

ons, which are also fundamentally provisional and incorrect (p. 85).

“Finally, perspectives of a concrete philosophy are developed in various thematic fields based on Kant’s philosophical questions: A concrete philosophy understands itself as a fundamental discipline of the critique of social abstractions, which works out the justification of the wrongness of the bourgeois life context, which is in the *Critique of the political economics* only presupposed or left out by Marx.” (p. 13)

The book presupposes that Marx’s work can accomplish more than stay at the level of “marxisms”. Marxist philosophy must turn into an abstract-critical concrete philosophy that questions self-evident “truths” taken for granted in today’s world.

Marko Kos

Philip Goff

Consciousness and Fundamental Reality

Oxford University Press,
Oxford 2017

Consciousness is a timeless and central topic in philosophy, especially as it pertains to the mind-body problem. While, on the one hand, the existence of consciousness is a truth that is certain to us, on the other hand, the nature of consciousness seems to be radically different in kind from the nature of physical matter. How, then, are we to understand the relation between first-person subjective experience and the third-person physical world? The physicalist suggests that every property, including mentality, supervenes on some physical property. Against this view, some philosophers have commented on the failure of physical science to account for the reality of subjective experience. The dualist, therefore, states that physicalism is false and instead endorses the philosophical thesis that consciousness is a fundamental entity that is ontologically distinct from physical matter. Squaring up to the challenge of the mind-body problem, Philip Goff’s book, *Consciousness and Fundamental Reality*, is an engaging work in speculative metaphysics that seeks to offer a somewhat different view.

Goff is perhaps most well known as a defender of panpsychism, which is the view that mentality is ubiquitous in the natural world. His preferred version of panpsychism in this book is cosmopsychism, which suggests that the universe itself instantiates some form of mentality. Since he takes consciousness to be irreducible and fundamental, he agrees with the dualist and disagrees with the physicalist. However, he is disinclined to concede fully to dualism, which he considers as providing a disunified picture of the world. Rather, he suggests that his panpsychism is a form of neutral monism which has been termed “Russellian monism”, although it is contested whether Bertrand Russell fully supported this view.

The book is structured in two parts. In the first part of the book, Goff presents a refutation of physicalism. He discusses some established arguments against physicalism, namely Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument and David Chalmers’ conceivability argument. While Goff sees merits in these arguments, he does not think they are wholly satisfactory in their traditional forms. He concedes that the knowledge argument successfully demonstrates an epistemological gap between physicality and phenomenality, but contends that more is needed to make this into a metaphysical gap. He also considers the conceivability argument, as traditionally presented, to be troublesome because it invokes a contentious two-dimensional semantic framework. To make these arguments successful, Goff proposes that we need to appeal to the notion of phenomenal transparency. A concept, he stipulates, is transparent “just in case it reveals the nature of the entity it refers to, in the sense that it is a priori (for someone possessing the concept and in virtue of possessing the concept) *what it is for that entity to be part of reality*”. Phenomenal transparency, then, is the notion that “phenomenal concepts reveal the nature of the conscious states they refer to”. Goff uses this notion of phenomenal transparency to modify the conceivability argument into a version which he considers to be more successful at undermining physicalism. Take *P* to be a physical fact such as C-fibre firing and *Q* to be an associated phenomenal fact such as the experience of pain. According to the modified conceivability argument, the conceivability of “*P* and not *Q*” entails the possibility of “*P* and not *Q*” because “*P*” and “*Q*” are independent concepts that are both transparent.

However, Goff’s refutation of physicalism does not stop here. Although he suggests that the notion of phenomenal transparency enhances the conceivability argument, he also proposes that the notion of phenomenal transparency undermines physicalism more stra-

ightforwardly. This is his revelation argument, which is reminiscent of Saul Kripke's modal argument against type identity physicalism. A subject experiencing a given phenomenal state forms a direct phenomenal concept of that state, which captures the type to which the state belongs and knowledge that the token state exists. In conjunction with physicalism, this would suggest that the subject experiencing the phenomenal state accesses the supposed physical basis of that state, but this is not the case. Therefore, physicalism is false. As Goff expresses it, "(a) we grasp what it is for someone to feel pain, and (b) we grasp what it is (at least in general) for someone to instantiate a certain (pure) physical state, and hence (c) it is apparent to our understanding that these are not the same thing".

