Abstract
In the philosophical and cognitive literature, the word ‘intention’ has been used with a variety of meanings which occasionally have been explicitly distinguished. I claim that an important cause of this polysemy is the fact that intentions are complex entities, endowed with an internal structure, and that sometimes different theories in the field are erroneously presented as if they were in conflict with each other, while they in fact just focus on different aspects of the phenomenon. The debate between Gallese’s embodied simulation theory and Csibra and Gergely’s teleological stance hypothesis is discussed as a case in point, and some misunderstandings occurring in that debate are analyzed. The thesis that intentions are complex entities is argued for by shedding light on the following aspects of intentions: conscious control; perceptual (and not only motoric) representations of end-states; attributions of value to those representations; appreciation of the rational relationships between means and ends.
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Notes
This distinction is also stressed by Jacob (2008).
Strictly speaking, even if mirror areas were sensitive to information concerning subjective inclination of agents towards end-states, it could be said that representation of intentions is probably not granted by mirror areas alone: mirror areas should plausibly be connected with other areas (e.g., the ones implementing the reward system), so that mirror areas plus those latter areas would grant representation of intentions.
An anonymous referee has claimed that both sides of the debate acknowledged several times that motor embodiment and the rationality principle are not in conflict with each other. However, I wonder then—limiting to one single example—how this is compatible with the fact that Gallese et al. (2009: 107) declare ‘more plausible to construe infants’ understanding of intentions in terms of their own motor knowledge than to call on a pure-reason-based inferential system such as that assumed by Gergely and Csibra’s teleological stance hypothesis’. As far as I can tell, the point is that we cannot even speak of ‘understanding of intentions’ unless the rationality principle is included into the picture.
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I would like to thank Robyn Carston, the anonymous referees and the editor of this journal for their precious comments on a previous version of the paper.
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Mazzone, M. Intentions as Complex Entities. Rev.Phil.Psych. 2, 767–783 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-011-0076-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-011-0076-x