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The Nature of Pleasure: A Critique of Feldman

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 September 2007

ELINOR MASON
ELINOR MASON*
Affiliation:
University of Edinburghelinor.mason@ed.ac.uk
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Abstract

In these remarks on Feldman's recent book, Pleasure and the Good Life, I concentrate on Feldman's account of pleasure as attitudinal. I argue that an account of pleasure according to which pleasure need not have any feel is implausible. I suggest that Feldman could avoid this problem but retain the advantages of his attitudinal hedonism by giving an account of the attitude ‘taking pleasure in’ such that the attitude has a feel.

Type
Research Article
Information
Utilitas , Volume 19 , Issue 3 , September 2007 , pp. 379 - 387
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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References

1 All quotations are from Fred, Feldman, Pleasure and the Good Life (Oxford, 2004), p. 56Google Scholar.

2 Fred, Feldman, Utilitarianism, Hedonism and Desert (Cambridge, 1997), p. 90Google Scholar.

3 Crisp has an interesting solution to the heterogeneity problem. See Roger Crisp, ‘Hedonism Reconsidered’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming).