mistake to infer from this that the intentional theory ought to retreat only to the notion of semantic representation, and deny that experiences are representational in the stative sense. For the only plausible forms of intentional theory appeal to the stative notion of representation in order to explain the distinctive phenomenology of perceptual experiences.

To see why they must do so, we should reflect on the distinctive role that an intentional theorist gives experiential states in contrast to other states with an intentional content. A simple objection to intentionalism is that sensory states cannot be purely intentional because sensing is just different from merely thinking. More exactly, one might claim that sensory states involve a certain

¹⁷ This problem was first raised in relation to belief-analyses of perception—which of course exploit attitudinative conceptions of representation—put forward by Armstrong and Pitcher, see Armstrong, 1968, pp. 216–226, and Pitcher, 1971, pp. 64–96 for their attempts to deal with the difficulty. Compare Craig's attempt (Craig, 1976), to hold on to a judgemental theory in the face of this difficulty.

immediacy or apparent presence of an object which is simply not required in cases of pure thought, and hence that experience is not representational in the way that pure thought is. John Searle gives good expression to the worry in the following passage, and also offers a swift solution:

If, for example, I see a yellow station wagon in front of me, the experience I have is directly of the object. It doesn't just "represent" the object, it provides direct access to it. The experience has a kind of directness, immediacy and involuntariness which is not shared by a belief which I might have about the object in its absence. It seems therefore unnatural to describe visual experiences as representations . . . because of the special features of perceptual experiences I propose to call them "presentations" . . . Strictly speaking, . . . presentations are a special subclass of representations (Searle, 1983, pp. 45–6).

One might question whether one can allay the worries Searle raises here just by the stroke of the pen as he suggests, but he surely is right that one should both try to articulate such worries and outline an answer to them. A more definite formulation of them may be extracted from the following thought. As we noted above, on the semantic conception of representation there is a state of affairs which both 'The cat is on the mat' and 'It is not the case that the cat is on the mat' represent.¹⁸ But, one might think, the phenomenological character of a visual experience of the cat right before one on the mat involves or is directed on the cat in a way that no experience of the absence of the cat could be. So the sense in which one's experience can involve the presence or presentation of an object cannot simply be explained by the semantic conception of representation. We need to appeal to the idea that there is something special or distinctive to the case of sensory experience which contrasts with other cases of intentional states: that experience involves a particular way in which objects are presented as being so. While the intentional account of experience does appeal to a common feature that experience has with other intentional states—namely the possession of intentional content—it should also stress a distinctive role in one's mental economy that experience has and the others lack. This is just parallel to what we say about beliefs in contrast to desires, and *vice versa*.

There are a number of resources that the intentionalist has to explain the way in which experiential states are phenomenologically distinctive and contrast with mere thought. They may claim that sensory states, in contrast to thoughts, have a distinctive kind of content, perhaps a non-conceptual content,

¹⁸ There may also be a state of affairs which the latter represents and the former does not, if one accepts that there are negative states of affairs, and denies that a sentence and its double negation represent just the same states of affairs.

which is not possessed by pure thoughts.¹⁹ Correlative with this, they may claim that such contents cannot possess the kind of logical complexity that pure thoughts have, so ruling out the problematic example above. They may also claim that experiential contents are bound to be more replete in informational detail, and possibly analogue in character in contrast to thought, and that this is echoed in the phenomenological character picked out in talk of immediacy.²⁰ Furthermore, if one rejects pure intentionalism—the claim that all aspects of conscious experience are to be explained by its intentional properties—one might allow a role for subjective qualities or qualia, in order to explain the distinctive sensory character of experience in contrast to that of thought.²¹

Yet answering the challenge in any of these ways does not exhaust the ways in which sense experience must differ from other intentional states. For the phenomenal characteristics gestured at by talk of the immediacy of experience connect with the consequences that having a state of mind with these characteristics has for a subject. And an intentionalist can only adequately explain this connection by appeal to the stative conception of representation. The connection I have in mind is the link between perceptual experience and belief. A nice expression of the link comes in this passage from Austin where he insists that we are not to think of the deliverances of the senses as always more evidence for something that we come to accept or to know:

If I find a few buckets of pig-food, that's a bit more evidence, and the noises and the smell may provide better evidence still. But if the animal then emerges and stands there plainly in view, there is no longer any question of collecting evidence; its coming into view doesn't provide me with more evidence that it's a pig, I can now just see that it is, the question is settled (Austin, 1962, p. 113).

In the normal case, a subject's perceptual experience fixes his beliefs about his environment. When Austin's pig comes into full view, the question is settled for him whether or not there is a pig around. It is this connection between experience and belief that has prompted attempts to reduce perception to the acquisition of belief, or to dispositions to acquire belief (Armstrong, 1968; Pitcher, 1971), but one needn't endorse such a reduction or elimination of

¹⁹ For the idea that perceptual experience has a non-conceptual content see Dretske, 1981 Ch. 6; Evans, 1982 Ch. 5; Peacocke, 1990 Ch. 3 and Martin, 1992; Martin, 1994; Crane, 1998; for objections to the idea of such content see McDowell, 1994 Lecture 3 and Postscript to Lecture 3.

²⁰ The idea that experience is replete in content is suggested by Pitcher, *op. cit.* pp. 74–7 as an answer to this kind of objection; the idea that non-conceptual content is analogue is one of the main themes in different ways of both Dretske and Peacocke's work on these issues.

²¹ This seems to be one of the motivations behind Baldwin's proposals about the projective theory of sensory content in Baldwin, 1992.

perceptual experience while still doing justice to the links that Austin remarks on.

One of the reasons often cited for resisting the reduction concerns the possibility of disbelieving one's senses. If Austin had been convinced that there just could be no pigs in his area of Oxford, then he might have become convinced that his eyes were deceiving him, and in that case his experience would not have settled the question for him, but would have just convinced him that he was suffering from an illusion or hallucination. Alternatively, he might have had reason to believe himself subject to hallucinations anyway, and so come to distrust his senses while remaining agnostic about whether there could have been pigs in the area. So the role of experience here is not to fix beliefs come what may, but rather to fix them where there aren't sufficient countervailing reasons either against taking things to be as they appear, or against trusting the senses *per se*. Bound up with this are elements of justification and rationality. Perceptual experiences do not merely have power over a subject's beliefs, they also have authority. We are liable to judge that a subject is justified or rational in believing things to be as they appear, even if things are not so, unless the subject has good reason to distrust his senses.

The immediacy, directness and involuntariness that Searle gestures at link directly to these functional and normative aspects of experience. From Austin's own perspective, introspection of his situation just reveals what attention to the yard had already shown: the presence, or putative presence of a pig. From Austin's perspective, matters are not neutral about porcine presence. For him, one might suggest, the reason for thinking that there is a pig there is simply the pig itself.

Of course, from an observer's perspective, we might think that that is not quite right. Austin could be in that situation even if there was no pig there, and unwittingly he was suffering from an hallucination. We would have the same explanation of his belief, and he would be equally in the right in forming that belief, even though in that situation it would in fact turn out to be false. So it is his being in the perceptual state, having a visual experience of, or as of, a pig which explains why he believes and ought to believe that a pig is there.

Now in the case in which a subject believes himself to be suffering an illusion or hallucination he may not come to believe that there is a pig there. The belief that one is suffering an hallucination need bring about no alteration in what one's experience is like. In this situation too, one's experiential situation will seem to be non-neutral about the presence of a pig. What alters is one's response to the situation as it strikes one, not necessarily how the situation is presented to one as being.

Furthermore, I suggest, it seems inconceivable that one should be in a mental state phenomenologically just the same as such a perceptual experience and yet not feel coerced into believing that things are the way that they are presented as being. That is, I claim that there is an internal link between the

phenomenological characteristics Searle draws our attention to, and the kind of functional role of perceptual states we have just outlined. While I offer no positive argument for this conjecture, it is notable how difficult it is to sustain a plausible denial of it.

Classical foundationalists about empirical knowledge resist this claim. For they claim that our beliefs about the objects around us are grounded in inferences from sensory states together with background beliefs about the conditions of enjoying these experiences. Such theorists would thereby seem to deny that experience can directly coerce our beliefs about the world. They seem to deny that our sense experiences have either this power or authority. However, typically they do so through denying that our experiences have the kind of phenomenological character that intentionalists ascribe to it. They tend to suppose that sensory experience is simply being affected in some way, or is the presentation of some non-physical colour mosaic. On such a view, experience would then have authority over our beliefs about the presence of such a colour mosaic, it is just that the presence or absence of such a mosaic would not bear directly on the state of one's environment. As such, these views do not really challenge the intuitive force of the idea that there is a rational link between the phenomenal character of one's experience and the beliefs one can form about the subject matter so presented.

Now if it is part of the nature of perceptual experience to have this role of fixing belief, at least where there is no countervailing belief which indicates the unreliability of the perception, and if the non-neutrality of experience is necessarily linked to its being an experience, then we would indeed anticipate that any state of mind with these phenomenal characteristics would have the typical consequences of perceptual experience. What exactly is the link here between the functional role of experience and these phenomenological characteristics? One might put it this way: the properties of immediacy or directness that Searle gestures at, or the kind of non-neutrality of the situation for the subject that Austin suggests, are the phenomenological echoes of the fact that one is in a state with the functional role that experience has. The fact that one is having a perceptual experience with a certain content is manifested to a subject through his awareness of the seeming presence of the objects of experience.

Given this, the phenomenological character of experience could not be explained solely in terms of semantic representational properties. For that very notion allows that things may be represented that way without being taken to be so. But that precisely ignores the way in which experience is committal about the objects of experience and the way in which that can be manifested phenomenologically. So to claim that the phenomenal character of experience is constituted by the experience's representational properties is plausible at all only where we construe 'representational' in the narrower, stative, sense which applies to states such as beliefs and judgements which involve taking things to be a certain way.

