

Journal of Ethical Urban Living

Nationalism & Social Stability

Stephen McAndrew

University at Buffalo

Biography

Stephen McAndrew is a graduate student in the philosophy PhD program at the University at Buffalo (SUNY) and also holds a JD. His research is concentrated on examining how economic transactions can reduce prejudice between diverse groups like immigrants and nonimmigrants.

Publication Details

Journal of Ethical Urban Living (ISSN: 2470-2641). March, 2019. Volume 2, Issue 1.

Citation

McAndrew, Stephen. 2019. "Nationalism & Social Stability." *Journal of Ethical Urban Living* 2 (1): 93–110.

Nationalism & Social Stability

Stephen McAndrew

Abstract

There is an increasing turn to nationalism around the world. The advocacy of “America First” policies, the Brexit leave campaign in Britain, and recent elections in Poland and Hungary show evidence of a rise in nationalistic sentiments. One reason given to explain this rise in nationalism is that in an increasingly diverse world stability is not possible without close cultural links between members of society, and that a shared national culture can provide those links. Nationalists argue that a shared national culture is a necessary condition of creating social solidarity that creates social stability. However, the nationalist solution to creating social solidarity can be questioned on a number of counts. First, it relies on a conceptually problematic account of national identity that holds that national identity includes elements like a shared culture, a shared history, and a shared connection to a particular geographic territory. There are reasons to think that this type of account of national identity is closer to an account of ethnicity than an account of national identity. An ethnic nationalism is morally problematic as it contends that one can only have solidarity with those who share one’s ethnicity, and could be used to justify discrimination against ethnic minorities. Second, even if this is the correct account of national identity, it is not the case that a shared culture, a shared history, and a shared connection to a particular geographic territory are necessary or sufficient conditions for social solidarity. Finally, nationalist attempts to protect the national identity of a liberal democracy by restricting all immigration, may actually destroy the values, such as individual rights and limited government of that liberal democracy.

Keywords

Nationalism, Social Solidarity, National Culture, Liberal Democracy, Immigration

Introduction

There is an increasing turn to nationalism around the world. The election of Donald Trump and his advocacy of “America First” policies, the Brexit leave campaign in Britain, and recent elections in Poland and Hungary show evidence of a rise in nationalistic sentiments. Regimes in Russia, Turkey, China, and India also show nationalistic tendencies (Fukuyama 2016; Economist 2016). One reason given to explain this rise in nationalism is that in an increasingly diverse world stability is not possible without close cultural links between members of society, and that a shared national culture can provide those links. Nationalists argue that a shared national culture is a necessary condition of creating social solidarity that creates social stability. For example, David Miller argues that “[p]eople feel emotionally attached to one another because they share this identity. They feel that they belong together and have responsibilities to

each other that are not simply the result of existing institutions and practices” (Miller 2016, 27). There is empirical evidence of a lack of solidarity between immigrants and nonimmigrants where there are cultural and religious differences. Philippe van Parijs points to the lack of integration of culturally diverse immigrants in Brussels (Van Parijs 2004) and Sweden is having a difficult time integrating immigrants (Traub 2016). So, nationalist concerns cannot be completely dismissed as without any empirical basis. It is also the case that it is not wrong to want social solidarity and hence social stability - no one wants to live in a society of constant conflict and tension. So, instead of dismissing nationalist worries about cultural diversity and social solidarity as motivated by misinformed or even malicious attitudes towards immigrants, I will take the nationalist concern in good faith and examine whether or not a robust national culture or identity is necessary for social stability.

To discuss nationality and how it is related to social solidarity I will examine an account that argues that a shared national identity is necessary for social stability. David Miller is a prominent proponent of this type of view so this paper will analyze his position. Miller argues that a national identity or nationality aids social solidarity, which (1) makes social policies like redistribution and environmental protection easier to implement, and (2) makes deliberative democracy easier because society will not collapse into sectional interests fighting each other (Miller 1995, 90–99).¹ Miller defines national identity as communities: (a) constituted by belief by the members of the community that they form a nation, (b) that have historical continuity, (c) that are active in nature meaning that they do things like make decisions together, (d) that are connected to a particular geographical territory, and (e) that share a common public culture (Miller 1995, 27). Miller argues national identity is not directly linked to ethnicity because this will lead to racism. Miller states that nations are not solely ethnic and that a public culture is not necessarily based on ethnicity but may, for example, be based on the mixing together of many different ethnic groups. Miller contends that national identity helps to make people feel like they belong in a particular physical place. Because nations have historical continuity, Miller contends that members of a nation have an obligation to their forebears and those who come after them to continue in the same historical traditions and to maintain the nation that has been fought for. Miller acknowledges that historical continuity that forms part of national identity can have large mythical elements. It may be that the origins of the nation are lost in history and that stories that have contemporary relevance or utility are

