Pascal Massie

This essay explores the ontology of non-actuality. The term 'non-actuality' refers to being insofar as it is not actual and yet is not reducible to non-being simpliciter (pure nothingness). Potentiality or virtuality, for instance, seem to occupy an intermediate space since these are neither actual nor pure nothing. In the first part, I propose a critique of actualism, the ontological position that considers that only that which is actual is real by considering an ancient version (Diodorus Cronus) and a contemporary debate on modalities (modal realism and modal fictionalism). I then analyze non-actuality through the case of virtual reality, the ontology of power, Aristotelian dunamis, and Deleuzian virtuality and reject the common reduction of potentiality to a lack or privation. As an alternative, I propose to conceptualize the form of process ontology that would accommodate virtuality and potentiality in terms of play (Spielraum).

This essay explores the ontology of non-actuality. The term 'non-actuality' refers to being insofar as it is not actual and yet is not reducible to non-being simpliciter (pure nothingness). Potentiality or virtuality, for instance, seem to occupy an intermediate space since these are neither actual nor pure nothing. In the first part, I propose a critique of actualism, the ontological position that considers that only that which is actual is real by considering an ancient version (Diodorus Cronus) and a contemporary debate on modalities (modal realism and modal fictionalism). I then analyze non-actuality through the case of virtual reality, the ontology of power, Aristotelian dunamis, and Deleuzian virtuality and reject the common reduction of potentiality to a lack or privation. As an alternative, I propose to conceptualize the form of process ontology that would accommodate virtuality and potentiality in terms of play (Spielraum).

This essay explores the ontology of non-actuality. The term 'non-actuality' refers to being insofar as it is not actual and yet is not reducible to non-being simpliciter (pure nothingness). Potentiality or virtuality, for instance, seem to occupy an intermediate space since these are neither actual nor pure nothing. In the first part, I propose a critique of actualism, the ontological position that considers that only that which is actual is real by considering an ancient version (Diodorus Cronus) and a contemporary debate on modalities (modal realism and modal fictionalism). I then analyze non-actuality through the case of virtual reality, the ontology of power, Aristotelian dunamis, and Deleuzian virtuality and reject the common reduction of potentiality to a lack or privation. As an alternative, I propose to conceptualize the form of process ontology that would accommodate virtuality and potentiality in terms of play (Spielraum).

Looking at the title of this book, one would expect another study of Hannah Arendt. “Natality” (associated with finitude) is a signed concept; natality “belongs” to the Arendtian corpus. And no doubt, O’Byrne’s book contains a substantial engagement with Arendt. Yet her project is much more ambitious on two counts: first, O’Byrne does not limit her study to Arendt but pursues natality through investigations of Heidegger, Dilthey, and Nancy. Second, her project is not simply exegetical. O’Byrne is developing her own reflection by pursuing natality in areas where the above-mentioned authors might not have thought of inquiring. The notion of natality operates in a plurality of discourses: biological, existential, political, metaphysical, and ethical. This semantic plurality is constitutive of the very concept of natality. Thus, it is crucial not to separate and isolate these senses but to consider them all at once; natality is political and existential, biological and ethical. The basi...

THIS PAPER ADDRESSES A DEBATE sometimes referred to as logical fatalism. It brings together three majors ancient texts: the “fatalist argument” discussed by Aristotle in De interpretatione 9, the claims attributed to the Megarians in Metaphysics 9, and, my main concern, Diodorus Cronus’s master argument reported by Epictetus in Discourses 2.19. By “logical fatalism” I mean the claim according to which it can be shown, on the grounds of logic alone, that the course of events in the world is governed by necessity. Most contemporary efforts have focused on reconstructing the unstated reasoning that led Diodorus to his conclusion, even though such an argument—as Epictetus himself suggests—probably never existed. In this paper I argue that the efforts to formalize the argument forget its ontological nature. Diodorus was engaged neither with a problem of formal logic nor, it should be added, with a critique of freedom. Rather, the master argument must be recast, along with other extant fr...

It is surprisingly difficult to justify private property. Two questions are at stake: (a) a metaphysical and juridical one concerning the nature of property and (b) an ethical one concerning our attitude toward wealth. This issue reached an unprecedented importance during the 12 and 13 centuries as a new moral ideal emerged. This essay analyses the controversy (with emphasis on Bonaventure’s Defense of the Mendicants) by first locating it in relation to the philosophical and theological authorities as well as Roman law. It argues that the dispute between the defenders of paupertas altissima and their opponents concerns the limit of the law. Gerard of Abbeville and John XXII saw a contradiction in a right to use that would exclude ownership. Yet, what the Franciscans were seeking was use without right. To relate to the world as something that is essentially inappropriable is to seek a form of life (a rule) prior to the law. Centuries after, such a possibility remains to be discovered.