The argument from transparency, then, can be seen fundamentally to be concerned with the explanation of the phenomenological datum that philosophers such as Tye insist upon. There is a negative charge against sense-datum theories, that introspection provides no direct evidence for the presence of non-physical entities or qualities of the sort that such theories posit, but the deeper concern is rather the demand for a positive explanation of what introspection does find. This grounds the claims of the intentional theory to be the obviously correct account of perceptual experience. This is why it has no need to assume that it is simply evident to us in introspection that our experience has representational properties. What is obvious to us, according to this line of argument, is that our experience is of mind-independent objects. There seems no hope of explaining this aspect of phenomenology purely in terms of non-physical sense-data. In contrast, there is a direct way in which an intentional theory of perception would seem to offer an account. So introspection seems to support intentional accounts of perception over sense-datum views.

2. Naïve Realism and Disjunctivism

The intentional approach to perception seems to offer a better account of the phenomenal transparency of perceptual experience than does a sense-datum theory. Is it the only possible account which takes this phenomenological datum at face value? From reading pure intentionalists such as Harman and Tye, one might think that only such intentional theories could account for how our experiences can be directed on mind-independent objects. For in presenting their positions, they tend to argue only against sense-datum or qualia views, and to do so simply by insisting on the considerations associated with phenomenal transparency. Likewise, one can find those who argue in favour of qualia or sensational properties doing so by denying that all aspects of experience are purely intentional.²² Yet there is at least one competing account to intentionalism, which would insist that our experiences are of mind-independent objects, but which would deny that our experience is so in virtue of representational properties it has.

Intentional approaches and sense-datum theories differ in at least two respects: intentional theories assert, and sense-datum theories deny, that mind-independent objects can be present to the mind in having perceptual experience; sense-datum theories assert, while intentional theories deny, that what is so present to the mind must actually exist. These two issues are logically independent, so one could agree with the intentionalist about one while also agreeing with the sense-datum theorist about the other. One such view would

²² See for example Peacocke, 1983 Ch. 1; although in conversation he insists that his notion of representational properties then was also intended to cover what is discussed below in the text as naïve realism.

be one on which one asserted that mind-independent objects are present to the mind when one perceives, but to agree with the sense-datum theorist, that when one has such experience, its object must actually exist and genuinely be present to the mind. Call this, *naïve realism*.

Naïve realism appears to offer us an alternative account of the phenomenal transparency of perceptual experience. The intentional theorist explains the phenomenological character by reference to the representational content of experience and the fact that one is having an experience with that content. But the naïve realist may claim that we should explain the phenomenal transparency in terms of the objects of perception, and not in terms of the experience's representational content: the objects have actually to be there for one to have the experience, and indeed one may claim that they are constituents of the experiential situation. When one introspects one's experience, one notes these aspects of the experiential situation and hence attends to them and can report on them.

More needs to be said to show that this a genuinely alternative account of phenomenal transparency, but one might already think that the position in question is ruled out of court anyway. For it is tempting to see the considerations about illusion and hallucination mentioned earlier as already having been sufficient to show that this kind of account is wrong.

As presented above, both sense-datum views and intentionalism assume that perceptual experiences form a common kind of mental state among cases of veridical perception, illusion and hallucination. The perceptual experience which one has when seeing a pig is of a kind which could have occurred were one not perceiving at all but having a visual hallucination indistinguishable from the sighting of the pig. On such an assumption, one may demand that whatever account one is to give of the experience one has when one veridically perceives, the same account must be applicable in some cases of hallucination. But, on the view bruited above, the objects of perception are aspects of the visual experience which actually have to exist when one has such an experience, so one could not have an instance of that kind of experience if the objects did not exist. One could not have such an experience in the case of hallucination. Therefore, given the assumption that perceptual experience forms a common kind across veridical perception, illusion and hallucination, the naïve realist view must simply be false.

However, so-called disjunctive theories of appearance question whether this assumption is correct. According to such views, we should not think that perceptual experience forms a common kind of mental state across perceptions, illusions and hallucinations, a state which forms a proper part of one's perceiving of a pig, and can occur in cases where one does not perceive but merely hallucinates the presence of a pig.²³ Of course, such views do not deny the evident truth that in both cases of perception and hallucination of a pig one can correctly describe the situation as one in which it looks to one as if a pig is present. Rather, what such views deny is that such truths about how things

look to a subject, or in general how they appear to a subject, need be made true by a state which is common to all the situations. Either the subject is genuinely perceiving a pig, or it is with them just as if they were perceiving a pig: a description of how things appear to a subject introduces no more than this disjunctive state of affairs.

A key expression of the view can be found in the following passage from John McDowell:

... an appearance that such-and-such is the case can be either a mere appearance or the fact made manifest to someone ... the object of experience in the deceptive cases is a mere appearance. But we are not to accept that in the non-deceptive cases too the object of experience is a mere appearance, and hence something that falls short of the fact itself ... appearances are no longer conceived as intervening between the experiencing subject and the world (McDowell, 1982, p. 211 (in reprint).

If one adopts such a disjunctive conception of appearances, then it is open to one to claim that in a case of veridical perception, one is presented with a mind-independent object, such as a lavender bush, and the state of mind one has involves a relation between oneself and the lavender bush one sees; the

²³ Disjunctivism as a thesis about perception was first developed by Hinton, see Hinton, 1973 and more recently championed by McDowell and Snowdon. For further discussion see also Child, 1994 Ch. VI. Disjunctivism as a thesis about knowledge has an older pedigree, see in particular Cook Wilson (Wilson, 1926), and Prichard, 1950, lecture on Descartes; McDowell is keen to develop a disjunctivist approach to knowledge and thought as much as one of perception; for a different development of disjunctivism concerning knowledge, and arguments for it, see Williamson, 1995. For objections to disjunctivism see Robinson, 1994 and Millar, 1996.

Note that the way in which I develop the idea of disjunctivism and the way in which I use the term 'intentionalism' conflicts with McDowell's own conception of these issues. He insists that experience is conceptual and intentional, see in particular McDowell, 1994 *passim*. So he emphatically resists the idea that a commitment to the intentionality of experience is motivated by the need to view experience as representational in order to answer the problem of hallucination.

In part the difference here is terminological, but there are also issues of substance and strategy of attack. If disjunctivism comes to be counted as a form of intentional theory of perception, then one cannot easily exclude the sense-datum views of experience from counting as intentional accounts too, albeit ones on which what is represented are not mind-independent. For if we take away the motivation for giving an answer to the problem of hallucination as definitive of intentionalism, the only reason to contrast sense-datum theories with intentionalism would be McDowell's contention that experience has to be conceptual in character; a claim that sense-datum theorists will reject. However, as McDowell is well aware, there are philosophers who defend forms of intentionalism while insisting that experience is non-conceptual.

I suggest that the fundamental divide among the views here concerns the treatment of the argument from hallucination, rather than the role of concepts. In that case it is more important to stress adherence to or rejection of the common element thesis rather than the conceptual or non-conceptual nature of the states of mind in question.

lavender bush and its salient features are partly constitutive of the experience one has. If these things are constitutive of the experience, then one couldn't be having such an experience if they did not exist. Of course, one could have an hallucination which was indistinguishable from such an experience—such that one thought that one was seeing a lavender bush even though one was not—but, on the disjunctivist conception, this would not be the same kind of state of mind, so the fact that one could have an hallucination without the existence of a lavender bush is not sufficient to show that one's experience when one is perceiving the bush could have occurred without the existence of that bush.²⁴ However, this is not to endorse what McDowell has to say about cases of hallucination, where he talks of 'mere appearance' being the object of experience. One may resist this for a number of reasons. First, one might better deny that there is any object of experience at all in this case, it merely seems to one as if this is so. Second, one might question, as Williamson does, whether there is a useful notion of *mere* appearance distinct from the notion of appearance which covers both disjuncts (Williamson, 1995, pp. 560–62). The key claim here is that the experiential state in the perceptual case is not common to the hallucinatory case; that leaves open exactly what one wishes to say about the hallucinatory situation.

So, disjunctivism seems to offer a way to defend naïve realism against this form of the argument from illusion. If the naïve realist can be a disjunctivist, then the argument from illusion can't be used to show that there is no alternative conception of phenomenal immediacy to that provided by intentional theories.²⁵ In turn, I suggest, it is only in the light of naïve realism, and its alternative conception of phenomenal immediacy, that we see any substance in the dispute between disjunctivists and intentional theories.

²⁴ I gloss over another important contrast between the kind of disjunctivism put forward in Hinton and Snowdon, and that defended in McDowell. For the former two, the relevant disjunctions contrast perceiving, whether veridical or misperceptions, with hallucinations, since the focus of debate is on the objects of perception. For McDowell, the contrast is between facts being made manifest and mere appearance, contrasting perception on one side with both illusion and hallucination on the other.

I would suggest that the most significant form of disjunctivism will actually fall somewhere in between these two approaches: not simply focusing on the contrast between when an object is present and when it is not, but focusing on whether some apparently perceived feature or aspect is present or not. For McDowell facts correlate with what a sentence can be used to say, so two facts could not be presented in different ways. For our purposes we could allow that the same objects or features could be presented in different ways, and hence the contrast would not be quite whether facts are manifest or not. For the purposes of this paper, though, the contrasts between these different forms of disjunctivism will not be crucial.

²⁵ Not all disjunctivists about perception need be naïve realists in the sense introduced here. For example, if one holds that the content of perceptual experience can be singular, and one also holds that singular content is object-dependent, then one will thereby be forced to be disjunctivist. On the other hand, for a view which allows the content of experience to be singular but denies that it is object-dependent, see Burge, 1993.

For, it must be said, if one looks at the work of those who have advocated disjunctivism *per se* then there is little that one can find which clearly fills out what the disagreement between that approach and intentionalism might amount to. It is quite difficult to find anything in the most common expositions of disjunctivism which look like arguments that their opponents will not simply think of as question-begging. For example, disjunctivists sometimes suggest that only they properly capture the common sense idea that our sense experience gives us direct access to the world. McDowell in the passage quoted above sets his account of perception and appearance against an opposition which accepts that ‘appearances intervene between the experiencing subject and the world’. Putnam, in a recent endorsement of McDowell’s views (along with James’s), complains that on most views of the mind, experience is:

a mere affectation of a person’s subjectivity by . . . things [“out there”]. I agree with James, as well as with McDowell, that the false belief that perception *must* be so analyzed is the root of all the problems with the view of perception that, in one form or another, has dominated Western philosophy since the seventeenth century. James’s idea is that the traditional claim that we must conceive of our sensory experiences as *intermediaries* between us and the world has no sound arguments to support it, and, worse, makes it impossible to see how persons can be in genuine contact with a world at all (Putnam, 1994, p. 454).