1. Miller uses the terms national identity and nationality synonymously and I will do the same here.

projected back on to the past. It can also be the case that some historical events that are eulogized as evidencing the national culture may have many mythical elements. Miller holds that even though these myths of national foundation won't stand up to critical examination, they are valuable for two reasons: (1) they provide reassurance that the national community we are part of has historical roots; and (2) they encourage us to live up to the moral example of our founders. For example, 'the Dunkirk spirit' encourages those with British national identity to persevere and work together to accomplish a great task (Miller 1995, 35–38). The public culture for Miller does the work of bringing people together by providing a sense that they belong together and have not been merely thrown together. Though a national culture is not monolithic or all-embracing it includes social norms like queuing. It is important to note that Miller is not against immigrants so long as they can be assimilated to the public culture, but he would seem to be committed to seeing it as problematic if immigrants come with a very different culture.

In Section A, I will look at whether or not Miller's definition of nationalism is correct or if his definition of nationality is closer to that of ethnicity. If his thesis is that people need to share ethnicity to feel solidarity this will not work in a multiethnic context. So, it will be problematic for his account of national identity if it is more like an account of ethnicity. In Section B, I argue that even if Miller's definition of national identity is correct, it is still the case that none of Miller's elements of nationality unproblematically generate solidarity. In particular, I will examine whether historical continuity, having a connection to a geographic location, or having a shared culture are necessary or sufficient conditions for solidarity. Finally, in Section C, I argue that attempts to completely protect national identity, as defined by Miller, by restricting all immigration are likely to backfire and instead undermine national identity, particularly if a nation views itself as a liberal democracy.

A. Does Miller have the correct definition of Nationality?

Some theorists have questioned whether Miller's definition of nationality is correct. Jorge Gracia contends that national identities are based in laws. Gracia argues that nations are political entities, governed by laws and tied to a territory and that membership of the nation is set by the laws established by the government of that nation (Gracia 2005, 109–141). Gracia rejects Miller's definition of nationality for the following reasons. Gracia thinks that Miller's requirements that nations are active in character and are constituted by the beliefs of the members of the nation are too

vague to serve as part of a definition of a nation (Gracia 2005, 110–111). Gracia argues that a shared public culture is not sufficient to create a nation because two separate nations may share the same public culture. He points to the example of a shared culture between parts of Argentina and Uruguay (Gracia 2005, 110–111). He argues that historical continuity is conceptually problematic as it leads to questions as to how long a history a nation must be able to attach to itself (Gracia 2005, 111). Gracia argues that “the unity of a nation does not involve features common to its members. Its unity should not be understood in terms of linguistic, cultural, racial, genetic, experiential, or class boundaries, even if in context these further unite the members of a nation” (Gracia 2005, 128). Gracia defines a nation as follows:

A nation is a subgroup of individual humans who satisfy the following conditions: they (1) reside in a territory; (2) are free and informed, and (3) have the common political will to live under a system of laws that (i) aims to ensure justice and the common good, regulating the organization, interrelations, and governance, and (ii) is not subordinated to any other system of laws within the territory in question. (Gracia 2005, 130)²

In fact, Miller’s definition of nationality is closer to what Gracia would define as an ethnic group. Gracia’s definition of an ethnic group is not based on descent but on kinship. That is to say that just as someone can marry into and so join a family, one can marry into or join an ethnic group. Gracia contends that historical relations between members of an ethnic group connect them to each other (Gracia 2005, 45–55). This is similar to Miller’s idea that historical relations between members of a nation bind them together. Gracia also points out that the origin of many ethnic groups may contain some element of myth. For example, he discusses the view of some ethnic Cubans of pre-Castro Cuba that contains mythical elements (Gracia 2005, 55–57). Again, this is similar to Miller’s conception of nationality, which Miller involves historical continuity and foundation myths. Gracia defines an ethnic group or ethnos as follows:

