Abstract
Propositional and notional attitudes are construed as relations (-in-intension) between individuals and constructions (rather than propositrions etc,). The apparatus of transparent intensional logic (Tichy) is applied to derive two rules that make it possible to ‘export’ existential quantifiers without conceiving attitudes as relations to expressions (‘sententialism’).
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Tuomo Aho, 1994, On the Philosophy of Attitude Logic, Acta Philosophica Fennica, Vol.57. Helsinki.
George Bealer, 1982, Quality and Concept, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
M.I. Cresswell, 1985, Structured Meanings. The Semantics of Propositional Attitudes, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Gottlob Frege, 1892, Über Sinn und Bedeutung. Zeitschrift für Philosophic und philosophische Kritik 100, 25–50
David Kaplan, 1969, Quantifying in, in: D. Davidson & J. Hintikka, eds.: Words and Objections on the Work of W.V.Quine, Reidel, Dordrecht.
Pavel Materna, 1992, Meanings are Concepts, From the Logical Point of View 2, 76–89
Richard Montague, 1974, Pragmatics and Intensional Logic, in: R. Thomason, ed.: Formal Philosophy. Selected Papers of Richard Montague, Yale University Press.
W. v. O. Quine, 1994, Pursuit of Truth.
Stephen Schiffer, 1987, Remnants of Meaning, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Pavel TichÝ, 1988, The Foundations of Frege's Logic, de Gruyter.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Materna, P. Rules of Existential Quantification into "Intensional Contexts". Studia Logica 59, 331–343 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005032311459
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005032311459