One can make some sense of this objection as one aimed against sense-datum theories and other forms of purely subjectivist accounts of perceptual experience. A familiar objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they introduce entities which act as a ‘veil of perception’ between us and the external world; and it is often suggested that the putative presence of such a veil would lead to insuperable sceptical problems. The complaint that such views introduce intermediaries into our experience of the world seems to be a variant of the ‘veil of perception’ objection. If so, then the best way of cashing out this metaphorical worry is in terms of the phenomenal transparency objection that we have discussed above.²⁶ For the transparency considerations are relevant to an account of perceptual justification. It seems reasonable to us that we should come to believe that our environment is a certain way, given that our experience presents that environment as being that way. A sense-datum view which seeks to explain experience purely in terms of the awareness of non-physical sense-data thereby seeks to replace the putative mind-

²⁶ Otherwise, one might ask, what warrants the metaphorical epithet and negative connotations of ‘veil’ or ‘intermediary’? Under the influences of management theory in business schools over the last few years, one can imagine a sense-datum theorist protesting that sense-data are ‘facilitators’ of our awareness of external objects rather than intermediaries, being the necessary concomitants of any such experiential access.

independent objects of awareness with these non-physical sense-data, and hence threatens to undermine this feeling of justification we have for our beliefs. For this reason one might think of sense-data as having to act as a 'veil': screening off what one believed to be the objects of awareness, and so undermining what we took to be the justification of our perceptual beliefs.²⁷

But if this is how we are to cash out the worry that sense-datum theories introduce intermediaries between the world and us, then this objection cannot be employed against an intentional approach. For, as was stressed above, an intentional theorist does not posit intentional content as any form of intermediary between the objects of perception and us, nor does he posit it as a substitute object of awareness for mind-independent objects of awareness. Rather, the appeal to intentional content is to explain the way in which such objects can come to be objects of awareness consistent with the thought that experience does form a highest common factor between veridical perception and hallucination. When one is veridically perceiving, and there is an object for one to perceive, then that is the object of awareness, there is no other object acting as an intermediary.²⁸

Perhaps this does not capture the heart of the objection. For at one point Putnam phrases his objection in slightly different terms:

[T]he key assumption responsible for the disaster is the idea that there has to be an interface between our cognitive powers and the world—or, to put the same point differently, the idea that our cognitive powers cannot reach all the way to the objects themselves (Putnam, 1994, p. 453).

If this is simply the complaint that the opposition must introduce an intermediary between the subject and the world, then as we have seen there is no clear reason to accept the complaint. The rephrased objection suggests that the worry is that anyone who accepts a common factor view, including the intentionalist, must admit that someone could be in the relevant state of mind, the having of a perceptual experience, and the world not be the way that it is presented as being. So the state of mind is not by itself sufficient to guarantee that the world is a certain way. If the having of such an experience exhausts one's cognitive powers, then one's cognitive powers do not reach all the way to the world, and there is indeed a gap between the mind and the world.

This is at least an accurate gloss on intentional theorists' approach to percep-

²⁷ Indeed, this seems to be the heart of Hume's main argument in the re-telling of his scepticism with regard to the senses in Hume, 1758; 1975 Sec. XII.

²⁸ Putnam is well aware of this line of response, 'All one has to do to be a direct realist . . . about visual experience, for example, is to say, "We don't *perceive* visual experiences, we *have* them." A simple linguistic reform, and *voilà!* one is a direct realist.' (p. 453). He does not, however, explain why this should be treated as merely a linguistic reform, rather than a proper response to the kind of objection he is pressing.

tion, albeit phrased in rather uncharitable terms. Nevertheless it is doubtful whether it can really have any suasive force. For really, the objection amounts to no more than a restatement of the main issue between the two views, and not some independent consideration which might help us see why the disjunctivist account is to be preferred to the intentionalist. According to the disjunctivist, veridical perceptions must be such that the occurrence of such experiences guarantees the presence of the objects of perception. On the intentionalist conception of experience, no such guarantee obtains. What we really want to know is why we should choose one of these positions rather than the other, and talk of a 'gap' does not seem to help us in that task.

Now there are different directions in which we could move in order to try and solve the problem. For example, in McDowell's own work the focus is at least as much on the issue of knowledge as on perception: he is concerned to deny that true belief forms a proper mental component of states of knowledge. On this kind of view, what one says about the case of perception will turn out to be a special case of a general approach to epistemology, and indeed to intentionality.²⁹ Whether one thinks that that broadening helps depends in part on one's expectations whether the analogue worries about a stand off will apply as equally in the general case of knowledge as they seem to in the case of perception.

But, independently of that, there may be reason to look for a dispute that can be fleshed out in terms of an account of perceptual appearances. After all, the disjunctivist claims to be doing justice to some common sense or naïve intuition about the kind of direct access to the world that perceptual experience can provide for us. When we come to state the differences between the two positions, we find ourselves talking in terms of notions of modality and constitution. One might be sceptical whether it could really be part of any common sense view that objects were or were not constituents of our experiences of them.

For if the disjunctivist cannot make out any independent reason why we should prefer his account to the intentionalist view, then the way experience seems to us would, at best, be neutral between the two accounts. If that is so, there already seems to be independent reason to prefer the intentional account. For since the intentional view embraces the thought that perceptions, illusions and hallucinations can form a common kind, it can accommodate and explain the evident fact that the three can be indistinguishable for their subject. Given this advantage, we need some concrete reason to prefer the alternative.

This returns us to the different conceptions of phenomenal immediacy in naïve realism and intentional theories. If a naïve realist adopts disjunctivism, then he can avoid the conclusions of the argument from illusion. If the naïve

²⁹ This is already clear in McDowell, 1982, but it is developed to a greater extent in McDowell, 1994 and 1995; see also Williamson, 1995.

realist offers a competing account of phenomenal immediacy from the intentional theorist, then the naïve realist form of disjunctivism proposes a different conception of the phenomenological character of experience from that given by the intentional theory. These competing accounts of the phenomenology of perceptual experience allow us to articulate the substantive disagreement between the two views.

While the intentional theorist assumes that experience is a common element between perception and hallucination, he also accepts that the situation does not seem to be neutral to the subject between the situation in which he is veridically perceiving and one in which he is hallucinating. Rather, for the subject it is as if the objects are right there before him. The intentional theorist seeks to explain this aspect of experience by reference to the kind of state of mind experiencing is. According to him, it is just that state of mind which is liable to fix the subject's beliefs about how his environment must be, and hence is a state of being presented to as if things are so.

A rather different account is on offer from the naïve realist who embraces disjunctivism (from here on I will assume that this is the only form of naïve realism or disjunctivism of interest, and write only of the disjunctivist). The disjunctivist wants to claim that when a subject is perceiving veridically, then the fact perceived is itself 'made manifest' to the subject and is constitutive of his experience. This is what gives rise to the modal consequences which distinguish the disjunctivist's and the intentional theorist's attitudes towards 'mere appearances', cases of illusion and hallucination. But it also has consequences for how the disjunctivist can explain how experience ought to give rise to belief, and how it does. One of the aims of judgement is that one's judgements should be true. If it is manifest to a subject that something is the case, then given the aim of judgement, *ceteris paribus*, he ought to make the judgement that matches what is manifest to him. So, in a situation in which a subject is perceiving veridically, and in no way distrusts his experience, he will feel compelled to judge that things are that way.³⁰ To borrow Austin's phrase, 'the question is settled' for him. In the case of veridical perception taken at face value, the immediacy or vivacity of experience reflects the character of the situation, that a certain fact obtains in the subject's environment and that fact has been made apparent to him.

³⁰ This contrasts with the most common terms in which the slogan about aiming at the truth are cashed out, namely in terms of obligations not to believe something if not true (cf. Humberstone, 1992). One normally compelling reason to prefer such formulations is that there are many facts too trivial for it to be plausibly a requirement on us to form an opinion on the matter—e.g. how many heads of corn there are growing this summer in the Midwest. If we restrict our attention solely to cases of beliefs grounded immediately in perception, these concerns do not apply. In the case of perception where matters are just apparently obvious to one, triviality does not come into it. Standing in the record shop, whatever my lack of interest, I cannot help but form an opinion about who is number one in the singles chart.

Put in these terms, the account is incomplete. For the disjunctivist explains the role of experience through appeal to relational facts about the perceiver and what is perceived, so the account cannot be applied in the same way to cases of illusion or hallucination. And this is surely problematic since hallucinations no less than veridical perceptions can lead to beliefs about the environment. As we noted above they can seem to the subject to have just the same kind of authority as perceptions. Furthermore, since reflection on whether one is genuinely perceiving or having an hallucination can affect whether one takes one's experience at face value, how the perceiver is to conceive of hallucinations has a bearing on his rationality even in cases of veridical perception. For a subject may raise the question whether he is hallucinating even in a case of veridical perception, and as a consequence he may resist the impulse to conform his beliefs to how things appear to him. The disjunctivist cannot, therefore, blithely refuse to say anything about how illusions and hallucinations affect the warrant or rationality of perceptual beliefs.³¹

However, there is a ready extension of the account of the authority of veridical perception available to a disjunctivist. For all sides agree that illusions and hallucinations can be subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptions. And this means that, from a subject's point of view, even in a case of pure hallucination, it may nevertheless seem to him as if some fact about the world is being made manifest to him. To the extent that he is committed to aim at the truth, then, he will feel under obligation to match his beliefs to how things appear to him to be. While he would be wrong objectively to match his beliefs to how things appear to him, we can explain through the indistinguishability of the hallucination from a veridical perception why his beliefs do alter and why it seems from his point of view as if he is in the right. From the fact that the situation is indistinguishable for the subject from one in which facts are manifest to him, we will expect the same kind of impact on the subject's beliefs. Now, when a subject reflects on his situation and suspects that he is suffering an hallucination and not really perceiving some-

³¹ An objection at this point is that really no explanation has been given for why the relation of 'being made manifest' to one does or should have the consequences that the theory predicts. To this extent we have been given no explanation at all. There is something to this point, but it is not clear that it gives us any reason to prefer an intentional theory. For, given the general terms in which we have discussed intentionalism, the same complaint can be made against that.