An ethnos is a subgroup of individual humans who satisfy the following conditions: (1) they belong to many generations; (2) they are organized as a family and break down into extended families; and (3) they are united through historical relations that produce features,

2. Gracia holds that nationality is a relational property of belonging to a nation that is shared by members of a nation.

that, in context, serve (i) to identify the members of the group and (ii) to distinguish them from members of other groups. (Gracia 2005, 54)³

However, historical continuity is not the only point of similarity between Miller's definition of national identity and definitions of an ethnic group. Other theorists have argued that ethnicity depends on members of the ethnic group sharing a common culture or a common language. For example, Angelo Corlett argues that a number of factors go towards establishing an ethnic group including a common culture, and a common language (Corlett 2003, 11–13). Anthony Appiah (Appiah 1990, 498) and Michael Brown (Brown 1997, 81–82) also think that an ethnic group has a common culture. In fact, Brown's definition of an ethnic group is very similar to Miller's definition of national identity. Brown holds that an ethnic group consists of the following elements: (i) a group name, (ii) belief in a common ancestry, (iii) shared historical memories, (iv) a shared culture, (v) connection to a particular geographic territory, and (vi) the group must believe they constitute an ethnic group (Brown 1997, 81-81). Once again, we must consider whether it makes more sense that sharing a common culture is a feature of an ethnic group or a feature of a national identity.

So many of the elements that Miller thinks make up national identity are thought to be part of what makes an ethnic group by other theorists; in particular the requirements that a national identity have historical continuity and a common culture. Indeed some commentators have labeled the rise of populist nationalist movements in the past few years as "ethnic nationalism" (Economist 2016). So, there is a case that Miller is in fact advocating not a shared national identity is necessary for social solidarity but instead that shared ethnicity is necessary for social stability. This, as Miller recognizes, is problematic for his position.

Miller does not want to say that nationality boils down to ethnicity, and he explicitly denies that it does (Miller 1995, 19-21). Miller's reason for denying that his definition of national identity is a definition of ethnic group is that Miller holds that his definition of national identity does not have a descent as a necessary condition (Miller 1995, 19-21). However, theorists like Gracia argue that this means that Miller's definition is not based on race, but may still be based on ethnicity as Gracia argues that ethnicity is based on kinship, while race is based on descent (Gracia 2005, 85). So,

3. Gracia defines ethnicity as "the relational property of belonging that characterizes the member of an ethnos." (Gracia 2005, 54)

stating that his account is not based on descent may not be enough to defend Miller's account of national identity from charges that it is race-based ethnicity but not from charges that it is an ethnic based nationality.

An ethnic nationalism is problematic for two reasons. First, if social solidarity depends on everyone sharing the same ethnicity, solidarity will be difficult to achieve in the current world where most nations are composed of a multiplicity of different ethnic groups. This is a denial of addressing the problem of creating solidarity between diverse groups. Second, it is morally problematic to hold that one can only have solidarity with those who share one's ethnicity. Ethnicity like race is not a morally relevant characteristic that can be permissibly used to treat people differently. If one argues that there can be no social solidarity in a multiracial or multiethnic society, this is not going to be a very convincing argument because this is an argument that can be used to support ethnic and racial discrimination.

However, given the controversy over the definition of national identity, it may be better to place less weight on the definition of national identity, and look to the factors that are thought to connect and build solidarity within groups. To be charitable, it should also be noted that even if Miller is mistaken in his analysis of national identity, he is still claiming that certain features that he includes as part of national identity are important to creating social solidarity and maintaining an open democracy. Moreover, it may also be the case that the factors that Miller thinks are elements of national identity are connected with national identity in the popular imagination of those who are seeking to use nationalism as a reason to restrict immigration. For these two reasons it is still a valuable exercise to examine the elements of Miller's definition of national identity to see if they actually can create social solidarity necessary for political stability. If we take Miller's list of features of nationality ((a) through (e)) above, the three that appear to do the most work are historical continuity, connection to a particular territory, and a public culture. If it can be shown that these features are neither necessary nor sufficient to create solidarity then Miller's account, whether it is of nationality or ethnicity, will not have shown that these features are necessary to maintain social solidarity. This is the task I will turn to in the next section.

