Abstract
Skeptical theism is the view that God exists but, given our cognitive limitations, the fact that we cannot see a compensating good for some instance of evil is not a reason to think that there is no such good. Hence, we are not justified in concluding that any actual instance of evil is gratuitous, thus undercutting the evidential argument from evil for atheism. This paper focuses on the epistemic role of context and contrast classes to advance the debate over skeptical theism in two ways. First, considerations of context and contrast can be invoked to offer a novel defense of skeptical theism. Second, considerations of context and contrast can be invoked to undermine the two most serious objections to skeptical theism: the global skepticism objection and the moral objection. The gist of the paper is to defend a connection between context and contrast-driven views in epistemology with skeptical views in philosophy of religion.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Adams M. (1986) Redemptive suffering: A Christian solution to the problem of evil. In: Audi R., Wainwright W. (eds) Rationality, religious belief, and moral commitment. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, pp 248–267
Almeida M., Oppy G. (2003) Sceptical theism and evidential arguments from evil. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81(4): 496–516
Alston W. (1991) The inductive argument from evil and the human cognitive condition. Philosophical Perspectives 5: 29–67
Alston W. (1996) Some (temporarily) final thoughts on the evidential argument from evil. In: Howard-Snyder D. (eds) The evidential argument from evil. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, pp 311–332
Beaudoin J. (1998) Evil, the human cognitive condition, and natural theology. Religious Studies 34: 403–418
Beaudoin J. (2005) Skepticism and the skeptical theist. Faith & Philosophy 22(1): 42–56
Bergmann M. (2001) Skeptical theism and Rowe’s new evidential argument from evil. Nous 35: 278–296
Bergmann M. (2009) Skeptical theism and the problem of evil. In: Flint T., Rea M. (eds) Oxford handbook of philosophical theology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 374–402
Bergmann M., Rea M. (2005) In defence of sceptical theism: A reply to Almeida and Oppy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83(2): 241–251
Bernstein M. (1998) Explaining evil. Religious Studies 34: 151–163
Cohen S. (1999) Contextualism, skepticism, and the structure of reasons. In: Tomberlin J. (eds) Philosophical perspectives 13: Epistemology. Blackwell, Cambridge, pp 57–89
De Rose K. (1995) Solving the skeptical problem. The Philosophical Review 104(1): 1–52
De Rose K. (2009) The case for contextualism. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Durston K. (2000) The consequential complexity of history and gratuitous evil. Religious Studies 36: 65–80
Durston K. (2006) The complexity of history and evil: A reply to Trakakis. Religious Studies 42: 87–99
Fales E. (1992) Should God not have created Adam?. Faith & Philosophy 9(2): 193–209
Fantl J., McGrath M. (2002) Evidence, pragmatics, and justification. The Philosophical Review 111(1): 67–94
Fantl J., McGrath M. (2009) Knowledge in an uncertain world. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Gale R. (1996) Some difficulties in theistic treatments of evil. In: Howard-Snyder D. (eds) The evidential argument from evil. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, pp 206–218
Hasker W. (2004) The sceptical solution to the problem of evil. In: Hasker W. (eds) Providence, evil, and the openness of God. Routledge, London, pp 43–57
Hawthorne J. (2004) Knowledge and lotteries. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Jordan J. (2006) Does skeptical theism lead to moral skepticism?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72: 403–416
Laraudogoitia J. (2000) CORNEA against theism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 48(2): 81–87
Lewis D. (1996) Elusive knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74(4): 549–567
Maitzen S. (2009) Skeptical theism and moral obligation. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65(2): 93–103
McBrayer J. (2010) Skeptical theism. Philosophy Compass 4(1): 1–13
McBrayer, J., & Swenson, P. (2011). Skepticism about the argument from divine hiddenness. Religious Studies. doi:10.1017/s003441251100014x
Nagel T. (2001) The last word. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Pereboom D. (2004) The problem of evil. In: Mann W. (eds) Blackwell guide to philosophy of religion. Wiley-Blackwell, Cambridge, pp 148–172
Piper M. (2007) Skeptical theism and the problem of moral aporia. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 62: 65–79
Plantinga, A. (1988). Epistemic probability and evil archivo di filosofia 56. (Reprinted in Howard-Snyder, D. (Ed.), The evidential argument from evil (pp. 69–96). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press; 1996).
Rowe W. (1979) The problem of evil and some varieties of atheism. American Philosophical Quarterly 16: 335–341
Rowe W. (2006) Friendly atheism, skeptical theism, and the problem of evil. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 59: 79–92
Russell B. (1996) Defenceless. In: Howard-Snyder D. (eds) The evidential argument from evil. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, pp 193–206
Russell B., Wykstra S. (1988) The ‘inductive’ argument from evil: A dialogue. Philosophical Topics 26: 133–160
Russell, B. (2004). The problem of evil: Why is there so much suffering? In L. Pojman (ed.), Introduction to philosophy: classical and contemporary readings (3rd ed., pp. 207–213). Oxford University Press.
Schaffer J. (2004) From contextualism to contrastivism. Philosophical Studies 119: 73–103
Schellenberg J. L. (1993) Divine hiddenness and human reason. Cornell University Press, Ithaca
Schnall I. (2007) Sceptical theism and moral scepticism. Religious Studies 43: 49–69
Sinnott-Armstrong W. (2008) A contrastivist manifesto. Social Epistemology 22(3): 257–270
Trakakis N. (2003) What no eye has seen: The skeptical theist response to Rowe’s evidential argument from evil. Philo 6: 250–266
Wilks I. (2004) The structure of the contemporary debate on the problem of evil. Religious Studies 40: 307–321
Wilks I. (2009) Skeptical theism and empirical unfalsifiability. Faith & Philosophy 26(1): 64–76
Wykstra S. (1984) The humean obstacle to evidential arguments from suffering: On avoiding the evils of ‘appearance’. International Journal of Philosophy of Religion 16: 73–93
Wykstra S. (1996) Rowe’s noseeum arguments from evil. In: Howard-Snyder D. (eds) The evidential argument from evil. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, pp 126–151
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
McBrayer, J.P. Are skeptical theists really skeptics? Sometimes yes and sometimes no. Int J Philos Relig 72, 3–16 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-011-9319-0
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-011-9319-0