Obviously, naturalists in the theory of content hope to explain why having intentional content has the consequences it does in terms of a general account of representation. Likewise a disjunctivist who embraces such naturalism may entertain the hope that they can come to explain how 'being made manifest' is realised by purely natural facts. Each party is in a position to claim that at some point they should be able to give a more illuminating explanation. It can hardly be claimed that any of the extant naturalistic theories of content are well-confirmed, and so there is little reason at the moment to think a naturalistic theory of representational content will be less problematic than some naturalistic theory of being made manifest.

thing, the fact that he draws that conclusion need not be sufficient to alter how the situation strikes him phenomenologically: it may still seem to him as if things are so. In this case, it will still seem to him as if some state of affairs is immediately and directly manifest to him, and so the compulsion to match his beliefs to the apparent situation will remain, and need to be resisted through reflection on his situation.

For the disjunctivist, therefore, there is a certain priority to the case of veridical perception in explaining how perceptual experiences can have authority over our beliefs. Either I am in a situation in which the fact that there is a lavender bush there is just manifest to me, and I thereby conform to the aims of belief by accepting that there is a lavender bush there, or I am in a situation which I cannot distinguish from that one, and so it will seem to me as if I am conforming to the aims of truth, by accepting that a bush is there. In either case, reference has to be made to facts which obtain only in the case of veridical perception to explain the upshot of experience. Furthermore, as paradoxical as it may sound, the explanation of how illusions or hallucinations can fix beliefs requires that we think of such situations as not only being misleading as to how the subject's environment is, but also as being misleading about themselves.

The intentional theorist does not assume any priority for the situation in which one is genuinely perceiving in the account given of immediacy of perception and the authority it has over one's beliefs. For this kind of approach accepts that one can have the same kind of experience whether one is veridically perceiving, having an illusion or hallucination. Furthermore, the working assumption is that there is nothing misleading in the phenomenological character of experience as to the nature of such experience. So however the experience seems to us to be, that should be quite consistent with this being a case of illusion or hallucination as well as being one of veridical perception. Of course, this is not to deny that there is a certain priority to the situation presented as obtaining in the content of the experience: from the subject's point of view matters are not neutral as to the presence of lavender bushes, oceans or pigs. But for the intentional theorist the same kind of state is present in all three situations, and this state has two properties which offer a common explanation. First, the experience has a representational content which is correct just in case the environment contains such objects. This situation obtains when one is veridically perceiving, but it can obtain even if one is not perceiving, or even not experiencing at all. Second, the state with that content is a certain kind of attitude, a sensory experiencing, which involves a default inclination to commitment to things being so. This state can be present in any of the three situations. Hence we explain the immediacy of experience by reference to properties the presence of which are indifferent to whether one is perceiving, having an illusion or hallucination, even if being in such a state of mind inclines the subject towards thinking that he is in just one of these situations rather than the others.

The naïve realist offers a competing account of the immediacy of perceptual experience to that of the intentional approach, and we can now see how the dispute between the intentional theory and the disjunctivist is made concrete. According to the disjunctivist, the phenomenological character of all perceptual experience requires us to view the transparency and immediacy of perceptual experience as involving actual relations between the subject and the objects of perception and their features. In just the case of veridical perception, the experience is a matter of certain objects being presented as just so, and in virtue of that, the subject ought to conform their beliefs to how things appear. Similar behavioural effects are brought about in cases of illusion and hallucination simply in virtue of them being indiscriminable from the subject's point of view from the case of veridical perception. A common explanation is not offered of the three cases—we explain the veridical perception by reference to the relational properties it alone possesses, and we explain the other two by reference to their indiscriminability from this. So, the particular situation of veridical perception is fundamental to the explanation of the character of all cases of perceptual experience.

According to the intentional approach we should not suppose that we have to understand the phenomenological character of perceptual experience in relational terms. It is at best an example of the kind of quasi-relational directedness that we find with all intentional phenomena. The peculiar immediacy and vivacity of perception, which can contrast with other mental states, do not show that we must treat such experience as relational, but rather that the state of mind has certain distinctive properties which can be present whether or not there actually are any objects of perception. So the two approaches differ over the metaphysical nature of perceptual experience and hence over the ways in which the immediacy and transparency of phenomenal character are to be accounted for, and their consequences to be explained.

However, in getting this far we have as yet given no reason to suppose that the debate can be settled in favour of one account rather than the other. To make further progress we need to step beyond discussion just of sense experience, and instead consider the relation between it and other elements of phenomenal consciousness, namely sensory imaginings.

3. Sensory Imagining and Imagining Sensing

Our discussion so far has focused almost entirely on perceptual experience. Both intentional theories and disjunctivist accounts offer accounts of how one's experience can have phenomenal transparency, and have the kind of impact on one's beliefs and actions that experiences do. We now need to look to a wider range of conscious phenomena to decide between these two accounts of immediacy. For, I shall argue that sensory imagining gives us a test of the two views, since there is an internal connection between sensory imagination and sensory experience: to visualise an apple is to imagine a visual experience

of the apple. With this connection revealed, we will be in a position to launch an analogue of the phenomenal transparency objection against the intentional theory which focuses on visualising, i.e. imagined visual experience, rather than actual visual experience.

By sensory imagining I have in mind those distinctive episodes of imagining or imaging which correspond to our use of the distinct senses: so we talk of visualising corresponding to seeing, or listening in one's head parallel to audition, and so on. Sensory imagining in this sense can be part of wider cognitive projects—imagery can both accompany and also constitute trains of thought. While attempting to fill out the crossword, images of potential answers to clues may pass through my mind; alternatively, I may work out which move to make by visualising the position on the chess board two to three moves ahead.

Typically acts of imagining things to be a certain way have both imagistic and non-imagistic aspects. For instance, you might visualise red apples and in doing so also visualise the red sheen of their skins, but you could as well visualise the apples without visualising their colour, although you would still imagine something red. The two acts of imagination are different, and the difference seems to lie in the presence or absence of chromatic colour in the sensuous aspect of the imagining. In both cases, red apples are the objects of imagination, but in the latter case, in contrast to the former, the redness forms an element of the image. There are parallels here with the case of pictorial representation: both a charcoal sketch and a watercolour can be pictures of red apples—but the latter can depict the red of the apples in a way that the former cannot. In general, we can think of the non-imagistic aspects of a case of sensory imagining as arising out of the wider cognitive project of which the imaging is a part. The same imagery can be put to different imaginative purposes: one might imagine red apples, perfect wax replicas of apples, the skins of such apples with the cores hollowed out or a cunning illusion of the presence of apples, while visualising in the same way. The differences between these cases lies not in the sensory core of imagining but the way in which that core is used in make-believe, the way in which it has, so to speak, been labelled.³²

The claim that I wish to defend here is concerned with the imagistic aspects of imagination, not the non-imagistic elements, and it is focused on the kind of correspondence that obtains between sensory imagination and sensory experience. When I visualise an apple, I imagine how it would look. This suggests a certain correspondence between the objects of vision and the objects of visualising: if I succeed in visualising things a certain way, then the way I

³² Compare here Christopher Peacocke's distinction between images and 'S-imagining', which 'is not literally supposing, it shares with supposition the property that what is S-imagined is not determined by the subject's images, his imagined experiences' (Peacocke, 1985, p. 25).

visualise them to be is the way that they would look if veridically perceived. The Dependency Thesis, as I shall call it, claims more than this, namely:

to imagine sensorily a φ is to imagine experiencing a φ

On this view, one kind of phenomenally conscious state, an event of imagining, takes as its object another type of conscious state of mind, a sensory experience. Disjunctivists and intentionalists alike may accept the dependency thesis, and hence grant that sensory imagining is imagining sense experience, but as we noted in the last section, they have different conceptions of what experience is, and so what kind of thing can be imagined in imagining a sense experience. The disjunctivist supposes that when one veridically perceives the fundamental kind of experience one has then it is just that of veridically perceiving which could not occur otherwise. By contrast, the intentionalist supposes that the experience then had is the kind of thing which could occur whether one is perceiving, having an illusion or hallucination. This difference between them will be relevant to the discussion later, but is not one which in itself determines whether one accepts Dependency or not. Likewise I assume at this stage that Dependency commits one to the claim that in imagining some scene one thereby imagines an experience of the scene—it is no part of Dependency to deny that one imagines the scene when one imagines an experience of the scene. Nonetheless, that is not to say that there is no issue about whether in imagining an experience one can thereby imagine the scene which the experience is an experience of. Whether the disjunctivist and intentionalist can both affirm this extra commitment is one of the key issues that is taken up below.

If this thesis is correct, we visualise objects by imagining visually experiencing them. Someone who rejected the Dependency Thesis might accept the correspondence outlined above, but claim that this follows simply from the fact that we can imagine the same things as we can perceive, and not that we imagine things sensorily by imagining perceiving them.³³ So, a defence of the thesis needs to show that it is internal to the nature of imagery that there is an imagined sensory experience whenever one sensorily imagines an object.

I suggest that the Dependency Thesis is plausible taken as applying to all sensory imaginings and all sensory experiences, at least for those cases where one imagines a situation ‘from the inside’. But for the purposes of this paper I do not need to argue this. For the objection to intentionalism will stand if we can establish that a version of the thesis holds for certain central cases of

³³ Compare the Dependency Thesis with Peacocke’s ‘Experiential Hypothesis’: to imagine being φ in [cases of sensory imagination] is always at least to imagine from the inside an experience as of being φ (p. 22). While ‘red apple’ would be an inappropriate substitution for φ in Peacocke’s formulation, the discussion of p. 23 suggests that Peacocke wishes to cover the case of imagining an apple with his hypothesis as well.

sensory imagining, certain kinds of visualising; and in what follows I shall argue for that conclusion. So counter-examples to the Thesis taken in full generality may not tell against the main point of this argument. Nevertheless, the Dependency Thesis indicates an attractive answer to the nice question of how sensory experience and imagining relate to each other.