B1. Having historical continuity does not necessarily generate solidarity

Let us first examine whether or not historical continuity is necessary or sufficient to create social solidarity. Being tied to the past is not sufficient to create to social stability. Even when people are looking to the same historical events and founders, they can

come to hold very different ideas, even opposing ideas, and these opposing ideas can cause instability. If the same historical events can give rise to many different national identities, including some that conflict with each other, then historically grounded national identities do not seem to guarantee social stability or deliberative democracy.

Take for example, Patriotica, a medium-sized possible nation. In Patriotica, there is a story that its earliest inhabitants, who are historically linked with its present inhabitants, fought for freedom from the nearby and much larger state of Imperica. The story is very ancient and many of the details are vague and some of the specific stories contain a large element of myth. Everyone agrees on the fact that gaining freedom from Imperica involved a lot of violence and death as there is evidence of preserved remains of mass graves of mangled skeletons, whom genetic tests have shown to be related to current inhabitants. The myth of sacrifice for Patriotica is taken to have different meanings by two different groups. One group (the “Warriors”) holds that these stories of sacrifice mean that the national identity of Patriotica is militaristic and that physical strength and willingness to use violence to protect oneself or Patriotica are national traits of Patrioticans. The Warriors further hold that current Patrioticans owe their allegiance to past and future generations to maintain these militaristic traits. They owe allegiance to ancient Patrioticans who died to birth Patriotica, and to future generations to preserve Patriotica in its current form (or close to its current form). However, another group (the “Peacemakers”) hold that these stories of sacrifice point to the need to devote one’s life to preservation of peace of Patriotica that was bought at such a great price of loss of human life. The Peacemakers also hold that they owe it to past and future Patrioticans to maintain these pacifist national traits. Both of these groups look to the same origin myths but come to very different conclusions. In fact, the different views of the Warriors and the Peacemakers have caused conflicts on many issues. The Warriors want to spend huge resources on military spending and to tailor school curriculum to train children to be tough and willing to die for Patriotica. The Peacemakers believe that resources should be devoted to healthcare and the provision of high-quality social services for all. They want military spending greatly reduced. They believe that the school curriculum should make children aware of the perils and costs of war and should focus on making children empathetic to all members of society. Because both groups are roughly equal in number they have relatively equal political power. However, each group believes that the other group is endangering not just the national identity of Patriotica but its very survival. The Warriors think that the Peacemakers will neglect the defense and security of Patriotica by not focusing on preparing the nation and the citizenry for war. The Peacemakers think that the

Warriors will lead Patriotica into unnecessary and costly conflicts that threaten the survival of the nation. Because of the relative equality of political power of both groups, neither can politically impose its view of Patriotica on the other group. This has led to frustration on both sides and to public protests and counter protests that increasingly result in violence and even loss of life. So, the two different worldviews are leading to instability and a lack of solidarity. Both worldviews are grounded on the historical origins of Patriotica but instead of bringing the society together, it tears it apart. It is plausible, as this thought experiment shows, that shared stories of national origin are not sufficient to generate social solidarity and prevent society from collapsing into conflicting sectional interests.

So, being tied to the past does not guarantee social stability because even when people are looking to the same historical events and founders, they can come to hold very different ideas, even opposing ideas and these ideas that can cause instability. It is plausible that the Patriotica thought experiment has parallels in the actual world. In the U.S., liberals and conservatives both appeal to founding fathers and founding documents and come to very different positions. Take for example debates over how to understand the U.S. constitution, which is a historical document related to the founding of the nation of the U.S. Liberals hold that the constitution is a living document that should evolve to protect rights not contemplated by its drafters, including same sex marriage and abortion. Whereas conservatives argue that the constitution should be narrowly interpreted in accordance with the actual text and not in line with changing social conditions. So, liberals and conservatives both look to the U.S. constitution as a historical founding document of their nation, but interpret it differently leading to a lack of social solidarity over issues like same-sex marriage and abortion. It may be the case that the same history can ground so many different national identities that the importance of being attached to the past becomes difficult to ascertain. If the same historical events can give rise to many different national identities, including some that conflict with each other, then historically grounded national identities do not seem to guarantee social stability or deliberative democracy.

