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In his criticism of Malcolm's definition of memory,¹ E. M. Zemach presents some examples to show the inadequacy of Malcolm's definition.² The purpose of this discussion is to show that, in fact, Malcolm had taken such cases into account and that Zemach's examples in no way show the unacceptability of Malcolm's definition.

Consider Zemach's first example: A person, A, learns that p at t_1 and learns that p again many times after t_1 . We would like to say that A remembers that p from t_1 , but, following Malcolm's definition, A can say he remembers that p only if A had not known at t_1 that p he would not now know that p. "Although, as a matter of fact, I came to know that p at t_1 , my coming to know that p at t_1 is not a necessary condition for my knowing that p at the present."³

It seems that Zemach is not clear on the type of connection which Malcolm posits between the present knowledge that p and the previous knowledge that p. Malcolm uses his first definition of factual memory, "A person, B, remembers that p if and only if B knows that p because he knew that p,"⁴ to explicate the connection. The word because in this definition has a special sense. "What does it mean to say that A knows that p because he previously knew that p? ... I believe its meaning is essentially negative ... To say that A knows that p because he previously knew that p implies that A has not just now learned over again that p. This brings out, in part, the negative sense of the 'because.'"⁵ In Zemach's example, had A not learned that p at t_1 , he would have learnt it on some other occasion, at $t_2 \dots t_n$, but Zemach insists that A remembers that p from t_1 and that we would not be permitted, on Malcolm's definition, to say A remembers that p from t_1 . Malcolm does state his reasons for such a view. "I think that when we say 'A remembers that p,' we refer, more or less vaguely, to a more or less definite previous time when A knew that p. We are asserting that A remembers that p from that time. This will imply that A has not learned over again that p since that time (emphasis added). If this is correct, we can get rid of the phrase 'just now' in stating our analysis of factual memory. The statement 'He remembers that p' will imply: 'He knows that p, and at a previous time, t_1 , he knew that p, and he has not learned over again that p since t_1 .'"⁶ If we, along with Zemach, suppose that A learns that p at t_1 , and then suppose that he learns it again at t_2 , we must conclude that between t_1 and t_2 A completely forgot that p. If A learns that p at t_2 , then he could not have remembered that p from t_1 . Had he remembered that p from t_1 , it would be impossible for A to learn again that p at t_2 -- he would

already know that p at t_2 . A's coming to know that p at t_1 may not be a necessary condition for A's knowing that p at t_2 , but A's coming to know that p at t_1 is a necessary condition for A's remembering that p from t_1 .

Zemach's second example involves the same difficulty of 'learning again that p ' which was encountered in the first example. A knows that p at t_1 , but, subsequently forgets that p . A then learns that p at some time later, t_2 . Zemach presents A as being reminded of the fact that p , but this is clearly a case where A learns over again that p at t_2 and only then remembers that he had learned that p previously, at t_1 . Zemach goes on to say that "... on Malcolm's analysis, again, it would be impossible for me (A) to say that now I (A) remember (s) that p , because my past knowledge that p is not a necessary condition for my present knowledge that p . On this view, apparently, I (A) must not say that I (A) have remembered anything."⁷ But Malcolm's analysis would not lead to such an absurd conclusion. Malcolm would say that A did not remember that p from t_1 and that A did remember that p from t_2 ; "...when we claim that someone remembers a certain thing, we refer (more or less tacitly) to a previous time, t_1 , when he knew the thing, and we are claiming that he remembers it from that time."⁸

Zemach employs his third example to show that Malcolm's definition will admit as instances of remembering some cases that clearly are not cases of remembering. Sam finds some gold, tells his wife, and promptly forgets about it. Twenty years later Sam's wife reminds him about the gold, yet he still does not remember anything about it. Zemach says that "On Malcolm's definition, however, it appears that he did. All three conditions are met: S knows that p and S knew that p at t (twenty years ago), and if S had not known at t that p (he could not have told his wife, and thus) he would not now know that p . His knowledge that p in the past is a necessary condition of his knowledge that p at the present."⁹ In order to scrutinize this case more closely let us restate Zemach's statement of the 'fulfillment' of the third condition in this manner: if S had not known at t that p , his wife could not have known about the gold; and if she had not known about the gold, then twenty years after t , S could not have found out again about it. There is, evidently, no necessary connection either between S's telling his wife that p and S's wife learning that p ; or between S's wife telling S twenty years later that p and S's finding out twenty years later that p . S's wife could have learned about the gold by discovering it where S buried it. Twenty years later S could have found the gold again himself.

There are other grounds on which Malcolm would deny that

Sam remembered. Again this is a case of learning again that p. At t, S learns that p. Some time after t, S forgets that p, having previously informed his wife that p. At t plus twenty years, S's wife informs S that p. At t plus twenty years S has again learned that p. We would say that "S remembers that p," meaning that "from t plus twenty years, S remembers that p." On Malcolm's definition, Sam did not remember about the gold from t.