On the one hand, we are keen to stress the correspondence between the two types of state, that how one imagines something is how it can look;³⁴ on the other hand we also need to stress the differences between them. In part these differences are obvious: imagery tends to be less determinate and replete in detail than sense experience; imagery can be subject to the will in ways that experience cannot be. But there is an intuition that the differences cannot simply reside in these obvious matters; since there must also be differences in kind and not just degree.

One approach here would be to suppose that the similarities between the two kinds of state are to be explained in terms of community of properties between them. Sensory experiences possess certain phenomenal properties and are thereby sensuous experiences, so sensory imaginings echo this aspect of sensuous experience by having some of the same properties, although possibly to a different degree. One will get different versions of the community view, depending on one's conception of the nature of phenomenal properties. A sense-datum theorist supposes that sensory experience is so in virtue of a relation to mind-dependent entities and qualities, so a sensory imagining which shared these properties would then be one which also was a relation to some mind-dependent entity, some inner mental image. In the case of an intentional theorist, though, phenomenal properties are understood by reference to intentional contents that experiences possess, perhaps of a form distinctive just to sensory states. Sensory images then will be phenomenal where they also possess the same kind of content. Moreover, the intentional theorist will have the resources to explain the difference between sense perception and sensory

³⁴ By far the main focus for this debate in recent years has been work on visual imagery in psychology, and reasons to argue for imagistic forms of representation in visual processing and in mental image tasks. For a recent elaboration of a theory of vision and imagery see Kosslyn, 1994 for the role of imagery in high-level vision see also Ullman, 1996 and for a philosophical discussion of it, Tye, 1993 .

One might take Kosslyn's work to be evidence for a shared type of state of mind present in both vision and visualising, a mental image within the visual buffer, in contrast to the Dependency Thesis. But the Dependency Thesis is not a claim concerned with the underlying mechanisms of visual cognition and visual imagery—it is quite consistent with the view that areas of high level visual processing are activated in much the same way 'top-down' in imagery as 'bottom-up' in perception. What it rejects is a simple inference up from the activities of the visual buffer to any claim which says visual experience and visualising must be of the same type of state of mind. No such move would be licensed by the empirical work or theories, although at times Kosslyn may be inclined to identify imagery with activation within a visual buffer, there are evident reasons to at least be sceptical or to resist this identification. What the visual buffer typically represents on his account is information about surfaces and illumination; the content of imagery is normally richer than this.

imagination in terms of a difference in kind: sense perception is a commitment to things being as they are represented to be, while imagining need only be the imagining or supposing of them being so.

But the community of properties is not the only way in which the intuitive similarity of imagining and sense experiencing could be accounted for. Instead, one may think of the connection as an internal or intentional one: sensory imagining is experiential or phenomenal precisely because what is imagined is experiential or phenomenal. At first sight, the suggestion may seem puzzling. Why should we think that imagining is sensuous in terms of what is imagined rather than, as with sensory experience, in terms of the way the mental state itself is? A clear reason for accepting this move comes when we consider certain kinds of case such as imagining bodily sensations. Consider, for example, the case of imagining an itch. Normally we think of feeling an itch to be a necessary condition of the existence of an itch (note, the claim is only that one should feel the itch, not that one should attend to or notice it), and we are also inclined to think that the feeling of an itch is sufficient for the existence of an itch. One couldn't show that one did not have an itch on one's left thigh by showing that the general state of skin there did not materially differ from one's right thigh where one feels no itch at all. One can not only feel itches but also imagine them and such imagining can be experiential. One can imagine 'from the inside' an itch on one's left thigh.³⁵ Now imagining an itch will typically involve a less determinate or intense episode than merely feeling one, but it does not seem right to say that in this case one is still feeling an actual itch, albeit one that is less intense in character than itches not brought about through imagining. Nor does it seem right to suppose that in imagining an itch one is aware of anything other than the quality of itchiness itself. So, we seem to be caught both saying that we should think of imagining an itch as experiential and like a sensation of an itch and hence the same, and yet denying that they are the same, since in having a sensation of an itch there is an actual itch of which one is aware, while in imagining an itch there is no such actual itch.

There need be no tension here as long as we recognise that imagining is a form of representing: imagining an itch is imagining the sensation of an itch, not the having of such an itch. As we have already noted in the discussion of intentional content and representation earlier, in general we accept that we can represent objects and qualities without having instances of them. So too with imagining an itch, we can represent itchiness, and itchiness can be before the mind, without there being any actual instance of itchiness of which one is thereby aware. So if we treat imagining an itch as a representing of an experience of an itch, then we can both accept that the relevant quality is

³⁵ That is to say, consider cases in which there is just an itch in the left thigh; not ones in which one imagines some person whose behaviour reveals that they have an itch.

before the mind, as it is in experience itself, while yet denying that there has to be an actual instance of it, in contrast to the case of experience.

Of course, while this is to treat imagining as a form of representing, I do not pretend here to offer any account of it in terms of a more general notion of representation plus some further specific conditions. There are plenty of cases of representing an itch which are not remotely like imagining one from the inside, such as merely thinking that you had an itch yesterday. Clearly it does no more than label the issue to talk as John Foster does of imagining being a form of *transparently* conceiving an object in contrast to thought (Foster, 1982, p. 103). What I wish to emphasise, though, in talk of representation here is the fact that there are conscious episodes which are in some respects experiential in character, but which also do not involve the instantiation of the experiential characteristics that they involve. These are imaginings of experience. It is then another question whether we can explain what imagining is in terms of a more general concept of representing.

So the case of sensorily imagining the itch gives us an example of why we should in some cases at least reject the community of properties view of how sensory imagining can be like sensory experiencing. For subjective qualities of awareness such as itchiness, we can hold to the view that imagining is not sufficient for having them only where imagining does not instantiate the relevant phenomenal properties sufficient for itching. Moreover, the example gives us a case in which Dependency is illustrated as holding—in imagining the itch, one represents a situation of such a quality being instantiated, one represents the occurrence of such an experience. However, precisely because the focus here is on a case of subjective qualities of experience, it is unclear how the case should extend more broadly to examples of sensory imagination, where the object imagined is something outside of the subject. I suggest that when we focus on examples of visualising we can see that these in fact do possess experiential aspects in common with visual experiences which are related to them as the itchiness of imagining an itch is related to a sensation of one. In both cases these aspects are imagined and not actualised. Here too, we want to say that we do not have an instance of a visual experience but an instance of imagining a visual experience, just as the Dependency Thesis claims. The aspects of visualising in question are the perspectival elements of visualising and visual experience. One can visualise things as to the left or to the right, above or below one just as one can visually experience them as so. One of the key aspects that visualising shares with visual experience is that (often) one visualises from a point of view, just as one always sees the world around one from a point of view. And as I shall argue, this perspectival feature of visualising can only properly be explained by taking visualising to be the imagining of seeing.

Bernard Williams in his discussion of visualising in *Imagination and the Self* recognises this aspect of visualising while still denying that visualising really is a case of imagining seeing something:

... even if visualising is in some sense thinking of myself as seeing, and what is visualised is presented as it were from a perceptual point of view, there can be no reason at all for insisting that that point of view is of one *within* the world of what is visualised (Williams, 1973, p. 37).

Williams's main strategy for convincing us of this is to appeal to analogies with theatre and cinema: in both cases there are points of view exploited in presenting the narrative, but in neither need the point of view exploited be a point of view within the narrative. Williams suggests, we should think of the point of view associated with visualising in the same way: it is one which can, but need not, be one within the imagined scene. And if it is not in the imagined scene then there is no reason to think that that scene has to contain an experience.

As Christopher Peacocke points out in response to Williams, the analogies here are not perfect. A theatre or film director has the liberty in distancing the point of view of the spectator from any point of view within the narrative given certain techniques of stagecraft or film editing. So such cases cannot really show that the point of view involved in visualising can as easily be detached from what is imagined—there is no analogue here for the proscenium arch or the jump cut. Yet while Peacocke may disarm Williams's analogies, he does not show why the view under attack ought to be accepted, why the point of view in imagining must be part of the imagined scene. While he may have disarmed Williams's main argument against the thesis for us, we do not yet have a positive reason to adopt it.

If we look to the way in which perspective can affect what has been visualised, then we can see why Peacocke is right in this matter. Visual experience can present objects as oriented within egocentric space: they are presented as above one, below, to the left or to the right. Objects being presented in different egocentric locations normally require that there is a difference in how things are. If one first sees a red light on one's left and a green light on one's right, and then sees the reverse, then one's relation to the two lights will have altered: either they will have moved or you will have moved (perhaps coming to stand on your head). Visualising takes over these orientational aspects of visual experience. One can visualise a red light to the left and a green light to the right. If you now visualise the reverse—a green light to the left and a red one to the right—how you are visualising is different from the first case. Furthermore, this doesn't just reflect a difference in the episode of visualising, rather the two differ because what is visualised is different in the two cases. In the one case the red light is on the left, the green on the right; in the other the green is on the left, the red on the right.

But now we can ask what difference need there be in the imagined scene in order for what has been imagined to be different in the two cases? Note, first, that in a world which contains merely two spots of light, there can be

no difference between the two situations.³⁶ The two situations count as different only where there is a point of view relative to which the one object is to the left and the other to the right, or *vice versa*. So, if we absent a point of view from the imagined scene, then what appears in visualising to be a difference in the scene imagined, and not just a difference in one's state of mind cannot be so. Contrary to Williams's position, Peacocke is right that there must be a point of view within a visualised scene, at least where the visualising involves perspectival elements and those determine aspects of what is visualised.