It also seems that historical continuity is not necessary for social stability. Let us return to the origins of Patriotica. Imagine that it is a large island that is located a long way from any other significant land mass. Further, imagine a great storm drives sailors who originate from lands to the east, west, north, and south of Patriotica to run aground in the waters around the previously uninhabited Patriotica with no immediate hope of returning to where they came from. We can imagine these sailors, who have no previous historical relations, forming a stable society on Patriotica. That is not to

claim that they will inevitably form a stable society, but just the modest claim that a lack of historical relations will not stop them from doing so. Some features that create solidarity between the sailors from different parts will have to be operating but none of those features have to be historical continuity. One possible feature of creating such solidarity will be the need to cooperate with each other to survive. They may also need to pool and trade expertise and knowledge in order to survive. One might object that this will not create massive amounts of social solidarity. However, an account of social solidarity that creates stability only needs to create enough solidarity to create stability. It does not have to create blood brothers just partners. An empirical example of social solidarity coming about without the necessity of historical continuity is again the U.S. where the absence of long historical continuity did not prevent social solidarity and a stable society becoming established. So, historical continuity is neither sufficient nor necessary to create social solidarity and stability. Perhaps connection with a particular geographic territory is better for creating social solidarity.

B2. Connection to a Particular Geographic Territory

Is connection to a particular geographic territory necessary or sufficient to creating social solidarity? It seems that feeling that one belongs in a particular physical place is not sufficient to generate solidarity between others who also feel that they belong to the same geographical location. The sense that one belongs in a particular geographical place has been the source of much conflict. For example, Israelis and Palestinians feel connected to the same geographic area, but this shared connection is a source of conflict. The same can be said of Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland and in many other places. Therefore, there must be something more than feeling like one belongs in a particular geographic region that generates solidarity.

However, is connection with a particular territory necessary to create social stability? To return to the example of the sailors who find themselves shipwrecked on the island of Patriotica, it seems perfectly plausible that they could create solidarity between each other even though none of them have a particular connection to the territory of Patriotica. They may even feel connected to the territories of the countries from which they originated. Again, if they create solidarity between themselves it will be due to factors other than feeling a connection to Patriotica. Immigrants came from many different places over the world to the U.S., for example, from Germany, Italy, Ireland, England and had no connection to the territory of the U.S., but were able to

generate social solidarity. These immigrants may have felt deep connections to their 'homelands' but this was not a barrier to the generation of social solidarity in the U.S.

So, it seems that connection to a particular geographic territory is neither necessary nor sufficient to creating solidarity. However, perhaps sharing a public culture is something that can create social stability.

B3. Public Culture

Miller argues that citizens have a right to their national identity that entitles them to control how their national culture is changed. Because the entry of people with diverse social and religious identities might change that culture, Miller holds that citizens have a right to control immigration in order to protect their national culture. Miller will allow immigrants to enter so long as they assimilate to the national public culture, but then the worry is that some groups will be seen as having religious or cultural commitments that prevent them from assimilating. Do people have a right to protect their national culture? It seems that Miller can only claim this if the public culture creates solidarity that would be lacking with it, so that depriving a group of their public culture would deprive them of a stable society. However, if public culture is neither necessary nor sufficient to creating stability, then the stakes are not so high and this argument has less force. So, in this section I will start by examining whether or not a shared public culture is necessary or sufficient for social solidarity.

Is a shared national public culture necessary or sufficient to create social stability? It seems again that the shipwrecked sailors on *Patriotica* can be used to show that sharing a public culture is not necessary to social stability. They arrive there from different places and it seems plausible that they can create stability without a shared culture. They will need rules to govern their interactions, and if that is what is meant by culture, there will be some form of culture. However, will they need common forms of music, art, manners, etc. to live in a stable society? It seems plausible that they would not. If the sailors remain on *Patriotica* and settle there and have descendents then a common culture will likely develop, but in that scenario the common culture comes out of a framework that facilitates social stability and is not a condition of such a framework. So, conceptually it is not a necessary condition to social stability to share a common culture. Historically, countries like the U.S. and Canada have been able to maintain social solidarity in the face of immigrants arriving from many different cultures.