This paper focuses on Aristotle’s discussion of PNC in Metaphysics Gamma and argues that the argument operates at three different levels: ontological, doxastic, and semantic through the invocation of three philosophical personae: the first one (the philosopher) can only state what is otherwise unprovable, the second one (a geometer) can only confirm that we should trust PNC, the third one (a sophistical opponent) denies PNC and must be silenced. Aristotle cannot prove what is beyond proof. This situation results in a fundamental ambiguity in the figure of the philosopher. The Metaphysics is written from the standpoint of an investigative thinker who admits her puzzlement before a question that will forever remain open and imagines another philosopher who has achieved a god-like insight into the first principles of all things. The path from the first figure to the second one, however, remains an enigmatic leap.

This paper focuses on Aristotle's discussion of PNC in Metaphysics Gamma and argues that the argument operates at three different levels: ontological, doxastic, and semantic through the invocation of three philosophical personae: the first one (the philosopher) can only state what is otherwise unprovable, the second one (a geometer) can only confirm that we should trust PNC, the third one (a sophistical opponent) denies PNC and must be silenced. Aristotle cannot prove what is beyond proof. This situation results in a fundamental ambiguity in the figure of the philosopher. The Metaphysics is written from the standpoint of an investigative thinker who admits her puzzlement before a question that will forever remain open and imagines another philosopher who has achieved a god-like insight into the first principles of all things. The path from the first figure to the second one, however, remains an enigmatic leap. When Aristotle introduces the principle of non-contradiction 1 in Metaphysics Gamma, he presents it as operating on three different planes: an ontological one, "the same thing cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same thing and in the same respect" (Meta. Γ, 1005b18-20); a doxastic one, "it is not possible to believe the same thing to be and not to be" (Meta. Γ, 1005b23-24); and a semantic one. 2 To these three levels

This paper focuses on Aristotle's discussion of PNC in Metaphysics Gamma and argues that the argument operates at three different levels: ontological, doxastic, and semantic through the invocation of three philosophical personae: the first one (the philosopher) can only state what is otherwise unprovable, the second one (a geometer) can only confirm that we should trust PNC, the third one (a sophistical opponent) denies PNC and must be silenced. Aristotle cannot prove what is beyond proof. This situation results in a fundamental ambiguity in the figure of the philosopher. The Metaphysics is written from the standpoint of an investigative thinker who admits her puzzlement before a question that will forever remain open and imagines another philosopher who has achieved a god-like insight into the first principles of all things. The path from the first figure to the second one, however, remains an enigmatic leap. When Aristotle introduces the principle of non-contradiction 1 in Metaphysics Gamma, he presents it as operating on three different planes: an ontological one, "the same thing cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same thing and in the same respect" (Meta. Γ, 1005b18-20); a doxastic one, "it is not possible to believe the same thing to be and not to be" (Meta. Γ, 1005b23-24); and a semantic one. 2 To these three levels

THE TRANSITION FROM ANCIENT TO MEDIEVAL philosophical theology is not a simple matter of substituting monotheism for pantheism, of replacing a divine that admits of multiple manifestations with a God who is one person (who is someone). Rather, it entails a deeper transformation of the concept of being. For the medievals, the claim, "God is," entails that being applies to God in a distinctive and exclusive sense. When characterizing this mutation, historians frequently stress that the Greeks could only conceive being as what maintains itself within its own limits. The ancient concept of "infinity" [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] would thus have designated a purely negative term. The infinite cannot truly be something; at best, infinity is a mere potency. For many historians, it is this limited conception that will eventually be overcome with the later emergence of a truly positive concept of infinity in the form of ens infinitum. No doubt Aristotle uses [TEXT NOT...

The conditions for an investigation of Achard of Saint Victor (who died in 1171) have only recently become available. Now the discovery of a very significant turn in the history of twelfthcentury thought is open to examination. The author focuses on Achard’s claim concerning an ontologically primary plurality. In the very title of Achard’s main treatise, De unitate Dei et pluralitate creaturarum, it is the word ‘et’ that joins together unity and plurality, expressing the core of Achard’s ontological insight, whereby a plurality is said to be true if it is grounded in absolute unity. That is to say, this plurality is not derived from unity (as would be assumed in an emanative account of plurality) but rather “coheres” with unity. Unity, likeness, and equality are the three terms that dialectically constitute the primary plurality. In this sense, true plurality is plurality without difference, without alterity and is thus convertible with identity. The essay examines (a) Achard’s doct...