In the second part of the book, Goff offers a defence of his preferred version of panpsychism. This follows several steps. He begins by suggesting that his view is a form of "Russellian monism". This appeals to the observation that physical science only captures the dispositional properties of things, but not their intrinsic natures. The descriptions of these dispositional properties indicate how these things are disposed to act in space and time but do not characterise what these things are like in themselves. According to Goff, these dispositional properties are the physical properties of the world, while the intrinsic properties are the phenomenal properties. Goff is clear that his view is not a form of physicalism, and I think that this is a reasonable analysis, inasmuch as his view acknowledges that phenomenal facts are not exhausted by the physical facts. However, as I will later argue, his view cannot hold up a coherent form of monism. Rather, I suggest that his view ultimately collapses back into a form of dualism.

After explicating his "Russellian monism", Goff distinguishes two versions, which are panpsychism and panprotopsychism. While panpsychism posits that phenomenal properties are ubiquitous and fundamental in the world, panprotopsychism suggests that there are protophenomenal properties, which themselves are not mental but can give rise to mentality in certain circumstances. Goff prefers the panpsychist version and rejects the panprotopsychist version. Panprotopsychism, he argues, is an incomplete picture of the world that resigns us to noumenalism. Moreover, he suggests that panpsychism is preferable to panprotopsychism for the reason of simplicity. In addition to the above, I argue that there is a more fundamental problem with the panprotopsychist version. Given that panprotopsychism purports protophenomenality to be nonexperiential, it suggests a gap between protophenomenality and phenomenality, wh-

ich is as significant as the gap between physicality and phenomenality. Therefore, the same arguments that are used to refute physicalism can also be used to show that panprotopsychism is false.

Having defended his preference for panpsychism, Goff discusses the combination problem, which he acknowledges as a serious problem for panpsychism. This concerns the apparent impossibility of combining multiple microsubjects into a single macrosubject. Goff proposes that this is underpinned by the subject irreducibility thesis, which states that "what it is for there to be a conscious subject *S* cannot be analysed into facts not involving *S*". That is to say, a deflationary analysis of subjecthood is impossible. This sounds broadly correct, and I propose that it can be understood further by examining the nature of subjectivity. Unlike physical events, which are impersonal and occur in third-person objective spacetime, phenomenal events are experienced from first-person subjective points of view. Indeed, many philosophers acknowledge that first-person subjectivity is what is essential to consciousness, such that consciousness necessarily entails the existence of a first-person subject. That is to say, a subject is the fundamental unit of consciousness, and the identity of a given subject is defined by its first-person individuation. It is in virtue of this first-person individuation that subjecthood is discrete. For example, the experiences which you and I have when we both gaze at the same red screen may resemble each other in terms of their qualitative characters, but they are fundamentally distinct from each other in virtue of the first-person perspectives to which they are respectively individuated. A macrosubject whose experience encompasses the contents of both of our experiences would not comprise a combination of your subject and my subject but would be another distinct subject with its own first-person individuation. Thus, the combination problem ensues because the discrete first-person individuation essential to a subject entails the impossibility of fusing or splitting subjects.

Goff takes the combination problem to refute a version of panpsychism called constitutive micropsychism, which suggests that principal bearers of mental properties are subatomic particles or the smallest regions of spacetime. Instead, he defends a version called cosmopsychism, suggesting that the principal bearer of mentality is the universe itself. His defence relies on a purported distinction between grounding by subsumption and grounding by analysis. According to Goff, *X* can be grounded in *Y* and *Y* can be a unity of which *X* is an aspect, even if *Y* does not entail what is essentially required by *X* to be part of reality. From

this, he suggests that the mentality of the universe may be a unity of which a subject is an aspect, even if the mentality of the universe does not entail what is essentially required by the subject to have individual subjecthood.