But is a national public culture sufficient to create social solidarity? Well, first of all we would have to figure out what a public culture is. Miller is not clear, and this may be because it is very hard to get to specifics regarding what a public culture is. He writes that a public culture is not “monolithic and all-embracing” (Miller 1995, 26). He mentions that it might include queuing, filling in forms honestly, and a commitment to democracy or the rule of law and might extend to religious beliefs or a commitment to preserve the purity of the national language (Miller 1995, 26). Given this characterization of public culture it is conceivable that a shared national public culture may not in every case maintain social solidarity. We could imagine that Patriotica has a strong public culture of shared manners, language, food and a strong public culture when it comes to what constitutes great art but still has deep political differences between the Warriors and the Peacemakers as described in Section B1 above. In the U.S., even though liberals and conservatives share the same language and enjoy the same food there are increasingly deeper political differences between the two groups.

However, as I mentioned in the introduction, there are empirical examples of there being cultural differences between immigrants and nonimmigrants and a lack of integration of those immigrants in places like Belgium and Sweden. So, while sharing a public culture may not be necessary or sufficient to create social solidarity, the lack of a shared public culture seems to be related to a lack of social solidarity in these cases. So, what can be said about such empirical examples? However, to the extent that those who are worried about a lack of integration between immigrants and existing citizens where there are big cultural and religious differences between immigrants and nonimmigrants, we should keep in mind the differences between the following propositions:

1. *Cultural differences can cause a lack of social solidarity.*
2. *Sharing the same culture is necessary for social solidarity.*

The argument that David Miller wants to make based on the scenario we observe cultural differences and a lack of social solidarity is the following:

1. *Cultural differences can cause a lack of social solidarity.*
2. *Immigrants come to their new country with cultural differences from the existing population.*

3. *In order to create social solidarity between immigrants and existing citizens, the immigrants must assume the culture of the existing population. (From 1 & 2).*
4. *Sharing the same culture is necessary for social solidarity. (From 3).*

However, the conclusion (3) does not necessarily follow from premises (1) and (2). What follows from premises (1) and (2) is instead:

- 3.* *Steps should be taken to create solidarity between immigrants and existing citizens.*

What steps consistent with (3*) can be taken to create solidarity between immigrants and existing citizens? David Miller wonders if there will be divergent conceptions of social justice and a lack of trust in a multicultural society. He also worries will those in a multicultural society be willing to extend principles of social justice to those outside of their group (Miller 2004). However, this does not show that immigrants have to take on the culture of their new country in order to create social solidarity necessary for political stability. In fact, Miller recognizes that the problem is not so much due to cultural differences but a lack of contact between cultures. He describes the amount of trust and the level of shared concept of social justice in a diverse society in three situations. The first in which the groups are alienated from each other with little contact even though they live alongside one another. The second in which the groups are segregated, and the third in which groups are integrated "and interact in cross-cutting associations of various sorts" (Miller 2004). Miller argues that this third scenario generates generalized trust and a shared sense of social justice. Similarly, Van Parijs notes that increased contact between groups tends to create greater economic solidarity (Van Parijs 2004). In fact he suggests that bringing immigrants into contact with existing citizens will bring groups together. This suggests that some mechanisms should be in place to encourage contact between immigrants and the existing population because that will help create solidarity. Interestingly, Van Parijs speculates that increased contact between immigrants and existing population will not adversely affect the culture of the existing population as much as it will adversely affect, and substantially change the culture of the immigrant population. So, increased contact between immigrants and existing citizens would seem to be a step taken to increase solidarity between immigrants and existing citizens.

The next issue is how this increased contact can be brought about. Miller argues that in order to be fully assimilated into their new location, immigrants must be culturally integrated and not merely politically and economically integrated. Miller argues that sharing cultural values is necessary to create trust, which trust is necessary for political and economic integration (Miller 2004, 29). But a case can be made that economic integration can build trust and lead to social integration. If we are permitted to return to the *Patriotica* thought experiment with the shipwrecked sailors from different origins we can show how trust can be gained via economic transactions. They may have different skills and need to trade with each other in order to survive. If they are to trade successfully they will need to trust each other. To create economic contact between immigrants and nonimmigrants policies might be put in place to facilitate immigrant business start-ups in a facility like a bazaar where immigrants can sell goods or offer services that will bring immigrants into contact with existing citizens.