Aristotle’s treatment of tactility is at odds with the hierarchical order of psyche’s faculties. Touching is the commonest and lowest power; it is possessed by all sentient beings; thinking is, on the contrary, the highest faculty that distinguishes human beings. Yet, while Aristotle maintains against some of his predecessors that to think is not to sense, he nevertheless posits a causal link between practical intelligence and tactility and even describes noetic activity as a certain kind of touch. This essay elucidates Aristotle’s analysis of the sense of touch in De anima and argues that tactility provides a paradigm for sensitivity in general and in particular for the reflexivity of sensation whereby the senses disclose not only what they are sensing but also that they are sensing. This feature, it is argued, has epistemological and ontological consequences. The sense of touch testifies to the physical presence of material beings and provides an empirical verification of substanc...

This essay addresses the following questions: How does the meta-sensory function of koine aisthesis (sensing-that-I-sense) relate to its other functions? How can a meta-level arise from the immanence of sensation? Can we give an account of meta-sensation that doesn’t assume a transcendental plane? My contention is that (a) the representationalist model doesn’t apply to Aristotle and that (b) Aristotle offers an alternative that is worth exploring. I propose to interpret the meta-sensory power of the koine aisthesis in terms of the sensing of the limits of perception. The sensing of the limit of sensation is the sensing of sensation itself qua potentiality as exemplified by Aristotle’s observations on the experience of seeing darkness or hearing silence. If it is so, sensing-that-I-sense doesn’t require an appeal to a transcendent faculty and arises from the immanent experience of sensation itself.

Masks are devices and symbols. In the first instance, they are artifacts that allow opposite poles to take each other’s place. They split the world into appearance and reality, manifest and repressed, sacred and profane. In this sense, they are dualistic. But by so doing they invert these terms. In this sense, they are dialectical. In the second instance, they exemplify doubt about people’s identities and the veracity of their words; they denote duplicity, inauthenticity, and hypocrisy. The conjunction of these two senses resides in the fact that masks are at the threshold between reality and fiction. Such a threshold makes possible the emergence of a space of play which asserts that the world does not express a determinate and final order but is infinitely open to the emergence of new, yet transient, forms of self-organization and open new spatiotemporal worlds.

The diversity of interpretations of Aristotle's treatment of chance and luck springs from an apparent contradiction between the claims that " chance events are for the sake of something " and that " chance events are not for the sake of their outcome. " Chance seems to entail the denial of an end. Yet Aristotle systematically refers it to what is for the sake of an end. This paper suggests that, in order to give an account of chance, a reference to " per accidens causes " is not sufficient. Chance occurs as a parody of teleology; it is a " for-no-purpose " that looks like a purpose. The notion of " irony " is suggested as a way of accounting for a situation that keeps an ambiguity open. The fact that chance is thought of in relation to teleology does not mean that it is " reappropriated " by teleology. Rather, chance reveals a hiatus that betrays the limitation of a language concerned with substances to account for events.

This essay addresses two interconnected questions: (a) In what sense is Skepticism a philosophy? (b) How can ataraxia emerge out of epochē? Skepticism is a practice that articulates three moments: equipollence, epochē (suspension of judgment), and ataraxia (freedom from disturbance) and Sextus’ account of how one can move through these moments demonstrates the its philosophical nature. However, to clarify the transition from epochē to ataraxia Sextus offers only one clue: the story of Apelles. If this story is paradigmatic, it is also ambiguous since the transition from epochē to ataraxia can neither be causal nor inferential. Apelles achieves his goal purely by chance. Contrary to a common interpretation, this doesn’t mean that the Skeptic abandons the inquiry (just as Apelles doesn’t abandon painting). Lastly, the essay argues that Skepticism is not only the practice of a certain dialectical method but also a practice upon oneself. The Skeptic must learn to dissociate herself from...

This essay addresses the following questions: How does the meta-sensory function of koine aisthesis (sensing-that-I-sense) relate to its other functions? How can a meta-level arise from the immanence of sensation? Can we give an account of meta-sensation that doesn't assume a transcendental plane? My contention is that (a) the representationalist model doesn't apply to Aristotle and that (b) Aristotle offers an alternative that is worth exploring. I propose to interpret the meta-sensory power of the koine aisthesis in terms of the sensing of the limits of perception. The sensing of the limit of sensation is the sensing of sensation itself qua potentiality as exemplified by Aristotle's observations on the experience of seeing darkness or hearing silence. If it is so, sensing-that-I-sense doesn't require an appeal to a transcendent faculty and arises from the immanent experience of sensation itself. W hen we touch a scrap of velvet, hear a song or taste honey, we never simply experience softness, pitch or sweetness; rather, sensing itself becomes an object of sensation. Sensing something, we simultaneously sense that we sense. Sensory experience encompasses the subject of sensation no less than its object. In order to perceive the alterity of a sensory object (i.e., in order to experience what I am sensing as other than my sensing it) I must have a concomitant perception of my sensation. As modern psychology understands it, this phenomenon, meta-sensation, 1 occurs at the confluence of sensation and perception, at the point where sensation (i.e., the process whereby a sensory receptor is stimu