Now Williams assumes that if the point of view does not have to be imagined within the scene, then it is also true that a seeing does not have to be imagined within the scene. I suggest the converse is true as well: if one does have to imagine a point of view within the scene, then one thereby must be imagining an experience within the scene, as Peacocke also claims. The reason for this turns on the way in which perspectival aspects of visualising can fix elements of what is visualised. It is here that we encounter the close parallel with the case of itchiness and the way in which for something to be imagined without being actualised it must be an aspect of what is represented by the state.

Consider again the visual experience of a red light to the left and a green to the right, where one is actually seeing this arrangement. In such a situation, one must be related spatially to the lights in one range of ways, and the converse if one sees the lights to be the other way round, with green to left and red to right. But this aspect of a difference in how things are presented as being does not turn up in experience as a point of view being an explicit element of how things are presented as being, with the relations of the objects perceived being marked relative to it.³⁷ Nor is it the case that the orientation of that point of view, what counts as up and down, left or right for it, come to be explicitly marked as an element of the presentation either. Rather, the

³⁶ Assuming, that is, that we cannot appeal to the left and right hand sides of absolute space here to mark the difference. It is implausible that in order to imagine the one scenario rather than another one need imagine the spots of light in relation to fixed positions in an absolute space.

It is also important to note that the that the example here concerns spots of light. For if we think instead of objects which have an internal orientation (i.e. which themselves have a top and bottom or front and back and hence a left and right), then differences between the two situations will turn up from whether the red object's left side is adjacent to the green object's right side, or *vice versa*. While some object-orientation for certain kinds of objects is relatively experience-independent (e.g. what counts as the front for an animal such as a primate), for other objects it is clearly experience dependent: the very same object can be seen now as a square now as a diamond depending on what orientation the object is seen as having, i.e. whether a vertex counts as the top of the object or the mid-point of one of the sides.

³⁷ This has been a familiar theme of many discussions of one's awareness of the self, it is notably connected with the image in the *Tractatus* discussion of the self in 5.633 and 5.6331, and in the *Blue Book* notion of the geometrical eye; see also Perry, 1993; Campbell, 1994; Eilan, 1994; Velleman, 1996.

point of view from which one perceives is marked in one's visual experience through it being the point to which the objects perceived are presented—if one can fix the location of those objects, one thereby determine the location of the point of view.³⁸ Likewise the orientation of objects perceived (relative to the subject) does not come from an explicit presentation of a relation between the object and the perceiver, rather objects are presented as to the left, or to the right. As John Campbell puts the point:

the egocentric frame used in vision employs monadic spatial notions, such as 'to the right', 'to the left', 'above', 'in front', and so on rather than relational notions, such as 'to my right', 'above me', 'in front of me', and so on (Campbell, 1994, p. 119).

One experiences the situation in which the red light is in front of one to one's left through experiencing it as in front, to the left. This phenomenal aspect of the visual experience—something's being leftish as opposed to rightish—is sufficient in the case of visual experience itself for the thing then to be presented as in a determinate region of one's environment. Now in the case of visualising, it is also true that the perspectival elements are in Campbell's terms monadic: one visualises the red light in front, to the left, rather than explicitly as in front of, and to the left of *me*. But in this case, they do not have the same role as in vision. For in imagining something as to the left one does not thereby imagine as in one's actual environment on the left.

Of course, one can project one's imagery in this way, and take things which one visualises as imagined to be within one's actual environment; but this is not necessary, nor is it the simplest case of visualising. One simply visualises the red light to be on the left in the imagined world. This requires that the perspectival aspect of one's visualising should relate not to one's *actual* situation, but rather to the *imagined* situation. This parallels the case of itchiness: when one imagines feeling an itch, the itch is present in the imagined situation not in the actual situation. As long as we think of such imagining as imagining the feeling of an itch, rather than having it, then we respect this fact. The same holds in the case of visualising. The red light is imagined as before and to the left of the point of view within the imagined situation by being imagined as presented to a point of view within that situation, and hence as being experienced as to the left from that point of view. In this way, an experience-relative aspect of a visualised scene, how it and its elements are oriented, is imagined through imagining an experience with the appropriate property, and hence in such cases of imagining the Dependency Thesis holds.

We have now seen reason to affirm not only that visualising can be like

³⁸ Within a certain parameter of determinacy: an experience may be more or less determinate about the spatial relations objects bear to the point of view to which they are presented.

experiencing, but that visualising is the imagining of visual experience. When I visualise an apple, I imagine it through imagining a visual experience as of an apple. As we shall see below, this result has significance for how we are to conceive of sensory imagining and sensory experiences. The claim also has broader consequences for claims about the way in which we can imagine the world to be, and use such imagining as evidence for possibility. Since this has often been the grounds for resistance to proposals like the Dependency Thesis, it is important that one should be clear about what is and what is not a consequence of it.

One objection is that the account is liable to collapse the distinction between simply imagining a tree and imagining oneself seeing the tree, or imagining someone seeing the tree. What the Dependency Thesis commits one to is the claim that in visualising a tree, one is imagining visually experiencing a tree. But this is not equivalent to imagining oneself visually experiencing a tree, or to imagining someone experiencing a tree. There is a link between the perspective from which one imagines and the first person in as much as one can exploit that point of view in first person thoughts, and so judge with respect to the imagined situation, 'I am situated before a tree' (Cf. Peacocke, 1985, p. 21; Velleman, 1996). But this is not the same as visualising someone within the scene standing before the tree (or imagining oneself reflected in a puddle in front of the tree). The two kinds of imagining are clearly different, and we indicate the latter kind of imagining when we talk of imagining someone seeing the tree. Likewise in talking of imagining oneself seeing the tree, the project indicated is consistent with imagining from a distinct point of view a scene including a person identical with oneself staring at the tree.

The point of view within the imagined scene is notoriously empty enough that one can in occupying that point of view imagine being someone other than one actually is. To use Williams's own example one can imagine being Napoleon looking out over the field at Austerlitz (Williams, 1973, pp. 42–4; cf. Velleman, 1996). So, in using imagery within an imaginative project it is open to one to exploit the point of view within the visualising, either as one's own, or as someone else's, whose point of view one make-believedly occupies. It is also possible simply to disregard the point of view, and focus on the objects within the scene imagined. The point of the Dependency Thesis is not to deny the possibility of such discarding of a point of view, but rather to point out that it does in fact need discarding. If we are to get right how we have visualised things, then we need to introduce the point of view and the experience into the imagined situation.

This last thought connects with the thought that imagery has a role as a source of evidence for possibility.³⁹ When I look at the clock to determine

³⁹ For more general discussion of the epistemology of possibility, see Hart, 1988 Chs. 2 and 3 and Yablo, 1993 for a discussion of the role of visualisation in mathematical discovery see Giaquinto, 1992 and Giaquinto, forthcoming.

where the hands are, I assume that the rate at which they move is independent of whether I am actually looking at them or not. So the information I derive from such experience is such that I am prepared to assume that it can obtain whether I continue to have such an experience. I am committed to the thought that I can find out from looking how things will be even when I am not looking at them. One detaches, as we might say, the information contained in an experience from the occurrence of that experience. In accepting the Dependency Thesis we should also accept that we have the same commitment to detachment in play in visualising. When I try to determine whether something is possible through rotating a mental image—say, when I try to work out whether the table in the shop will make it through my front door—I am interested in the possibility of things being so independently of whether I am actually viewing them or not. For such purposes the point of view and experience within imagination are irrelevant.

Note that with this comes a certain limitation on the use of visualising. One cannot use visualising as independent justification for our commitment to detachment, since it itself exploits the commitment. If the Dependency Thesis is right, then simply imagining a tree does not demonstrate that a tree could exist without one perceiving it, since imagining the tree is imagining experiencing the tree. But suppose that one did take imagining the tree to show in some way the possibility of trees existing unperceived, it still couldn't show that such trees can exist independent of any state of mind whatsoever. In imagining the tree one can't show that the tree could exist independent of both imagining and experiencing. The deep challenge here is to explain how we can conceive of how the world is anyway independent of any of our states of mind, be they perceivings or imaginings. The commitment we have to having knowledge of a world independent of our states of mind can hardly be justified directly by appeal to how we frame the world to be in imagination.⁴⁰

The consequences of the Dependency Thesis looked at so far concern the fact that an experience is internal to the imagined situation in addition to the objects of that experience. But one might as easily be concerned that the imagined situation will contain less than one might have thought, if the thesis is true. On this view, doesn't the content of imagining contain only the experience and not its object? To visualise a tree is at least to imagine a situation containing a tree, whatever else belongs in that situation. An experience of a tree can occur without a tree having to exist. Imagining an experience of a tree does not thereby guarantee, therefore, that one has imagined a tree as well as the experience. So if visualising a tree is imagining an experience of a tree, then one has not thereby imagined a tree itself merely through imagining an experience. Hence to visualise a tree is not yet to imagine a tree.

⁴⁰ Again, the most detailed discussion of these issues is to be found in Peacocke, 1985, in particular pp. 27–32.

This argument is hardly conclusive. It relies on the thought that if two things are distinct then imagining the one cannot be sufficient for imagining the other. (We might christen this the 'Reverse Cartesian' principle of possibility, since it inverts the thought that if one can imagine *a* and *b* apart then they are in fact distinct.) It is far from clear that the principle is true. But we needn't take the worry expressed here as intended to be a decisive argument. Instead we can see it as posing a challenge. Given the Dependency Thesis, how do different accounts of experience and imagination explain how we can imagine objects in the world?

With this question, we are now in a position to draw out the consequences of the Dependency Thesis for the dispute between disjunctivism and the intentional approach. In the next section we shall develop an objection to the intentional approach which parallels the phenomenal transparency objection to sense-datum theories discussed above.

4. The Immediacy of Sense Experience and The Non-Neutrality of Sensory Imagination

In the case of perceptual experience we were faced with two competing accounts of its phenomenal transparency and immediacy with nothing which would enable us to choose between them. Yet, once we recognise the correctness of the Dependency Thesis, we have another means of testing the two accounts. For we can turn from the case of perceptual experience to its analogue in sensory imagining, the imagining of such experience. We can then ask whether the two theories would predict the same claims about the phenomenological character of the imagining of sensory experience. My claim will be that there is an analogue to the phenomenal transparency and immediacy of visual experience in the case of visualising, and this aspect of visualising is as hard for the intentional theory to explain as the phenomenal transparency of experience is for a sense-datum theory to explain.