However, I suggest that this claim is problematic. First, it is doubtful whether the purported distinction between grounding by subsumption and grounding by analysis obtains in the sort of scenario required by cosmopsychism. In the sort of scenario where *Y* encompasses the totality of fundamental facts and *X* is a nonfundamental fact, it is usual to say that *X* is grounded in *Y* and also that *X* is *a priori* entailed by *Y*. Hence, grounding by subsumption is coextensive with grounding by analysis. Second, cosmopsychism does not overcome the issue regarding the first-person individuation of subjecthood. As mentioned above, what is essential to subjective experience is being individuated to a particular first-person point of view. This first-person individuation defines the unique identity of a given subject and makes it a discrete experiential unit that is essentially partitioned from other subjects, individuated to different first-person perspectives. Accordingly, the claim that subjects could blend to comprise a single unity is nonsensical, as such blending is made impossible by the discrete character of first-person individuation. Likewise, the related claim that a macrosubject could split into smaller microsubjects is nonsensical, as such splitting is also made impossible by the discrete character of first-person individuation. The above can be taken to refute cosmopsychism, inasmuch as it suggests that the purported mentality of the universe is not, as Thomas Nagel notes, a singular “view from nowhere”, but a conjunction of multiple numerically distinct subjects, which are themselves the principal bearers of phenomenal properties. Again, if it turns out that there is a macrosubject associated with the whole universe, this would not comprise a unified blend of all the subjects in the universe, but would be another distinct subject with its own first-person individuation.

Further to my above objection to cosmopsychism, I have two more general critical points concerning the underlying metaphysics of Goff’s panpsychism. The first critical point is that it is untenable to interpret his view as a form of monism. As noted above, his version of panpsychism posits that the basic ingredients of reality are intrinsic (phenomenal) properties and dispositional (physical) properties, which are mutually irreducible. An initial observation is that this view, insofar as it is committed to *sui generis* phenomenal and physical particulars, is not a monist view. Rather, it indicates a dualist ontology.

This is because the purported bearer of these properties would not be an ontologically basic unit, but a mereologically complex kind that is composed of and can be broken down into more basic phenomenal and physical units.

In response, the panpsychist might suggest that these properties are, by way of a necessary connection, tied together so closely as to make them jointly constitute a single reality, but I argue that this strategy would be problematic. The positing of a necessary connection between these distinct domains is precluded by the conceivability argument, which is considered a key motivation for considering panpsychism. Hence, panpsychism would undermine itself by assuming such a necessary connection. Such a purported necessary connection would also be unwarranted and suspiciously *ad hoc*, inasmuch as there is no other area of enquiry that requires such brute metaphysical necessity between distinct domains. Indeed, following David Hume, it is usually accepted that matters of fact which are not linked by identity or logical entailment can only be contingently related. Even in the standard model of physics, the most basic parameters are those which are not dependent on the values of other parameters.

The panpsychist, then, is left to take the conceivability argument seriously and accept that the relation between the two domains is contingent. Consciousness must be accepted as being ungrounded. However, the resulting view would not be a form of monism. It would, instead, be an elaborate form of naturalistic dualism, according to which phenomenal properties are ubiquitously associated with physical properties via contingent laws. The panpsychist’s world may be a world where all physical events are associated with corresponding phenomenal events, but there may be possible worlds in which these associations do not obtain. And so, the aforementioned trouble with positing brute metaphysical necessity between distinct domains indicates that neutral monism is false and fails to provide a satisfactory metaphysical underpinning for panpsychism. If we accept that phenomenality and physicality are ontologically fundamental and mutually irreducible, as the panpsychist does, then we are accepting that some form of dualism is true.

