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Perspectival Modeling

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Michela Massimi
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Abstract

The goal of this article is to address the problem of inconsistent models and the challenge it poses for perspectivism. I analyze the argument, draw attention to some hidden premises behind it, and deflate them. Then I introduce the notion of perspectival models as a distinctive class of modeling practices whose primary function is exploratory. I illustrate perspectival modeling with two examples taken from contemporary high-energy physics at the Large Hadron Collider at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), which are designed to show how a plurality of seemingly incompatible models (suitably understood) is methodologically crucial to advance the realist quest in cutting-edge areas of scientific inquiry.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 85 , Issue 3 , July 2018 , pp. 335 - 359
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†.

I am grateful to Wolfgang Adam, Alan Barr, Jon Butterworth, Tiziano Camporesi, Andrea Coccaro, Victoria Martin, Monica D’Onofrio, and Michael Krämer for many helpful conversations on modeling in high-energy physics during fieldwork at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) and other related events. I am grateful to audiences at AIPS Dortmund, Leeds, Bristol, and Oxford, where an earlier version of this article was presented, for the many stimulating questions. My thanks to the editor and two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments. This article is part of a project that has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (European Consolidator grant H2020-ERC-2014-CoG 647272, Perspectival Realism: Science, Knowledge, and Truth from a Human Vantage Point).

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