So, while there are empirical cases where there are cultural differences between immigrants and nonimmigrants and a lack of immigrant integration, such cases do not necessarily support the contention that immigrants must take on the culture of their new country in order for there to be solidarity. This can be seen from the fact that (4) does not follow from (3*). But, these empirical cases demand an explanation. Why is it the case that cultural diversity between immigrants and nonimmigrants can be observed along with a lack of immigrant integration in certain cases but not others? We should be careful to make sure that the problem of lack of immigrant integration is not due instead to multicultural policies that can prevent immigrants from assimilating with the existing population. However, the kind of multicultural institutions that build solidarity between diverse groups is not a subject that I have space to address here. I briefly suggested policies that facilitate immigrant business ownership that brings immigrants and nonimmigrants into greater contact, but again I do not have the space to explore this idea fully here. All I have sought to show is that just because cultural differences can lead to a lack of social solidarity it does not follow that sharing the same culture is necessary for social solidarity. However, in Section C I want to examine another problem with national identity as a protection for social and political stability, that it may achieve stability but at a high cost for liberal democracies.

C. Harming National Identity By Trying to Protect it

Miller argues that shared national identity is necessary to generate the solidarity needed for what he calls an open, deliberative democracy to function.⁴ In Section B, I contended that national identity, at least of the kind defended by Miller, is neither necessary nor sufficient for social solidarity that creates political stability. In addition nationalism that seeks to protect a liberal democracy by preventing those with different cultural or religious values from entering, may actually be extremely harmful to that liberal democracy. This is because the policy measures necessary to retreat to a robust national identity that excludes those who are a cultural threat to that national identity are themselves a threat to a national identity built on liberal democracy.

Let us return again to Patriotica. Patriotica is faced with numbers of culturally diverse people who wish to live in Patriotica. Nationalists in Patriotica argue that allowing such people to live in the country poses a threat to the country's national identity and therefore a threat to its stability. Patriotica is also a liberal democracy and this is part of its national identity. By liberal democracy I mean that Patriotica is a society in which: (i) the citizens enjoy rights like freedom of association, freedom of expression, freedom of movement, and due process, and (ii) the government is limited by the rights of citizens. My argument is that if a retreat to national identity means that Patriotica must close its borders to all culturally diverse people, then it may not be possible for Patriotica to remain as a liberal democracy.

Enforcing a complete ban on immigration will require force to prevent immigrants from entering Patriotica. Government agents will have to use force and the threat of force to keep immigrants from entering the territory of Patriotica. If immigrants try to evade the authorities of Patriotica, then force will have to be used. This may mean use of force not just at official border crossings but at other potential points of entry in the country. Controls on entry will require citizens of Patriotica to be checked as they enter. These measures may not unduly worry citizens of Patriotica or affect the status of Patriotica as a liberal democracy. However, it is likely that if the goal is the complete elimination of immigration that more will be needed to be done as some immigrants will arrive into Patriotica.

In order to locate and remove all immigrants that enter through unofficial channels, government agents will have to investigate businesses and residences to check the

4. Miller defines a deliberative democracy as "the ideal of a political community in which decisions are reached through an open and uncoerced discussion of the issue at stake where the aim of all participants is to arrive at an agreed judgment" (Miller 1995, 96).

credentials of those living and working there. Inevitably, some citizens of Patriotica will have their credentials checked in their places of work and business. Having to prove your right as a citizen of Patriotica to reside there is not something that one envisions as part of a citizen of a liberal democracy. It is further not part of a liberal democracy to just target certain people due to their names or physical appearance as likely immigrants. A liberal democracy treats all of its citizens equally and cannot differentiate along racial or ethnic lines. Keep in mind that national identity can include those of different ethnicities. So, all citizens of Patriotica will experience citizenship checks and have their privacy from government intrusion curtailed. Rules punishing landlords from renting to immigrants or punishing employers from hiring immigrants are not likely to be enough to stop the citizenship checks. First, the government will need to conduct checks to make sure that landlords and employers are complying with the rules. Second, in a non-ideal world some landlords and employers will attempt to evade the rules.

To completely eradicate all immigration to protect national identity would further require random public stops of pedestrians and motor vehicles. Stops on public transport could also be used to locate immigrants. Stops on public and private transportation would be a restriction on one's freedom on movement that does not seem to belong in a liberal democracy. Again, it would not be compatible with a liberal democracy to restrict those stops only to those suspected of not being citizens of Patriotica due to their name or physical appearances.