Paying heed to William of Ockham’s famous heuristic, the panpsychist might be disinclined to admit a dualist ontology due to the consideration of parsimony. This is reflected in Goff’s suggestion that his view is appealing because it paints a “unified picture of reality”. A dualist ontology might be considered to defy this consideration by positing two contingently related domains. However, I think that the appeal to parsimony fails to support

the monist rendering of panpsychism. We are encouraged not to postulate more entities than are required, but I argue that the entities are required here. As noted above, the notion of single stuff whose aspects are connected by brute metaphysical necessity would fail to account for the conceivability of modal variation between these two domains. To account for this, we need to posit that the two distinct domains are only contingently related. Hence, the most parsimonious theory that adequately accommodates the conceivability argument's outcome is provided by dualism. On a more general note, though, the preference for theoretical parsimony relies on the assumption that the world is parsimonious. If, however, the world actually turns out not to be parsimonious, then theoretical parsimony would fail to be truth conducive.

This leads to the second critical point, which is the question of why we should suppose that our world is the panpsychist's world. By conceding that the relation between phenomenality and physicality is contingent, we open up various modal possibilities for precisely how these domains might be correlated. We can no longer assume that physicality and phenomenality are ubiquitously tied together by necessity. Rather, in virtue of these countless modal possibilities, we can take it as true that there exist infinite consciousnesses across a plurality of metaphysically possible worlds, but the ways in which consciousnesses are distributed in particular worlds are contingent on the characteristics of the psychophysical laws that obtain in those worlds. In his discussion of the conceivability argument, for example, Goff entertains a "ghost" world where phenomenality obtains without any associated physicality and a "zombie" world where physicality obtains without any associated phenomenality. Given our own experiences as subjects embodied in biological systems, we at least know that our world is a world where phenomenal properties accompany certain macrophysical processes. However, it is less clear why we should think that all of our world's physical processes are accompanied by phenomenal properties. Of course, there may indeed be a metaphysically possible world where all physical events, microphysical and macrophysical, are associated with corresponding phenomenal events. However, there seems to be little reason to suppose that our world is such a world.

Although we might disagree with the overall metaphysical picture it paints, *Consciousness and Fundamental Reality* is an excellent book. Goff has done a commendable task of challenging the orthodox view with confidence, clarity, and rigour. The first part of the book is altogether more persuasive than the second part. In particular, his revelation argument in

the first part is a valuable addition to collecting arguments against physicalism in the philosophical literature. The strongest moments in the second part are his expert analyses of the combination problem and the subject irreducibility thesis. Ultimately, though, I think that his monist rendering of panpsychism is unsound. If we are convinced that physicalism is false and needs to endorse a different position, we will do better by committing to the more standard form of naturalistic dualism. Nonetheless, it is a benefit of this fine book that it encourages us to take seriously the idea that consciousness has a fundamental place in our ontology.

Hane Htut Maung

**Massimiliano Lorenzo
Cappuccio (ed.)**

**Handbook of Embodied
Cognition and Sport
Psychology**

The MIT Press,
Cambridge (MA) 2019

As the very first of its kind, the *Handbook of Embodied Cognition and Sport Psychology* brings a unique perspective and multidisciplinary approach to consideration and research of sport, especially given how this release finally bridged analogous fields of Embodied Cognition (EC) and Sport Psychology (SP) together and integrated them in a joint effort of scientific investigation and critical reflection of sport. Within impressive 770 pages, this volume contains an introduction and seven large sections with 26 insightful chapters written by 69 prominent authors, briefly presented in the closing section of the book.

As the "intrinsically interdisciplinary" science that studies human intelligent systems and mental functions, while researching the potential, limits, and usage of the mind in the complex and sometimes extreme circumstances of sport, Cognitive Science relies heavily on sport psychology and opens up to different collaborations. Thus, most of the 26 chapters are based on the interdisciplinary collaboration between scholars from different disciplines, such as psychology and neuropsychology.