Zemach concludes his criticism of Malcolm's definition by saying that "In his definition it is nowhere stated that if S remembers that p, then S has to believe that his present knowledge that p is due to his past knowledge that p... But if it is a necessary condition for S to believe that he remembers that p if we are going to say of him that he remembers that p, then Malcolm's definition is found faulty again."¹⁰ Zemach would have to agree that Malcolm would find that the following case would make sense: S remembers that p, but S does not believe that his present knowledge that p is due to his past knowledge that p. It seems that in this case, in order for S to assent that his previous knowledge that p has no connection with his present knowledge that p, S must have indeed forgotten that he had learned that p. In order for S to say now "I know that p," he must have learned again that p after he had forgotten it. If S says "I remember that p," in this case, we would remind him that "... when we say 'A remembers that p,' we refer, more or less vaguely, to a more or less definite previous time when A knew that p. We are asserting that A remembers that p from that time."¹¹ We would tell S that he does not understand the correct use of the word 'remember.'

Again it is very clear that Zemach does not understand what Malcolm means by because in his definition of factual memory. This is the basis of Zemach's confusion. Zemach says that "Malcolm's definition requires only that, as a matter of fact, S's present knowledge that p will be due to (caused by, etc.) his past knowledge that p, while S may just as well believe that this is not the case, i.e., that that p is something he had never known before."¹² On Zemach's interpretation it appears that the present knowledge that p and the previous knowledge that p are two distinct pieces of knowledge which are causally related. This interpretation does not carry the sense of the because in Malcolm's definition. Malcolm clearly states that "... it may be misleading to speak of two elements of knowledge. There are not two pieces of knowledge but one piece. Memory is the retention of knowledge. One knew something and still knows it. The present knowledge in memory is the same as the previous knowledge."¹³ The type of cause that Zemach speaks of is not the sense of cause which Malcolm posits between present and previous knowledge. "There is an important sense of 'cause' in

which a singular causal statement of the form 'x caused y' implies a general proposition of the form 'In like circumstances, whenever x then y.' But this meaning of 'cause' cannot be involved in factual memory, since in saying that someone remembers that p, we are certainly not committing ourselves to the truth of the general proposition that 'In like circumstances, whenever a person has previously known that p then he knows that p,' even if we could give any clear meaning to it."¹⁴ Malcolm's sense of cause is a special negative sense.

A person, B, remembers that p from t, only if it is the case that had B not known that p at t, he would not now know that p. The negative counterfactual conditional statement 'If B had not know at t that p, he would not now know that p' does not express a law. It is similar in meaning to such a statement as the following: 'If you had not given me a cigar I should not have one now.' This would simply mean that, in fact, no other opportunity of my obtaining a cigar presented itself. Similarly, our negative counterfactual conditional about B's knowledge means that, as a matter of fact, if he had not obtained this knowledge at t he would not have it now. This is a kind of thing we often know to be true, just as we often know it to be true that this man would not have a cigar now if someone had not given him the one he has. Nothing is implied, in either case, about the existence of a causal chain or of a continuous process.¹⁵

Of course if S said that "that p is something (I) had never known before," then we would not say of S, even if he now knows that p, that S remembers that p. Malcolm implies that S has not learned the thing over again since t₁. More generally, Malcolm requires that nothing whatever has occurred at some later time, t₂, such that S's knowledge "dates" from t₂ instead of t₁.

I have been trying to explain the meaning of the third element in Malcolm's definition of factual memory, namely, the meaning of saying that someone now knows that p because he previously knew it. The definition of factual memory can now be stated in full as follows: A person, B, remembers that p from a time, t, if and only if B knows that p, and B knew that p at t, and if B had not known at t that p he would not now know that p.

Zemach's alternative to this definition is this: S remembers that p, (S says, "I remember that p"), but S does not believe that his present knowledge that p is due to his past knowledge that p. Zemach is attempting to show that this absurd alternative is consistent with Malcolm's interpretation of memory,

which it clearly is not.

¹Norman Malcolm, "A Definition of Factual Memory," Knowledge and Certainty (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1963), pp. 222-240.

²E. M. Zemach, "A Definition of Memory," Mind, 1968, pp. 526-236.

³Zemach, p. 527.

⁴Malcolm, p. 223.

⁵Ibid., pp. 233-234.

⁶Ibid., pp. 234-235.

⁷Zemach, p. 527.

⁸Malcolm, p. 235.

⁹Zemach, p. 528.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 528.

¹¹Malcolm, p. 234.

¹²Zemach, p. 528.

¹³Malcolm, p. 229.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 232.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 236.

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