In a liberal democracy many people may not only oppose these government intrusions in their lives, but oppose the policy of restricting immigration. In Patriotica the Peacemakers may embrace newcomers seeing it as an opportunity to broaden their society and practice empathy with those different from themselves. Any views opposing the restrictive immigration regime will have to be kept from being advocated. This will require restrictions on freedom of expression and freedom of association of the Peacemakers. Again, this will be problematic for a liberal democracy in which issues like immigration are openly and freely considered.

The changes necessary to insulate a society like Patriotica from all unofficial immigration would significantly affect Patriotica as a liberal democracy. And, therefore, adopting these changes would change what it means to be a citizen of Patriotica, if part of Patriotican national identity is being part of a liberal democracy. The overall point is that in order to stop all immigration, Patriotica will have to turn into a police state restricting rights of Patriotican citizens. This will affect the status of Patriotica as a liberal democracy, and change what it means to be Patriotican. It is likely that such

changes will be seen as a greater threat to what it means to be a Patriotican than the fact that some unofficial immigration will occur. Just like a soccer player who in seeking to defend his team's goal mistimes his kick and scores in his own team's goal, the steps to protect a liberal democracy from unofficial immigration would result in an 'own goal.' It is therefore my thesis that completely insulating a country like Patriotica from all who want to enter is not feasible without severe damage to Patriotican national identity as a liberal democracy. I think that any liberal democracy faces this same issue - that by insulating itself from all migration that it creates a greater threat to its cultural identity than migration poses.

Someone might object that liberal democracies like the U.S. or the U.K. do not actually protect individual rights consistently, so being a liberal democracy cannot be part of their national identity. However, national identity does not have to be based on a completely accurate picture of a nation. Instead, it is based on the way the citizens of that nation view it. So, it can be the case that being a liberal democracy is part of the national identity of a nation even if individual rights are not protected in all cases so long as the citizens view being a liberal democracy as part of the identity of their nation.

Conclusion

The nationalist solution to creating social solidarity can be questioned on a number of counts. First, it relies on a conceptually problematic account of nationalism that holds that national identity includes elements like a shared culture, a shared history, and a shared connection to a particular geographic territory. There are reasons to think that this type of account of national identity is closer to an account of ethnicity than an account of national identity. Second, even if this is the correct account of national identity, it does not seem to be the case that a shared culture, a shared history, and a shared connection to a particular geographic territory are necessary or sufficient conditions for social solidarity. It may be the case that immigrants have different cultural values and that some mechanisms may have to be put in place to integrate, in particular by bringing immigrants into contact with the existing population, but this does not show that a shared public culture is necessary for social solidarity. Finally, nationalist attempts to protect national identity of a liberal democracy by restricting all immigration, particularly in a liberal democracy, may destroy the values, such as individual rights and a limited government of that liberal democracy.

References

- Appiah, Anthony. 1990. "But Would That Still Be Me?" Notes on Gender," Race," Ethnicity, as Sources of" Identity." *The Journal of Philosophy* 87 (10):493–499.
- Brown, Michael E. 1997. "Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict." In *The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration*, edited by Montserrat Guibernau and John Rex, 80–100. Malden, MA: Polity Press.
- Corlett, J Angelo. 2003. *Race, Racism, and Reparations*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Economist. 2016. "The New Nationalism; Trump's World." *The Economist*, 19 November 2016.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 2016. "US Against the World? Trump's America and the New Global Order." *Financial times*, November 11, 2016.
- Gracia, Jorge JE. 2005. *Surviving Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality: A Challenge for the 21st Century*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Miller, David. 1995. *On Nationality*. New York: Clarendon Press.
- Miller, David. 2004. "Social Justice in Multicultural Societies " In *Cultural Diversity Versus Economic Solidarity - - Proceedings of the Seventh Francqui Colloquium, Brussels, 28 February - 1 March 2003.*, edited by Philippe Van Parijs, 13–32. Brussels: De Boeck & Larcier s.a.
- Miller, David. 2016. *Strangers in our Midst: the Political Philosophy of Immigration*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Traub, James. 2016. "The Death of the Most Generous Nation on Earth." *Foreign Policy*, February 10, 2016.
- Van Parijs, Philippe. 2004. "Cultural Diversity Against Economic Solidarity." In *Cultural Diversity Versus Economic Solidarity - Proceedings of the Seventh Francqui Colloquium, Brussels, 28 February - 1 March 2003*, edited by Philippe Van Parijs, 371–396. Brussels: De Boeck & Larcier s.a.