I would like to shape our discussion of Mendelsohn's treatment of sensation and knowledge in Plato (notably Theaetetus and Timaeus) by focusing on two claims at the core of his argument: 1. The inability to reach a satisfying answer to the question concerning the nature of knowledge in the Theaetetus is due to the fact that Socrates seeks enduring and unfailing knowledge about the nature of knowledge itself without reference to the phenomena the senses reveal. 2. The Timaeus responds to this perceived failure of the Theaetetus by grounding knowledge "primarily within the operations of the senses." In this view, the Timaeus saves the phenomena that the Theaetetus had abandoned. However, I am not sure that the contrast between these dialogues is as stark as Mendelsohn suggests and I will argue that the account of the nature of sensation in the Timaeus doesn't fundamentally deviate from what we read in the Theaetetus. In support of his first claim, Mendelsohn observes that Socrates emphasizes the qualitative aspect of sensation and neglects its formal aspect (what the author calls a "microscopic restriction"). Thus, one must doubt that the senses can provide even a momentary certainty. According to Mendelsohn, the flaw in Plato's turn away from sensation and toward the powers of the soul is the implicit assumption that the human being will be left to her own devices in order to posit unity in the perpetual flux of appearances. Plato's distrust of sensation as an epistemic power can be justified only if we possess a knowledge of sensation and this requires an account of meta-sensation. Yet, as early as the Charmides, Plato argued that there can be no sensation of sensation and therefore that sensation cannot be of itself.

Masks are devices and symbols. In the first instance, they are artifacts that allow
opposite poles to take each other's place. They split the world into appearance and
reality, manifest and repressed, sacred and profane. In this sense, they are dualistic.
But by so doing they invert these terms. In this sense, they are dialectical. In the
second instance, they exemplify doubt about people's identities and the veracity of
their words; they denote duplicity, inauthenticity, and hypocrisy. The conjunction of
these two senses resides in the fact that masks are at the threshold between reality
and fiction. Such a threshold makes possible the emergence of a space of play which
asserts that the world does not express a determinate and final order but is infinity
open to the emergence of new, yet transient, forms of self-organization and open new
spatiotemporal worlds.

It is surprisingly difficult to justify private property. Two questions are at stake: (a) a metaphysical and juridical one concerning the nature of property and (b) an ethical one concerning our attitude toward wealth. This issue reached an unprecedented importance during the 12 th and 13 th centuries as a new moral ideal emerged. This essay analyses the controversy (with emphasis on Bonaventure's Defense of the Mendicants) by first locating it in relation to the philosophical and theological authorities as well as Roman law. It argues that the dispute between the defenders of paupertas altissima and their opponents concerns the limit of the law. Gerard of Abbeville and John XXII saw a contradiction in a right to use that would exclude ownership. Yet, what the Franciscans were seeking was use without right. To relate to the world as something that is essentially inappropriable is to seek a form of life (a rule) prior to the law. Centuries after, such a possibility remains to be discovered. For most contemporaries, private property is so unquestionable a principle that the idea of probing its validity or inquiring into its foundation seems sacrilegious. As for the possibility of voluntarily renouncing it, it is barely imaginable. Yet, although it is difficult to imagine life without private property, it is surprisingly difficult to justify it. It is often assumed that property is natural and necessary for the well-being of individuals and the maintenance of social order. This alleged naturalness would turn it into an inalienable right while its alleged necessity would turn its effects into social goods. Without it, wouldn't we feel deprived? Wouldn't we lose any motivation to act or work? Wouldn't we lose our sense of responsibility? Wouldn't society cease to function? Yet, the urgency with which we run to the defense of property and proclaim it an undeniable requirement, a just institution, and a moral good betrays some uneasiness. This issue reached an unprecedented importance during the 12 th and 13 th centuries as a new moral ideal appeared, an ethics of dispossession—paupertas altissima. It is often said that the late medieval period saw the birth of claims to individual private rights. 1 While this is probably true, we must also observe that it occurred in a context of profound questioning and contestation. What's more, this was not a purely speculative debate; at least for some, it became a form of life. Finally, the issue had a political impact: it entailed a critique of the clergy's lavish lifestyle and the tendency of the Church, arguably the first international corporation, to amass riches. 2 Marsilius of Padua offers a strong support to the " perfection of poverty " championed by the Franciscan order and a very explicit condemnation of clerical and papal abuses. According to Marsilius, the members of the episcopate " have a burning desire for pleasures, vanities, temporal possessions, and secular rulership, and they pursue and attain these objectives with all their energies not by rightful means, but by wrongdoing both secret and open. " Marsilius of Padua, The Defender of the Peace (Defensor Pacis), trans. A. Gewirth (New York: Harper, 1956), 185.