Proper functions and Aristotelian functions in biology

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Philosophical accounts of functions

It is common for defenders of the modern-history approach to admit a pluralist framework for functions—admitting for example, a place for `systems functions' as described by Robert Cummins—but to say that there are different kinds of functions belonging to different explanatory projects.3 Here I wish to argue that the modern-history concept, while acceptable as reflecting a stipulative definition, is of limited importance,

Biological functions and the needs of scientific practice

It would seem, therefore, that of the three reasons cited above for being interested in an account of biological functions, the second is the most important, i.e. the reason which is framed in terms of the needs scientists have for identifying and using functions in science. These needs can be specified by the following list of requirements:

  • 1.

    We need a principled account of why certain capacities and powers are described as functions, e.g. for why the function of hearts is pumping blood as

Aristotelian explanations and functions

It is clear that there is a notion of `function' that scientists do use other than that of proper function. That fact, of course, is compatible with there being certain scientific needs that only the latter notion captures. But before we can decide on that issue, we need to clear about precisely which notion other than proper function scientists are using. Possibly it is the systems function described by Cummins. Possibly it is the metaphorical `design' sense proposed by Kitcher.

Functions in modern biology

As we saw previously, one of the conditions that we should expect an account of natural function to satisfy is that it show the connection between natural functions and functions for artefacts, as well as displaying the crucial way in which they differ. The Aristotelian account is eminently suited for this dual purpose. In this section, I propose to show not only how this account is suitable, but at the same time, show how it is suitable for the needs of contemporary biologists.

A clock or a

The connection between aristotelian functions and proper functions

The central role of Aristotelian functions is to provide functional analysis. Though this is the way functional explanations work, I have argued, there is no reason why the functions so specified should not have a role in the causal explanation of the presence of the relevant trait or organ. Indeed, not only is this role consistent with explanations framed in terms of Darwinian natural selection, but we can draw a stronger conclusion: Darwinian adaptationist explanations, which are relied upon

The normative role of functions

Even if the modern-history account does not capture scientific practice, perhaps we could defend the account in the other way allowed previously, as fulfilling some of the needs that other accounts of function fail to fulfil. Preston argues for this claim in her article, where she maintains that Millikan's analysis is essential for biology, even though Millikan, in effect, tries to dispense with other notions of function.

Against Cummins, Preston points out that the systems account of function

Functions and representation

One of the major purposes of introducing the notion of proper function was to provide a naturalistic account of representation, i.e. of content, for mental states (at least for a central class of mental states). Millikan was the pioneer, but one of the most developed theories is that presented by Fred Dretske. The fundamental idea behind the theory, as Dretske explains, is that a system S represents a property P if and only if S has the function of indicating, or providing information about,

Conclusion

In conclusion, we can say that there are the following advantages to retaining Aristotelian functions as part of biology:

  • 1.

    they are consistent with a theory of proper functions;

  • 2.

    they are required even if we adopt the concept of proper function;

  • 3.

    they perform certain important and desirable tasks that proper functions fail to perform; and

  • 4.

    they escape serious objections that can be levelled at other accounts of `function'.

Finally, if there are to be natural representations, then the best chance for

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