When one visualises an ocean like the Pacific, one imagines a blue expanse. Reflecting on what one's act of visualising is like, one can attend only to the blue expanse that one visualises and nothing else. No surrogate or medium for the water or for the blue are evident to one in so imagining. In this respect, visualising is as transparent as visual experience. However, there is an aspect of the transparency of visual experience, its immediacy, which is not present in the same way in imagination. When one has a visual experience of a blue expanse of water, it is for one as if the expanse is actually there before one. As discussed earlier, things being so for one is liable to influence one's beliefs or actions: one is inclined to believe that there is an expanse of water there, as long as one takes one's experience at face value. When one visualises such an expanse of water it is not as if the blue expanse is actually there in front of one. One's imagining lacks this immediacy. As Sartre says about imagery:

while he appears to me as an image, this Peter who is in London appears to me absent. This absence in actuality, this essential nothingness of the imagined object is enough to distinguish it from the object of perception (Sartre, 1991, p. 261).

In imagining, one can imagine objects as before the mind yet absent from one's actual surrounding. And at the same time, the visualising lacks any direct influence over one's beliefs about the actual environment.

Nevertheless, there is a kind of analogue of immediacy present in visualising. Having the visual experience of water puts one in a position which is not neutral with respect to the actual environment as to whether blue water is present or not: that is how we have to characterise what our visual experience is like. Visualising the water puts you in a position of not being neutral with respect to the *imagined* situation. In visualising the expanse of water, one is not non-committal whether the imagined situation contains a blue expanse of water. Furthermore, visualising in this way can have consequences for what one accepts about the imagined situation and hence what one comes to believe is possible. In the furniture shop I might visualise a table being turned on its side and passing through the doorway, and on that basis decide that it is possible to move such a table into the house without too much effort.

So these aspects of visualising—the lack of any introspectively evident medium together with the non-neutrality towards the imagined situation—suggest that in imagining a visual experience we imagine how things would be immediately presented to us in such an experience. At the same time such imagined immediacy has consequences for the attitude we actually have towards the imagined situation, namely that it contains the kind of objects which we imagine the experience of. How do the different accounts of the transparency and immediacy of perceptual experience fare at explaining these aspects of visualising?

According to the (naïve realist) disjunctivist, a visual experience of an expanse of water which is the veridical perception involves the patch of water as a constituent of the experience. The experience has the influence that it does over one's beliefs about how things are in one's environment precisely because how things are in that environment is made manifest to one in having the experience. Now, when one visualises such an expanse of water, one thereby imagines such an experience and hence the constituents of the experience: so in imagining the experience, one imagines it as immediate. Furthermore, because the experience has as constituents the objects of the experience, one's actual attitude towards the imagined scene will be one of those objects being present. So for a disjunctivist the imagined immediacy of visual experience should have direct consequences for one's actual attitudes towards the imagined scene. This is just the position predicted by the description above of the transparency of visualising.

Matters are more problematic, however, when we turn to the intentionalist

picture. For on this account it is much more difficult to explain the coincidence of the imagined immediacy of an imagined visual experience in visualising and our actual attitude towards the imagined scene. For the intentionalist, perceptual experience has the immediacy it has in virtue of being the kind of state of mind it is. That is to say, the reason why one is non-neutral about whether there is an expanse of blue water before one when having a visual experience is because one is having an *experience* of blue water; and having that experience involves a default attitude towards one's environment being so. But, of course, given the Dependency Thesis, one is *not* actually having a visual experience when one visualises a blue expanse of water, but merely *imagining* such an experience. So is not thereby in a state whose attitudinative aspect would give rise to the phenomenon of immediacy, and one's actual state of mind should lack the immediacy of visual experience and its consequent influence over one's beliefs. As we have already noted above, this is indeed true of visualising: it is not as if the water is actually there in front of one, nor does one come to believe that it is so.

However, as we have also noted, one does have an actual attitude towards the imagined scene, that it contains an expanse of blue water. This is the sense in which we are not neutral in visualising with respect to the imagined situation. How does the intentional theory explain this non-neutrality? It cannot simply appeal to the fact that in the imagined situation one would be having an experience which in that situation would give one the commitment to there being water present. For that is simply an observation about what attitudes would be in an imagined situation, we need to know what one's actual attitudes are, as directed towards the imagined situation, and how these can explain aspects of the phenomenology. Mere imagined commitment to the presence of water in the imagined situation is quite consistent with actual neutrality about the presence of blue water in the imagined situation. For all that has been said, one could imagine from the inside such conviction without thereby actually having it, just as one can imagine itchiness without thereby having it. If we are to explain the non-neutrality of one's states of mind by one's attitudes, then we need to find some actual attitude, some state of mind which one has in the actual situation and not merely an imagined one within the imagined situation.

The obvious move here is to claim that the state of imagining itself comes with a commitment to the imagined situation's being a certain way. After all, when one entertains the supposition that there is a pig in the room, one does not actually take there to be a pig in the room, but one does take there to be a pig within the imagined situation. So, one might suggest that visualising the blue expanse is just an experiential analogue of taking on the supposition that there is a blue expanse. However, this fails to take into account the full consequences of the Dependency Thesis. Certainly, in imagining a visual experience one is thereby actually committed to there being a visual experience in the imagined scene, but the extra move that is needed is a commitment to

the presence of what the imagined experience is an experience of. When one entertains the supposition that there is a pig in the room, one does not have to entertain the supposition that one believes that there is a pig in the room. What the intentional theory is required to do is to explain how in imagining an experience with a certain content one thereby also takes up a similar suppositional attitude towards the content of the imagined experience. And in so taking up a commitment, thereby brings about the phenomenology of the transparency of imagery.

After all, recall that in imagining the ocean, one need not imagine it before one's actual point of view, although one may well imagine it facing a point of view. So the perspectival elements of the visualising, and the way in which they determine how the imagined world is to be requires that they should be an element of the imagined scene and not an aspect of the actual scene. At the same time, the subject's non-neutrality with respect to the imagined scene requires that he or she should be in some actual state of mind with the relevant content. But there seems to be no candidate state with both the right content and the right attitude to fit both conditions. The problem for the intentionalist is to explain the coincidence of an imagined phenomenological property of an imagined experience with one's actual attitude towards the imagined situation containing that imaginary experience.

There seems to be a serious challenge here for the intentional theorist to explain the phenomenology of our sensory imagining, to explain how such imagery seems to give us the presence of an imagined scene rather than a mere imagined experience of the scene. But is it right that the intentional theory needs to explain our actual commitment to how the imagined situation is? What would be wrong with simply introducing the non-neutrality as a commitment within the imagined scene, but not yet in the actual attitudes of the imagining subject? After all, one might add, one can as easily imagine hallucinating a scene, as one can seeing the scene, or the scene itself. If visualising is at root no more than just imagining an experience, then we have a simple explanation of this fact.⁴¹

The problem with this suggestion is that of making sense of the idea that, with respect to the sensuous aspect of visualising, one might be imagining purely experience and not its objects. Recall that in the case of visual experience itself, as opposed to imagery, when one comes to believe that one is merely having an hallucination this need have no affect at all on the phenom-

⁴¹ Just such a strategy might be thought to suggested in the following passage from Peacocke: '... we are asked not just to imagine the sort of experience one has when one sees a tree, but to imagine a *tree*, really there in front of us. What this last involves, I have argued, is that the imaginer not merely imagine from the inside an experience as of a tree, but also that he S-imagines as a condition on the same imagined world that the experience is a perception of a tree. So when he imagines a tree, the S-imagined conditions entail that, in the imagined world, some tree is perceived' (Peacocke, 1985, p. 28).

enological character of one's experience: it is still for one with respect to what one's experience is like as if there are thirteen pink elephants dancing the *can can* in front of one. So, one can come to have an intellectual appreciation of the fact that one is suffering an hallucination, but that has no direct phenomenological manifestation in experience itself. For both perception and hallucination, we can characterise what the mental state is like purely in terms of the putative objects of perception and the qualities they seem to have. So now it seems as if, when one takes on the project of sensorily imagining visual hallucination as opposed to visual perception, what one has to do is imagine the situation as for the perceptual situation. One's appreciation of its hallucinatory status will not come from some phenomenologically distinctive element of what one has imagined, but rather the further cognitive gloss one puts on it all. That is, when one sensorily imagines a visual hallucination, one puts oneself in a position where one takes the imagined situation to contain the objects presented, and then uses that image as the basis of imagining a situation just like it in which it appears to one as if there is such an object, although none is present. Compare the task here with one of imagining falsely believing the Eiffel Tower to be taller than John Hancock Tower in Chicago—one needs first to imagine a situation in which that is how things really are, as revealed to one's own point of view, and then to exploit that within a further imaginative exercise as how things merely appear to be within that point of view.⁴²

But the response we are considering cannot accept this picture. For according to it, the visualising must be neutral about what objects the imagined situation is taken to contain. That this counts as imagining the objects being so is to be carried only by the intellectual context of the imagining, its imagistic character, on the other hand, must be assumed to be entirely neutral. This introduces a sharp contrast between the phenomenology of actual visual experience and visualising. For in the former case, introspection of the experience, whether it be a veridical perception or an hallucination, would seem to reveal only the putative objects of perception and their manifest qualities. On the current suggestion, attention to what one has imagined cannot reveal imagined objects or qualities since that would not leave one default neutral with respect to the imagined situation about what objects and qualities it contains. One must, therefore, be introspecting something other than the objects and qualities available to introspection of one's experience, perhaps its representational properties revealed as such.

