Conclusion
I suggest that Carter and Hestevold's arguments for L1 and L2 can be given a chance to succeed if (i) everywhere in them that we find an occurrence of the thesis Transient Time we replace it with an occurrence of Presentism, and (ii) everywhere in them that we find an occurrence of the thesis Static Time we replace it with an occurrence of Presentism's denial. I'm fairly confident that their arguments for L1 would succeed if these changes were made. (If Presentism is true, nothing has temporal parts, for some at least of the temporal parts of a thing extended in time must be past or future. But if nothing has temporal parts, Endurance must be true.) I'm less confident that their arguments for L2 would succeed if those changes were made. But if the changes that I suggest are not made, the arguments for L1 and L2 certainly fail.
Similar content being viewed by others
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Mason, F. Transient time and the persistence of the concrete. Philosophia 28, 491–501 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02379797
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02379797