We have here, therefore, a dilemma for the intentionalist which parallels the problems presented to the sense-datum theorist. On the first horn, the theorist accepts that introspection of imagined visual experience reveals no

⁴² There is a close connection between these concerns with transparency and Moore's paradox see for example Evans, 1982 Ch. 7.3; Heal, 1994.

more about its character than does introspection of actual visual experience. A consequence of this is that it seems as if visualising is as committal to what the imagined situation contains as visual experience is with respect to the actual situation. As we have seen, the intentionalist cannot extend the account of commitment from the experiential case to the case of visualising. On the other horn, the intentionalist may seek to deny that visualising does carry any such commitment with respect to the contents of the visualised situation. In that case, the theorist must offer a different construal of what can be introspected of one's visualising, and admit that something other than the putative objects of experience are open to introspection at least in the case of imagining experience, if not in the case of experience itself.

As we noted above, the kind of non-neutrality that perceptual experiences have presents the intentional theory with no particular problem, for the theory need not claim that the representational properties of visual experience are manifest to one when one introspects one's experience. Rather, it need claim only that we can see, from reflection on the possibility of illusion, that the mind-independent objects of perception are present to one in having such experience only in virtue of the experience's representational properties. Once we turn to the case of visualising, though, we see that the intentional theory can avoid the above problems only by supposing that in imagining visual experience, the representational properties of the imagined experience are manifest to one as such, and hence that it is clear to the imaginer that there is more to imagining an expanse of blue ocean than simply what is visualised.

If we focus on the case of perceptual experience alone, it is difficult to see how there can be any phenomenological feature which distinguishes an intentional approach from a disjunctivist account. Both claim, in contrast to a pure sense-datum theory, that the mind-independent world can be present to one in having such experience. Both have accounts to give of the immediacy of experience and how that coincides with the kind of authority experience has over our beliefs. Once we recognise that the perspectival aspects of visualising reveal that such imagining is imagining experience, then we can see that the two approaches do indeed predict different results with respect to the phenomenological character of sensory imagination. Furthermore, the difference in question directly relates to the conception of how the objects of a sensory state can be given to one; whether we should conceive of that as representational, and hence not requiring the presence of the objects or not.

The intentional theorist uses a phenomenological datum, phenomenal transparency, against sense-datum theories of perception. As we saw in the first section, this comprises both a negative part, a denial that there is any evidence for mind-dependent objects or qualities in introspection, and a positive demand for an explanation of what is found there, the mind-independent objects of perception. Our discussion of sensory imagination suggests that there is equally a challenge along these lines to the intentional theorist only 'one level up', as one might say: not at the level of introspecting perceptual

experience itself, but at the level of introspecting the imagining of perceptual experience. For it is not only perceptual experience which possesses phenomenal transparency, but visualising, the imagining of visual experience, possesses a kind of analogue of that transparency too. There seems no ready explanation on the part of an intentional theorist for this kind of transparency, for the non-neutrality we have towards the imagined situation. At the same time, there is the threat that an intentionalist would predict that we should be aware of the representational properties of imagined experience as such when we visualise, even though we seem to lack any awareness of a medium with respect to an imagined world just as much we lack such awareness with respect to how we experience the actual world to be.

5. Conclusion

It would be wrong to think that the above line of argument is sufficient to establish the correctness of a disjunctivist account of visual experience. Rather, the argument shows a way in which the dispute between the disjunctivist and the intentional theory can be given content in terms of what we would claim about the nature of the phenomenal character of experience and of sensory imagination.

The disjunctivist denies that perceptual experience forms a common kind among veridical perception, illusion and hallucination. While the above discussion gives us a motive for making this move, it provides no materials in itself to show what is wrong with the numerous considerations for taking experience to be such a common element. Namely, it offers us no response to those considerations which flow from the possibility of having illusions or hallucinations which are subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions, or those which flow from thought about the immediate physical causes and mediated physical effects of experiences.⁴³

But the argument presented above does suggest that there is an internal problem with the strategy of motivating an intentional account of perception by appeal to phenomenological considerations.⁴⁴ The intentional approach

⁴³ For expression of these objections see Foster, 1986 Ch. II sec. x; Robinson, 1994. For a discussion of how the disjunctivist may respond to the subjectivity indistinguishability argument see Martin, 1997.

⁴⁴ One could, of course, propose an intentional theory of perception while rejecting all concern with phenomenology—that is one way of reading Armstrong's belief-theory in Armstrong, 1986 Ch. X. Nothing I have to say here would tell against that strategy.

One might note, however, that such a view would run against a lasting tradition within psychological work on perception and cognition. It is clear from various leading accounts of visual cognition, that psychologists are guided by phenomenological observation in the construction of theories of visual processing—for clear statements of these commitments see, for example Nakayama, He, and Shimojo, 1985 and Driver and Baylis, 1996. While such theories of visual cognition are not theories of phenomenology *per se*, the fact that they use it as evidence for the accounts of processing suggest that philosophers cannot be committed to taking scientific psychology seriously while repudiating any concern with

seems to offer an account of experience which aims to take our introspection of experience at face value, thereby avoiding the need to posit some kind of error in our naïve or common sense judgements about perception and experience. The problem of the transparency of sensory imagining which we have outlined suggests that, in fact, the intentional approach faces difficulties in taking the introspective evidence at face value no less than the sense-datum approach does.

The phenomenological objection to sense-datum theories concerns the account they should give of sensory experience, while the objection to intentional theories develops only via reflection on sensory imagination. Given the considerations discussed above, the problems concerning sensory imagination reflect directly back on the intentional theory's account of sensory experience. So in this way, the transparency objection relates on the one hand to the sense-datum theory's account of the objects of experience, and on the other to the intentional theory's account of the manner in which such objects can be given in experience.

As was noted in the introduction, proponents of sense-datum theories are normally aware of the transparency objection and the introspective evidence for it. A common response is to deny that such introspection is a reliable guide to the real nature of appearances. According to many such views we need to distinguish between the sensory core of experience and its interpretation. The introspective evidence for transparency on this view confuses interpretation of experience with the uninterpreted sensory core. As we might uncharitably gloss this, such views claim that introspection of experience is in error, and that experience is not really the way it seems. Faced with a parallel phenomenological objection, a defender of the intentional theory might respond to our arguments in a similar style, by developing an error-theory of sensory experience or imagination and rejecting the phenomenological claims made here as misleading.

Staying at the level of imagination, the theorist might claim that the phenomenological evidence in favour of Dependency outlined above is illusory. I have claimed that it is possible for us to visualise objects as presented to a point of view which is not one's actual point of view, but a merely imagined one. The intentional theorist might deny Dependency by denying this phenomenological observation. Namely, by claiming that even if we think we can imagine things as located in an imagined environment and not the actual environment, in fact we can only visualise things as presented in the environment around us. This would remove the evidence used in favour of the Thesis as it applies to visualising.

Even if we could take this denial seriously, at best it would remove one

phenomenology in their own accounts of perception. One just can't hope to do the philosophy of perception without also having a concern with the nature of phenomenal consciousness.

line of argument in favour of the Dependency Thesis. As we noted already in cases of imagining bodily sensations we already have independent reason to favour the Thesis, and so one might think that there are more general grounds in favour of it other than the perspectival features of visualising. A more plausible strategy, therefore, would seem to be one which accepts the Dependency Thesis, but which denies the phenomenological claims made with respect to the imagined visual experience in the case of visualising.

The theorist may admit that we cannot tell in introspection of imagining the difference between the imagined visual experience and the scene which we imagine through imagining that experience. They may also grant that this recommends to us the view of visual experience as relational, and hence as different in kind in cases of veridical perception from illusion or hallucination. Nevertheless, they may insist that this is merely a misleading impression. Even though visual experience seems to us to be non-intentional, when we reflect on its character as revealed in visualising, it is in fact not that way. In actual fact, though, experience is of a kind which can occur whether or not one is perceiving, having an illusion or hallucination. And so, on this view, perceptual experience is systematically misleading about its character.

The sense-datum theorist is forced to say we are under a false impression concerning the objects of sense, taking them to be the mind-independent objects in the environment around us when in fact they are non-physical entities. Correspondingly, the intentional theorist will have to say that we are under a false impression about the ways in which such objects are given to us in experience. It seems to us as if the way in which objects are presented to us in such experience does not allow for their absence, while according to the intentional theory this is indeed so.

The idea that introspection will lead us into error about how things seem to us is hardly an attractive one. Yet given the considerations about phenomenal transparency, it is difficult to avoid. In contrast to the kind of global errors in introspection posited by sense-datum theories and intentional accounts, the disjunctivist can claim that veridical perceptual experiences are exactly as they seem to us to be: states in which parts of how the world is are manifest to us. But even the disjunctivist is forced to concede that we are misled about the nature of some of our experiences by introspection: after all, it can hardly be denied that it is possible for one to have an illusion or hallucination which is indistinguishable for one from a veridical perception. Given the disjunctivist's account of veridical perception, he is required to deny that such experiences are as they seem to us to be. Such experience is misleading not only about the world, but about its own nature. So in the end, sense-datum theories, intentional theories and disjunctivist accounts all have to endorse some form of error-theory concerning perceptual appearances and the introspection of experience.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ The term 'error-theory' originates with J.L. Mackie's views of secondary qualities and of moral properties—see Mackie, 1975 Chs. 1 & 2; Mackie, 1977 Ch. 1—on the view of secondary qualities advocated, they do not have the nature that our experience presents them as having; in the case of moral values, the error is more direct, we judge the world to contain values, but in fact it does not.

One of the central themes of the traditional debate about the objects of perception was a concern with the errors of a common-sense or naïve view of perception. Since Hume, the argument from illusion has been taken by some to show that there is a deep error in common-sense ways of thinking about perception. The phenomenal transparency objection against sense-datum theories is one way of expressing opposition to this traditional anxiety: the sense-datum theory requires that we should not take introspection of our experience at face value.

What we have discovered, in working through the consequences of the phenomenal transparency objection, is that in the end there really is no way of taking introspection of our experience at face value. If we are to take seriously conscious experience, and the evidence derived from introspection of it, then we cannot avoid the traditional problem of such a conflict. There is bound to be a gap between how we are inclined to characterise experience when taking introspection at face value, and how in fact we have to say it is, once we have taken into account the possibilities of perceptual error.

*Department of Philosophy
University College, London*

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